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ABSTRACT
C.H A.N.G. ING CORPQRA JE .STRATEG IE S.... IN...A. ...PERICO.....OF CRIS IS:. 
IG H_ T E C H N OL 0 G Y N U L TI N_AT I.ON AL.... C OR P O R A T 1 0 N S .... I N.......S C 0 T LAND
NANCL: GOLDSTEIN
The dissertation proposes that the eoonomics of the crisis 
of capital accumulation and the extraordinary pace of 
technological and market change have led to new corporate 
strategies and industry structures in the high cech 
electronics industry. The research, a survey of management 
in fourteen leading computer and semi-conductor 
multinationals, was designed to integrate and explore the 
usefulness of theories on industrial structure and labour 
markets.
The product life cycle model cannot solve the problems of 
diversified and increasingly competitive global markets 
and their evermore sophisticated demand for customised 
products. Similarly rigid barriers between differentiated 
and non-competing labour markets in dual labour market 
theory cannot account for new associations of labour and 
technologies or ^or the new importance of non-wage 
difference in global labour supplies.
The research demonstrated the necessity of linking both 
demand and supply conditions in explaining contemporary 
industrial structure. The data persuasively supports the 
view that the supply conditions in local labour markets 
not only are critical to the global distribution of 
capital, but more importantly shape those investments. 
Scotland provided the industry with an annual labour 
supply and appropriate skills and a training/education 
sector responsive to industry needs, offering unique ways 
for corporations to minimise the cost of reshaping and 
retaining their workforce. When combined with significant 
state support of capital investment, the region provided 
cost- and risk-minimising opportunities for using 
expensive advanced technologies and extending their 
effectiveness in rapidly changing markets.
Further, gender was a major factor in the emerging 
structure of work and the speed of industry adjustment. 
Rising male unemployment, shrinking employment vacancies 
for men, and the support of the region's women workers led 
to the industry's hiring men as the new production 
workforce, allowing new job design, recruitment criteria, 
employment expectations, and the worker commitment 
necessary for increasing the productivity of new 
investments.
(ii) 
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CHAPTER 1: T H E..... HIG H_. T E C.H.... .E L E C T. R 0 N.I C S...... MU L T.I N ATI ON A L
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1.1 I NJ.ROp.UCTI ON
The unprecedented growth in the 1960's and 1970's of 
the microelectronics industries captured world attention. 
The computer and semi-conductor industries were new 
industries producing products that seemed to have the 
potential for continuing market growth. These industries 
also held out the hope of improved employment 
opportunities in a world where traditional manufacturing 
industries no longer served as the primary creators of 
wealth and jobs. Leading firms in these young industries 
had grown fairly rapidly: employment at their home bases, 
most of them in California in the US, exploded during the 
early 1970s, and they expanded early in their development 
to overseas locations, where they also created a lot of 
jobs. These corporations attracted the attention of 
labour, and industry analysts and development economists 
(among others) because of their unusual form of 
internationalisation: their plants overseas were export 
platforms manufacturing one (or a few) part(s) of the 
completed product before sending them back to the US or a 
third market for final sale. Their employment overseas - 
particularly in the Far East - grew very rapidly.
The semi-conductor firms were 'new' multinational 
corporations, and the computer firms, many of them long- 
established, were transformed by the capability and 
cheapness of the chip. These firms experienced 
unprecedented sales growth and, as a result, global 
expansion. These microelectronics multinationals gained 
significant global economic and political clout because of 
their record and potential for growth in both the First 
and Third Worlds. Global corporate expansion during this 
period was not to extract raw materials or to capture 
foreign markets, the conventional rationale for the 
internationalisation of production. The incentive in most 
cases 1 was to tap new labour supplies, the cheapness of 
which could not be matched in the home-base economy. This
1
pattern challenged the adequacy of the dominant theory on 
multinationals which argued that firms expanded overseas 
to control product markets. This form of 
internationalisation of capital, introduced by the US 
semi-conductor industry as it expanded from California to 
the Far East, understandably captured a lot of research 
attention.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, these same firms 
along with new competitors were establishing manufacturing 
facilities in Europe. There was little investigation into 
the structure and behavior of these subsidiaries, perhaps 
because they employed predominantly female labour like the 
plants in the Far East and the pattern in older 
electronics firms. They were assumed to be the same 
labour-intensive, low capital volume assembly plants 
already dotted around the world. 2
By 1979 many market-leading computer and semi- 
conductor firms had established manufacturing facilities 
in Scotland. This concentration of high tech5 was, 
however, little noticed outside the region. Regional 
officials called the development Silicon Glen. However, by 
the beginning of the 1980s, the number of high tech firms 
located in the area increased and established firms were 
expanding. Even at this point, the role of these 
subsidiaries within the global corporation went 
unquestioned. Ulhile the Scottish economy had as many 
differences as it may have had similarities to the 
economies in the Far East, there was no suggestion that 
these plants were any different from the predominant 
subsidiary form in the Far East or that they represented 
any alteration in the industry's international division of 
labour. The aim of the research on the region's high tech 
industry reported here was to investigate whether this 
assumption was justified.
1.2 REM£!?^^
While the research reported here focused on the 
structure arid behaviour of the multinational corporation
as an economic unit, the character of the industry itself 
is fundamental, not incidental, to the analysis. Until the 
early 1980's, US firms propelled the industry and 
dominated the definition of its character. The US micros 
industry maintained phenomenal growth in employment, as 
well as sales and international markets, for a period of 
more than twenty years. The industry's economic compulsion 
to innovate produced many generations of products within 
its relatively short life.
Also the US microelectronics industry has a colourful 
history. It rapidly developed a reputation as a group of 
glamorous, fast-paced companies and managers: often 
beginning in California garages, their record of turning 
high profits within a few years captured the imagination 
of international audiences. The industry's entrepreneurs 
were always interesting, if not flamboyant.
The industry's vibrancy - seemingly continuous 
expansions of manufacturing capability to cope with 
surging demand and a fervor for technological innovation - 
contrasted starkly with so much of manufacturing as it 
existed at the time in most of the western capitalist 
economies. The US and UK, among others, were experiencing 
deindustrialisation in traditional industries and a shift 
to service industries. Further, many long-established 
manufacturing firms had transformed themselves into 
financial holding companies to take advantage of the 
incentives of international subcontracting or the 
substitution of acquisition for investment. As a result, 
well-paid, skilled manufacturing jobs were lost. The 
growing concern in industrialised countries about the 
economic implications of deindustrialisation and 
dependence on "hollow corporations' assigned great 
importance to the microelectronics industries as major 
manufacturers and potential new engines of job creation. 
The benefits of the industry's health and rapid growth 
reached far outside the home base economy. Many other 
countries including Third World countries gained
investment and jobs as the industry.spread across the 
world.
The industry's growth concentrated in particular 
regions of the US and the world. High tech firms have 
accumulated in large numbers in Silicon Valley 
(California) and in and around Boston (Massachusetts) in 
the US, and in Scotland and the M4. Corridor ("Silicon 
Gulch*) in the UK, Singapore, Hong Kong and a number of 
other Far Eastern countries, as well as Japan. In many 
cases these areas became dynamic growth centres, fuelled 
by the support and intervention of the state. As a result, 
the health and welfare of many regions became dependent on 
the robustness of the industry and on the success of local 
operations. Public officials throughout the world, having 
watched other regions benefit from the industry's success, 
began competing to attract the industry's new investment 
as a way to mediate domestic unemployment problems. By the 
end of the 1970"s and the early 198O's the industry's 
successes, record of growth and international scope had 
made this industry an important variable in economic 
development and policy-making worldwide.
The products of the microelectronics industries also 
have great economic importance. The integrated circuit^ 
and the computer are technologies that have fundamentally 
changed methods and costs of production, the exchange and 
processing of information. These are products that have 
altered the ways work is done in every sector of industry 
- creating new opportunities for efficiency, reducing 
some labour inputs, lowering unit costs, and promoting new 
product possibilities. The productivity of the entire 
economy now to some extent depends on the output 1-evel, 
price, quality and capability of the product of these two 
industries. The market relationship of these firms, as 
intermediate and capital goods suppliers, with other 
industries has become a pivotal economic nexus. Any 
disruption in production or distribution in the 
microelectronics industries will delay production and 
investment schedules elsewhere. As suppliers of critical
technical inputs, the industries can alter income 
distribution amongst sectors of industry. Favouring large 
customers over small ones to deal with product shortages 
or channeling resources to new products and customers, 
which, in effect, ignores the needs of existing customers, 
can determine the market success or failure of dependent 
firms.
The importance of high tech electronics as a major 
employer has influenced the rest of industry in other 
ways. The industry's efforts to rewrite the management- 
labour relationship has influenced and may help transform 
the employment relation in and vitality of other sectors. 
This high profile, dramatic industry may be 
disproportionately attracting labour and financial 
resources - both public and private, denying access to 
other industries. Industry leaders recognising their 
political clout have in recent years actively pressured 
the state for supportive legislation and preferred 
treatment in the US, the UK and elsewhere. Protectionist 
trade laws and preferential labour market intervention by 
the state can alter (in some cases drastically) the 
conditions under which other industries must operate. The 
successes and failures of high tech can influence the 
competitive conditions for other sectors.
The computer and semi-conductor industries also 
employ large numbers of women workers across the globe: 
these sectors offer a valuable window for assessing 
women's position in the labour market in new and non- 
traditional sectors. While inheriting employment and 
structural patterns from its evolutionary predecessor, the 
electrical equipment industry, the microelectronics sector 
has been a major source of new jobs that quickly acquired 
a female gender-identification. These jobs were not 
"naturally' women's work, lifted directly from the 
household as food processing, textiles, garment-making and 
child care were. This is capital goods manufacturing which 
has historically employed men. However, electricals as 
"light' and "clean' work became acceptable work for women,
in contrast to the oily, noisy and dirty work with huge 
machines that dominated traditional manufacturing. The 
gender-ascription was transferred as electronics grew to 
dominate the industry. This sector provides a good 
opportunity to examine the changes in the industry's 
reliance on women workers, the quality of these relatively 
"new* jobs, the extent of ghettoisation and potentially 
the process of the gendering of jobs.
1- 3 THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
My research interest was to explore if these 
corporations had maintained, without change, their past 
pattern of overseas investment in the face of radically 
new competitive conditions. The industry established 
global operations early in its history. By 1983/4, the 
time of this study, all of the world market-leaders were 
multinational corporations because of advantageous 
relative labour costs overseas. By the late 1970*s and 
early 1980*s, however, escalating competition and costs 
imposed phenomenal pressure on US multinationals to grow 
and to change.
In particular, customers demanded that major US firms 
produce better quality product, a challenge that severely 
threatened their sales and market base. While "quality* 
has now become a buzzword in industries as diverse as 
autos and food processors, in the early 1980*s the 
quality problem was a critical yet underestimated factor 
in transforming the industry. Also by this time Japanese 
semi-conductor and computer firms had significantly 
increased their shares of the US market. The Japanese 
challenge, which had already eroded the power of US auto 
and steel firms, shocked the industry. No one imagined 
that the strategy of continuous product innovation would 
ever fail to maintain US firms' control of US and world 
markets. (See Chapter 4.)
Ulith these pressures, the static theory of the 
multinational corporation as a rigidly hierarchical global
structure, (Vernon, 1966; Cohen et al., 1979) was 
problematic. It gave us only a simplistic model of the way 
capital extended across economies and created and 
exploited an international division of labour. Many, 
following Vernon's seminal work (1966), had divided the 
world into two - the US or other advanced industrial 
economy (eg Japan or Germany) and the low-wage economies. 
All overseas manufacturing operations were essentially 
clone plants to exploit low-wage labour.
The significant economic changes in the industry by 
the 1980*s brought complexities and uncertainties that 
suggested that this model is too simple. The aim of this 
research is to examine how changing competition has 
influenced corporate strategies and the industry's 
international division of labour. Was the multinational 
corporate structure established in the 196O's and 1970's 
suitable to handle changing competitive conditions? Long- 
established examples of multinational corporations defined 
overseas production as relatively unskilled work for low- 
wage labour. Could the low relative costs of overseas 
manufacturing with cheap labour, in this case women's 
labour, continue to provide competitive advantages in 
spite of dramatic market changes?
If this were no longer the case, what were the new, 
compelling features of competition and how did management 
alter the global distribution of responsibilities, 
technologies and employment as a result? The central 
research questions of this study, then, are as follows:
how did US microelectronics multinationals adapt 
to the new competitive conditions provoked by 
rapidly changing technologies and markets and by 
the Japanese challenge, and
how did new strategies alter the role of overseas 
subsidiaries?
To answer these questions the research focused on the 
industry's development in Scotland during the five years, 
1979 through 1984.. The region had been the location of a 
number of US semi-conductor and computer multinationals
prior to the study period: this suggests these 
subsidiaries had contributed to the international division 
of labour that had been successful for US firms in the 
past. Furthermore, industry investment in Scotland grew 
significantly between 1979 and 1984, indicating that the 
region offered economies important to new global 
strategies.
The study concentrates on identifying changes in US 
multinationals' operations in Scotland. As both an 
indicator and consequence of change, the impact of new 
corporate strategies on women's employment and work in the 
region was an important secondary focus. However, during 
the course of the study it became clear that industry 
changes were affecting the work of and relationships 
amongst all workers and occupations. That meant opening up 
this last question to examine the impact on the structure 
of work. These were the questions at the centre of this 
research.
8
CHAPTER 2: PROD UCT_.... LIFE.....CYCLE... THEORY. AN.D ...THE ..THEORY.....OF
SEGN.E.N.TED......L.ABOU_R:_...HARKETS :
A. ..Sury.ey of Re 1 e yant Literature
2.1 INTRpDUCTION
The multinational corporation and segmented labour 
markets are two areas of prodigious theoretical and 
empirical work. This chapter explores the conventionally 
separate bodies of literature on the multinational 
enterprise and segmented labour markets: the aim is to 
examine the explanatory power of the theory of these in 
analysing the global structure of the high tech 
electronics industry.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
half considers the literature on the development of the 
multinational corporation as the internationalisation of 
productive capital. The multinational corporation has many 
forms: the discussion here focuses on it as the 
institutional attempt to organise production globally to 
improve capital accumulation. As such, it is a business 
organisation whose market strategies and competitive 
successes and failures can affect job opportunities and 
employment patterns in many global locations
simultaneously. There is a wide and rich literature on 
the multinational corporation. Theoretical work has 
concentrated on the macroeconomic issues of the role of 
the global corporation in trade, capital flows, economic 
growth, and uneven development and the micro concerns of 
how this company form succeeds in overcoming market 
imperfections and inefficiencies. Also, the theoretical 
debates have explored the political economic activity and 
implications of corporations so large and powerful that 
they threaten the political and economic sovereignty of 
nation-states (Warren, 1975; Murray, 1975).
The discussion here, however, telescopes in on the 
development of theory to explain the reasons that 
corporations invest in production overseas and the 
resulting division of labour within the global firm. 
Raymond Vernon framed the theoretical discussion of the
product life-cycle (PLC) theory (1966). This section 
examines his work closely and discusses how it must be 
modified to take into account the pressures on 
multinational corporations in "information' markets and 
from new technologies.
Vernon's work was an important contribution for its 
timing as well as its theoretical approach. His entry 
point was the explosive growth of world trade in the 
196O*s. His interest was to investigate the nature of US 
participation in trade and the seemingly counter-intuitive 
finding by Leontief (1953) that the US global 
corporation, a rapidly growing business form during the 
1960's, contributed to this pattern of trade and focused 
his attention there. His analysis of the multinational 
corporation was particularly interesting in that he 
explored the relationship of the competitive nature of 
product markets and management decisions about the global 
allocation of technologies and the role of the nature of 
the product, its age in the market, and competitive 
conditions at home and abroad in investment and technology 
decisions, his work allowed both a specificity and a 
complexity that improved greatly on theories that depended 
upon calculable transaction costs to explain overseas 
investment.
Vernon*s product-life-cycle theory deserves attention 
because it continues to have wide support both in industry 
and academia. In spite of the many changes in global 
industrial development and trade in the 1970's and 1980's, 
many still use the PLC theory as an explanation of US 
deindustrialisation and as a guide for empirical research 
on location and investment decisions (eg Heckman, 1984; 
Crawford, 1984). Consequently, it also remains the 
ideological framework for formulating policy for economic 
development and saving jobs.
For these reasons, the PLC model of the multinational 
corporation is an excellent starting point for analysing 
the global microelectronics industry. Vernon's 
consideration of the relevance of product market
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competition, technology choices and location, and the role 
of information and R&D focus on the most salient features 
of high tech electronics in the 1980* s.
At the same time, the extraordinarily rapid pace of 
change of product and production technologies may test the 
applicability of a theory which is appropriate to a 
Fordist, mass-production economy. Most of the chapter's 
second section explores the contributions and limitations 
of Vernon's PLC theory. This section includes analysis of 
the work of those who offered a similar conceptualisation 
of the structure of the multinational derived from a 
Marxist perspective.
The second half of the chapter examines the 
literature on segmented labour markets. This body of 
literature developed out of the recognition of the 
increasing concentration of capital in large corporations 
and the power these complex institutions commanded in 
shaping labour markets. The dual labour market theory 
(DLM) is never defined or applied wider than one national 
economy, and, while applied in analyses of many other 
advanced capitalist economies, the theory arose from the 
experience of the growth of the US corporation. However, 
the DLM model of capital's structuring a class of jobs as 
secondary to require few skills and to employ economically 
inferior workers is consistent with Vernon's description 
of the overseas manufacturing investment of 
multinationals. This chapter considers the DLM theory 
first as an analysis of the organisation of work in the 
modern firm. As today's corporations are faced with 
compelling reasons to expand globally, the chapter then 
examines how well segmentation theory extends to the 
international organisation of capital and explains the 
relationship of a multinational firm to regional and 
global labour markets.
2.2 TJdi.._Jii!^^
The multinational corporation is the dominant 
organisational form of modern capitalism. This firm,
11
operating across national borders, has come to dominate 
international trade and currency flows and to wield 
authority over the economic health and welfare of 
individual sovereign economies. As it became a more 
obvious actor in international economies in the 1960s and 
1970s, an extensive and varied literature developed to 
analyse its global activities, the reasons for its 
development, and the implications.
2.2.1 Nep.c .1 a_s_s i.c.aJL_.._ ._. .. .
Orthodox microeconomic analyses of the global 
corporation contend that the multinational is an efficient 
agent in allocating factors of production and distributing 
commodities, given the distortions of the market at both 
the national and international levels (Caves, 1974; 
Kindleberger, 1969; quoted in Cohen et al, 1979). By 
concentrating on the economic pressure to overcome 
information problems, theoretical and empirical work 
attempted to identify and calculate transaction costs as 
the cost-minimising trigger for investment overseas. 
Foreign direct investment results as the way a firm 
minimises the transaction costs of selling abroad, eg 
losing control over exploitable intangible assets such as 
R&D through licenses, etc. , or the expense of training 
foreign nationals. Understandably these firms with 
significant investment in exploitable information assets 
and with potentially large losses from uncertain turns in 
the market have the most to gain from investing abroad. 
The drive to maximise the return on technologies was found 
to be a potentially significant motivation for 
multinational expansion: firms with extensive R&D have 
tended to operate transnationally (Gruber et al, 1967). 
Managers committed resources to R&D based on the 
expectation of earning a return worldwide (Mansfield et 
al, 1969).
However, the literature ignores the potentially high 
costs and risks of managing a firm made up of 
interdependent yet globally dispersed parts. Low unit
12
shipping costs, for example, cannot satisfactorily explain 
the willingness of more and more firms to undertake risky 
investments in foreign lands. Company size and economies 
of scale (by, for example, global centralisation of 
separate part-processes) seem more compelling economic 
justifications for overseas investments. Furthermore, 
theories arguing that calculable cost differences (between 
exporting and overseas production of between technology 
licensing and foreign direct investment) determine 
investment decisions are static in nature: they ignore 
that firms operate in and must respond to dynamic markets 
and global economic conditions.
Market power and strategy shape global investment 
patterns: calculations of relative costs may support or 
trigger reassessment of these decisions. An oligopolistic 
firm actively competing over unit costs or product 
differentiation would invite further competition by 
licensing its technology rather than controlling 
manufacture abroad. The transactions cost approach and, 
more generally, a static neoclassical framework fail to 
consider the dynamics of market power in corporate 
decision-making. Furthermore, as a static analysis, 
orthodox microeconomics cannot incorporate the economics 
of changing technologies and the introduction of new 
products, factors that have dominated microelectronics 
markets since the 1970' s. Relative price signals cannot 
explain change in a dynamic economy with highly 
concentrated markets. Theory explaining multinational 
investment must centre on market strategies to survive or 
stifle competition.
2.2.2 T.h9...Pj2.o..dU£^^
Vernon viewed the multinational corporation as an 
organisation derived from and well-suited to economic 
change. The product-life-cycle hypothesis deserves 
careful examination because it periodises the changes in 
corporate organisation that respond to market changes. It
13
looks at the dynamic adjustment processes that are outside 
the framework of the static transactions cost model.
Vernon's product life cycle theory, a hypothesis 
about the dynamic structural adjustment of an 
international firm, developed as a partial answer to a 
macroeconomic debate about shifting trade flows. In the 
1950s and 1960s a theoretical debate over the reasons for 
international trade and trade shifts was at the centre of 
the international economics literature (as it is today). 1
Vernon entered the debate partially to solve the so- 
called Leontief ~paradox' (1953, in Wells, 1971). The 
neoclassical theory of factor proportions, as an 
explanation for international trade, derived from a 
competitive model which, by relying solely on 
international price differentials, could not explain the 
tendency for US export industries to be more labour- 
intensive than import substitution industries.
Vernon (1966) argued that the assumptions of 
perfectly competitive conditions were too restrictive to 
interpret the post-World War II international economy. The 
theory, by relying on automatic responses to price 
differentials, ignored the development of institutions 
important to the flow of trade, such as common markets. 
Vernon also roundly criticised the neoclassical assumption 
that knowledge was free and instantaneously available. He 
argued that clinging to this assumption ignored the 
obvious differential abilities of entrepreneurs to know 
and respond to market opportunities and to turn ideas into 
commercial products. The patterns of innovation, 
manufacture and trade, while conditioned by differential 
factor allocations, could not be explained simply by 
calculating factor costs plus transportation costs. 2 
Further, the resulting proprietarial knowledge and 
abilities effectively created product monopolies that were 
much more important than relative prices in stimulating 
trade in manufactured goods.
In spite of the macro entry point, Vernon focused on 
the role of the entrepreneur and the changing structure of
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the firm. 3 His model's focus on the actual global 
structure of the corporation and on the dynamics of the 
allocation of technology and labour makes it a singularly 
useful starting point for analysing global structure of 
firms in the highly international electronics industry. 
Companies are at the centre of trade. Trade flows 
depended on management choices between exporting and 
investing in production overseas. His hypothesis focused 
first on the economics of this choice given monopoly 
control of intangible assets, then on the resulting 
structure of foreign direct investment as a product 
matured. His model reflected the importance of three 
factors which were underestimated or ignored in earlier 
work - the process and importance of product innovation 
and its timing, the role of ignorance and uncertainty, and 
the effects of scale economies. The economic role of 
information, particularly the monopoly control of 
information, was central to his analysis.^
The Model
Vernon argued that the ease of getting information 
about a market and thus proximity to that market were 
major factors in explaining the ability of some 
entrepreneurs to develop a new technology and turn it into 
a commercial product. He further argued that the shape 
and success of those innovations would depend on the 
relative factor scarcities of that economy: an economy 
with a relatively expensive labour supply would be more 
likely to generate ideas for labour-saving products. 
Entrepreneurs were more likely to commercialise this kind 
of product successfully in a relatively high income 
economy with the willingness and ability to purchase 
labour-saving devices.
Vernon further suggested that the production of the 
new product would take place in the same economy (and 
possibly the same site) as product innovation and 
development. The producer, uncertain of market response 
to the new product, wants quick and easy communication 
with that market (customers, suppliers and potential
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competitors) to try to refine the product and production 
specifications appropriately, to sharpen production 
methods, to define the market, etc. In addition, 
management would be highly dependent on skilled production 
and professional labour to perform these tasks 
effectively. Maintaining and exploiting access to market 
information are key in successful commercialisation and in 
the location decision. The producer would be relatively 
protected from competition over price during this period 
because the price elasticity of a new technology product 
in a high income economy is low, and the producer has a 
monopoly by virtue of the innovation.
These were the economic concerns of the first or 
growth phase of a new product. The economics that drove 
management decisions on manufacture, marketing and trade 
would change as the product aged, suggesting a 
periodisation to frame the analysis. (The periodisation 
was further refined by his students Hirsch, 1965, and 
Wells, 1971.)
Standardisation and Scale Economies
The "maturing product* was a "stable*, standardised 
product: all specifications were fixed to enable mass 
manufacturing. The experience of early growth had 
eliminated the uncertainties of product and production 
specification. Company success was now dependent on 
developing a mass market and on achieving economies of 
scale. During this phase, management might consider 
replacing exports with manufacturing capability overseas.
Fundamental to a decision for global expansion, 
however, was that the income level of the overseas economy 
must be high enough to support a large market for the 
product and, as a result, the subsidiary could capture 
scale economies (Vernon, 1971). Vernon suggested that 
firms would first invest in the higher income economies of 
Western Europe and that this would only happen once the 
price of the product had dropped sufficiently to create a 
mass market in an economy less wealthy than that of the
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US. Firms would not commit resources abroad until the firm 
had sufficient experience and success with the production 
technology to minimise factor costs and to achieve 
reliable and certain results. Further, manufacturing 
was no longer dependent on a specially skilled labour 
force, due to a fixed production function: without high 
skill requirements, the firm was free to locate production 
anywhere there was an average labour supply.
Vernon argued that a simple transactions cost 
calculation, while consistent with his analysis, was 
inadequate to explain this decision. If continuing or 
expanding exports improved the scale economies of 
production at the home base plant, and/or if 
transportation costs were declining, the reliance in 
centralised production would grow stronger (Vernon, 1966; 
p.388). However, other considerations - such as import 
control policies - would more than likely dominate the 
corporate location decision. In fact, the most important 
trigger to investing overseas, according to Vernon, was a 
threat to the firm's monopoly power in those markets. 
Substituting overseas manufacturing for exports can pre- 
empt a threatened loss of market or market share in an 
oligopolistic market. This defensive rationale for 
internationalisation was particularly powerful for firms 
in research and development (R&D)-intensive industries; 
these sectors tended to be highly concentrated and 
oligopolistic (Gruber et al, 1967).
For an older, mature product, the dynamics of 
production would create wider opportunities for global 
expansion. Extensive production experience and scale 
economies would have further reduced product price. The 
lower price would create markets even in low income 
economies that were large enough to support a mass 
production facility. Production in a low wage economy 
would be attractive not only for increasing the returns on 
the corporation's technology by moving into a new market, 
but also as an opportunity to slash unit costs. Given the 
wider field of competitors for a mature product, 6 this
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relative unit cost advantage and potential profit margin 
increase might convince management, in Vernon's view, to 
manufacture in these new locations for a much wider 
market, even exporting back to the home base economy.
The drive to maintain market control in the maturing 
phase and to increase revenues and profit margins in the 
more competitive mature phase provokes management to 
invest overseas in Vernon's model, mediated by 
opportunities for achieving scale economies. He argued 
that neither nominal exchange-rates nor price-adjusted 
exchange rates affected the power of his hypothesis.
This model successfully explained much of the growth 
of multinational corporations in the post-war period, 
supported by Vernon's (1979) own and others* empirical 
research (Hirsch, 1965; Gruber et al, 1967; Wells, 1971; 
Forsyth, 1972; Horst, 1972; Magee, 1977; Caves, 1982). It 
also explained the tendency of US firms to become 
multinationals (and of such a large proportion of 
multinationals to be US-based firms) and of overseas 
investment to be concentrated in innovative industries 
(Caves, 1982).
The PLC theory offers a particularly useful starting 
point for analysing the international pattern of the high 
technology electronics industry. Vernon's emphasis on the 
economic role of information in establishing a 
technological monopoly and in directing the pattern and 
timing of overseas investment suggest that the PLC theory 
should describe the international organisation of this 
information- and R&D-intensive industry. Empirical 
research on parts of the microelectronics industry has 
provided support for his model (See for example, 
Scibberas, 1978; Lake, 1979; Heckman, 1984), particularly 
his emphasis on achieving scale economies as a necessary 
condition for overseas investment. A micro analysis like 
Vernon's, the research reported here on the high tech 
electronics industry in Scotland attempts to assess the 
extent to which Vernon's model of the global corporate 
allocations of technology, labour and product
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responsibilities predict the organisation of these 
multinational corporations.
2.2.3 Hymen's Analysis of the ^GlQbal__D.i.vi.s.i.on....gf......Ljabour
Stephen Hymer's contribution to the analysis of the 
multinational corporation deserves consideration in this 
discussion. He wrote extensively on the economic 
motivation of overseas investment and the profile of the 
multinational corporation. He originally intervened in the 
debate, like Vernon, to argue against the explanatory 
power of macro trends, such as comparative advantage. His 
analysis (Hymer, 1976) centred on industry and firm 
characteristics: the motivation to expand transnationally 
was to protect or create monopoly control over foreign 
markets. The model of the firm in his later work (Cohen et 
al., 1979) looked very much like Vernon's product cycle; 
however, he examined more explicitly the impact of global 
corporations on labour.
As an organisation well-suited to economic control, 
the multinational corporation expanded globally to tap the 
differing economic advantages of the world's labour 
markets and, in the process, reinforced those differences. 
The geographical hierarchy of multinational operations, in 
his view, set up hierarchical and rigid divisions amongst 
workers around the world. His work, then, makes explicit 
-where Vernon was implicit - the connection between 
corporate technology decisions and global differences in 
labour markets and jobs. Hymer provides an international 
model of segmented labour markets. This is an important 
link and contribution to dual labour market theories, 
considered in the next section, which ignore the 
internationalisation of capital and labour.
Hyrner's original research on the multinational 
demonstrated that a popular argument about diversifying 
one's portfolio of investments could not explain the 
pattern and growth of the multinational firm. He argued 
that management did not decide to establish manufacturing
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facilities overseas as a response to changes in the 
interest rate: foreign direct investment was not simply an 
alternative to other portfolio financial instruments whose 
return was diminished by a falling interest rate. The 
interest rate had little to do with overseas investment in 
productive capital. 7 As in Vernon's analysis, the 
possibilities for overseas investment in manufacturing 
originated with monopoly and differential advantages of 
firms in the world's markets. Overseas manufacturing 
provided firms with opportunities either to maintain 
control in important markets or to exploit more fully a 
market advantage, either eliminating competition abroad or 
expanding to appropriate greater returns on particular 
skills, knowledge or abilities (Hymer, 1976).
The multinational corporation expanded globally, in 
Hymer*s view, to establish economic control - control over 
foreign product markets and labour. He argued that a 
spatial hierarchy and the resulting international division 
of labour best served that goal, fostering a growing 
centralisation of control by US capital and dramatic 
qualitative changes in the world economy (Cohen et al, 
1979).
The corporation centralised planning and decision- 
making in the major capitals of the world (New York, 
London, Paris, Tokyo, etc.) which offered immediate access 
to the biggest capital markets and easy communications, 
including face-to-face contact, with media sources and the 
industry and political leaders who might influence 
corporate strategy. Management would locate R&D and 
related activities in other large cities in the home base 
economy ("regional subcapitals') where there were 
communities of scientific and technical personnel and 
other white collar professionals. This environment would 
facilitate information exchange and stimulate product 
development. While separate from headquarters, rapid and 
effective communication between these two levels was 
important to maintaining general understanding, employee 
confidence and loyalty and effective coordination.
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The overseas subsidiary looked like that of Vernon's 
model. Hymer argued that stable, continuing production was 
the role of the subsidiary. Involving overseas workers in 
technological development might lead them to want to 
further develop some of their ideas and to try new methods 
of production rather than continuing to produce output in 
the old way, according to management prescription. It was 
in management's interest to cut the subsidiary off from 
idea development and involvement in decisions. 
Subsidiaries were restricted to standardised production 
processes staffed with low wage, relatively unskilled 
workers. These facilities were dispersed to low-wage 
economies around the world, the exact locations determined 
by labour and materials costs (Cohen et al, 1979).
The global organisation of the parts of the firm 
would mirror their places in the corporation's "pyramid of 
power" (Cohen et al, 1979). Further, this corporate 
organisation would imprint a global hierarchy of 
dependency.
"A regime of multinationals 
corporations would tend to produce 
a hierarchical division of labour 
between 'geographical regions 
corresponding to the vertical 
division of labour within the firm... 
[C]onfin[ing] the rest of the world 
to lower levels of activity and income, 
that is, to the status of towns and 
villages in a New Imperial System. 
Income, status, authority, and 
consumption patterns would radiate 
out from these centers along a 
declining curve, and the existing 
pattern of inequality and dependency 
would be perpetuated. ... [T]he basic 
relationship between different countries 
would be one of superior and subordinate, 
head office and branch plant." (Cohen et 
al, 1979; PP.157-8)
Like Vernon, Hymer viewed controlling communications 
as a critical concern of corporate management. Management 
recognised the necessity for reliable and smooth 
communications both to and from the product development 
and marketing functions and would keep them nearby in the
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home economy. The marketing function features prominently 
in both Vernon's ©nd Hymer's work. Vernon considered it 
critically important in the first product stage, when 
positioning the product in its biggest, most receptive 
market determined its success. The interplay of marketing 
with all corporate decisions kept product development and 
manufacturing in the home base economy. Hymer, in 
contrast, argued that the marketing function could not be 
confined to one stage but grew in importance and 
complexity, simultaneously integrating all the steps of 
capital accumulation - production, education and 
consumption - and, with the objective of control, thrust 
the corporation into global expansion. To capture and 
control overseas markets, firms had to understand and 
adapt to overseas cultural and social consumption factors. 
A sales office alone could not do that
effectively: controlling an overseas market required a 
manufacturing facility which would allow the firm to use 
its technological expertise to satisfy local needs.
_._. .Bra in c h __ P 1. a in t
As might be expected, research outside the US 
frequently concentrated on the phenomenon of the "branch 
plant* itself and its impact on the host economy. 
Empirical work demonstrated that the subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations fit Vernon's and Hymer's 
prescriptions. They produced standardised products with 
relatively low skilled and inexpensive labour (Forsyth, 
1972; Pirn, 1975A; Massey, 1978; Moxon, 1979). The parent 
devolved little if any decision-making and for a number of 
reasons (eg creating low-pay jobs and having few links 
with the local economy) provided few benefits for the host 
region (Pirn, 1975B; Hood and Young, 1983). These authors 
explicitly or implicitly endorsed the PLC formulation. The 
subsidiary was both "headless and heartless' because 
product development and growth was centralised in the home 
base economy. The branch plant was also potentially
22
"footloose' because it was liable to move to a lower-wage 
location as the product matured.
Froebel et al (1980) focused on Vernon's mature 
product stage (though there was no acknowledgement). Their 
"world manufacturing platforms' were branch plants in the 
Third World that were responsible for highly routinised 
mass manufacturing processes for mature products and for 
exporting them around the world. That included supplying 
the home base economy. The economic rationale for this 
form of a multinational was, in contrast to Vernon,® 
solely exploiting the low labour costs. The locations that 
multinationals chose offered both the social, cultural and 
economic construction of an inexpensive (usually) female 
labour supply and state protection maintaining the 
employment contract and labour supply conditions.
2.2.4 WjsaJ<ne s.s_e_s_ .p^
The PLC model has severe limitations in describing 
and analysing the high tech multinational corporation in 
the international economy of the 1980s. This section 
explores the theoretical limitations of the model. The 
discussion here centres on three points. The "business 
environment' disparities between the US and other 
industrial economies are no longer significant or 
instrumental in the timing of corporate global expansion. 
The world economy has become much more international, not 
least because of the major economic role of the 
multinational corporation. Vernon's entire analysis rides 
on the dominance of the standardised product in the world 
economy.
Vernon's analysis of multinationals grew out of a 
world with wide disparities of income amongst economies 
and, more specifically, between the US and the rest of the 
world. Some of the disparities between the US and parts 
of Western Europe and Japan had narrowed if not 
disappeared by the late 1970s. Also manufacturing 
multinational corporations were relatively new economic 
institutions in the early 1960s. By the late 1970s,
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individual multinational corporations had established 
extensive and complex international operations, and many 
major markets were becoming truly international.
Vernon (1979) acknowledged both of these points (see 
also, Vernon and Davidson, 1979). When taken together, the 
altered international business environment means that the 
unique conditions in the US market no longer explains the 
global structure of a US multinational (much less the 
world market dominance of US multinationals). Vernon 
conceded that, because of the convergence of per capita 
incomes amongst a number of industrialised countries, a 
corporation might not wait so long before manufacturing a 
new product overseas. His own and others' research found 
that the more international experience a corporation had 
(both in introducing new products and in producing 
overseas), the faster it was likely to transfer new 
products and production to those economies (Vernon and 
Davidson, 1979; Lake, 1979). The shortened time period 
before investing overseas was due both to the economic 
well-being of particularly First Uorld markets and also to 
the likelihood that these corporations would be better 
informed about and experienced in foreign markets than the 
firms of the 1960s (Vernon, 1979; Vernon and Davidson, 
1979).
Vernon, however, stopped short of the logical 
implications of the new assumptions. Firstly, there is no 
reason for any. delay in manufacturing new products 
overseas. Uhy should corporations wait at all before 
manufacturing a product abroad if there are overseas 
markets that are economically receptive and, as has been 
suggested, if there is greater international homogeneity 
of demand? Indeed, given the rapidity of communications 
and the high degree of internationalisation in many 
sectors, a product in many markets is now effectively a 
global product from the day it is introduced. Management 
wanting to exploit the monopoly period of its new 
technology would surely strive for simultaneous new 
product manufacturing in all important global markets,
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unless there are other factors that explain multinational 
locational and timing decisions. 9
Secondly, if similar demand conditions held across a 
number of economies, there was no longer an explanation of 
why a US firm must develop a product and manufacture it 
first at home. A firm (either a domestic company or a 
multinational subsidiary) in any of the sophisticated 
industrial economies would have access to the market 
information on which product and production technology 
development depends. Similarly these economies would have 
acquired, through the developments of their markets, the 
skilled production and professional personnel needed for 
product development: Vernon had considered the supply of 
skilled labour a critical factor in the pattern of global 
expansion.
To acknowledge these changes requires a 
reconsideration of the pattern, timing and economic 
strategies of the modern multinational corporation. The 
assumption of a standardised product was at the centre of 
the PLC analysis of the global reach of a firm and the 
eventual shape of the transnational corporation. This 
weakens the theory's explanatory power in a transformed 
market economy. Vernon's (1966) multinational was a 
corporation producing a standardised product horizontally 
in more than one country.
By 1979 his view had altered but without irreparably 
harming his theory. By the 1970's multinationals were 
commonly vertically disintegrated; the product had been 
broken down into mass produced component parts and 
production was widely dispersed around the globe. This 
structure enabled the firm to take advantage of 
international input and operating cost differentials and 
to integrate more countries into an international 
marketplace (Piore and Sabel, 1984.). The driving force 
behind this global dispersion and ~crosshauling' was 
achieving scale economies on a global level.
In recent years, however, the dominance of the 
standardised product has been severely challenged in
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international markets. The demise of GM and Ford's "world 
car* strategy, for example, derived from the failure of 
one car style and structure to satisfy a wide range of 
culturally-specific tastes and quality requirements 
(Sabel, 1987; Piore and Sabel, 1984, cites other major 
failures of global standardisation strategies, eg 
steel.). Standardisation is a particularly inappropriate 
strategy for capital goods markets where heterogenous uses 
demand heterogenous product (Rosenberg, 1982).
The development and growth of "information-intensive* 
products in the "information society* of the 1970"s and 
198O*s have dramatically altered the viability of the 
standardised commodity in world markets. Vernon and Hymer, 
in spite of their interest in the economic role of 
information, did not anticipate how information processing 
would transform products and production methods nor how 
these changes would affect competitive conditions and the 
resulting corporate strategies for capturing markets and 
organising production and distribution. These changes 
severely undermine the applicability of the PLC theory.
Many information products (ie products that contain 
and process a lot of technological information about the 
specific end-use of the product) cannot be standardised 
either over time or across markets. In many high tech 
markets, the rapid technology advances and the economic 
benefits of adopting new technologies have forced 
potential customers to become much more sophisticated in 
their understanding of product developments and their own 
application needs. Markets can now keep pace with the 
newest technological improvements of the product through 
inexpensive and rapid communications opportunities and 
consequently demand continual product advances. While 
these pressures are particularly severe in high tech 
electronics and information technology markets, the 
necessity for firms to cater to many different markets and 
customers has been documented in a wide range of 
industries in the 1980s (Hirschhorn, 1984; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984).
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Secondly, markets have demanded increasing 
customisation of products. In microelectronics in 
particular a product designed or adapted to a specific use 
will perform more economically: it is usually faster and 
more reliable. Marketing an information-processing 
commodity demands a high level of understanding of the 
product's end-use: the product must deal with if not 
incorporate the procedures and technologies of the 
customer's use. Increasingly, selling the product requires 
adapting it to that specific application.
The supply conditions and structure of the 
manufacturing firms must change to meet the demand for 
heterogenous, application-specific products. Neither 
Vernon's nor Hymer's rigid, hierarchical model can cope 
with the evolving supply conditions for a highly 
differentiated product and market. Firstly, the rapid pace 
of technological and market change challenges the concept 
of a fairly predictable, staged cycle of product life. 
Corporations could profit more from a technology monopoly 
by shortening the time gap between product introduction 
and exploiting world markets if the technology is likely 
to change quickly. Also, market demand for mature products 
seems likely to shrink rather than expand as Vernon 
predicted given the many newer, more capable (and cheaper) 
products that would already have appeared on the market by 
that time. The unpredictability of the market size for a 
mature product would seem to discourage a management 
strategy that delayed overseas production until the 
product matured.
Secondly, defining and creating a mass market is more 
difficult. With rapid product changes, potential customers 
are less likely to warehouse large amounts of components 
or equipment because of the threat of rapid obsolescence. 
This makes producing for inventory to achieve scale 
economies (Vernon, 1979) a very limited strategy.
The pace of change and the demand for customisation 
call for greater capital flexibility and a pattern of 
continuing feedback from the market (Piore and Sabel's
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flexible specialisation model, 1984; Hirschhorn's post- 
industrial model, 1984) beyond the soope of the branch 
plants in both Vernon's and Hymer's work. The organisation 
of production must prove capable of gathering changing 
information from volatile markets and must accommodate 
variations in demand and specific customers. The structure 
of the corporation must adjust to cope with these changes. 
A different relationship with the market is necessary to 
establish continuous feedback from customers to all the 
steps and stages of production - R&D, production design, 
testing - and administration and marketing. The responsive 
company structure that Vernon associated with the new 
product stage proves to be necessary throughout (and 
potentially to extend) the life of a technology wherever 
there is a major market. 10
Interestingly, Hymer predicted the growing importance 
and complexities of a multinational's communications among 
its parts and with its markets (Cohen et al, 1979). 
However, he underestimated the limits of a rigid 
corporate structure to respond to these changes. Neither 
Vernon nor Hymer anticipated the competitive necessity for 
the multinational corporation to adapt to significantly 
different methods of competing in and controlling markets. 
In addition, increasing specialisation and customisation 
suggest the possibility of fragmented rather than 
concentrated world product markets. Corporate strategies 
to operate globally may no longer be the result of 
monopoly control. The rigidly hierarchical multinational 
corporate structure of Vernon's and Hymer's models seems 
ill-suited to respond to continually new information 
inputs and product demands and to win the heterogenous 
markets around the world.
2. 3 DUAL LABQUR_..riARKEX. THEORY
ION ^ND
Dual or segmented labour market theory provides an 
appropriate lens for viewing employment patterns and
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changes in the modern business organisation. This labour 
market model (in all its variations) derives specifically 
from the growth of and concentration of power in twentieth 
century US corporations, the same corporations that 
consequently became multinationals in the 1950's, 1960's, 
and 1970*s. Because the institutionalisation of ~good' 
jobs and ~bad* jobs which the DLM theory describes 
generated the profits and the technological and managerial 
expertise that enabled corporations to expand globally, it 
would follow that the corporations would reproduce this 
employment pattern in their transnational structure. In 
fact empirical research throughout the 1970*s and 1980*s 
found the international employment structure that Hymer's 
model explicitly predicted. US multinationals expanded 
into lesser developed economies by creating low-skilled, 
low-pay jobs, shifting the exploitation of a "secondary' 
labour market from the US overseas (see, for example, 
NACLA, 1977; Froebel et al, 1980; Elson and Pearson, 1980; 
Grossman, 1979).
DLM theory provides an analysis for understanding the 
links between company and industrial growth and the 
structure of work in US monopoly capitalism. By 
incorporating Hymer's international perspective, the DLM 
theory offers a model for interpreting the historical 
economic role of overseas jobs and workers and a gauge for 
assessing current global employment patterns.
This theory developed out of the inadequacy of 
orthodox competitive models of the labour market to 
describe the actual operations of the unique market for 
labour and, in particular, to explain the existence and 
the persistence of discrimination. The postwar influx of 
women into the British labour market was marked by severe 
and continuing occupational segregation by gender. Sixty- 
three percent of all women workers work in jobs done by 
women; 8O% of all male workers had all-male jobs (1980 
Census; Martin and Roberts, 1984). This means that in 
spite of the growing participation and attachment of women 
to the labour force, the gender segregation of 1901 has
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remained intact throughout the twentieth century. Table 
2.1 shows the historical pattern.
TABLE 2.1. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION: 1901 -198O
% of men working in % of women working in
jobs with 70% or more jobs with 70% or more
male workers female workers
1901* 89% 71%
1921* 83 56
1951* 82 5O
1961* 77 53
1971* 77 51
1980+ 80 63
SOURCES: * Hakim (1978) from population census reports, 
1901
through 1971.
+ Martin and Roberts (1984) from population 
census,
198O.
To explain this segregation, dual labour market 
economists claimed that institutions developed within 
labour markets to serve the interests of large 
corporations. Powerful corporations established barriers 
between jobs and workers to maintain market power, 
technological profits, etc. by controlling their labour 
supply. The resulting institutional barriers limited the 
firm's need to compete in external labour markets and 
blocked the (potential) effectiveness of wages and 
salaries in allocating workers to the economy's better 
jobs. The creation of "good' jobs and "bad' jobs were both 
the objective and the result. Different socio-economic 
groups of workers were associated with the job groupings, 
and formal and informal barriers blocked access for many 
people to the better jobs.
The DLM model is a good starting point for attempting 
to analyse the highly gender-segregated employment 
structure of the high tech electronics industry precisely 
because it begins where orthodox theory failed. Dual or
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segmented labour market theory recognised the theoretical 
importance of the growth, market power and economic 
requirements of the postwar industrial enterprise and the 
existence of persistent inequalities in the labour 
markets.
This section of the chapter introduces and assesses 
the work of major DLM economists, Doeringer and Piore, who 
worked both separately and jointly, and Gordon, Edwards 
and Reich (whose joint work will be abbreviated GER) . The 
analysis of their work is preceded by an analytical 
summary of its theoretical context. The final part of the 
chapter reviews the contributions of feminist economists 
and sociologists who have criticised DLM theories for 
their incidental treatment of gender-exclusive labour 
markets.
2.3.1 Nepc 1 ass_i ca.l. . An.aJL .y ;.s..es_ of Gender ..p..i.^^g
The increasing participation of women in the US and 
UK labour markets throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
has drawn a great deal of attention from academics and 
policy-analysts. That attention has been due at least in 
part to the tendency for women to be channelled into a 
relatively few occupations and their experience of low pay 
relative to male workers, a situation that persisted even 
as their participation grew to close to half of the labour 
force. This called for an explanation which economics 
orthodoxy could not provide. In a perfectly competitive 
labour market, individual productivity determines labour 
market outcomes. The market would not allow two workers of 
equal productivity to earn different wages. Profit- 
maximising firms paying more for their labour than their 
competitors would face a competitive disadvantage that 
would soon eliminate them from the market. And with 
perfect mobility, workers would move to jobs and companies 
with better pay. Within the model of perfect competition, 
any divergence between marginal productivity and pay could 
only be a short-term imperfection that the dynamics of 
competition would soon eliminate.
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Gary Backer, a major contributor to the literature on 
discrimination, argued that gender-associated pay 
differences derived from individual choice or from 
different original endowments. Employers may have a 
preference f.or male workers: they can choose not to 
maximise profits by paying men more than women (of equal 
productivity), preferring to indulge a "taste for 
discrimination" (Becker, 1971). These employers would 
employ women, then, only if they were willing to work at a 
discount. Discriminating male workers also might cause pay 
differentials. Men who did not want to work with women 
might consent to work only if they were better paid. In 
both cases, discriminating employers refusing to minimise 
labour costs would lose profits. In a competitive economy, 
they could not sustain this behavior; competitors relying 
entirely on lower-paid women workers would in time force 
discriminating employers out of business. While attempting 
to explain women's experience in the labour market, this 
model clearly considered discrimination a temporary and 
aberrant phenomenon. Becker and his followers refused to 
recognise the persistence of discrimination.
Dropping the assumption of perfect competition led to 
a more convincing explanation. Madden (1973) argued that 
an employer could continue to employ women willing to work 
for less pay than men if there were no other firms 
competing to hire the women. Women's more limited mobility 
(due to domestic responsibilities and perhaps access to 
transport) could restrict them to jobs in one nearby firm. 
This firm could maintain pay and job discrimination even 
if the women were introduced into a male labour force. The 
women would have little choice in a monopsonistic labour 
market. This "power relations* model, as Bruegel (1982) 
labeled it, replaced individual choice with the 
effectiveness of (or absence of) market power: the market 
and its inequalities would remain stable unless new 
competitors entered the region willing to bid women 
workers away with better jobs and pay. Importantly, Madden 
rejected the orthodox dogma of the wage reflecting
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individual productivity. Her analysis revealed that 
distinctions between "male* and "female" work can save 
employers money.
The model of men and women working side by side at 
different pay rates for the same job is, however, not 
convincing over the long term. Employers could reduce 
total labour costs by substituting lower-paid but equally 
productive women for all their male workers. The entire 
labour force would in time be female. This does not 
accurately describe what has happened. The model does, 
however, allow major employers market power: employers 
have the power to distinguish between "male* and "female* 
work and to maintain that distinction by control over (for 
example) a geographical labour market. Firms reduce their 
wage bill by employing women and men in ctiff&r&nt, non- 
competing jobs and benefit as long as their power in the 
labour market remains unchallenged. The model also 
acknowledges that women's lack of market power v.a.v. men 
and their employers (eg less mobility, lower unionisation 
rates, etc. ) makes them weaker agents in the labour 
market .
_
Where women and men work - the industry, the type of
firm and the type of job - turns out to be extremely 
important in explaining and maintaining discrimination. 
Workers with similar work experience and education earn 
different wages according to the industry and the size of 
the company (Bibb and Form, 1977; Lloyd and Niemi, 1979). 
Layard, Piachaud and Stewart (1978) found significant 
earnings differences amongst workers in different 
industries - holding skill, training and experience 
attributes constant - with the lowest paid industries 
having predominantly female work forces. Workers in small 
firms are paid less than people doing similar jobs in 
large firms (Bibb and Form, 1977; Blau, 1984A) , and women 
are more likely than men to work in small firms. Further, 
studies by Treiman and Hartmann (1980) and Bielby and
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Baran (1986) both located earnings differentials between 
men and women in their differing distributions across 
occupations, a relationship that grew stronger the finer 
the occupational definition. The latter study (like the UK 
report cited earlier by Martin and Roberts) found that the 
vast majority of a large sample of US workers were in 
occupations that were exclusively female or male. This 
segregation, rather than skill, size of firm, or education 
and training, was the major determinant of earnings 
opportunities. This has been supported in many other 
studies, even when productivity factors are controlled 
(See for example, Oppenheimer, 1968; Hakim, 1981; 
Stevenson, 1975). Blau (1984.B) showed that men working in 
"female' jobs earned less than other men in similar but 
different occupations. Clearly job and pay inequalities 
were not different kinds of discrimination but different 
faces of the same problem.
Neoclassical economists Chiplin and Sloane (1976) 
attempted to analyse job discrimination. They claimed that 
the reason gender segregation lasted in a competitive 
labour market was that women chose their jobs. Women 
preferred, for example, jobs in small firms because these 
jobs could frequently be found close to home and small 
firms offered a more casual, family-like atmosphere than 
large firms. While the pay might be lower in a small firm, 
all individuals of equal potential reaped identical "net 
benefits' ; so the system was stable. Chiplin and Sloane 
simply fell back into subjective rationalisation when the 
neoclassical tools failed (Bruegel, 1982).
Individual choice is also at the heart of human 
capital theory. In human capital theory, neoclassicals 
argue that labour market inequalities are not caused by 
discrimination, but result from workers (in specific, men 
and women) having dlflering productivities. The market 
cannot then fairly assign them the same jobs and wages. 
These productivity differences arise because men and women
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make different choices about investing in their own human 
capital - that is, the education and training that will 
qualify them for (well-paid) jobs. Women, expecting their 
domestic role to reduce the time and continuity of the 
labour force participation, want to maximise their 
earnings during their period(s) in paid employment. So 
they are less willing than men to forego wages for 
training (on and off the job). They choose jobs that do 
not require training (Mincer and Polacheck, 1974). They 
also seek employment where they will not be penalised for 
a break in their career or needing to work part-time (ie 
where wages/salaries do not vary with experience) .  *  * 
The theory, which maintains a tenacious hold on the 
ideology of pay and employment analysis, places individual 
choice and expectations at the centre of labour market 
operations. It disregards the externally imposed barriers 
that frame that choice. Further, the sexual division of 
labour in the family is taken as given, and the result - 
women's constrained labour market choices - is portrayed 
as logical and fair. Yet Becker's theory (1957, 1973) 
follows a confusing circular path. Becker asserts that the 
decision to marry and to have children derives from 
women's expectation of occupational segregation in and 
lesser returns from paid employment. The "utility' of two 
people can be maximised by allowing the man to realise 
his earnings potential in the labour force and by the 
woman accepting responsibility for unpaid work in the 
household. Occupational segregation reinforces the 
division of labour in the family and that sexual division 
of labour compels women to choose less well-paid, less 
permanent jobs than men (Amsden, 1980). Becker and, more 
generally, neoclassical theory fail to acknowledge sexism 
in the domestic sphere, so simply cannot explain the 
subordinate position of women either in the labour market 
or in the family.
In spite of its seductiveness, the ideology of 
individual choice at the root of neoclassical theory 
obscures the fact that an individual's opportunities, as
35
well as preferences, are socially constructed. External 
social, economic and political factors shape behavior. 
Acknowledging the element of power implies that the 
options for some are more restricted than for others and 
compels an analysis explaining why. Bergmann (1974) and 
Madden (1973), building on much earlier work by Edgeworth 
and Fawcett, argued that barriers that could develop 
within imperfect competition severely limited women's 
employment choices. Their "crowding hypothesis" claimed 
that social conventions and outright bans excluded women 
from a large number of occupations, types of companies and 
industries. All women workers are crowded into a limited 
number of occupations. The resulting wages are lower than 
in other occupations (for both men and women) because of 
the oversupply of labour to those jobs. The broader range 
of men's occupations are protected from competition from 
women workers; an artificial barrier reduces the 
competition there, creating a higher wage than would be 
the case if all barriers were removed.
2.3.2 Labpur; _..Mark_et ^egme_nt at i on
The crowding and power relations models, while 
focusing on labour supply to explain discrimination in the 
market, recognised that barriers within industry could 
also be important in restricting employment opportunities 
for women. Theories of dual or segmented labour markets 
developed from the view that the potential barriers on the 
demand side had grown to dominate labour market operations 
because of the concentrated market power of large firms in 
capitalist industrial economies in the late 1960's and 
1970's. Institutions within and between firms replaced the 
market forces in defining and allocating jobs. Barriers 
restricted access to job categories to certain groups of 
workers, blocking the mobility of capital and labour that 
is necessary to bring the wage and marginal productivity 
into line. The industrial structure and the nature of the 
firm determined the supply of good arid bad jobs and which 
workers got them, not the supply of high and low quality
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labour or the numbers of people applying. Where 
neoclassical theories assumed that the economic system was 
neutral in the creation of low-paid employment, theories 
of segmentation targeted system structures as the cause of 
inequalities. In the neoclassical models,
"women's low pay is explained by lower 
productivity (caused either by less 
human capital investment or innately 
lower productivity), by imperfect 
mobility or by discrimination which 
distorts the profit-maximisation process. 
It is argued that the economic system 
has no vested interest in such practices; 
indeed, efficiency would be improved by 
their elimination." (Humphries and Rubery, 
1984, p.335)
In contrast, the segmentation theories contended that the 
demand for labour structured the labour market to 
discriminate.
Segmented labour market theory offered a stylised 
model of two institutionally and technologically disparate 
job segments, primary and secondary. The segmentation 
resulted from the growing economic importance of 
oligopolistic firms with extensive investment in physical 
capital. These large corporations depend heavily on 
employees who know how to make the equipment and the 
labour force work well: these company- and job-specific 
skills had become much more important to productivity and 
profitability in contemporary production than in earlier 
generations (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). The high fixed 
costs of extensive capital investments compelled employers 
to want to retain these employees. Firms offered these 
workers higher pay, better benefits and job ladders inside 
the firm to keep them in the company (Harrison and Sum, 
1979). 12
Piore (1975) further divided the primary sector to 
reflect the pattern he saw in large manufacturing firms 
and in class structure. The upper tier comprised 
managerial and professional jobs and the lower tier, well- 
paid blue collar skilled, craft work and a few white 
collar administrative jobs. The top jobs in the hierarchy
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offered the best pay, benefits and career ladders. Also 
these employees had more job control, and education, 
personal achievements and personalities rather than formal 
rules fixed their position in the hierarchy (Piore, 1975; 
Harrison and Sum, 1979).
The secondary labour market comprised more general, 
less skilled jobs, usually referring to less capital- 
intensive manual work. Because only a minimum (if any) 
training was needed in these jobs, there were few costs to 
the employer for high turnover in these jobs. Employers 
could save money by minimising pay and investment in 
working conditions for secondary jobs.
The disparate segments referred both to jobs and 
workers (Doeringer, 1975; Doeringer and Piore, 1971) 
distinguished by the differing behavioral expectations. 
The most important of these was employment stability 
(Piore, 1971). Secondary workers were not expected to have 
a long-term commitment to the job, so the jobs, in turn, 
offered little to solicit the worker's loyalty.
Firms structured work, hiring and employment 
practices in these segments in order to cost-minimise. 
Employers minimised costs by maintaining low turnover in 
the highly standardised, capital-intensive production 
areas through employee satisfaction and by filling lesser- 
skilled vacancies with the lowest-cost labour. 3,14
A key feature in primary sector employment is the 
internal labour market. The employer designs a hierarchy 
of linked jobs and associated training opportunities 
within the primary sector to give an employee additional 
skills and/or to promote her/him. The internal labour 
market (ILM), then, is a system of job ladders and formal 
criteria within the firm determining pay, promotions and 
layoffs and cushioning the primary sector worker from the 
impact of the external labour market (Buchele, 1981). 
Management pays for this protected environment to retain 
long-serving employees as the least cost way of filling 
new vacancies that require company-specific knowledge. It 
will work as a cost-minimising strategy for workers with
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transferable skills in primary sector work areas and for 
employees who need only incremental enhancements of skill 
or knowledge to prepare them for the next job.
The conditions in the external labour market frame 
the extent to which employers rely on to which primary 
sector workers reap the benefits of an ILM. The external 
labour market determines the costs and benefits of the 
choice to train employees for job vacancies rather than 
recruit from outside. The most advantageous situation for 
the firm is one where the vacancy requires only an 
incremental addition to a worker's skills and knowledge, 
minimising the time and cost of training. The conditions 
in the external labour market can, however, convince 
employers to invest more heavily to train/upgrade and 
promote employees. The circumstances include when (1) the 
employee knows so much about the firm that losing him/her 
to competitors would be costly; (2) it is the only 
alternative because the needed skills do not yet exist in 
the labour market, and (3) labour shortages would make 
recruiting new workers very expensive (Doeringer, 1975).
Management offers employment security and mobility 
only to primary sector workers. There are no ladders and 
few promotion options for workers within the secondary 
sector. The job gives them no saleable skills and no 
incentive to stay. There is no incentive to upgrade 
secondary workers into primary sector job vacancies 
because, with the very different production technologies 
in the two sectors, the training necessary would be long 
and expensive. Secondly employers hesitate from investing 
in secondary workers who are not expected to stay long at 
the firm. The ILM, then, progressively enhances the 
position of one group of workers, while continually 
reinforcing the negative characteristics of the secondary 
group. Primary sector employers and workers have vested 
interests in perpetuating the system. The barriers between 
the two sectors become insurmountable, making escape from 
the secondary sector all but impossible. 16
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2.3.3 We_akn.esses_.....in......t.he._.DL_M.._Mpde_l.
Doeringer and Piore recast the analysis of labour 
market discrimination: the firm attaches pay, benefits, 
better or worse working conditions, and opportunities for 
advancement to occup&tions 9 not individuals. The factors 
that determine the mix of good and bad jobs - the product 
market position and size of the firm and the method of 
production - simultaneously set pay (or at least 
differentials) for the jobs, not the productivity or the 
educational qualifications of the individual (Blau and 
Jusenius, 1976). The theory abandoned the neoclassical 
concepts that labour is a commodity like any other and 
that individual behaviour propels the market.
"[S]egmented theories are explicitly 
historical and focus on systematic forces 
which restrict the options available to 
(members) of the labor force. The primary 
unit of analysis is no longer the 
individual and his [sic] free choices, but 
rather groups or classes who face 
objectively different labor market 
situations which systematically condition 
their "tastes' and restrict their range 
of effective choices. The orthodox models 
(take) institutional parameters as given 
and then analyze the equilibrium which 
results from the choices of ... individuals 
within those parameters." (Carnoy and 
Rumberger, 1977; quoted in Harrison and Sum, 
1979; p.695).
The theory, however, refuses to face one of the 
fundamental issues in analysing labour market 
inequalities: why do certain groups and riot others end up 
trapped in secondary jobs? Doeringer and Piore offer only 
a convenient, functional explanation. Class cultures and 
subcultures produce young workers with the characteristics 
that channel them into secondary and upper and lower tier 
primary jobs (Piore, 1975). The social structure
"produces the differentiated labour 
supply that the system demands...
"~[T]he particular characteristics 
of the secondary workers are largely
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"accidents" which the economic system 
makes use of but does not create.'" 
(Piore, 1980, quoted in Humphries and 
Rubery, 1984; p.336)
This assumes that groups accrue social and political power 
outside and prior to any economic role and the social 
system will harmoniously continue to provide the needed 
quota of subordinate jobs for the maintenance of the 
economic system.
This happy "coincidence of wants" (Humphries and 
Rubery, 1984), oversimplifies and distorts the 
relationship between the demand and supply sides. Firstly, 
the model considers the secondary sector a homogenous 
group of workers all with roughly equivalent labour market 
qualities. The model views women both homogenous as a 
group of workers (Beechey, 1978) and interchangeable (in 
terms of behavioral characteristics and labour market 
power) with all other subordinate workers. That black, 
white and ethnic workers and men and women have differing 
experiences and advantages/ disadvantages in the labour 
market has been the source of a rich and growing 
descriptive and analytical literature (Uallace, 1980; 
Buchele, 1980; Malveaux, 1984). Further, Doeringer and 
Piore simply ignore that women workers face unique 
constraints and expectations in the labour market because 
of their domestic role. In addition, their gender- 
blindness orevents them from realising that all women are 
not identical in the workings of the labour market. 
Employers distinguish between white, black and ethnic 
women (Coyle, 1980; Phyzicklea, 1980; Siegel arid Boross, 
1980), young and older women (Goldstein, 1986), and 
"first' and "third' world women (Green, 1983; Pearson, 
1983) when hiring, resulting in a diversity of work 
experiences.
Secondly, the fact that secondary workers do riot 
display the characteristics that employers attribute to 
them shatters the explanatory power of the model. 
Doeringer and Piore claimed that the fundamental defining 
feature of subordinate jobs is management's expectation of
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and willingness to tolerate high turnover from some 
workers. However, research on women workers shows women to 
have a strong attachment to paid employment. An IFF study 
(1980) of women in the labour force, for example, found 
that, age for age, full-time women workers stayed as long 
as men with individual employers (though they may leave 
the labour market more often due to childbearing and 
domestic responsibilities). Women, particularly after 
childbearing, remain in their jobs for long periods while 
continuing to be concentrated in secondary jobs. Short 
tenure, then, cannot be used to define the secondary 
sector and cannot explain the relegation of women to the 
"bad' jobs and low pay in the subordinate sector. 
Conceding the possibility of statistical discrimination 
(that is, some individuals may be trapped in secondary 
jobs'because employers mistakenly attribute to them the 
statistically valid and undesirable characteristics of the 
group; Piore, 1971) does not rescue the theory. Millions 
of single women without children in low-pay unstable jobs 
in the US and UK cannot all be a mistake of employer 
perception. Employers value these workers for secondary 
jobs precisely because they must keep their jobs to 
support their families and have few better alternatives. 
The DLN model fails to explain why particular groups of 
workers continue to be relegated to subordinate jobs.
2.3.4. A.._._Mar x ls£... _An^
Radical economists, most prominently Gordon, Edwards 
and Reich (GER), challenged the Doeringer and Piore's 
concept of a coincidental and harmonious match of supply- 
side characteristics with demand-side requirements. Their 
analysis of segmentation disputed the central tenets of 
Doeringer and Piore's model: to suggest that firms 
structured labour markets primarily to protect job- and 
firm-specific skills fundamentally misread the propulsion 
of the system. GER's model focused on the opposition of 
capital and labour. Capitalists developed highly
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compartmentalised and hierarchical job segments to 
increase their control over the production and 
accumulation processes. By segmenting labour markets, they 
could buy off, contain or quash the development of working 
class strength and minimise the cost of labour more 
effectively (Edwards, Reich and Gordon, 1975).
The increasing concentration of capital in the 
twentieth century made segmentation both possible and 
necessary, according to GER. Giant corporations wanted to 
protect and to exploit their market power. The labour 
movement, growing strong under monopoly capitalism, 
threatened capital's profitability and control. At the 
same time, product market control provided the stable 
demand to support investment planning and the resources to 
create a primary market, developing durable labour- 
management institutions to placate, incorporate and 
regulate the workers central to the company's operations. 
In GER's secondary labour market, capitalists use a 
divide-and-rule strategy to exploit social divisions and 
antagonisms amongst disadvantaged groups in the labour 
force. Playing these groups off against one another 
discourages unionisation and depresses wages.
Ulhile GER viewed the secondary labour market as a 
consolidation of common employment practices in the 
earlier, more competitive period of capitalism, ILMs 
created in the primary market were an innovative, more 
sophisticated form of control. As Doeringer and Piore had 
explained, more stable product demand and the large number 
of differentiated jobs in monopoly capitalism's 
corporations made the strategy of institutionalising 
rewards and control both possible and more important. The 
central concern was control - how to 
supervise the growing numbers of diverse workers, 
particularly white collar employees, in the large, 
complex, often geographically far-flung corporations of 
the postwar period. This, along with the problems of 
dealing with increasingly powerful skilled trade unions, 
threatened capitalists' control over operations and
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profitability. As corporations became more bureaucratic to 
cope with their growth, ILMs replaced the direct, personal 
contact of traditional supervision of workers. ILMs 
outlined the rules of behavior and career pathways for 
primary workers to get ahead. ILMs imposed the corporate 
hierarchy directly on the daily behavior of and 
expectations for primary workers (Edwards, 1975).
Class relations are the engine of the Marxist model, 
both the central opposition of capital and labour and the 
role of unequal class fractions. GER attributed capital's 
success in establishing segmented labour markets to the 
cooperation of unions, mainly those representing the 
relatively more powerful skilled workers. Union leaders 
agreed to adhere to employer work rules and internal 
hierarchies in exchange for high wages, relative 
employment security (Adler and Bowers, n.d.) and 
mechanisms that controlled the supply of skilled labour, 
impeding any infringement on their privileges.
A One-Sided Argument
This was GER's only acknowledgement of the 
interaction of the demand and supply sides in the 
segmentation of labour markets. Their model is a 
functionalist one 17 in which capital uses pre-existing 
social divisions in the working class to serve the 
interests of capital. The relationship of the groups is 
stable and exogenous to the development of segmentation. 
Uhile the model explores how the demand-side structure 
keeps workers in their segments, it does not explain how 
they came to their positions of relative
power/powerlessness or how the system responds to changes 
in those positions. GER document, for example, the 
relegation of women to secondary jobs in the growing post- 
war service sector (GER, 1982) and refer to the history of 
"new' subordinate jobs being created to employ women (in 
clerical work, for example, Davies, 1975). Yet they never 
ask why women. They ignore women's unpaid work in the 
household sphere and the resulting constraints on their
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participation in the labour market: being female was a 
disadvantage in the labour market without theoretical or 
operational distinction from being Chicano. Further, they 
neglect to consider the role that the relationship between 
women and male workers plays in shaping the demand for 
labour and the path of capital accumulation. Marxist 
feminists criticised this disregard for the gender 
dimension.
2.3.5 T h e Marx i s t ,._F em in i s t C r it i q u e
Any analysis of women's participation in the labour 
force must start with a recognition of women's 
subordination in the family. 18 (See Elson and Pearson, 
1981, for a thorough analysis.) Women tend to enter, leave 
and re-enter the labour force to fit around childbearing 
and other domestic responsibilities. They are often unable 
to hold full-time or full-year paid jobs because they have 
primary responsibility for these chores. This alleged lack 
of attachment has significant value for capital: female 
labour uniquely lends itself to part-time, flexible 
employment (Hurstfield, 1978; Beechey and Perkins, 1982; 
Hunt, 1975).*^ Part-time and adjustable working hours 
reduces the cost of the employment contract. Women's dual 
role makes them a unique reserve army of labour that can 
be quickly mobilised for paid employment or returned to 
the household according to the requirements of capital 
(Beechey, 1977; Bruegel, 1979; Humphries, 1976; Humphries 
and Rubery, 1984.) . However, that expendability does not 
always dominate their role in the labour market. The same 
qualities of women's labour have convinced some 
capitalists that using women as a core labour force offers 
useful cost-savings opportunities during recessions. 
Retaining women workers and expelling more expensive male 
labour may prove more cost-effective, as Bruegel (1979) 
found to be the case in some industries and occupations.
Most feminist accounts disagree with the GER 
assertion that women's subordinate status is exploited by 
capital alone. Working class men and their institutions
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have historically devalued women's abilities and 
experience. The concept of skill has itself been defined 
in traditional male craft terms that belittle or ignore 
women's capabilities (Phillips and Taylor, 1980; Cockburn, 
1983). Male trade unionists - through actions on the shop 
floor, local and national collective bargaining and 
lobbying for state support - have acted to exclude women 
from access to primary jobs (Hartmann, 1976; Rubery, 1980; 
Kenrick, 1981). This has often been with the support of 
male capitalists and, in some cases, with the help of 
women (eg in the defense of household living standards, 
Humphries, 1977).
The "Patriarchy First' Argument
Indeed, many believe that the patriarchal 
relationship dominates the role of capital in defining 
women's disadvantaged position in the labour market. 
Certainly patriarchy existed prior to the advent of 
capitalist production. The "patriarchy first' position 
contends that capital had to adapt to the pre-determined 
sex-differentiated hierarchy: male power in the domestic 
and political sphere had to be protected within the work 
place. Cross-class male solidarity certainly offered 
significant material rewards: male managers and workers 
maintained both the benefits of women's domestic labour 
and privileged access to better jobs. The patriarchal 
relationship has, at times, prevailed even when quashing 
male power would have been in the interest of capital (eg 
when homogenising the work force would have been useful: 
Hartmann, 1979; Phillips and Taylor, 1980).
By asserting the autonomous and superior role of male 
domination, however, these arguments deny the 
interrelationship of the system of social reproduction - 
integral to the shape and pace of economic development - 
and that of capitalist production. The value of this 
literature, however, is that it clarifies that gender 
power relations have roots independent of and prior to 
capitalism that cannot be explained as simply functional
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to the requirements of capital. Also, acknowledging male 
interest in sustaining women's subordinate position both 
in market and non-market activities exposes the 
possibility of collusion and conflict within classes 
(Humphries and Rubery, 1984).
Where the DLM theorists subordinated the sphere of 
social reproduction to that of production, the "patriarchy 
first* arguments declare women's subordination in the 
domestic sphere autonomous and predominant. Both 
oversimplify and misrepresent labour market operations. 
The two domains have a dynamic relationship. US 
electronics firms, for example, expanded overseas - 
changing into transnational firms to tap the supplies of 
"green* female labour in Far Eastern countries. Why was 
the competition among secondary labour market groups at 
home insufficient to produce low wages for capital? Given 
that the companies expanded in low-wage and severely 
underemployed economies overseas, why did male managers 
not hire male workers to preserve the male breadwinner 
tradition which still has extraordinary ideological power 
in most cultures? Why did these companies relocate to 
other countries when constraints on the female labour 
supply (and in some case attempts to organise unions) 
pushed their secondary job wages up? Given the 
interchangeability of disadvantaged groups in the GER 
model, why did firms not hire local unemployed men? How 
would the DLM theory explain the substitution of men for 
women in the US computer industry and the simultaneous 
upgrading of jobs once the employer recognised that the 
industry might create a lot of those jobs, as in the case 
of the first computer technicians, the ENIAC girls? Why 
would employers in some industries restructure primary 
sector male work into deskilled jobs that were then given 
to women (in computer programming, Kraft, 1984; in 
telecommunications, Hacker, 1979). In these last two 
examples, the male employees had considerable expertise 
and control over the work process or the labour market (ie 
through unionisation). The patriarchy first argument
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cannot provide an explanation for these substitutions. 
The functionalist DLM analysis - in its gender-blindness - 
does not acknowledge much less explain that gender 
differences give capital economic choices amongst workers 
and work structures.
The Sphere of Social Reproduction
The demand-side determinism of the DLM theory is its 
gravest error. Capital neither defines nor operates 
impervious to the social context. Eliminating capital 
would in no way guarantee the elimination of gender 
divisions, the logical implication of the GER analysis.
"In the feminist account,..[women*s 
low pay and exclusion from certain 
jobs] does not simply operate at the 
level of individual decision- 
making: the process of mutual 
reinforcement of the domestic 
division of labour and the segregation 
of paid labour is more deeply, 
historically rooted in both the 
institutions of the trade union 
movement and of the state...[U]omen*s 
unequal pay and limited job oppor- 
tunities. .. cannot be fundamentally 
altered while the existing division 
of domestic labour between the 
household and the state, as well 
as between men and women, is taken 
as sacrosanct." (Bruegel, 1982)
In fact the sphere of social reproduction alters the
structure of capitalist production. As suggested in the
example of the Far East above,
"the geography of gender relations 
[eg the availability of new supplies 
of inexperienced, "green' female 
labour] has been an important element 
in British industry's attempts to 
reorganise geographically; to 
restructure itself out of crisis." 
(Massey, 1983)
The "willingness' of women in economies with high un- or 
underemployment to work extremely long hours at very low 
pay rates knowing their capabilities will last only a few
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years (eg losing their eyesight due to the miniature tasks 
of the job; Grossman, 1979) gives capitalists the 
productivity to postpone investing in automating 
technologies (Froebel et al, 1980). While this may 
enhance short-term company profitability, the availability 
of this specific labour supply slows the industry pace of 
technological change and the shape of competition. 
Eventually, some firms, relying on manual labour rather 
than new capital investment, may lose market share and 
power to those investing in new technologies.
The Assumption of Stability
The quotation above points to another fundamental 
problem with the theories of dual and internal labour 
markets - their assumption of a stable economic state. 
Both Doeringer and Piore and GER suggest that the 
secondary labour market provides the flexibility necessary 
for capital to adjust to changing competitive conditions. 
Their models presume the continuance of the long period of 
relatively unfettered capitalist expansion in the 1960s 
and early 1970s and ignore the inherent unevenness of the 
capital accumulation process. External demand shocks or 
major changes in the conditions of profitability can 
jeopardise the market advantages and the resources of the 
large corporation and thus corporate ability to maintain 
the payroll and upkeep of a significant cadre of primary 
sector employees. The institutionalists (adherents of DLM 
theory) incorporated technological change into their 
model: it reinforced employers* reliance on company- and 
job-specific skills, so perpetuated the economics of the 
DLM.
However, corporate investment in new technologies are 
often precipitated by crisis (Massey and Meegan, 1982). 
Profitability crises largely determine the nature and 
timing of major investments in new technologies. Employers 
use new production technologies to break labour's control 
over the work process and the associated labour costs or 
to change the corporate cost structure. That gives
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management the opportunity to reorganise work and the 
allocation of people to jobs.
This may not only shift the balance of employment 
between the primary and secondary sectors. Major 
restructuring may also cause redundancies, including the 
abrupt termination of career ladders in the primary 
sector. In crisis employment stability amongst primary 
sectors workers - the economic rationale of the system of 
segmentation - can become a liability for capital. DLM 
theory was developed during the extended (and seemingly 
endless) expansion of the 1960s and early 1970s when 
perhaps crisis seemed avoidable. By the early 1980s crises 
abounded throughout manufacturing industries globally, and 
importantly they reflected resurgent international 
competition amongst fractions of capital. Capital-labour 
conflicts were key only in specific industry cases. The 
monopolistic market control by powerful US corporations 
which financed the labour market segmentation of Doeringer 
and Piore and GER was under severe siege by overseas
producers. Rigid labour market structures could nott
withstand the advent of the crises of the 1980s. Neither 
can the DLM theory.
The challenges to monopoly control over markets came 
from many directions. Market demand for newer or 
customised products can threaten the viability of 
standardised product and production techniques (that Piore 
viewed as the basis of labour market differentiation). 
Wildly fluctuating demand, cyclical changes more severe 
than anticipated, and new or more effective competitors 
can all threaten the stability and the size of the mass 
market necessary to the profitability of these large 
manufacturing firms.
The potential for crisis has multiplied with the 
internationalisation of capital. Because the DLM theories 
are wholly domestic in their analyses, they overestimate 
the stability of the system. The internationalisation of 
capital has promoted international labour markets. The 
high degree of differentiation of labour internationally
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opens up a world of diversity that can shape the 
conditions for the purchase of labour power (Massey and 
Meegan, 1979). The prices, labour force characteristics 
and the conditions of the employment contract in one 
country now affects employment in others. Corporate 
strategies can take advantage of global opportunities for 
cost-minimising and minimising labour turnover (eg 
operating in countries where there is persistent 
unemployment or where the state protects the employment 
contract) more varied than the rigid and expensive rules 
of ILMs. That diversity is particularly important during 
crisis when capital consolidates, automates, restructures 
and potentially relocates production. All workers, not 
just secondary workers, are forced to compete over wages 
and employment conditions with workers around the world. 
Crisis eliminates the stability of internal labour markets 
and the employment protection for primary workers.
2.4 CONCLUDING POINTS
The criticisms raised in both sections are likely to 
be very important in analysing the growth and development 
of the high tech electronics industry. First, the industry 
is by definition both information- and technology- 
intensive. As a result, the industry's profits depend on 
company success in producing both rapidly changing and 
highly variable rather than standardised, mature products. 
That also suggests a company reliance on a bigger, thus 
more costly, group of primary workers than has 
historically been the case for mass manufacturing 
industries. Secondly, it is an industry that has been 
volatile since its beginnings and has been in flux 
throughout the 198O's. As a highly internationalised 
industry, in terms of markets and the organisation of 
production, 'the industry provides a particularly useful 
case study for examining whether or not the economic 
benefits resulting from the PLC and DLM models are 
appropriate and adequate for companies in the midst of 
significant technological and market change. The
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criticisms here suggest that the hierarchical and rigid 
structures of the two models and the dependence on - at 
least in the PLC international organisation of production 
- conventional scale economies will not be able to cope 
with the demands of fast-paced information industries. 
Furthermore, as the industry has been a major employer of 
women globally, investigating the recent developments in 
this industry offers the opportunity to assess whether 
gender does in fact affect the allocation of jobs and how 
those decisions can influence the structure and 
competitiveness of the entire industry.
Chapter 5 examines in detail the extent to which the 
PLC hypothesis explains the pattern of high tech 
electronics investment in Scotland in the early 1980's. 
The aim is to examine if multinational organisation has 
responded to the important new dimensions of competition 
discussed above - fast-changing product demand, product 
customisation and more intense international competition. 
Preceding that, Chapter 3 outlines the research 
methodology of this study, and that is followed by a 
chapter that reviews the history and changing dynamics of 
the industry. Chapter 6 then investigates multinational 
employment policies in the subsidiaries located in 
Scotland to determine if current economic pressures 
altered the segmentation of jobs and workers.
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CHAPTER 3:
The research focus on corporate investment and 
employment strategies for coping with industry crisis 
required specific and up-to-date information that 
published data could not provide. Consequently, the 
research relies in the first instance on personal 
interviews with corporate managers, the only reliable and 
adequately informed sources. Further, the terrain of the 
study had to be restricted. Uhile the research interest 
concerned the international shifts in roles and resources 
amongst subsidiaries and locations of multinational 
corporations, limited resources narrowed the geographical 
scope of the study. The field survey, thus the study, 
focused on Scotland, a major concentration of the 
industries' global investments.
The field survey included fourteen computer and 
semiconductor multinational corporations (ie SICs 366 and 
367) operating in Scotland in 1983/4. Thirteen of the 
firms originated in the US, one in Japan. All but two of 
the firms ranked in the top twenty in world sales in their 
industries (1981 for the computer industry, 1984 for the 
semi-conductor industry). In fact four of the seven 
semiconductor firms and six of the computer firms were 
amongst the top ten firms. Using published or publicly 
available data, Appendix 1 lists the survey firms and 
outlines their history in Scotland.
3   1 PA!A._.._CpLL_E_CT I ON
The field survey also included seven multinational 
corporations with headquarters or advanced manufacturing 
and research facilities in California. Corporate 
executives and managers were interviewed to identify major 
international technological developments and global 
corporate strategies and to understand the economic forces 
behind the changing geographical dispersion of corporate 
investment. These firms included both headquarters for the 
survey firms and other corporations which were major
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actors in their industries. They also are listed in 
Appendix 1.
Because of the pace of change in these industries and 
the absence of reliable or illustrative data (See 
discussion below.), most of the analysis in this study 
relies on data from these corporate interviews. Corporate 
executives in these firms agreed to cooperate only on the 
conditions of a guarantee of confidentiality. To keep that 
promise, actual company names are omitted in the text.
Interviews were arranged with the managing directors 
of the Scotland subsidiaries and appropriate executives in 
the firms in California Ceg Vice-President of 
International Operations or Technology Development). These 
were considered the people most able to speak with 
authority about the corporation's overall investment 
strategies, overseas operations in Scotland and the ways 
in which the firm had altered the organisation of 
technologies and employment in response to new competitive 
pressures. In a few cases executives in Scotland 
substituted their personnel or plant production managers. 
Management in all of the selected firms granted 
interviews. According to others involved in industry 
research in the US, Scotland and England, the 10O% 
response rate was unprecedented.^ Appendix 3 includes the 
field survey questionnaire. The field visit in all cases 
included a request for corporate data to document the 
following:
a. employment and output in the Scotland subsidiary 
(measured by sales or value added) from 1970 to 
1984; and
b. the occupational distribution of employment for
the subsidiary at the time of the survey, for five 
years earlier (1979) and for the end of the next 
five years (1989).
Unfortunately, managers were extremely reluctant to gather 
or divulge this information and, though a number of firms 
forwarded data, a complete data set could not be 
constructed. The data was either inappropriate (eg data at
54
the corporate level rather than the subsidiary), 
incomplete or incomparable (eg measured in differing 
units).
Data from these firms were supplemented by interviews 
with a range of industry actors and experts who 
corroborated, explained and added to the stories of the 
managers. As a result, the field research included more 
than eighty separate supplemental interviews; some were in 
California, Boston, Massachusetts, and London, but most 
were in Scotland. The distribution of industry 
perspectives represented by these interviews is, as 
follows:
Managing directors of six small Scotland-based high 
tech firms, three in the computer industry and 
three in chip design;
Managing directors of three firms supplying the 
region's high tech industry;
Seven academics, most of them regional leaders in 
the education and training sector in Scotland and 
nine academic research professionals who have 
investigated the high tech industry in Britain and 
the US;
Twenty industry experts from both the public and 
private sectors in Scotland, England and the US;
A number of public sector officials, including 
three high ranking officers in the Scottish 
Development Agency, the region's development 
authority (two of them policy-makers for the 
development of high tech in the region); an 
economist as the Scottish Council (Development and 
Investment), the Director of Planning at Fife 
Regional Council, an elected representative on the 
Fife Regional Council; a representative of the 
Strathclyde Regional Council; the economists for 
two regional planning agencies and three 
professionals from the EITB in Glasgow and London;
Twelve trade unionists active in trying to organize 
in the Scottish and US high tech industries;
Sixteen industry workers, including production 
workers, engineers and administrators; and
Directors of three JobCentres in Scotland located 
in areas with a high concentration of high tech 
jobs.
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All of the interviews in the UK and US were conducted in 
the autumn of 1983 and the spring, summer and autumn of 
1984.
These interviews proved to be important supplements 
to the interviews of managers in the primary survey firms. 
A number of factors limited the reliability of the 
interview data from primary corporations. In an industry 
where control of information dominates competition, 
creating market and revenue advantages, executives were 
often vague, if not secretive. Confidentiality was 
assured, yet managing directors all avoided giving details 
in areas they considered sensitive. Also, the industry 
style is one of friendly, freewheeling bravado: 
distinguishing hopes or momentary opinions from strategic 
and operational decisions was at times very difficult. The 
supplemental interviews helped cross-check information 
and, as these interviewed were competitors, consultants or 
suppliers, added detail to the vague picture the 
multinational executives provided. The additional 
perspectives provided by these respondents offered 
evidence that helped distinguish important directions, if 
not trends, from minor or transitory activities. (The 
complete list of interviews is in Appendix 2 and the 
questionnaires are in Appendix 3.)
3. 2 (IE T HODOLOG. 1CAL_IS.SUE_S
One of the primary purposes of the field survey was 
to determine whether or not the nature of the technology 
investments and, thus, technology-related responsibilities 
in the Scotland subsidiaries had changed from earlier 
investments in Scotland or other overseas locations. To do 
this, the survey asked managers for specific information 
about capital equipment purchased and installed during the 
study period (1979-1984). The survey gathered information 
on both the year of installation and descriptions of the 
functional capability of specific machines to identify 
those investments that were state-of-the-art technologies 
and those that were established technologies.
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It was, however, impossible to realise this objective 
for three reasons. First, managing directors in some cases 
did not know the details of all their investments or the 
functional capabilities of all installed equipment. Their 
responses to these questions were, as a result, often 
ambiguous. This problem was compounded by the fact that 
many of them considered specific details on technological 
capabilities sensitive information. Furthermore, the fact 
that capital equipment for design, manufacturing and test 
was often custom-designed for the producer firms made 
distinguishing different generations of technologies by 
date and/or capability impossible. Consequently, the 
findings reported here rely on managers* responses about 
whether or not the specific technologies had been 
previously used within the corporation or within the 
industry. While this means conclusions about technology 
responsibilities at the Scotland subsidiary rely on 
managers* interpretations and assessments, these men were 
all experienced and knowledgeable electronics engineers. 
In addition, each had the responsibility of accepting from 
corporate headquarters and devolving responsibilities for 
technology assessment, investment and installation at 
their subsidiaries. Consequently, the findings reported 
here are in all probability quite robust.
The focus of interest was from the beginning the 
industry. However, as an industry developed by 
individualistic entrepreneurs, there was likely to be 
considerable diversity amongst firms. It was not clear 
that industry-wide technological and market changes would 
cause an industry-level response rather than a series of 
individual firm adjustments. In addition, the industry, 
particularly the semi-conductor sector, had historically 
supported so-called niche strategies (ie market pockets 
for specialised products). So, the field survey 
concentrated on management policies in individual firms to 
capture this diversity.
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The differences, however, were only ones of degree. 
The competitive pressures of the industry and the dynamics 
of industry development in Scotland were compelling: as 
major global market leaders, the firms were pushed in the 
same direction as the rest of the industry - competing 
through product differentiation and reducing unit 
production costs. A study of the entire high tech 
electronics industry, or even one dynamic region such as 
Silicon Valley in California, would have included a large 
number of small new competitors, starting with only a 
rented office and a telephone and a range of market 
strategies. Firms facing bankruptcy, merger and take-over 
would also have been included. Industry growth in Scotland 
had nourished some diversity: there were many domestic 
start-up firms, for example, a few spin-offs from the 
industry's largest firms. However, this was a very minor 
portion of the region's industry in terms of both 
employment and output. This study focused on the largest 
part of the regions' industry - the segment of well- 
established multinational corporations. There was 
considerable consistency in their strategies to set up or 
expand in Europe to compete for market share in a prime 
overseas market.
My research approach depends on "descriptive 
synthesis", as Amsden (1985) and others before her called 
it. Descriptive analysis captures the political economies 
of change while it happening. In cases of strategic, 
technological or institutional change, quantitative 
analysis is simply inadequate. Because it derives from 
historic patterns and existing relationships, it cannot 
capture change.
This research is essentially an in-depth case study 
of an industry segment, and the method proved to be 
particularly appropriate for this industry. At the time of 
the study, the industry was changing rapidly, both growing 
after a two-year downturn and shifting priorities to 
profit rapidly from that growth. While there had been a 
number of important descriptive studies, particularly of
58
the semi-conductor industry (Borrus, 1983 and 1984; Ernst, 
1983; Scibberas, 1977), they had not considered the 
international organisation of the industry an important 
variable in strategic market response or competitive 
capability. That made an in-depth examination of the 
industry in one region a useful contribution to 
understanding structural change.
The Inadequacy of Published Data
A descriptive approach was also necessary because the 
strategic changes taking place could not have been 
discovered from any published quantitative data. Neither 
annual reports nor government data could capture changing 
strategies of, for example, the global distribution of 
technological responsibilities or altered recruitment 
policies, each of which signaled a new role for the 
subsidiary. In addition, the time lag between data 
collection and publication was a more important problem in 
this fast-paced industry than is usually the case in 
industrial analysis. In 1984 no quantitative data were for 
the period 1980 through 1984: consequently, there was no 
way to capture the critical years of industrial change 
through published data.
Secondly, there was no reliable and consistent 
quantitative data available either at the national or 
regional level. At the national level, it was impossible 
to separate out activity in the computer and semi- 
conductor industries from that in older industries 
included in SIC's 366 and 367. At the three-digit level, 
each of these SIC's combines high tech firms with many 
older electrical and electronics firms producing older and 
very different products, using much less advanced 
technologies than in the sample firms. For example, SIC 
367 includes radio and electronics components and capital 
goods which combines conventional transistors and passive 
devices such as resistors and capacitors with 
semiconductors. Manufacturing processes and industry 
structure in these slow-growth product sectors have in
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many cases changed little over the past five to ten years, 
years of phenomenal growth and change in integrated 
circuits. To use employment, occupational or investment- 
related data that combines these traditional products 
with information-intensive products would mask the 
discovery of any distinctiveness or new relationship in 
the newer industries. Published data at the national level 
was insufficiently disaggregated to be useful. 2
Further, there were no consistent time series data 
for the industry's employment, occupational distribution, 
capacity utilisation, capital growth or wages/ 
salaries anywhere within the Scottish public sector. The 
regional development authority and planning departments 
relied on a highly imprecise and unreliable data set based 
on a postal survey. Known as SCOMER (Scottish Manu- 
facturing Establishment Record), each year's data was 
based on a unique decision about the principle for 
inclusion of firms, so company and industry data were not 
comparable across years. The survey was only irregularly 
run. Responding was voluntary. The response rate was said 
to be rather low and often did not include the region's 
major employers, most of whom were the multinationals 
examined here. Large employers, continually negotiating 
with the public sector for money and favours, had vested 
interests to maintain secrecy, so had no incentive to 
respond. As a result, smaller and less technologically 
advanced firms were overrepresented in survey results 
though the large firms accounted for most of the 
industry's employment and investment. Further, the SEPD, 
the agency responsible for data collection, did not follow 
up questionnaires with interviews or any kind of cross- 
checks to determine the reliability of responses. The 
data was so unreliable that only by analysis of national 
Census data in 1983 was it discovered that employment in 
the region's electronics industry had fallen during a 
decade which was thought to have been one of growth. The 
industry actually lost as many as 10,000 jobs from 1970 to 
1979, in spite of official boasts about the industry's
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growth in the region. The discrepancy was due to reliance 
on the SCOMER data (Young, 1983).
The only wage data disaggregated by region and 
industry was collected by the Scottish Development Agency 
(SDA). It included firms in the electronics and high tech 
sectors of the industry. At the time of this study, 
however, the agency had conducted only three half-yearly 
surveys (1982 and 1983) which, according the SDA's 
statistics department, were not strictly comparable 
because of data collection problems.
As a result, publicly-available regional data was 
wholly unsatisfactory for any analysis of industrial 
restructuring. The field survey was the only reliable way 
to learn how the industry was actually coping with change. 
The interviews were an opportunity both for learning the 
nature and logic of corporate decisions and for requesting 
quantitative data. While the firms fairly consistently 
provided current and historic employment levels, getting 
full and comparable data sets on past, current and future 
occupational distributions or output or value added 
figures proved impossible. The reasons varied from the 
absence of any data disaggregated to the subsidiary level 
(le the UK corporation was often the lowest level of 
analysis available.) and wide variability in company 
measurements of output to flat refusal to disclose 
competitively sensitive data.
3-3 , C ONC L UDI N.G.... PO I. NT S.
At the time of the study the lack of knowledge about 
the actual activities of the survey multinationals and the 
economic role of Scotland's subsidiaries made the industry 
in Scotland a rich research focus. Given the rapid pace of 
change in technologies and market strategies, the survey 
interviews proved to be the only way to uncover 
contemporary economic pressures and responses. In spite of 
the limitations of the research method in providing 
reliable and comparable data, interview data describe 
industry changes surprisingly consistent across firms that
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would be difficult if not impossible to capture with 
quantitative data.
Chapters 5 and 6 report the findings of the field 
survey and assess whether or not they support the product 
life cycle and dual labour market theories. The final 
chapter considers the impact that the research method, the 
limitations of interview data and the timing of the study 
has in interpreting and generalising from these findings.
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4 - 1 INTRODUCTION
The US microelectronics industry expanded globally 
early in its history. This chapter looks at the history of 
the industry and its global spread to explore the extent 
to which the product-lite-cycle analysis explains the 
pattern of internationalisation. After a brief analysis of 
the economics of industry growth until the late 1970s, the 
chapter then outlines the changing economic conditions and 
mounting competitive tensions that led to a shift in 
corporate strategic priorities by the early 1980s.
To understand the role of Scotland within industry 
dynamics, the chapter reviews the history of high tech 
multinationals in the region. The economic role of the 
region shifted markedly in 1979/80: changes in Scotland in 
the early 1980s resulted directly from corporate efforts 
to resolve this crisis of accumulation. Chapter 5 will 
examine in detail the "new" multinational subsidiaries in 
Scotland and compare their role within the corporation to 
that predicted by the the product-life-cycle hypothesis.
The integrated circuit 1 or chip as it is colloquially 
called, is a product that processes information, so has 
endless applications. It can work wherever information can 
be used to run or control operations, eg a switch to turn 
on household heating, a calculator a fuel level indicator, 
etc. The number of applications and their economic 
feasibility grows as the product becomes more powerful and 
the cost per function drops. The computer is an informa- 
tion processor used both on its own and in tandem with 
other industrial systems. It depends on the chip as its 
key component. 2 ' 3
This study focuses on the manufacture of the central 
processing unit or the brain of the computer. This product 
focus, however, is obscured by the complex interrelation- 
ship of hardware and software. To produce a finished 
product, a firm must design, manufacture and test the
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hardware and software operating system together.^ In fact, 
software is a critical factor in the success of both 
computer and semi-conductor firms in defining and 
capturing markets. The chapter's discussion of software, 
however, is limited to its role in altering the costs and 
strategies in microelectronics multinationals.
The US semi-conductor and computer industries have 
different yet intimately intertwined economic histories 
and structures. Their interdependence derives from the 
relationship of their product technologies. This chapter 
discusses the development of the two sectors in parallel, 
tying them together where similar and exploring the 
dynamics of their relationship.
*    2 THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ...SEMICONDUCTOR AND 
COMPUTER INDUSTRIES THROUGH THE 1970s
4.. 2. 1 The Product Market
The semi-conductor industry, a $13 billion market by 
1979, gained attention because of its exceptionally high 
growth rates year after year. While the growth rate for 
the entire electronics industry (that is, consumer and 
capital goods) averaged 20% and 23% annually for the US 
and Europe, respectively, between 1963 and 1973, the sales 
of integrated circuits Cics) grew 541% and 60O%, annual 
averages, in those markets over the same period calculated 
from data in Scibberas, 1977). 5 That phenomenal growth 
continued into the 1980s: from 1979 through 1981, the 
value of worldwide shipments of ics grew by an annual 
average of 31% (Cane, 1981A). The growth resulted from the 
rapid proliferation of new microelectronics applications 
for standardised memory chips throughout industry. By the 
mid 1980s there was concern about slowed growth. However, 
the slower growth rate still far exceeded that in 
traditional industries. World sales between 1981 and 1985 
grew 21% (annual average: Sylvester, 1985A).
The US computer industry, too, expanded rapidly in 
the 1970s due to, amongst other factors, a more generally 
perceived need for computing power and better developed 
and marketed applications. As Table 4.1 shows, the value
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of global shipments by US-based firms grew throughout the 
late 1970s, averaging 15% p.a., while US GNP averaged only 
4.2% growth (1977 - 1979).
TABLE 4.1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER MARKET*
Shipments of US-Based Manufacturers
No. of 
Systems 
Shipped
Percent 
Increase
$M Value 
Shipped
Percent 
Increase
1976
1977
1978
1979
198O
1981
1982
1983E
1984FC
35,800
50,690
88,000
161,070
221,980
330,070
497, 190
707,4.50
976,940
+42%
+74
4-83
+38
4-49
4-51
4-42
4-38
6,234
7,214
9, 112
10,627
11,252
12,296
13,778
15,714
18,244
Average
Annual
Increase 4- 52%
4-16%
4-26
4-17
4- 6 
4- 9 
4-12 
4-14 
4-16
4-15%
Source International Data Corporation, 
Reprinted in F; inain!.cia_l_..TjLme  s., 
April 11, 1983
* The data refers to totals of all general purpose 
(mainframe) computers, minis, small business computers, 
desktop computers and other systems (such as IBM's S/7) 
shipped by US-based manufacturers.
US computer and semi-conductor firms dominated world 
markets throughout the 1960's and much of the 197O's. 7 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the overwhelming domination 
of both the computer and semi-conductor markets by US 
firms. Uhile some European economies had major electronics 
producers that dominated their local markets (eg ICL in 
the UK in the early 1970's), indigenous firms came under 
severe attack by US multinationals in the 1970's. The US 
producers had, for the most part, superior technologies, 
product responses to fast-paced markets and price for 
performance indicators. US firms also dominated the
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TABLE 4.2. SHARE OF SALES OF GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTERS
(Mainframes)
UK Market Only* World Market Share**
1964 1968 1972 1973 1978 
IBM 4O 23.4 38.4 65.8 64.2
Burroughs O.9 6.4 3.9 6.6 7.6
Univac/
Sperry 2.5 8.8 3.7 7.1 7.1
NCR 7.6 10.7 2.9 3.8 3.9
Control Data - 5.4 1.8 3.0 2.4
Honeywell 5.2 6.4 7.0 12.6 11. O
BUNCH Total 16.2 32.6 19.3 33.1 32.0 
UK Cos. 42.5 41.9 30.5
Others :
IBM-PCMMs - - 1.3
Other 1.1 2.5
* Source: Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
Subcommittee D, House of Commons, U K C o m P u t e r I nd us try, 
HC 272; Volume II - Appendices, Appendix 2; 1969/197O. 
Also Aj5p.ejn.d._i.cjej^_^^ Select Committee 
on Science and Technology, Subcommittee A; Appendix 14; 
October, 1973.
**Source: FJ. ria_nc_i_a,l_T.i me_s , September 21, 1979; Reprinted 
in Locksley, Table 2.9, p25.
development and control of the minicomputer segment, the 
faster-growing segment in the 1970' s. (Micros did not 
exist then. ) In the semiconductor industry US-based firms 
dominated the technological innovations, as well as world 
sales from the industry's inception through most of the 
1970s, as indicated in Table 4.3.
4.2.2 e J5 £_r U.g^
The US computer industry was an oligopoly. It 
maintained a fairly stable market structure throughout the 
1960's and mid-1970's (See Table 4.2.), both in terms of
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market leadership and distribution of market shares. 
Markusen (1986) found the US industry modestly 
concentrated: four firms accounted for 51% of sales (1981; 
see Table 4.5). However, that concentration declined 
throughout the late 1970*s. IBM dominated the market from
TABLE 4.3 RANKING OF TOP COMPUTER FIRMS BY UORLD SALES
Sales Share of 
World Minicomputer 
Market* 
1975
Ranking by Sales in 
All Computer Markets**
1981
DEC (US) 37.0
Hewlett-
Packard 17.4
Control Data 8.4
Honeywell 4. 6
General
Automation 4.4
(US)
Texas
Instruments
TOTAL
4. 1
75.9%
IBM (US)
DEC (US)
Control Data (US)
Burroughs (US)
NCR (US)
Sperry (US)
Hewlett-Packard
Fujitsu (Japan) 
Honeywell (US) 
ICL (UK)
*Source: International Data Corporation, Reprinted in 
Scibberas, Senker and Swords-Isherwood, Stud_y___o_f __the___UK
' SPRU, September, 1978.
** Source: F. in a n c i_a 1 _ T i m e s , April 3, 1983.
1955; five corporations, known as the BUNCH - Burroughs, 
Univac (later Sperry), NCR, Control Data and Honeywell - 
followed in market share. However, IBM led the pack by 
far: it held 71% of total world sales (1977) and its total 
revenues were seven times those of its nearest competitor 
(1979). Each of the competitors held onto particular end- 
user markets as their revenue bases. Competition between 
them focused on adapting product to particular uses and on 
improving price/performance ratios.
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TABLE 4.4 UORLD MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR SEMICONDUCTOR
MERCHANT MULTINATIONALS 
Percent Shares
1972 1976 1978 1980 1984* 
US Firms 37.9 43.5 38.7 41.9 44.IE
Japanese
Firms 12.1 17.8 24.2 21.5 36.7E
Source: O'Connor, 1983; Table V.I, p!30.
* Source: Global Electronics Information Newsletter, 
March, 1985. The data from the two sources are not 
strictly comparable. The figures for 1978 through 1980 
derive from the industry's top 20 firms, while the data in 
the final column refers to the industry's top 50 firms. 
However, the figures correctly reflect the growth in the 
number of Japanese competitors and their rather sudden 
entrance in world markets. Before 1979/80 their market 
share primarily reflected their sales in the Japanese 
economy.
TABLE 4.5. CONCENTRATION RATIOS FOR US COMPUTER
" PRODUCERS
Bases on Percent Value of Shipments by
Largest Firms
.. 1972. 1977
CR4 67% 51% 44% 
CR8 83% 64% 56%
Source: Markusen, 1986; Data from Figure CP5 in 
draft manuscript, p9.
However, the development of the minicomputer outside 
the computer producer establishment signaled the entry in 
the mid-197O's of new competitors, altering the nature of 
competition. By 1981 one of those start-ups, Digital 
Equipment Corporation (DEC) had become the second largest 
computer producer in the world.
In addition, a number of new firms producing IBM- 
compatible machines entered the market in the early 1970's 
to exploit IBM's huge customer base. While their growth 
had little impact on total market concentration, they did
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challenge the market leaders' competitive strategies. IBM 
management could no longer depend on continuing sales to 
existing customers to support and expand its revenue base. 
The rest of the BUNCH faced a more difficult marketing job 
because customers suddenly had the choice of a much wider 
variety of product capabilities within the IBM operating 
system.
The semi-conductor industry was more volatile. Uhile 
the concentration ratios looked relatively stable 
throughout the 1970* s, the firms included in the CR4 and 
CR8 rankings changed every few years, as indicated in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Three firms in the 1972 top eight 
world producers had fallen out of the ranking by 1980, and 
three new firms had gained significant market share (Table 
4.7). Many of the industry's firms were growing very fast 
during this period, doubling their revenues every two 
years. However, two US firms remained market leaders by a 
wide margin - Texas Instruments (TI) and Motorola.
TABLE 4.6. IDJDUJ5J^^
Based on World Market Revenues
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
CR4 
CR8
32%
47%
36% 
52%
31% 
48%
30% 
49%
30% 
47%
25% 
39%
Source: 0*Connor (1983).
While there was some industry consolidation during 
the 197O's, market power was actually more widely 
dispersed by 1982. The concentration ratios, particularly 
CR4, had dropped significantly and the revenues earned by 
the top ten world producers had declined as a proportion 
of the total world market (from 54% in 1980 to 44% in 
1982). This reflected the growing competitive strength of 
new entrants, often smaller specialist firms. Also, end- 
user firms became a major source of competition in the 
industry. Those that were large buyers of chips began
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TABLE 4.7. ....... S EMI. - C OND U C10 R ._ _FI R M S
Ranked in Descending Order by Value 
of World Sales
Market Rank (% Market Share)
TEXAS
INSTRUMENTS
(US)
MOTOROLA
(US)
PHILIPS
(Neth)
FAIRCHILD
(US)
TOSHIBA
(Japan)
HITACHI
(Japan)
ITT
(US)
RCA -US \
SIEMENS /
(Germany)
SGES-ATES
(Italy)
NATIONAL
SEMICONDUCTOR
(US)
NEC
(Japan)
INTEL
(US)
SIEMENS
IBM**
(US)
SIGNETICS
(US)
AMD
(US)
GENERAL INSTRUMENT
(US)
.1972
1 (11.8)
2 ( 9.8)
3 ( 5.1)
4 ( 4-.8)
5 ( 4.2)
6 ( 3.9)
7 ( 2.8)
8 ( 2.3)
9 ( 2.2) 
10 ( 2.1)
1 (11.4)
2 ( 8.0)
6 ( 4.5)
4 ( 5.3)
8 ( 4.0)
7 ( 4.2)
9 ( 3.2)
1.980
1 (11.2)
2 ( 7.8)
9 ( 3.9)
8 ( 4.0)
6 ( 4.6)
5 ( 4.7)
5 ( 4.5)
3 ( 6.0)
10 ( 2.6)
3 ( 5.5)
4 ( 5.4)
7 ( 4.1) 
10 ( 3.0)
14
.1984
1 (7.2)
2 (7.1) 
8 (3.0)
3 (6.O)
4 (5.6)
6 (3.9)
2 (7.1)
7 (3.6)
5
8
9
16
(4.7) 
(3.0) 
(2.9)
SOURCES: 0* Connor ,( 1983) ; Tables V.I and V.2; p!30-l.
.
(1985 ) .
** NOTE: Captive producer not included in earlier 
calculations.
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.1972. 1.9.Z4. 1980. 1984
TOP 4 COS. 31.5 % 30.7% 29.9% 27.4%
TOP 10 COS. 49 % 53.8% 54.1% 51.1%
designing and manufacturing their own chips internally to 
protect their proprietorial information about the 
technology and to ensure a reliable supply. These captive 
producers, as they are called, reduced the growth of the 
commercial chip market. 8 In addition, the leadership 
changed and Japanese firms, such as NEC, gained market 
power.
The phenomenal growth in both industries resulted 
from and further propelled new product technologies, 
particularly, in the semi-conductor industry. There firms 
introduced new products every few years, each a 
technological improvement by several orders of magnitude. 
By 1980, engineers were doubling the memory capacity of a 
chip every year and its operating speed every three years 
(Vedin, 1980). 9 The increased capability and reduced 
price per function of new products opened up new 
applications and thus new markets. The pace of change in 
product characterisitics had to be matched by changing 
production technologies, 10 so the economic description of 
these industries must turn to the technologies of 
production.
4.2.3 ^._...._.............. -__.
In both industries the technical requirements of each 
of the stages of production - product research and 
development (R&D), design, manufacture, final assembly and 
testing - differed sharply from one another in their 
proportionate dependence on capital, labour and other 
resources. When competitive pressures forced firms to make 
economies, strategies reflected the differing options in 
each stage of production. Because the operational and 
information links between stages were minimal, the
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processes could be geographically separated and dispersed, 
allowing firms to take advantage of opportunities for 
cost-cutting around the globe.
The first stages, research and development, invent 
and perfect the basic technical operation of a new 
product. Once the basic technology has been determined, 
chips must be designed. A designer must map out the paths 
of each transistor and complete circuit and must double- 
check that they will perform the expected function on a 
chip. Ulith the expanded complexity of LSI, the task has 
been likened to creating a functionally correct map of the 
sewer and electrical systems of Manhattan that will then 
be reduced onto a 1 square mm piece of silicon. The job 
requires an expert either in the electrical and 
communication properties being implanted on the chip or in 
the end-use application. Uith higher scales of 
integration, the task is aided by computers (computer- 
aided design, CAD) which specify, draw, and alter the 
design and simulate and check its functioning.
Fabrication of the silicon wafer refers to the 30O to 
50O chemical and mechanical processes that transform a 
slice of pure silicon into a wafer containing hundreds of 
integrated circuits. This is the most complex 
manufacturing ever adapted for mass production (Saxenian, 
1981). The slice of silicon is first chemically prepared, 
then oxidised to ready the surface for numerous deposits 
of chemical films. Then in photolithography a "mask" or 
pattern of each layer of circuits is projected onto the 
wafer in an optical, camera-like process. Chemical 
processes then etch those microscopic patterns into the 
silicon surface and treat the exposed pathways to create 
areas of electrical conductivity. Each series of processes 
to make one layer of circuits must be repeated for each of 
the dozens of circuit layers. Extreme precision in 
temperature and timing is essential to insure that each 
circuit is well formed and that the layers relate
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correctly to one another. Even one minute irregularity can 
ruin the whole wafer batch. The wafer is then put through 
a metalisation process, giving it a thin metallic coating. 
Fabrication ends with preliminary testing.
The next stages - assembly, packaging and final test 
- are called back-end activities. Once the wafer has been 
sawn into the individual die which will become chips, each 
good one is mounted into a package that looks a bit like 
an oblong centipede. Assembly requires extremely fine gold 
wires to be bonded under a microscope first to the minute 
outputs on the die then to the outlets, or pins, in the 
package. The package is then carefully sealed to protect 
the device from the outside world. While the 
specifications for each batch demand adjustments at each 
stage of fabrication, assembly and packaging are 
practically identical across products, differing primarily 
in the number of wires and pins. In final test, the 
finished chips are visually inspected for imperfections, 
then put through a sequence of electrical and atmospheric 
tests on electronic instruments to insure the chips will 
perform as required.
Each time the firm decides to introduce a product 
with more transistors and circuits, every procedure from 
design through final test becomes more difficult because 
it must be done more precisely. The size of each 
connection has been reduced yet must be constructed as 
perfectly as before. The production equipment must be 
better controlled and more sensitive. Frequently one 
machine cannot be stretched to produce more than one or 
two generations of product. New products often require new 
capital equipment.
Given that the costs of fabrication can better be 
amortised when the number of chips on one wafer has been 
increased, industry leaders pushed hard to reduce the size 
of each chip while increasing its density to lower unit 
cost. That drive to miniaturise has dominated the industry 
since its beginning and succeeded in creating the 
phenomenally rapid changes in product capability (Hodges,
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September, 1977). The industry's technologists doubled the 
number of elements squeezed onto one chip every year from 
1959 through 1977 (Noyce, 1977 in Forester, 1981). This 
pace of change demanded continuing new investment in 
production technologies.
The Manufacture of a Computer
The steps in producing a computer more closely 
resemble a traditional assembly process. The design of the 
hardware, an extremely complex, information-intensive 
product, requires both computer tools (CAD) and people who 
understand intimately how the instrument communicates and 
how it will be used. The people developing the software - 
either the operating system or application package - must 
have access to the hardware specifications and frequently 
need to communicate and negotiate with hardware designers. 
This relationship became closer as product complexity 
increased. The product was assembled in many cases on a 
traditional conveyor belt assembly line. First the 
subassemblies (eg, the power supply and the keyboards) are 
put together. Also the individual circuit boards are 
'stuffed, ' that is, loaded with chips and other 
electronic components, then the chips are soldered on. 
They must then be tested. All of the subassemblies are 
inserted into the computer cabinet and the boards are 
loaded into their drawers. Then all parts are wired 
together. The machine is thoroughly tested, checking the 
operation of all connections and components and simulating 
the machine's usage to insure the software and hardware 
perform the necessary functions.
4.3 THE lii^JMO.!!:^ 
I NDIJ ST R 7
4.3.1 Ih_e___Se.m i_^c on djucjbor _I ndu s.t _ry.
It was clear even in the early 1970' s that the 
product cycle of the semi-conductor would create economic 
problems. The US industry focused almost exclusively on
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creating new, cleverer products to create new markets 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1983). The difficulty and 
complexity of designing new, more complex and smaller 
devices led to a long and expensive lead time before a 
product could be introduced. That product then typically 
had only three to six years on the market (Chang, 1971) 
before a product innovation would be introduced and it was 
considered technologically and economically obsolete. The 
monopoly period for an innovative firm to reap excess 
profits from a product it introduced was even shorter and 
highly uncertain. It was relatively easy to copy a new 
product technology once it was on the market: the 
innovative firm soon lost its position of technological 
leadership. ^
With semi-conductor producers racing to miniaturise 
the circuits on a chip to reduce the cost per unit of 
information (bit), management needed a strategy that would 
generate sufficient funds to pay for new product 
development over the relatively brief market life of their 
products. The strategy for most firms was to concentrate 
resources on standardised volume devices - memory and 
logic chips (Borrus, 1983) and to aim to capture large 
market share as quickly as possible to gain experience and 
economies of scale to gain further reductions in unit 
cost. They used price cuts to create additional demand. 12
The aim was to generate large revenues quickly to 
fund the development work for the next product generation. 
Revenues from continuing sales growth would provide return 
on the capital investment. More fundamentally, efforts to 
increase output volume were necessary to gain the 
technological expertise to improve the quality and speed 
of production. The learning curve strategy dominated the 
industry's development. This engineering concept proposes 
that moving quickly into mass production requires 
production staff to solve production problems early and 
quickly which leads to better output quality (yield - the
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number of good die on a wafer). This pushes unit cost down 
which, when passed onto the market, generates greater 
demand, supporting increased output and continuing 
engineering learning curve gains. The faster a firm moved 
down the learning curve, the greater its technological and 
economic advantage over competitors. Competitors, without 
having achieved the savings in unit cost, would be forced 
to meet the leader's low price to stay in the market; this 
resulted in reduced profit margins unless they achieved 
similar economies. 
The concept became a competitive rule: each doubling 
of the cumulative units of devices produced led to a fixed 
percentage reduction in price. From 1964 to 1975 that 
price reduction averaged 27.6% (estimated in constant 
dollars by Benjamin Rosen; O'Connor, 1983; Figure IV.4). 
TI, the market leader, ruthlessly rode the learning curve 
to maintain a dynamic technological lead on the industry 
throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's. Management in 
competitor firms raced to match the progressively deeper 
price cuts in semi-conductor products that persisted into 
the 1980's. 
The key to the viability of this strategy was 
continuing increases in product demand. While the 
Department of Defense created most of the demand and 
subsidised the industry early in its development (94% in 
1963, O'Connor, 1983; Siegel, 1980; Mowery, 1982), the 
computer industry's demand for chips created explosive 
market growth in the 1970's which enabled US firms to 
dominate the world market (MacIntosh, 1979).13 The two 
industries fostered each other's technological and 
growth. Falling chip prices promoted increased demand in 
enduser markets and fostered the development and 
exploitation of new applications. All of the industry's 
competitors benefited to some extent from this rapid 
diffusion of the product technology and the wider customer 
base. As Table 4.8 shows, the US producers increased their 
delivered output of the 64K RAM by a factor of more than 
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t.w_!~Qty as its price dropped. Many volume producers thrived 
on this rapid expansion of the market.
Table 4.8. CHRONOLOGY. OF PRICE CHANGES FOR_THE
Average US - Cumulative
Shipments
Selling Price By US Firms
1980. Q3 $45
04 30 190,000
1981. 01 20
02 15
03 9
Q4 7 3,806,000
1982 5
Source: 0* Connor (1983),
Table IV. 11; p. 113.
A number of manufacturers operated, instead, a 
"niche* strategy to protect their prices and profits from 
this relentless pressure to reduce cost. These firms 
produced devices for specialised applications, so were 
less price-sensitive. Niche strategies could produce high 
profits. Intel, for example, pioneered highly advanced, 
very fast devices, particularly the microprocessor. The 
firm designed successive generations of product that were 
ahead of the industry. With this specialty and its 
technological lead, Intel could charge a premium for its 
clever devices. In this case, the niche strategy 
propelled the firm into industry leadership (seventh in 
world sales by 1980).
This strategy, however, could not completely or 
permanently protect a firm from market competition. The 
specialty market had to be sufficiently large and growing 
to generate a revenue base that would support the costly 
capital investment for production. The strategy was also 
not without large costs and risks. Success in niche 
markets still required producers to have first-hand
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experience of mass production methods to provide the 
technological know-how to keep production yield high. Also 
there was always the possibility that a new product would 
be introduced that would steal the niche or make it 
obsolete. Throughout the 1970*s new devices were 
continually introduced which were faster, cheaper, more 
flexible and more innovative. A niche company could lose 
its market overnight. As a result, competitive pressure 
forced these firms, too, to offer more advanced products 
frequently: customers watching the functional capability 
of standard devices improving daily grew to expect similar 
improvements in specialised products. Also, these firms in 
most cases had to continue mass-producing memory chips to 
maintain manufacturing expertise.
The development of the microprocessor changed 
competition in the US semi-conductor industry. This 
product could be mass produced then programmed to fit 
individual customers' needs. The chip had a standardised 
structure, but could be programmed to fulfill a wide range 
of uses. Because they could be mass produced, these 
"computers on a chip* could be supplied at a cost low 
enough to create widespread demand. Most of the major 
producers, driven by the market to supply a complete range 
of chip products, began producing microprocessors and the 
necessary support devices.
Two important changes resulted. First, the micro- 
processor is no longer a component: it is a partial or 
complete system. Consequently the semi-conductor firms 
had to develop closer contact with potential customers to 
understand thoroughly the use of the microprocessor in 
order to design the chip and its software appropriately. 
Servicing the market was outside the expertise of mass 
producers, a gap which encouraged the entry of new, start- 
up firms.
Secondly, concern about technological exposure led 
more major computer firms to produce these chips 
internally» either by starting from scratch or by 
acquiring an independent firm. These firms wanted to
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avoid technological and price dependence on outside 
producers for a chip that was essentially the brain of 
their computer products (Borrus et al, 1983; Bierman, 
1982; Keyhoe, 1982C; Ernst, 1983; O~Connor, 1983). 14 High 
R&D and capital costs, which had formerly limited 
competition in the industry, did not deter these large 
firms. Competition by captive producers further reduced 
the growth in the chip market and, by buying up 
independent producers, increased the concentration of the 
semi-conductor industry. This put significant new 
pressure on established semi-conductor companies. The 
captive producers had vast sums of money to devote to R&D, 
pressuring independents to generate greater revenues. 
Furthermore, captive producers, by designing and producing 
their own state of the art chips, denied the merchant 
firms access to the information and expertise they needed 
to develop advanced chips for new products. Some chip 
firms compensated for these losses by integrating forward 
to sell consumer and computer products. These changes 
increased the competition, financial exposure and 
instability in the industry.
4.3.2 T.he._Compu .t;.eir._. I.ndustr. X.
  In the computer industry IBM served as the industry 
price and performance setter for the US and world markets. 
The rest of the BUNCH followed IBM's lead. They introduced 
their own models (architecture systems that were not 
compatible with IBM's) and attempted to undercut IBM's 
price while offering the same or better performance. The 
history of the computer industry had some of the 
excitement of a television melodrama: at times IBM lashed 
out with price or performance surprises when its market 
share was threatened. The pricing arid new model procedures 
were, more usually, well contained within a stable 
industry framework.
Each firm depended critically on maintaining its 
customer base, which constrained any radical departure in 
competitive strategy. Each firm was simultaneously
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competing with other firms over new and improved products 
while trying to maintain customer satisfaction with older 
machines: that customer base provided a continuing revenue 
flow. Systems vendors expected their customers to buy 
replacement machines - this generated 60 to 70% of the 
producer's revenues (Duncari, 1981). To some extent the 
BUNCH producers targeted market segments, eg, Burroughs in 
accounting and business applications, to control their 
market base.
Dependence on the existing customer base restricted 
the parameters of industry competition. This was 
particularly true for the huge firm of IBM. Introducing a 
major breakthrough or a machine with a price/performance 
ratio far better than earlier models would in effect make 
earlier models redundant. This jeopardised the firm's 
replacement revenues and, because of the uncertainty 
suddenly created, potential revenues for the new 
product. 16 So cost-cutting was the most common market 
strategy in the computer industry for many years. IBM 
could exploit its huge economies of scale and the rest of 
the pack could attempt through improved design and 
marketing to find new customers to improve their market 
share and profit margins.
The introduction of the mini-computer shook UP the 
industry's relatively stable competition. "Minis', 
developed by the DEC and Data General Corporation, 17 
became the fastest growing sector of the market because 
these smaller and cheaper machines rivalled the 
performance of established mainframe products 
(DeJonquieres, 198OE). Also, the new firms targeted their 
new product at the office and data processing markets, the 
customer base of the established giants. The smaller 
machines could be distributed throughout a business - a 
faster, more efficient and cheaper use of information - by 
eliminating the need to queue projects through a 
centralised data processing department. 18 The mini's 
cheaper processing of information transformed computer 
usage and markets, stealing part of the replacement sales
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from established leaders. They soon introduced minis of 
their own. The new machines, made possible by remarkable 
improvements in the technological capability of chips,* 9 
dramatically improved the duality of computers while 
simultaneously reducing the cost per function of 
information processing. The resulting reduction in the 
price/performance ratio for computers (falling at a rate 
of 25% per annum for small mainframes throughout the 
197O's and 1980*s; Duncan, 1981) 2° put continual downward 
pressure on the selling price for all computer hardware. 
At the same time, competition forced most computer firms 
to supply a full range of computers, including minis, 
which escalated the pressure to increase R&D, already a 
relatively large expense for the industry.'21 The attempt 
by ic firms to sell computer systems was a further 
discouragement to established computer producers from 
initiating any major technological collaboration with ic 
firms.
Structural change in the two industries grew out of 
the new opportunities created by these technological 
innovations. The capability of one chip to contain an 
entire electronic system invited new competitors who could 
specialise in the design of and software support for 
specialised chips. The availability of programmable 
computers-on~a-chip and of memory devices that could store 
huge amounts of information transformed the concept of 
computers and both the demand and supply sides of the 
market. The mini-computer forced computer firms to offer a 
wider range of products and, consequently, to deepen their 
R&D commitment. Competition in the 197O's forced firms in 
both industries to provide a continuing flow of new 
products. The associated expense of product development 
for competitors sat uneasily next to cutthroat pricing, 
behavior more usually associated with mature products and 
industries.
An important element of competition in both 
industries was the phenomenal rate of technological and 
market change throughout the 1970's. The number of
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transistors (the fundamental connection or switch in a 
circuit) which could be'crammed onto the surface of a chip 
had risen a thousandfold since 1970 (DeJonquieres and 
Keyhoe, 1984.), which vastly increased the numbers of 
things a chip could do. The cost of a unit of solid state 
memory fell by the same order of magnitude over the same 
few years. Design engineers had doubled the number of 
circuits on a chip every year and a half for most of the 
1960's and 197O's. An analogy dramatises the magnitude of 
this innovative pace:
"...[I]f transport technology had progressed 
from stagecoach to Concorde as rapidly as 
electronics technology since the (development 
of the) transistor, Concorde would be able 
to carry half a million passengers at twenty 
million miles per hour...[And] a ticket for 
the Concorde flight would have to cost less 
than a penny if it were to compare with the 
rate at which microelectronics has gotten 
cheaper." (Rosenberg, 1982; plSl)
This pace multiplied the risk of and pressure on the 
design phase for a new computer product. Computer 
designers had to thoroughly understand the operation of 
every new chip. Each new computer product had to be 
designed to use the newest devices extremely cleverly in 
order to maximise the potential sales life of the product, 
so it will continue to sell even after the next generation 
of ics was introduced. Simultaneously, managers have 
pressured their development departments to minimise if not 
reduce the development cycle to exploit new products 
commercially as quickly as possible. A similar race was 
going on in the leading ic companies. In both cases 
development costs were rising while the sales life 
shortened and the uncertainty of payback increased.
Each successive year of competition sharpened the 
pincer-like pressures of high and rising development costs 
and fast-falling prices. Management in both industries 
had problems in cost-containment and product planning. 
Reducing some costs was essential to maintaining 
competitive prices and profit margins. Management sought
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cost reduction opportunities that could be exploited 
quickly and easily and that would not jeopardise corporate 
technological progress. Both industries, in spite of their 
differences, targeted production labour, the cost 
considered the most amenable to reduction. Both industries 
had production processes that could be divided up, 
separated and dispersed geographically (Storper and 
Ualker, 1983) : that enabled management to minimise 
production costs in a unique way.
Both the US semi-conductor and computer industries 
fanned out across the globe during the late 1960's and 
early 1970' s for very similar reasons. Firms responded to 
downward pressure on prices by locating plants in the Far 
East to take advantage of dramatically lower labour costs 
for lesser skilled labour. Government policies in many of 
the Far Eastern countries encouraged this investment, 
helping firms expand rapidly to meet fast-growing product 
demand. The savings possible from locating manual 
manufacturing for standard products in the Far East were 
so great that once one firm did it, competition compelled 
all the other large and many small competitors to follow 
suit to maintain their profit margins.
In the early 1960's, management of US firms 
recognised the different economies of the separate stages 
of production. Fair-child Semiconductor, the "mother* of 
many of the ideas and most of Silicon Valley's ic firms, 
targeted the reduction of labour costs in the labour- 
intensive assembly and testing operations. At that time 
labour costs were 4.5% of the total cost of producing a 
semi-conductor (NACLA, 1977). There was then no 
alternative to the manual assembly of chips: no machine 
could reliably bond and wire the products' many sizes and 
shapes. While there were efforts to automate computer 
assembly (most notably IBM's), firms relied on manual 
methods because they were cheaper and more flexible. 
Because these manual activities could be separated from
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design and advanced manufacturing, managers realised that 
dispersing them to a low-wage economy would dramatically 
reduce costs. Fairchild relocated die-bonding, wire- 
bonding and packaging of chips from California to Hong 
Kong in 1962, then to South Korea in 1966.
>
US tariff policy also fostered "off-shoring'. Items 
806.30 and 807.00 imposed only a limited duty on the 
importation of (in the former case) certain metal articles 
that had been previously processed in the US and (in the 
latter) articles assembled from US-made components. The . 
import duty, based only on the value added outside the US, 
was very low because of the exceptionally low wages in the 
Far East. The fact that standardised assembly and 
packaging could be separated and performed by relatively 
unskilled (what came to be called semi-skilled) 22 workers 
gave firms the opportunity to take advantage of these 
regulations. These activities did not require a large 
contingent of highly trained technical personnel, as 
fabrication would, and inexperienced assemblers and 
testers only needed a few weeks' training. Furthermore, 
global shipping was quick and inexpensive because 
completed wafers and components were small, light and 
fairly sturdy and could be shipped by air. Competition 
forced all of Fairchild's competitors to flock to the Far 
Eastern locations to match Fairchild's cost advantage. The 
growth of back-end activities was rapid and spectacular 
(Chang, 1971). By 1979, all of the top twelve ic 
producers, all US firms, had set UP at least two and in 
many cases four, five or six assembly plants in the Far 
East. 25 Many Japanese and European firms followed suit. 
Offshore plants provided unbeatable "low tech" cost- 
savings in a market where price-slashing was a continuing 
competitive strategy. 24"
The computer industry, because of the nature of the 
product and its heavy dependence on government markets, 
traditionally had to be close to its customers to win 
large contracts. Computer systems, then, were usually 
customised, so designers, marketers and sales people had
84
to know the requirements of potential buyers to present 
and sell these specialised, differentiated capital goods. 
In addition, with such a large proportion of a company's 
total turnover dependent on resale to existing customers, 
firms had to maintain contact with customers to insure 
they could design and sell appropriate upgraded equipment 
and peripherals to that customer base. Consequently, the 
computer industry early in its history expanded globally 
by investing in the major industrial, European community 
economies to qualify for military and other large 
government agency contracts. Once the Common Market was 
formed, industry leaders dispersed high value added 
manufacture (eg, for central processing units) inside EEC 
tariff walls. 25
Improved price/performance ratios and the 
introduction of the mini in the 197O's made computers 
feasible for many data management uses, particularly for 
scientific and engineering design work, and greatly 
expanded potential markets. Locating high value added 
manufacture and de'sign work inside the EEC continued to be 
important for computer firms. Design and development work 
located near major government buyers was mainly product 
modification: firms centralised research and most of 
product development in the home-base economy where secrets 
could be better awarded and where experienced technical 
personnel were concentrated. At the same time, assembly of 
the standardised sub-systems and peripherals was, as in 
the semi-conductor industry, dispersed to low wage 
economies, 26 often in the Far East. By the 197O's the EEC 
tariff persuaded a number of the US computer 
multinationals that they could reduce costs on a number of 
products by locating all manufacturing inside the Market. 
They did this by tapping a specific cheap labour force for 
labour-intensive low-skilled assembly - "married" (often 
rural) women (Massey and Megan, 1978). Burroughs, for 
example, claimed that its British operations (assembling 
the central processor and many peripherals) supplied
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products at 6O% of US production costs (Hu, 1973). (See 
discussion in Chapter 6. )
Most of the semi-conductor and computer industries 
concentrated R&D and advanced manufacturing, as well as 
corporate planning and administration, in a California 
region called Silicon Valley. The computer industry, as 
an older industry, often had headquarters elsewhere in the 
US.^ However, by the 1970* s the dynamism of Silicon 
Valley demanded a presence (eg, R&D) in California.
-....... se_.._a.nd | J3j.se -__ of .. ..._. ....
This section profiles the development of Silicon 
Valley. ^ ° The microelectronics industry began with 
Uilliam Shockley's success in building more than one 
transistor in a solid substrate, then miniaturising them 
in California in the 1950* s. His employees at Bell Labs 
started the spin-off process: they got backing to start 
their own company, Fairchild Semiconductor, which in turn 
spawned almost fifty new firms over the fifteen years from 
1957. 29
These and other firms stayed in Santa Clara County, a 
valley of orchards, for a number of reasons. Since World 
War II grants had funded a ballooning 'industry' of 
electronics R&D at Stanford University labs to design 
military components and equipment. Post-war weapons and 
missiles contracts from the Department of Defense also 
created a boom for the West Coast aerospace industry, of 
which Lockheed in Santa Clara County was a major actor. 
This generated demand for high tech electronics products, 
encouraging many large electrical/electronics firms to set 
up nearby in the 1940' s and 1950' s. Stanford University, 
specifically Fred Terman, was instrumental in this. The 
University donated land to start a high-tech industrial 
park. The university simultaneously expanded its 
exceptional science and techology programmes and labs 
during the period. By the 195O' s the region had a rich and 
growing base of highly trained engineers, on-going 
advanced research activity and technology-intensive firms.
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Silicon Valley became a magnet for idea people and became 
the most attractive place to cultivate, expand and 
capitalise on those ideas and the people who created them. 
University-industry proximity provided a hothouse for 
technological competition and innovation. Dissatisfied 
engineers from the labs and firms frequently set up their 
own firms nearby. Barriers to entry were still low, 30 and 
the region offered start-up firms opportunities for 
technical exchange and for tapping the technical labour 
market. Industry suppliers and support services also 
flocked to the region.
The area also offered the cultural and educational 
"quality-of-life' that attracted highly educated 
professionals - a significant, if over-rated feature of 
the Valley. By 1970, Silicon Valley had become the most 
concentrated centre of electronics enterprises in the US 
and the world (Keyhoe, 1982E). As the successes grew in 
number and riches, venture capital for new ideas flowed 
more plentifully into the region. Silicon Valley became 
the world leader in microelectronics exploitation and 
innovation.
Semi-conductor firms starting up in the Valley, often 
with just a few engineers, established both research and 
production facilities. Once the economies of shipping 
lower-skilled work to the Far East became apparent, 
management concentrated in California those activities 
that depended on technology-trained personnel in 
California - R&D, advanced manufacturing, and final 
testing. Seventy-nine percent of the R&D activity of Santa 
Clara-based firms was concentrated in the county, while 
management had dispersed ninety-seven percent of the 
assembly work offshore (Markusen, 1986). Advanced 
manufacturing, for example, chip fabrication, employed one 
highly skilled engineer for every two or three semi- 
skilled workers (Saxenian, 1981; Markusen, 1986).
A few features unique to the development of Silicon 
Valley guided corporate strategies in coping with the 
1980*s. The importance of technology personnel to company
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profitability, the continuing dependence on large numbers 
of relatively unskilled production workers, and the 
phenomenal pace of industry growth all shaped industry 
pressures and adjustments.
High tech companies in the Valley gained a world-wide 
reputation for cultivating their scientific and technical 
personnel - the source of the ideas that created new 
products markets and profits. In addition to lavish 
expenditures on gala parties31 , gymnasia and leisure 
facilities, management built firms to enhance the informal 
communications amongst and active participation of these 
idea people (Howard, 1981), avoiding rigid bureaucracies 
and tiresome procedures. Ideas were at the centre of 
company, industry and regional success. The idea was to 
keep ideas and the people creating them contented and 
inside the firm.
Production, however, required lesser-skilled workers, 
too. Employment of operatives in the San Jose area32 grew 
to 11,510 by 1974, doubling the 1966 level (Green, 1983; 
Table 12-6, p.311). While the industry's growth in the 
1970's resulted in continuing increases in technical jobs, 
the industry also continued to rely on a significant 
number of relatively unskilled workers. 33 For example, 
about forty percent of a typical Silicon Valley chip 
producer's 1971 employment was professional, techical, 
managerial and marketing staff, while less than half (48%) 
was production workers (Saxenian, 1981). 34
The microelectronics industry's explosive growth in 
Silicon Valley and competitive success bred serious 
problems that were associated with the industry's 
dependence on both highly skilled technical staff and 
production workers. 35 Regional employment grew by 156% 
from 1960 to 1975. Housing costs skyrocketed as a 
result. 36 Heavier usage clogged the county's roads: 
commutes of two to three hours between home and work 
within the county became commonplace, particularly for 
lower-pay workers who had to live further away from work. 
Schools were crowded. The beauty and the quality of life
88
in the region, so important in attracting 4000 PhD's and 
other highly-paid professionals, deteriorated 
significantly. These developments, combined with 
increasing competition for labour at all levels, led to 
astronomic turnover rates. Managers of large high tech 
firms reported annual labour turnover of 25 to 40% 
(Interviews with Silicon Valley managers).
These problems translated into escalating pay for all 
industry employees (Saxenian, 1981; Keyhoe, 1982E). High 
turnover meant higher costs because of the operational 
slowdowns, unsolved technical problems, the expense of 
finding replacements, and a company's loss of technical 
information and possibly new products to the swelling 
field of competitors. To reduce turnover and counteract 
rising living costs, the industry continually increased 
wages and salaries - especially for electronics engineers 
and designers - throughout the 1970's (Saxenian, 1981; 
Keyhoe, 1982E). At the same time product market 
competition from the Japanese and the growing number of 
domestic producers forced cost-cutting. Rather than reduce 
the resources devoted to the idea people in the industry, 
management looked to production to find ways to save 
money.
4.4.2 J.h,e_ Fa.r_... Easjtj^^ y
Sending production to the Far East became an 
irresistible option because of the extremely low wages 
available there. "New' supplies of labour in 
underdeveloped economies offered seemingly endless 
potential to slash both the direct and indirect costs of 
production in relatively simple labour-intensive assembly 
operations that were such a large portion of ic and 
computer production costs (Chang, 1971; NACLA, 1977; Lim, 
1978; Scibberas, 1979; Hancock, 1980; Lineback, 1982; 
Borrus et al., 1983). 7 Average hourly wage costs in Hong 
Kong, for example, including supplementary compensation, 
were only 10% of those in the US in 1969/70 (Chang, 1971;
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P. 27). Table 4.9 lists wage rates in a number of the Far. 
Eastern economies that became important offshore locations 
for the microelectronics industry. Low wage rates 
translated into a 48% savings on the manufacturing costs 
of a chip in the early 1970's (1973: Parsons and Stowsky, 
1986). Ulhile average pay for US production workers had 
risen to $4.52 an hour by the late 1970*s (Saxenian, 
1981), the wage differential with the Far East still 
offered significant savings. As a result, the number of 
microelectronics firms and industry employment in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and later the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia grew rapidly (Siegel 
and Grossman; 1978; Froebel et al., 1980). Fairchild had 
located 7O% of its work force in Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore by the mid-1970's (Scibberas, 1979). Within 
three years of opening a plant in Malaysia, National 
Semiconductor employed more than 18,000 people in the Far 
East. By 1976 all of the major computer firms had offshore 
manufacturing sites in the Far East. As many as 300,000 
women were employed in the offshore electronics industry 
in Southeast Asia in 1979 (Grossman, 1979).
TABLE 4.9. UAGES IN THE FAR EAST
Average Hourly Wages Including Supplementary 
Compensation (US Dollars)
* *1970* 1980.
Hong Kong 0.28 1.20
Singapore 0.29 1.25
South Korea 0.33 2.00
Taiwan 0.80
Malaysia 0.6O
Philippines O.50
Indonesia 0.35
US 2.92 8.06
Source: * Chang (1971) from USITC Commission
Report; ** 0*Connor (1983), 
Table VII.15; p.339.
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The Far East offered multinationals other non-wage 
cost-minimising opportunities. Hiring and firing costs 
were minimal due to the continuing influx of rural women 
looking for work in these underemployed economies and due 
to the minimal training needed for the exported jobs. The 
industry relied predominantly on inexperienced female 
labour (Froebel et al., 1980; Siegel, 1981). 39 In fact, 
management in many firms targeted young unmarried women, 
age 16 to 25, when recruiting, using them to replace 
"older" women workers once exhaustion and eyestrain 
weakened their productivity (Siegel, 1981). 40 Employers 
found that (at least at the beginning) the supply of this 
young female labour force was highly elastic: whenever 
more workers were needed, they were easily found, and when 
demand slumped, they could be released to find employment 
elsewhere or return to their villages. 41 The gender and 
cultural characteristics of the labour supply in many of 
these countries made industry employment adjustments to 
cyclical change almost costless.
Benefits and other labour-related costs, which can 
double the wage bill, were also minimised in the Far East 
(Elson and Pearson, 1980). By hiring only young, unmarried 
women, employers avoided costs of maternity leave and 
family-related absenteeism (Siegel, 1980). In addition, a 
number of governments actively intervened to minimise 
foreign capital's labour problems. Governments outlawed 
strikes (Philippines: O'Connor, 1983) or unions (South 
Korea: Siegel, 1980), subsidised dormitories to keep 
workers near the plant, 42 and set UP Free Trade Zones 
surrounded by fences, enabling the lock-in or lock-out of 
workers during labour troubles (Froebel et al., 1980). 
State intervention through protective legislation was 
rare: firms were able to require long work days and work 
wee j<s (typically 48 to 60 hours), demand overtime with 
little compensation and fire problem workers (ie, low 
productivity or union sympathisers) without concern about 
worker recourse to legal rights.
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Industry analysts continue to argue that women's 
"nimble fingers' were the central factor in generating 
this offshore industry (See Froebel et al., 1980; Lim, 
1979). These plants typically required a very low capital 
investment (NACLA, 1977): pictures depicting typical 
Plants show banks and banks of women sitting at 
microscopes tending to microscopic assembly. The tasks of 
assembly were complex; technologies had not yet been 
developed to automate them reliably. The low labour costs 
made these low cost, low risk and highly flexible manual 
operations (Froebel et al., 1980) multinational 
management's choice for operating in a market well-known 
for its dramatic and unpredictable booms and busts.
The development of microelectronics multinationals in 
the Far East was a unique form of internationalisation. 
Traditional foreign direct investment typically led to 
setting up facilities to extract raw materials from 
resource-rich economies or to manufacture complete 
products that would replace exports from the home-base 
economy. The semiconductor and computer investments in the 
Far East were primarily part-process plants that shipped 
output back to the US or third markets. They were 
facilities that were tightly integrated into a 
multinational production and distribution schedule.
This global division of labour, dispersing labour- 
intensive manual operations to low-wage economies while 
keeping R&D and advanced manufacturing in the US, was 
tremendously successful.^3 For many generations of chips 
and years of computer production, it reduced costs of the 
still necessary manual labour activities (Borrus et al, 
1983), maximised corporate flexibility, nourished 
unparalleled market growth and increased profits for US 
firms in the 1970's. In fact, these spatial cost-cutting 
strategies remained intact even though labour costs 
(particularly semi-skilled labour costs) were shrinking as 
a share of total costs.^ Though capital requirements and 
costs grew rapidly toward the end of the 1970*s, 
multinational management seemed more willing to use
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international wage and income differentials to cut 
production labour costs than to attack costs closer to 
home. 5 While this structural disintegration of 
production succeeded in the competitive and technological 
conditions of the time, this view of the global structure 
of the industry continues to dominate analyses of the 
industry in the much different competitive conditions of 
the 1980s.
4 . 4 . 3 y_S_J^icr_g^_l_e_£^^
US corporate investment in Europe differed 
dramatically from multinational expansion into low-wage 
Third World countries because of Europe's higher standard 
of living and more sophisticated customers. US computer 
firms began investing in Europe shortly after World War 
II, particularly to win sales from government agencies, 
then the major buyers of computer systems. ^ 6 US computer 
firms set up in Europe to qualify for the baldly 
nationalist preferential purchasing policies**"7 and to meet 
the very specific technical requirements of many European 
countries. Germany, Britain and, to a lesser extent, 
France, were key locations because they were the largest 
and most technically sophisticated markets in Europe 
throughout the 1970' s (USITC, 1979). In addition, a 
number of European countries actively supported the 
development of a national firm in the computer industry to 
provide public control over a strategic industry. Many US 
multinationals located manufacturing in Europe to maintain 
close contact both with these state-subsidised competitors 
(eg, ICL, LTd in the UK, CII-Bull in France and Olivetti - 
in Italy) and their markets (House of Commons, 1973; Hu, 
1973). In some cases, firms, most notably IBM, established 
software development centres in
England to tap the ideas of the region's high tech 
engineers.
Major chip manufacturers also began locating in 
Europe in the late 1960's and early 1970' s for the same
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reasons (Hood and Young, 1984; Scibberas, 1979; Hu, 1971); 
the aim was to supply both US and European computer firms 
in a region that did not have a large, well-established 
chip industry. Ulhile many firms first entered Europe as 
sales and marketing organisations, manufacturing capacity 
proved necessary to gain military, telecoms and other 
government contracts. 4" 8 Also the 10% to 17% duty on 
imports imposed by the formation of the EEC in the late 
1960s encouraged manufacturing inside the region for 
price-sensitive products. ^ ^
The production technologies were by all accounts 
relatively mature (USITC, 1979) and produced well 
established products developed and designed in the US, 
usually from the more sophisticated offerings of the 
corporate product line. US computer multinationals 
assembled the central processing unit and some peripherals 
within the EEC - monitors, keyboards, printers, etc. 
However, extremely labour-intensive work for computers and 
semi-conductors (for example, winding core memories for 
computers and assembling and packaging chips) was shipped 
to the Far East and reimported under the lesser duty 
(10%) .
US multinational investment in Europe in the 1960's 
and 1970' s, then, was very different in economic 
motivation and structure from that in the Far East. 
However, European subsidiaries for the most part produced 
mature US-designed products with long-established 
manufacturing technologies, thus fitting the "branch 
Plant' model (Hood and Young, 1975; 1983).
4.5 THE C R I SI S_... 0 F .....CAP IT A L __ A C : C U NU L.A T..1 0 N._..A.N ID ........I . N DU S T R. I..A L ." "'""""" -  --
Tensions within both industries built up during the 
197O's and broke loose first in the semiconductor industry 
about 198O. The industry's past success in riding out 
serious economic storms - usually by waiting, closing down 
capacity or announcing redundancies - was no longer a 
viable response by the time of the 1981-2 recession. New
94
factors and the increased severity of existing tensions 
aggravated the situation.
Companies in both industries were being ferociously 
squeezed on both the cost and price fronts. Due to the 
pace of technological change and the increasing complexity 
of product and production technologies, the two sectors 
faced rapidly rising capital and development costs and 
short and uncertain sales lives for their products. Firms 
also faced greater and greater competition from new 
products and new producers. This aggravated the downward 
pressure on prices and frustrated producers' potential to 
gain volume sales. These factors were squeezing profit 
margins even for leading firms. 50
Industry analysts and academics recognised 
fundamental changes in the economics of the 
microelectronics industries:
"Many companies are gradually becoming 
aware that a shift is taking place in 
the fundamental rules of the semiconductor 
game and are uncertain how to cope with it. 
Their anxiety is all the greater because 
they themselves invented the original 
rules." (DeJonquieres, 198OD)
"The shape of the semiconductor industry 
is changing nearly as fast as the market 
is growing. " (Ecjo.nom.ist, 1984)
"..[T]he semiconductor industry is at a 
turning point in its development, a point 
at which its structure and competitive 
success in the industry will both be 
determined by a struggle o-yejr._j5.h..a..nge_s.__._i_n 
t.h..e.. ..eco.no mi c.s.__.ajnd...^
PC.Pd.ucti..on...in_t hie;..__i.n.dustry [emphasis in 
original]." (Borrus, 1983; p.5)
"There is also the concern that the 
[high tech electronics] industry may 
be entering more than just a patch of 
short-term difficulty and is confronted 
with fundamental structural problems." 
Investors had begun to shy away from 
electronics as a result, according 
to industry expert Guy DeJonquieres 
(1985).
"The complexion of the global computer
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industry and the nature of competition 
has changed noticeably [in the 1980s] 
with the trend toward smaller-scale 
[product] systems." (O'Connor, 1985; p.316)
Uhile many had romantically characterised these 
industries as technologically-driven (eg, Mowery, 1982), a 
technological innovation would not have solved the 
problems of the early 1980s. The situation clearly 
spotlighted the inseparability of the economic and the 
technological dynamics of these industries. This section 
outlines the causes of the international crisis. The text 
assesses the major economic shifts in detail - the 
increasing competition, both by Japanese firms and the 
proliferation of new products that brought in new 
competitors; the shift in market demand to more highly 
customised and better quality products; and the escalating 
development and production costs. The chapter then reviews 
the resulting shifts in management strategy and the 
importance of the European market in industry adjustment.
4.5.1 Gr w i . ng i _ Cpmpe t i t i on
Increased competition for US firms came from 
different directions. Japanese firms, previously focused 
on the Japanese market, became a major contender in world 
markets. New products introduced in both industries 
altered the size and nature of the competitive field.
Japanese producers significantly altered both the 
line-up in the competitive battle and the rules of the 
competition in both sectors by the early 1980' s. The 
Japanese had largely been discounted by the US industry. 
They had sold low-end, often mature products in the US for 
years. While US producers leaped ahead to invest in the 
next product generation, US industry experts snobbishly 
accused Japanese firms of being unable to do more than 
mimic the technological innovations achieved by US market 
leaders. However, during the late 1970' s Japanese products
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gained a reputation for quality and reliability achieved 
through their strategy of continually investing in the 
most advanced production methods.
In the late 1970's the Japanese took advantage of the 
ic boom in the US and the unit cost advantage provided by 
their highly automated production technologies (Borrus et 
al., 1983). They exported vast quantities of the then 
current generation of memories at prices that were lower 
than most US firms. In 1979 alone Japanese ic exports to 
the US swelled from $250 million to $365 million. By 1982 
Japanese ic sales in the US were valued at $56O million 
CSIA, 1983). Uhile US firms claimed that Japan was 
"dumping," US producers had to meet that lower price or 
lose sales and market share. 51
A second event was important in the changing 
competitive climate. US end-user firms, led by an 
announcement by Hewlett-Packard in 1979, claimed that 
Japanese devices were superior in quality and reliability 
to those of US producers. Due to competitive pressures to 
eliminate defects, they claimed they would buy Japanese 
ics, ignoring the "Buy American" plea of the US 
electronics industry. Spokesmen explained that US chips 
were not satisfactorily tested and they had been receiving 
what had become an unacceptably high rate of defects per 
shipment.
Cheaper and better Japanese chips gained in the US 
and world markets as a result. By 1983 Japan produced 37% 
of the world's chips (Fin ain c_i_a11 __ T jLm e; s, 1984B) and 
controlled 7O% of the world market in the newest chip - 
the 64-K RAM (Thackray, 1983): "They [the Japanese] have 
irrevocably changed the [ic] memory business." (Keyhoe, 
1982D).
In computers, Japanese producers were also gaining 
attention - if not so dramatically - by supplying 
technically competent, competitively-priced machines. They 
usually started by supplying low-end equipment to avoid 
head-on competition with IBM and the rest of the BUNCH and 
enhanced the product line over time. As mentioned above,
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they operated in the US market predominantly as Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM: ie producing for US firms 
which would sell them under their own brand name); as a 
result, their presence in the US market was largely 
hidden. This dependence on Japanese products increased 
dramatically in the late 1970's because US management 
needed to have a wide product range to satisfy the market 
and wanted to avoid the high expense and risk of investing 
in the necessary production capacity. Japanese firms 
gained US and world market share covertly through OEM 
arrangements.
A Uidened^ Product Market
At the same time, new products and existing products 
with enhanced commercial potential crowded the market 
further threatening growth potential and market share of 
US firms. In the computer industry the challenge of the 
mini and the microcomputer to the mainframe and the 
conventional organisation of computing capacity deepened. 
The technological capability and power of both the mini 
and the micro increased and market demand increasingly 
turned to equipment for decentralised data processing 
Cfii.Q.a.!lcijLL_JriJD.!!«.§.» 1980). Simultaneously, the introduction 
of and love-at-first-sight market response to the 
microcomputer shook the foundations of the industry. In 
semi-conductors, special order or so-called custom and 
semi-custom, 52 chips gained market share by satisfying new 
market demand for application-specific ics (ASICs) rather 
than standardised products.
The growth and consolidation of the mini market by 
the early 1980's represented the aggravation of an endemic 
problem in the computer industry. The industry's 
continuing to provide commodities with greater power at a 
lower price forced firms to seek ever larger markets. As 
Duncan (1981) lucidly explained,
"Greater power for less price, called 
increased price/performance ratio, 
means that the turnover, let alone 
profit, generated by the same total
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power of the new system will be lower 
than the old one. To withstand the erosion 
of the existing customer base, vendors 
must offer a price/performance ratio 
generally in line with the industry, 
determined by the market leader in that 
sector - IBM in the case of mainframes, 
DEC in the case of minis and the three 
personal computer vendors in the case 
of micros [ie, Apple, Tandy and Compaq]. 
The price/performance curve is, however, 
dropping faster than the expansion in 
demand from existing customers in the 
vendor's portfolio - leaving a gap which 
has to be filled by higher volumes of 
production and sales, reinforcing the 
process of competition between the 
companies for a larger market share." 
(P.89)
The acceptance of the minicomputer, particularly as it 
became more powerful and more versatile, threatened the 
future growth of mainframe sales and the existing customer 
base of IBM and the BUNCH. However, the mini was also a 
new unexploited market that had a significantly higher 
growth potential than the mainframe business. All the 
established computer firms jumped into this market. 53
The introduction of the micro sent another shock wave 
through the industry. This new machine, defined as a 
desktop system costing less than $SOOO (Coffey, 1982), 
tapped an entirely new and very large market of upper 
income professionals wanting to continue work at home. 
They also offered business an even cheaper option than 
minis for tailored, distributed data processing 
(Cane,1983C), and this was the major growth segment for 
the early 1980's (B a re I aiy; s.__ R: e;.v i e..w, 1983).
The micro was essentially a good design for the 
assembly of standard components: producing them required 
little front-end investment. These low barriers to entry 
meant practically any one could produce them. 5<i With their 
standardised inputs, they leant themselves to mass 
production.
This was a major change. The computer industry UP to 
this point had been essentially a small batch production 
industry. Firms had in some cases achieved economies of
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scale mainly in peripheral manufacture and by constructing 
capabilities with fairly standardised building sub- 
assemblies that were tied together to fulfill a customer's 
requirements. Marketing had been the key to improving 
revenues and profits: firms sought new markets for their 
products and tailored systems carefully to those uses.
The micro, in effect, challenged all the established 
marketing and production strategies of the industry. The 
marketing and sales networks for micros were quite 
different from the extremely large and expensive machines 
in everything from targeting sales to the right personnel 
in a business to the primary selling features. Price in 
particular became much more important. Volume production 
techniques created the conditions for lively competition 
over price. This economic dynamic was not, however, 
restricted to the micro segment. Because of the rapid 
technological improvements in computer capability, micros 
threatened to encroach on the minicomputer market": the 
capability of the small machines was approaching that of 
the larger one and was a less expensive, more flexible 
alternative. As Table 4.10 indicates, micros rapidly 
gained dominance in computer sales. This new competition 
threatened to pull the industry price/performance ratio 
down even further. As the analysts quoted below testify, 
the computer industry was in upheaval again.
"The principle impact of micro- 
miniaturization has been the 
downscaling of systems with 
functionally equivalent perfor- 
mance characteristics. This has 
resulted in a steady improvement 
in the price/performance ratios 
of computer systems...The result 
[of chip advances] has been the 
appearance on the market of 
successive generations of 
computers, each of which consists 
of machines that are smaller, more 
powerful and versatile, and less 
expensive than their predecessors. 
State-of-the-art supermicros, for 
example, are not only more advanced 
than earlier micros, but also rival 
in performance minicomputers and
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certain medium-scale mainframes. 
C.O'Connor, 1985; p. 312)
"In 1981,...the momentum of 
expanding a customer base that 
provides future growth passed 
from the mini to the micro 
vendors." (Coffey, 1982).
TABLE 4.10. !HJLJ=;i!l^
SYSTEMS
Value of Large 
Computer Systems 65* 35%
Value of Small and 
Micro Systems 35% 61% (sic)
Total Sales $33 Billion $61 Billion
Source: Info Corp, published in Raymond 
Snoddy, (1983).
In the semi-conductor industry, the market for 
customised chips (ASICs) grew rapidly, stimulated by the 
explosion and diversity of micro-electronics applications. 
More successful computerisation of the design process 
shortened the design time and cost of ASICs, making them 
commercially feasible. Also, their marketability improved 
because one customised chip can replace many standardised 
chips, both improving end-product performance and reducing 
component and manufacturing costs. 56 Design and 
manufacturing technologies made it possible to mass 
produce ASICs. 57 This variable mass production enabled a 
producer to deliver a chip to a customer in as little as 
16 weeks (1982: Williams, 1982A) in contrast to more than 
a year for a fully customised chip. In the fast-paced 
computer market, the faster turnaround time gave computer 
firms a new advantage in jumping in and capturing a market 
quickly. Experts expected that ASICs would capture as much 
as 40% of the world market by 1990, expanding from 10% in 
1984 (Keyhoe, 1984B). The customised product brings with 
it a different production economics.
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Established volume producers in the semi-conductor 
industry did not immediately jump into the small batch 
custom market. Management in these firms focused their 
strategies on coping with the relentless pace of 
technological competition and the growth of their 
traditional markets. A number of relatively small firms 
opened to fill the gap. 58 The economics of survival and 
success was different for the new competitors. Design 
costs dominated the costs of firms operating at low volume 
levels. Many of the firms opted to re-divide the stages of 
ic production and produced nothing but chip designs. They 
sub-contracted fabrication and assembly to established 
volume chip producers, many of whom had surplus 
capacity. 9 Other firms specialised in a different way: 
they developed software packages to enable customers to 
design their own chips, shifting design costs entirely to 
the customer.
The ASIC product and the new firms supplying them 
disrupted the competitive structure of the industry in two 
ways. First, the rather homogenous structure of firms and 
their strategies for competing were suddenly challenged 
by the new competitors with lower fixed costs and more 
flexible structures. Second, these new competitors 
seriously threatened the market base of the established 
volume producers. These were not just new products that 
would expand potential market demand: the ASIC was a 
technological alternative to a grouping of standardised 
chips, an option that many customers preferred. Volume 
producers saw their efforts to create and capture ever 
larger markets stymied by the new product. The 
simultaneous demand growth for micro-processors challenged 
the viability of a mass production strategy. Firms buying 
microprocessors needed to buy supporting chips and an 
array of programmable devices, and potentially ASICs, and 
they wanted to buy all their chips from the same supplier. 
Supplying only standardised memory chips was no longer a 
satisfactory strategy for maintaining a large and growing 
market share.
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To offer customised chips, firms had to enhance their 
design capabilities and staffs to deal with customers and 
their technical requirements. To supply a wider product 
range required bigger and more diversified capital 
investment because many of the products required 
distinctly different production technologies. Volume 
producers also had to rethink market strategy: a big 
company either had to find enough large customers who 
would need many designs or to target particular end-user 
industries where an individual application-specific design 
could be sold to many customers (Borrus, 1983). 60
As suggested throughout this discussion, these new 
products not only created new markets but also represented 
product convergence, a threat to the market base of all 
established semi-conductor and computer firms. Uith the 
right software and marketing, customised chips and mini 
and microcomputers could replace standard chips and large 
general purpose computers. While many of the new entrants 
(and some of the established firms, too) in both markets 
had from the beginning targeted product niches, the need 
for bigger sales and access to growth markets led many to 
leave their niches and attack other markets. This further 
increased the competition in both industries. Hewlett- 
Packard, for example, had established itself as a 
measuring instrument firm for the scientific, medical and 
engineering markets, but the cheapness of adding computing 
power turned their products into computers. 61 By 1984, 
its minis and mainframes had become major competitors to 
IBM in the data processing market (Interview with 
management at company headquarters, 1983). Similarly, 
other US niche producers targeted their products to the 
data processing and office automation markets by the early 
198Q's. 62 Niche strategies were often not sufficient 
revenue bases and management had turned to seize 
opportunities in larger markets.
In the chip industry, the captive producers cited 
above are a prime example of industry convergence. They 
were new competitors and their output was growing faster
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than that of the established merchant firms by the early 
1980's. 63 Also the predictions of rapid growth of ASICs 
sales had convinced management in all the established 
volume ic firms to produce for this market; the division 
between the mass production and custom product markets was 
too limiting. The competitive field in the semi-conductor 
and computer industries were flooded with new competitors 
producing new products and new competition resulting from 
the declining segmentation of markets.
Service - A New Element in Jlarket Demand
Increasingly sophisticated industrial buyers began 
looking beyond the product in choosing among the crowd of 
products and competitors in both industries. Customers in 
the 1980s wanted systems and wanted help in setting them 
up. End-users wanted to purchase products to computerise 
entire operations. Purchasing decisions were being 
directed toward equipment that allowed expansion and 
flexibility and toward companies that were expected to 
continue to support those systems. 6^ The market looked to 
firms that could supply all the components of a system - 
from the least sophisticated to the most powerful 
technology link (DeJonquieres, 198QB).
Technical support, including applications 
engineering, and product servicing also became an 
important factor in competitive strategies and marketing. 
In these highly internationalised markets, that meant 
maintaining a far-flung servicing network to reach all 
existing and potential customers. Customers increasingly 
wanted both computers arid chips to perform company- 
specific tasks. That meant computer and semi-conductor 
firms had to have sales and technical personnel products 
to suit those requirements and then to sort out any 
resulting technical problems.
The pressure to have this kind of distribution and 
support network favoured large multinationals over newer, 
small competitors because of the expense it represented.
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IBM's well-known international marketing and distribution 
network was extremely important in the company's ability 
to fend off the smaller firms and dominate the micro 
market so quickly in the early 1980s.
However market demand for technical support and 
servicing forced most multinational managers to reassess 
global strategies, particularly in the semi-conductor 
industry. The world's leading producers of standard 
devices had to be able to approach the market as service 
companies by the early 1980's (Interviews with managers 
in California and Scotland, 1983 and 1984). 65
4.5.2 Mounting Capital Costs
Uhile both the number of competitors and the more 
sophisticated product demand were eroding the customer 
base of established producers, the costs of staying in 
competition were rising astronomically. Capital costs for 
production technologies and R&D and the costs of software 
development rose absolutely (Ernst, 1983; Markusen, 1986) 
and as shares of total costs with no end in sight. The 
ratio of high tech front-end investment to total turnover 
increased to 15% by the early 1980's from 10% in the 
1970*s - higher than in any other industrial sector 
(Williams, 1982B).
Capital investment grew for a number of reasons. More 
sophisticated, computerised production technologies were 
necessary to produce high quality, complex products with 
precision and to have the flexibility to produce a variety 
of products with different specifications. 6 Equipment 
costs rose with each product generation. A piece of 
optical lithography equipment for chip fabrication rose 
from $4000 in the early 1970's to $300,000 to $500,000 by 
1983 (Interview with Silicon Valley executive). Managers 
argued that investment in this equipment had become a 
competitive necessity, particularly for US semi-conductor 
producers competing with the production quality of 
Japanese firms.
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Also the R&D expense for increasingly technical 
products mounted dramatically in both industries. By the 
1980's, "[a] central feature of high-technology industries 
...[was] an apparently inexorable rise in the development 
costs of new products" (Rosenberg, 1982, P.284).
That is partly due to the greater complexity of 
products (Mowery, 1982,), thus the greater expense of the 
equipment and skills to design them. However, heightened 
competition over products also forced firms to introduce 
more products more often. For most companies the 
development period for each product was shortened and 
intensified. Competition had reduced one long-established 
computer firm's five- to six- year product development 
period in the 197O's to only 18 to 24 months by 1984. IBM 
took only 14 months to decide to produce a personal 
computer and to introduce it in the market in the 
early 1980*s. Rushing R&D, however, increases costs: it 
means hiring additional product researchers and support 
staff, paying for expensive overtime hours and stretching 
other resources.
Furthermore, competition from the Japanese, 
particularly in semi-conductors, forced US firms into a 
burst of capital investment in the early 1980's, in spite 
of the costs. The Japanese had achieved their superior 
product quality by a strategic emphasis on production 
engineering, as they had done in a number of other 
industries. The Japanese producers invested heavily in 
equipment and personnel to improve their wafer yield and 
chip testing. Industry leader NEC, for example, invested a 
massive 10.2% of its 1982 sales in R&D, and most of that 
would have gone to process development (Garner, 1983B). 
Japanese firms also invested heavily in the most 
sophisticated production, handling and process control 
technologies (sometimes developing it in-house) to achieve 
high yields (Rose, 1982; Bruederle, 1984). That contrasted 
with the US producers' emphasis on introducing the next 
innovative product. US competitors spent on average about 
5% of sales in 1982 on R&D, and most of that would have
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been devoted to work on new products. The focus of the 
Japanese industry on production engineering gave them both 
high quality output and lower unit costs.
"From the very early days of their 1C 
business, NEC has believed that cheap 
memory would make up for the deficiencies 
of software [a relative strength of the 
US computer market]. This led NEC to 
focus on the development of high 
density or cheap per bit [ie, unit of 
information] memory ICs. NEC also believed 
that higher reliability would result in 
lower overall costs. These views led to 
NEC's emphasis on mass production 
technology." (Interview with President 
of NEC Electronics Inc. in Corporate 
Tirnes, April, 1985)
Also, in the case of Japanese firms, "[t]otal automation 
is the ultimate goal - an imperative for survival" 
(Gregory, 1984A). 67 To respond to Japanese success in US 
markets, US producers acknowledged that greater capital 
investment and attention to production economies were 
essential to compete in product quality and unit cost. 68 
Similar pressures for improved quality and lower 
production costs were driving US computer firms to invest 
in more automated equipment. While the wage differentials 
between Far Eastern economies and the US had eroded 
slightly during the 1970*s, wage costs and reducing labour 
costs were not the stimulus to this industry drive to 
automate. Higher quality performance driven by severe 
competition was the rationale for automation in the 
1980's.
The costs for this capital investment had become 
exorbitant with the increasing complexity of production. 
The cost of capital equipment skyrocketed during the late 
1970's and early 1980's: there was more than sixtyfold 
increase in the price tag on photolithography equipment 
over just two generations, as Table 4.11 shows. The 
estimated capital costs of a fabrication plant multiplied 
as the chip density and the precision necessary to produce 
them have increased. A plant for 16K RAM memories was $25 
million; a plant equipped to produce 64.K RAMs costs about
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$10O million. A facility to fabricate the VLSI chips (for 
example, 256K RAMs) was expected to cost about $200 
million (Thackray, 1983). As B _u si n e; s; s...... W e_e;_k (1985)
reported:
"The price tag for a new chipmaking 
Plant is climbing past the $100 million 
mark - 10 times the price a decade ago 
[1975]. The capital investment is 
becoming quite staggering."
TABLE 4.11. COST INCREASES FOR SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS OF
1C FABRICATION EQUIPMENT
Contact 
Printing
Projection 
Aligners
Lithography Equipment
Line 
Width
Throughput 
Wafers/Hr.
10 microns 60
2-5
Direct-Step- 
on-Wafers 1 
(Wafer-steppers)
- 2
Electron 
Beam 0.5 - 1
60
30
Approx. 
Cost of 
Machine
$15,000
$480,000
$1.5 m
Approx.
Capital
Requiremt
$30,OOO
$240,000 $400,000
$1.6 m
$25 m
Source: US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 
(1983)
Reprinted in Ernst, 1985 (p336)
* These are successive generations of photolithography 
equipment that have been used to do essentially the same 
task with increasing precision. They expose the circuit 
patterns on the silicon wafer. The line widths listed 
above indicated their increased precision: the newer 
technologies have progressively reduced the line widths of 
each circuit path on a chip, measured by a millionth of a 
meter unit.
** The capital requirement estimates the expenditure on 
enough equipment to meet a production target of 1000 wafer 
starts per week.
The president of Texas Instruments claimed that an 
investment of between $25 and $35 billion would be
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necessary for the firm to maintain its market position 
over the ten years from 1980. That contrasts with the $4. 
billion spent over the previous decade (F:.in.a_ncia.l.m..T_imes., 
1980).
The cost of entry into the microcomputer market - the 
segment of the computer industry with the lowest barriers 
to entry - similarly escalated during the early 1980's. At 
its inception, entering the micro market was "a 
comparatively cheap business to enter" (Newman, 1982; 
p46). By 1982/3 that had changed. Management of a UK-based 
micro firm, ACT Ltd. laid out the financial investment 
requirements for a start-up:
"In the first place to be successful 
you have to be in the business in a 
big way - at least 30OO sales a month. 
Then you need £3 m for the company, 
£2 m for the increase in debtors, 
£2 m in factory costs, £2 m r and d 
costs, a £1 million software 
commitment and an introductory 
marketing effort of £1 million. 
"... You can guarantee that the cost 
of entry doubles every year. Two 
years ago, when we were developing 
Apricot, we needed £10 million, 
last year we would have needed 
£20 million, and if we were 
starting this year we would be 
looking at £40 million." (Danks, 1984).
He attributed the change to the growing domination and 
competitive muscle of the industry's market leaders, IBM 
and Apple Computer.
For the producers of bigger computers, a major cause 
of rising investment costs was the dramatic escalation of 
the unit cost of software. Software was a growing 
strategic concern in both the chip and computer 
industries. Software enabled a piece of hardware - chip or 
computer - to perform the functions that the customer 
demanded. Increasingly complex hardware depended on 
increasingly complex software. That software created more 
potential problems and expense for maintaining it. 
Industrial customers chose products at least in part by 
their software: they wanted to avoid buying systems that
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would burden the firm with great and unexpected costs for 
systems analysts and software engineers to adapt the 
system and keep it operating. The quality and 
appropriateness of the manufacturer's software was 
critical in attracting new buyers and retain existing 
customers. 9 Also producer firms could not design their 
complex products without the appropriate software. 
Developing the appropriate
software to design and customise products became critical 
to making sales. 71-'
The share of software development in system costs 
rose steadily through the 1970's and early 1980*s 
(O'Connor, 1985; Ernst, 1983; Cane, 1981). 71 ' 72 Figure 
4.1 contrasts cost paths through the 1970's and early 
198O's. Technological advances rapidly reduced the cost 
per function of integrated circuits, so hardware costs 
increased only modestly. Simultaneously, the unit cost of 
software relentlessly increased. The rising cost of the 
computer tools needed to produce software (O'Connor, 1985) 
and a worsening global shortage of software engineers 
(Ernst, 1983) accounted in large part for the rising 
costs. In addition, the artisan-like nature of the 
software production process had remained relatively 
intact. 75 That meant the turnaround time and the 
associated labour costs remained highly unpredictable and 
uncontrollable.
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'__ C O 
Cost per line of software
Cost per Gate of 1C Capability
1974 76 78 80 82 84
Cost per Computer System
Soo
LOO r
JOO
  Sefftu^rc
1974 76 78 80 82 84
Source: Motorola Inc. 
Reprinted in F i_n ainc^ i.a.!_.... T i mes, 
November 3, 1980
In both the computer and semi-conductor industries, 
management's inability to reduce or contain the costs of 
the "software bottleneck" and unwillingness to scrimp on 
R&D or investment in particular new technologies put
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greater pressure on them to reduce costs in other parts of 
the production process.
4.5.3 T h_ e^^qub. 1 e.._. B.i nd f J nee r t
The competitive pressure to maintain increasingly 
expensive R&D and capital investment mounted for both 
industries in an economic environment of rapidly falling 
prices and a relatively short and uncertain product life. 
The ability of firms to recover front-end investment costs 
and to reap sufficient revenues to pay for new product 
development was jeopardised by increasing difficulties in 
gaining a large market base. The shock during the late 
197O's and early 1980' s was the pace of change of all 
these factors. When US ic producers were pushing prices 
down through achieving learning curve economies, there was 
at least some measure of predictability. Japanese 
competition eliminated that. In the computer industry, the 
rapid proliferation of new products destroyed the 
protection niche strategies had provided from price 
pressures.
The Short Product Life of Microelectronics Products
A short product life was a feature of the dynamics of 
the US-dominated ic industry from its start. Many US 
firms had achieved their world leadership by their 
technological inventiveness and exploitation of the high 
(monopoly) profit period after the introduction of a new 
product. They then abandoned that product in two to three 
years to exploit a new one (USITC, 1979) . The sudden 
increase in competition in the late 1970* s threatened the 
firms' ability to earn enough to carry on development for 
the next product. The larger competitive field reduced the 
potential market base and the length of the product 
selling period. .
The 64K RAM memory device was the turning point. It 
was an important product because it was the entry into
112
VLSI complexity: sales success and the associated 
production experience were critical to competing in the 
market for the next generation product. US producers faced 
competition from a Japanese product from the beginning. 
With their technology and unit cost advantages, they 
undercut the price of US firms. This was a surprise: in 
the past Japanese firms had successfully copied existing 
chip products and sold them in mature product markets. The 
Japanese firms won a significant share of the US market, 
and, when the ic market slumped in 1981/2, flooded the US 
market, further depressing the product price. By 1983/4 
Japanese firms were mass producing the next product, the 
256K RAM, for world markets. Their success in cutting into 
the US 64K memory market, along with the recession, had 
sharply reduced US firms' revenues: many US firms did not 
have capital capacity ready to compete in the 256K memory 
market. A number of US producers effectively surrendered 
that market to the Japanese by 1985 (New> ..Yor_k__T_i_mes, 
1985). With the number of competitors and the basis of 
their competition changing rapidly, predicting the market 
life of the chip became near impossible, as did which 
firms would profit from it.
Because the production technologies are so closely 
tied to changes in product technologies, particularly for 
semi-conductors, this fast pace of product introduction 
accelerated the pace of capital equipment obsolescence. In 
1981, the average age of semi-conductor equipment was 4.4 
years, a loss of half a year since 1975. (Ernst, 1983). 
Capital investment in fabricating a new product generation 
often means investing in new production facilities rather 
than just upgrading or replacing individual pieces of 
equipment. New generations require higher cleanliness 
standards arid more precise equipment across most of the 
processing steps. As the market life of a product shortens 
or at least becomes more unpredictable, the financial risk 
of investing in new production capital becomes riskier and 
riskier with each successive product.
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In the computer industry, competition - particularly 
in the micros and work-stations segment - similarly 
compressed the product life cycle. The rapid improvements 
in what ics could do and the fierce competition to 
introduce new products that would exploit those 
capabilities, squeezed the length and raised the 
uncertainties of the market life of any one product (Behr, 
1985). The introduction of a new hardware product with an 
important technological enhancement or a better price, or 
even a successful software package for another firm's 
product can steal market share from an established product 
very quickly. Recognising this uncertainty, micro-computer 
managers set two-year targets for payback on their capital 
investment when launching new products (Behr, 1985). The 
time pressure on computer capital goods, while less 
severe, was no less relentless. A leading edge instruments 
producer had to develop each new product from scratch 
(that is, from the new circuit technology up) around a new 
microprocessor introduced in 1983: that process would take 
about three years and would last only the few sales years 
of that one product generation. Formerly, a product 
technology was expected to last at least seven years and 
two or three product generations (Interview with company 
engineering manger, 1984).
In contrast to the industry convention for
depreciating production capital over five years or more, a 
two-year product life can be a crippling pressure. The 
computer industry has more flexibility in its production 
technologies than the semi-conductor industry. Many firms 
maintained manual and semi-automatic procedures for many 
years to mediate the financial pressures. Labour-intensive 
techniques can adjust to many successive product 
generations. Also, the mini and mainframe have a 
marginally longer product life, so some protection from 
the relentless pace of product change. The market life of 
more expensive computer equipment may be three to four
\
years (Durican, 1981) and up to ten years with periodic 
additions to upgrade it (Interview with computer firm
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executive, 1984). Upgrading can be relatively inexpensive 
and easy: producers now leave room for inserting 
additional boards to add speed or new functions. In 
addition, business and the public sector, the market for 
expensive equipment, have slow, bureaucratic procedures 
for making capital investment decisions. They are unlikely 
to respond as rapidly as the consumer and small business 
markets to the introduction of each new product. 76 
However, the rapid pace at which micro producers expanded 
the power and versatility of their products put them in 
direct competition with minis in the business market: this 
may have pushed mini manufacturers into a shorter product 
cycle.
Price Pressures
Unprecedented pressure on prices heightened the risks 
of introducing new products. Hardware prices fell in both 
industries due to continuing competition to improve the 
price/performance ratio and to create new and larger 
markets. Competition from Japanese producers drove prices 
down further.
Computer firms competed over price to create 
additional demand: 77 creating new applications would open 
up new markets as the growing number of competitors 
crowded the existing market bases. In the past, the price 
competition amongst market leaders had gradually pulled 
the industry price curve down (Duncan, 1981), but the 
price competition had not been se.vere, protected under 
IBM's relatively high price policy.
Pressures became severe in the early 1980's. This was 
largely because the increased power of machines all along 
the product range and the convergence of other technical 
equipment markets (eg, instrument and photocopier markets) 
broke down the barriers that had created protective 
segmented markets. In the micro segment management 
zealously reduced prices to make a dent on an increasingly 
crowded and confusing market. 78 And mini manufacturers
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diversified to produce a range of machines that could 
compete with the micros. This put direct pressure on the 
price of more expensive machines. The smaller machines 
could be connected to perform complex tasks extremely 
cheaply, creating a significant incentive for the market 
to substitute them for a mini with multiple terminals. 
Management of high-end machines had to resort at times to 
price-cutting to sell their machines in a market with lots 
of nearly equivalent cheaper machines.
In addition Japanese computer producers formally 
entered the world market in the late 1970's and early 
1980*s. The experience and scale economies they had gained 
from selling volume products to world markets under OEM 
arrangement gave them both quality and unit cost 
advantages over much of the computer industry. Their 
micro, mini and peripheral products sold under their own 
names - Toshiba, Fujitsu, Panasonic, NEC, Epson, etc. - 
undercut the prices on most US producers.
Rapidly falling prices more clearly defined the semi- 
conductor market. As explained above, learning curve 
strategies, as outlined above in the example of the 64K 
DRAM in Table 4.. 8, historically pushed prices of each 
successive generation of ic memories lower than the lowest 
unit price of its predecessor (O*Connor, 1983). The 
necessity to attract additional markets exacerbated this 
tendency in recent years. 79 The Japanese competition, 
undercutting US prices to use their surplus capacity (See 
discussion above), brought cuts that went far deeper than 
the price declines that learning-curve economics had given 
US producers. The industry sustained price cuts on 
average of 70% per bit (of information) every year from 
the late 1970's into the early 1980s (Thackray, 1983). 8O
For both industries the early eighties were years of 
a deepening vicious cycle of declining prices, additional 
and rising costs, and growing numbers of competitor firms 
and products. Gaining the greater volume sales that would 
have compensated for per unit losses was checked by the 
fast pace and extent of growth of the competition.
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Inadequate revenues compelled ic firms to abandon 
expensive R&D ventures (eg bubble memories). Firms 
experienced cash flow difficulties and reduced profit 
margins. Some firms retrenched and some, particularly in 
the microcomputer sector, went out of business. Large 
multinational firms with their extensive corporate 
reserves were cushioned to some extent from the 
pressures. 81 Past strategies that rested simply on price- 
cutting or introducing a new product could no longer 
sustain a firm in the global high tech marketplace of the 
late 1970* s and early 1980' s.
4 - 6 C ONC L UD.I.NG _.P 0 1 NT S
By the early 1980* s (particularly after the market 
downturn in 198O/1) management in US multinationals 
acknowledged that the changed competitive conditions and 
the mounting tensions for major industry competitors 
called for new corporate strategies. The existing 
organisation of production and corporate resources could 
no longer cope with the simultaneous and competing demands 
of improving product quality, customising product demand, 
continuing new product and process development, and 
finding flexible market strategies appropriate for 
capital-intensive production, all at a dizzying pace of 
change. In the past firms had traditionally adjusted the 
size of their work force or their capital utilisation to 
respond to shifts in market demand. The conditions of the 
late 1970' s and early 1980' s and the speed with which they 
could change made this strategy too costly. These 
conventional methods of adjusting (eg, major redundancies) 
"denied" firms opportunities to enter new markets and 
weakened future competitiveness.
While the analysis in this chapter has located the 
accelerating crisis in high tech industries in the 
competition between fractions of capital - US vs. Japanese 
corporations, multinationals vs. entrepreneurial start-up
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firms, labour has not been ignored. However, labour has 
not been an organised political force in these industries 
since their inception, except for a few long-established 
computer firms. There is little evidence to support an 
argument that labour has intervened to protect its 
interests in the organisation of production and 
competitive strategies in these sectors. Corporations in 
both industries have maintained non-union or anti-union 
policies internationally. 82 Active (at times insidious) 
corporate campaigns to suppress union organisation have 
worked along with the industry's shifting skill needs and 
structure to prevent the organisation of any formal labour 
opposition in all of the continents of industry 
operations. There have been valiant efforts to win 
representation and to improve working conditions, but they 
are isolated cases. Those unions that have been involved 
in the industry have proven relatively powerless to alter 
the course of events in this highly international and 
fast-paced industry. ^
Changing labour qualities, costs and conditions of 
work prove critical to understanding the industry crisis 
and the forms of its resolution. However, these features 
have been shaped by demographic factors and by 
social/cultural and state policy responses to the 
explosive growth and economic importance of the industry, 
not by the active opposition of organised labour.
.................... ....R.espo_nse ; :
Multinatipnal ......Cpmpjst.j.J:lye _SJ:rat
One of the first efforts that managers in Silicon 
Valley mentioned was to locate new operations in other 
regions. Management felt compelled to do something to end 
the very costly technical labour turnover they 
experienced. Semi-conductor multinationals in particular 
were locating new fabrication plants in Colorade, Idaho, 
Texas, Washington, Oregon and other parts of California. 
They chose locations where they could find "good people* 
or where the lifestyle and cost of living were
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sufficiently inviting that technical personnel would be 
willing to move.
Secondly, managers explained that the 1980's required 
them to target their products to markets much more 
closely. The strategy of the 1970's - producing relatively 
standardised innovative product and expecting the product 
itself and the marketing division to create a market for 
it - was no longer considered a viable approach to the 
large and increasingly sophisticated world marketplace. 
Producers targeted growth markets and large individual 
customers. Semi-conductor firms, for example, each 
targeted a few of the following end-user markets - 
telecoms, automotive, mini-computers, information 
managements systems, and robotics. Each had differing 
product requirements and cycles. All producers recognised 
the necessity to offer customised product. These 
priorities led to a number of changes in orientation to 
the market.
Custom-specific orientation meant designing products 
to solve particular technical and data problems that 
customers had. That required a much closer relationship 
with those markets and individual buyers. It required the 
producer to develop technical expertise in their industry 
targets and to devote time and personnel to working with 
the customer throughout the production cycle, even after 
the sale was completed. That meant a strong sales force 
trained in the technologies and an extensive field 
engineering work force to maintain contact with the 
market. In addition, it placed much greater importance on 
software development for products and for testing. 
Developing customised software was the prime method for 
turning a relatively standardised chip or a group of 
standardised computer modules into a product that would 
perform according to a customer's needs. The product then 
would have to be tested to perform those functions: that 
required tailored testing software. Management claimed 
that this direction was changing their firms from 
manufacturers into service companies.
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Thirdly, the competition from the Japanese challenged 
US producers to concentrate resources on developing 
production economies. Every manager interviewed pointed to 
corporate efforts to economise on the use of capital and 
information. Top of their agenda was automation: in the 
semi-conductor' industry, managers claimed they could not 
wait any longer for better perfected production 
technologies. Greater automation in this and in the 
computer industry was needed to achieve better quality and 
lower unit cost to compete with the proven record of 
Japanese producers. Japanese firms had won an important 
competitive battle by manufacturing memories at 10 to 
20% higher yield than US firms. Investing in more highly 
automated equipment would produce greater product 
uniformity and greater reliability. The custom orientation 
of the market made these even more critical objectives for 
a producer': when every single wafer or computer component 
is promised to a particular customer with a delivery date, 
succesful production scheduling demand high and 
predictable product quality (ie, low defect rates). 
Another priority in using capital and information 
inputs more economically was to integrate separate stages 
of manufacturing. Managers emphasised the importance of 
computerised production equipment and software systems, 
designed to coordinate the different stages of production 
and to feed back information gained at one point to all 
other related steps - including design, ordering and 
inventory, manufacture, sales, and testing. Management's 
motivation for these expensive investments was 
- to speed up product turnaround and to use UP 
inventories more quickly, ("To get product out the 
door" ) , 
- to improve the effectiveness of expensive 
production equipment through continuous production, 
and 
- to turn information learned from the market more 
quickly into products and sales. 
Consequently many firms had continuous, seven-day 
production weeks in many of their facilities. The aim was 
to use capital equipment as continuously as possible while 
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the market for that product lasted. Developing economies 
of throughput, rather than of scale, took centre stage in 
strategic investment: the priority was to invest in 
capital that could flexibly manufacture a range of 
products smoothly and quickly. Uhile these efforts were 
not without problems, management in the 1980's considered 
quality manufacturing targeted to market demand central. 
These strategic shifts led to record investment in 
new, more automated and precise technologies (paired with 
expansion) in both industries in the years immediately 
after the 1981/2 slump (Financial.....T.i_mes, 1984B). They also 
stimulated management's reconsideration of the role of the 
individual subisidairy within the global corporation. For 
many of these corporations, these changes called for a 
more truly multinational firm. As one manager explained,
"The first thing we're trying to do 
here is to be a multinational company. 
You can't conquer the world [market] 
from any one given spot."
As he went on to explain, that meant decentralising 
operations geographically around the world to serve the 
important markets more completely. He claimed that 
decentralisation and the resulting autonomy were critical 
to gaining customer confidence that a subsidiary could 
actually make a decision quickly and follow up on the 
design, delivery and support of a highly sophisticated 
product.
While there has been a debate about the extent to 
which these multinationals are automating and 
decentralising operations in the Far East and other global 
locations (See for example Russell, 1984; Ernst, 1985), 
this study cannot resolve that question. However, the next 
chapter reports the findings of the research survey among 
US (and one Japanese) high tech multinationals in Scotland 
to assess how these strategies have affected the operation 
of subsidiaries there. Are they still the "branch plants' 
that Vernon (1969), Forsyth (1972), and Hood and Young 
(1979) and so many others have claimed? Or have the 
demands of high tech markets and sophisticated
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technologies transformed them into a different sort of 
subsidiary?
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US "multinational strategies to cope with the crisis 
of the 1980' s reassessed the economic logic of the 
contribution of the subsidiary and its location. The 
necessity for firms to adjust swiftly to unpredictable 
market demands and to economise on the overwhelming 
capital costs of competing, forced management to question 
the value of "branch plant' subsidiaries. The US 
industry's overseas subsidiaries throughout the 1970' s had 
generated huge cost savings by using cheap labour for 
manual assembly of mass-produced, standardised products. 
These production methods and the global dispersion of 
industry facilities could not deliver the economies 
necessary for the more complex and variable products of 
the 1980' s. This chapter examines the US multinational 
reassessment of the role of subsidiaries in Scotland, and 
established a sizeable overseas concentration of 
microelectronics production by the end of the 1970' s. 
Rather than disinvestment, US multinational management 
allocated to these subsidiaries the responsibility for 
capturing the European market, and as a result 
dramatically enhanced the technology investments in and 
autonomous of these plants.
The chapter has three sections. The first reviews the 
the history of foreign direct investment by micro- 
electronics multinationals in Scotland. The next section 
summarises survey findings on changes in the industry's 
investment in the region. That section includes an 
assessment of the reasons why Scotland serves as a focus 
of corporate, strategic response. The last section 
explores the implications for the theory of multinational 
corporations.
There was one Japanese multinational corporation in 
the survey. The strategic priorities and changes in this 
firm during the study period provide a useful contrast to 
the sample of US firms: this firm revealed some of the
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important features of the current and future threat to US 
markets and competitiveness. Inclusion of the findings 
from this provide a context for the developments in US 
multinational firms, which are reviewed in this and the 
next chapter.
5.2 TH E. . H ISTOR Y_ 0 F_ F 0 R E I GN D IRECT I N V ES T M E N J_ I N
The electronics industry in Scotland developed in the 
midst of the ruin of the region's traditional industries - 
coalmining, shipbuilding, steel and heavy engineering, all 
now "sunset' sectors. The region had lost more than 
200,000 jobs in the decade since 1975, and one-third of 
its manufacturing employment (Meredith, 1985A) . In the 
midst of this industrial collapse, "One of the most 
powerful concentrations of electronics companies in 
Europe" (FMj..na.nc_ia.l......T_ime_s, 1985) developed in Scotland. The
industry grew to include three hundred or more firms, *  
employing about 42,500 people (Rosie, 1984), and 
represented an investment in new facilities of 
approximately £50O million (1984 prices) between 1978/79 
and 1984 (SDA, 1983A; 1983B; Faux, 1984).
" . . . [E] lectronics presently stands as 
Scotland's principle growth industry and a 
source of considerable hope for the future. " 
(McDermott, 1979)
As such, regional economic policy had prioritised the 
growth and development of the industry. 2
Though the area originally had a wide variety of 
electronics firms during the study period, "Silicon Glen' 
developed predominantly around "high tech' or micro- 
electronics (Johnstone, 1983). The region's producers 
supplied 79% of the UK's integrated circuit market and 21% 
of Europe's (GujardAan, 1984) and represent the largest 
concentration of semi-conductor manufacturing outside the 
US and Japan. Firms in the region produced 10O,OOO 
personal (micro) computers in 1984 and were expected to 
fill fifty percent of UK demand for micros in 1985 and 
(forecast before the 1985 slump) to manufacture more than 
1.75 million micro computers by 1988 (Interviews with SDA
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official and Andrew Hargrave, industry expert, April and 
August, 1984). In fact, Scotland had the highest per 
capita output in the world of both home computers (British 
B_ys_i_ne_s_s, 1984) and integrated circuits - five per person 
per week in 1984, forecast to increase to 12 1/2 by 1986 
(DeJonquieres, 1985C).
The corporate contributors to this growth were major 
actors in the world high tech market place: ten of the 
world's top 50 information technology corporations 
(?_i._d?.n9JkM.L....I.Ml!?S., 1981) have manufacturing facilities in 
Scotland, as do three of the top four market shareholders 
in the semi-conductor industry (O*Connor, 1983, p.131). 
Many of them were world leaders in sales and profits 
growth in their main product markets during the first half 
of the 1980's (E. 1 e; ctrpn_ic:s__Bus.ines s, 1986). [See Appendix 
1 for profiles of survey firms.]
Scotland had long been a site for multinational 
manufacturing investment. Foreign direct investment 
expanded during the 1970's (Forsyth, 1972; Firn, 1975): 
foreign-owned firms accounted for 16% of the region's 
manufacturing employment in 1979, in contrast to 89% in 
1964. The portion of net manufacturing output produced by 
the foreign sector also increased, from 15.6% (1973) to 
20.5% (1979) (Young, 1984, p.96). Foreign direct 
investment in Scotland was particularly concentrated in 
the more resilient industries of the 1970's - instrument, 
electrical/electronic and mechanical engineering (Hood and 
Young, 1980).
Multinational participation in the electronics 
industry has been more pronounced than in other industries 
in the region (McDermott, 1979). By 1978 22% of the 
industry's firms were US corporations, employing 41% of 
the industry's labor force (BAH, 1979). By 1983, US 
corporations, a small proportion of the industry's firms 
(13%) still controlled 41% of the industry's employment 
(SDA survey, reported in Firn and Roberts, 1984, Table 
9.3).
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US electronics firms began investing in Scotland 
around 1950 when the technology was actually electro- 
mechanical. By the 1960's major firms such as IBM, 
Burroughs, and Honeywell were manufacturing typewriters 
and accounting machines. Also Hughes had set up a plant 
producing diodes. A second wave of new US corporate start- 
ups invested in Scotland in the late 1960's to take 
advantage of the high and immediately realisable grant 
levels - 45% of capital investment - then available in the 
region (BAH, 1979; Dunning, 1973). Scotland served as 
their ~port of entry' to Europe - the overseas production 
site set up to get to know the relatively homogenous 
European market (Hood, Reeves, and Young, 1981; Hood and 
Young, 1980).
The production technologies and the organisational 
structure of these plants fit the models of Vernon's 
product life cycle. They were simply "foreign production 
centres" (McDermott, 1979), using mature technologies to 
convert and second-source US products for the UK and EEC 
markets (Scibberas, 1977; USITC, 1979; BAH, 1979). The 
plants had few sourcing linkages within the regional 
economy, manufacturing or importing most of the needed 
inputs (Forsyth, 1972; McDermott, 1979; House of Commons, 
1980). Production operations were predominantly labor- 
intensive assembly and test. The US firms tended to employ 
proportionately more women than do indigenous firms 
(Forsyth, 1972; Scibberas, 1977), creating many "semi- 
skilled' jobs for women (Firn, 1975A; House of Commons, 
1973) in the midst of the high and rising male 
unemployment in the traditional industries.
As predicted in the product-life-cycle model, the 
role of these plants was import substitution using 
production techniques that had been extensively used by 
the corporation in the home base economy.
In keeping with Vernon's theory, there were layoffs 
and closures amongst the US multinationals in the region 
in the 1970's as mature product markets collapsed. 
^Industrial menopause', as Hood and Young (1977) called
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it, caused many US multinationals to retrench local 
operations: the subsidiaries had not updated their product 
lines or production techniques, which either run their 
course or faced unbeatable competition from newly 
industrialised economies.
"As a result Scotland...entered the 
latter half of the 1970s vying with the 
Mezzogiorno of Italy as the least competitive 
manufacturing region in the whole of Europe." (Hood 
and Young, 1977)
State policy targeted overseas electronics firms as 
early as the 1950's for regional developement. In 1954, 
the UK Ministry of Supply identified electronics as a 
strategically important source of growth for the Scottish 
economy (McDermott, 1976). The "growth centre' concept 
further underlined the official objective of developing 
the electronics industry to build a long-term self- 
sustaining growth (Pirn, 1973). State preferential 
purchasing from firms producing in the UK further 
supported this effort. This policy required any 
electronics firms wanting access to government agencies, 
large technologically-sophisticated buyers, to establish 
an import-substitution facility in the UK. 3 (Scibberas, 
1977).
Later, state policy directed firms to more capital- 
intensive investment (through the Industry Acts of 1966 
and 1972) and to regions of high unemployment. Successive 
governments altered the levels of and balance between 
automatic and selective financial incentives and aid that 
benefitted Scotland, much of which was designated as an 
Assisted Area. The Government also subsidised construction 
of advance factories on industrial estates and in New
Towns.
The regional electronics industry dominated by US 
multinationals did not generate unambiguous growth and 
benefits during the 1970's. Industry employment dipped 
severely in the mid-seventies (a fact only recently 
discovered due to the very poor employment statistics kept 
at the regional level), resulting from the change-over to
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truly electronic products and processes. By 1979 the 
region's industry was again growing: the five-year period 
of this study, 1979 - 1984, was one of significant growth, 
as Table 5. 1 shows.
TABLE 5.1. EJEIf^J^
1970 48,258
1975 38,700
1978 34,3OO
1981 37,628
1983 41,500
1984 42,500
Sources: SDA, 1979; McCrone, 
1983;
Young, 1983.
NB : These data, taken from different sources, are not 
strictly comparable; they offer only a rough indicator of 
employment change in the region.
Industry contraction in the 197O's persuaded the SDA 
to commission a study to determine future employment 
potential in the region's industry (BAH, 1979). At that 
time they found no evidence to indicate that the 
established multinationals had any plans for expanding 
operations in Scotland. In fact managers expressed 
hesitancy about the future of their plants, citing the 
importance of shorter product cycles, the rapid pace of 
technological change, exchange rate fluctuations, 
corporate consolidation in the home base economy and the 
primacy of reducing costs.
?. m. p. a <?.tr.. ...o.f ...Chaing ed.... MaIT; k. e;t..._..Qo_ndj._t ions
Much of the academic literature presumed that any 
investment by the industry's multinationals would continue 
to follow the pattern of the recent past -- transferring 
mature technologies to global subsidiaries whether for 
import substitution or for export platform production. 
This analysis of the use arid organisation of the 
technologies within the production unit and within the
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corporation is entirely ahistorical. The rapid and 
drastic changes in technologies and markets pressured 
multinational management to fundamentally reconsider 
their investment strategies. Amongst other factors, 
management in US semi-conductor firms realised they had to 
respond to the Japanese producers' rapid domination of the 
US and world 64K integrated circuit markets (New York
1985), and US computer firms had to compete with 
the vibrancy shown by the UK computer industry. US 
producers refocused their efforts to improve product
*
quality to regain customers and to press forward with 
investment in more automated equipment (Interviews with 
managers in Silicon Valley).
These factors prompted management to reassess the 
shape and role of corporate global operations; these 
reassessments were then reflected in capitalisation 
projects globally. Scotland seems to have gained pride of 
place in corporate global realignments. From 1980 to 1984 
multinational semi-conductor and computer firms invested 
£540.9 m pounds in 1984 prices (Rosie, 1984). That 
included three new start-ups and expansions in six already 
established firms. Four of those firms expanded twice 
during the study period. Further investment plans were 
announced subsequently - a major expansion by one of the 
start-ups, an established multinational corporation 
opening a new facility in a separate location within the 
region, and five additional firms planning to establish 
manufacturing plants in 1984-86.
5. 3 SURVEY_.FINDINGS
Most of the fourteen survey multinationals invested 
heavily in their Scotland subsidiaries during the study 
period. While many analysts assumed the investments were 
simply expansions of mature mass production capabilities, 
these investments were, in fact, transforming the plants 
into more highly automated, more integrated very modern 
facilities. The criteria considered important in assessing
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the industry's development included decisions about new 
investment, including the newness of the technologies, the 
integration of formerly discrete, dispersed production 
stages, and the allocation of new products and geographic 
market responsibilities. The discussion below outlines 
this transformation.
5.3.1 New...._Inyestiments in the Subsidiary in Scot 1 and
During the years 1979-1984 at least eight of the 
eleven established semi-conductor and computer firms 
invested significantly in their Scottish plants. Almost 
all of those investments were in new capital equipment and 
in expanded production capacity. Seven of those eight 
expanded more than once during the five years since 
1978/9. In addition three new firms, one of them Japanese, 
started up in these sectors during the study period. In 
each case, the firms invested steadily throughout the 
period. The Japanese firm had begun a major second phase 
of capital expansion during the period.
Investment in all of the survey firms was directed
 
to automating existing and new production processes. Every 
single semi-conductor and computer firm had recently 
invested in automated equipment to eliminate some of the 
manual operations in production. In some cases, management 
had announced more than one infusion of capital during the 
1979 through 1984 period. These investments financed 
additions and new facilities, not simply capital 
replacement.
Many of the investments, particularly in the semi- 
conductor industry, doubled and tripled the size of the 
subsidiary in Scotland, as Table 5.2 indicates. National 
Semiconductor began a £100 million expansion (in 1984) 
which, when complete, would double its square footage and 
1983 site employment. That followed an expansion in 1980 
that had doubled employment. These expansions made the 
Greenock plant the corporation's largest site outside the 
US. Motorola, making the single largest investment in the
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region, increased plant size by 67% with an employment 
projection that was 163% over the 1978 level. General 
Instruments concentrated its corporate productive 
capacity in one particular chip technology in the Scotland 
plant with a staged succession of advanced fabrication 
wings. These investments doubled plant size by 1983 (SDA, 
1983A), and tripled output capability.
TABLE 5.2 SEMI-CONDUCTOR INDUSTRY EXPANSIONS IN SCOTLAND
FIRM FACILITY SIZE ('000 SQ. FT) 
CURRENT PROJECTED
Motorola 150 
National
Semiconductor 15O 
NEC 60 
General
Instrument 40 
Hughes 60 
Burr-Brown 35
250
300
180
80
92
75
SOURCE: SDA, (1983A).
COST OF 
INVESTMENT 
(£m. )
60
45
40
42.5
1 CEst) 
25
5.3.2 Investment in Automation
The semi-conductor firms had introduced automated 
equipment in every phase of chip production, but 
fabrication was a key target. All the survey firms had had 
fabrications before 1979, mostly for devises at the low 
end of the market. Chips were sent to the Far East for 
assembly and in many cases back to Scotland for final 
testing. The new equipment regulated and increased the 
speed of production and increased the precision of process 
control by eliminating handling.
Most firms automated the following steps in 
fabrication processing in the Scotland plant in the early 
1980's:
 mask alignment and photolithography; 5
 new equipment that amalgamated individual 
tasks, reducing the transfer of wafers between 
steps;- 6 and
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 automated transportation of wafers between 
processing work stations to further reduce human 
handling.
The investments in automated transport were still 
partial: most firms had installed equipment that loaded 
and unloaded wafers automatically at each processing step. 
Also they had invested in equipment that amalgamated 
processing stages further reducing transfer of wafers. 
Only one firm had installed robots to eliminate human 
handling. However, a number of managers in the region's 
largest plants indicated that they were participating in a 
global race to develop completely automated transfer of 
wafers and chips throughout production. One technical 
manager claimed he would install a completely automated 
transport system in the plant in Scotland by 1986. 7 All 
of the more automated techniques discussed above were 
introduced primarily to protect the investment in working 
capital - the unfinished chips.
In the computer industry, assembly was the primary 
target of automation. All of the plants had, in the past, 
used some sort of partly-automatic insertion equipment to 
put some chips onto printed circuit boards. 8 During the 
study period, three of the plants fully automated the 
insertion of at least 95% of the component chips, leaving 
only a few odd-shaped components (eg resistors!) to be 
inserted manually. The programming difficulties for 
equipment dealing with various sized inputs had delayed 
this achievement in automation until 1983 and 1984. 9 ' 10 
Also, most firms had installed fully automatic flow solder- 
machines, ^  fully automatic forming machines (to shape 
components to the required specifications) and automatic
/
machines to drill holes for the components, all replacing 
machines that required operators to load, adjust, and 
uload the part-products.
While many of these investments in automation in both 
industries focused on reducing wastage of variable capital 
due to defects, managers were also keenly concerned with 
ensuring only high quality, products went out the door,
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that delivery to customers was fast and dependable and 
that capital equipment was used as efficiently as 
possible. 12
Consequently, investing in more automated testing 
equipment was a high priority in both semi-conductor and 
computer firms. Managers in two of the four fully 
operative semi-conductor plants stressed that slowness in 
testing had become the biggest bottleneck at their plants. 
All of the survey firms had invested heavily at least 
since 1979 in automatic testing equipment. Newer automated 
test equipment (ATE) could test many more functions or 
parameters more precisely and faster. Those improvements 
were important given that, in the semi-conductor industry, 
a microprocessor in the mid 1980's might have required 
50O,OOO individual tests. While test equipment was 
computerised and automated to some extent many years ago, 
managers claimed that they had stepped up the investment 
rate in recent years to have equipment that could test 
increasingly complex chips and computers. They were 
upgrading and replacing final test equipment in order to 
test the product more rigourously as it progressed through 
production. The semi-conductor market leaders in Scotland 
were replacing test equipment every two or three years, 
with each new piece of test equipment costing from 
$75,OOO to $lm. The manager of only one firm admitted to 
using less than up-to-date test equipment. His firm 
produced a much less sophisticated chip for the consumer 
electronics market, allowing a less aggressive technology 
policy. Computer firms were able to modernise their 
test equipment without replacing it by adding new circuit 
boards and additional peripherals. These "kickers" 
enabled computer firms to respond incrementally to some of 
the technological changes in computer capability: firms 
could compete technologically with the same test equipment 
for five to ten years. In all cases, a firm's purchase of 
new ATE equipment was state-of-the-art technology.-^
Speeding UP throughput was a major reason for 
investing in other state-of-the-art technologies in both
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industries. Two semi-conductor firms had begun capital 
investment in 1984. to produce 6" wafers in the Scotland 
facility while the industry standard was still 4." and 5". 
This change r'equired both an investment in state-of-the-
art equipment in the preliminary steps of wafer 
fabrication (eg photolithography) and investment in more 
sensitive equipment in subsequent processes, because the 
larger wafer was more prone to breakage. The National 
Semiconductor facility was to be the first in the 
corporation to produce 6" wafers, and the subsidiary was 
given responsibility for' selecting and installing the 
equipment. 14. The leap to a larger wafer meant producing 
potentially 1000 more chips than was possible on a 4." 
wafer, or a 100% increase in output per wafer- The 
Japanese firm's decision to invest in robots (to load 
chips onto boards and into furnaces) was in large part, to 
speed UP turnaround time. While the corporation had used 
robots at other production sites, a manager claimed this 
was the corporation's most advanced installation to date. 
While determining the modernity of equipment was not 
possible, publicly available information indicates that 
at least three of the semi-conductor firms and one 
computer firm had invested in equipment to produce the 
next generation of VLSI chips, which demanded state-of-the 
art technology The Japanese semi-conductor firm, 
following a strategy of incremental technology 
improvement, was building a facility in Scotland more 
advanced tr)an its plant in Roseville, California, 
considered the most advanced facility in the world (Ernst, 
1983). In the computer industry, IBM, a world leader in 
factory automation, had annouced that the plant in 
Scotland was its most adventurous effort in manufacturing 
automation to date. The survey evidence suggests that in 
many other cases investments in Scotland in the early 
1980's were in state-of-the-art technologies. In other 
firms, managers indicated that production in Scotland had 
been significantly automated over the past few years, that 
there were extensive plans for further automation and that 
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there was no longer an economic rationale for investing in 
an/thing but the newest technologies. Across the board, 
the Scottish subsidiaries with good market expectations 
were using every available opportunity to automate with 
the most advanced equipment available.
5.3.3 In t e g r a t i n g Produictign_  Prp<c: e sses
The subsidiaries in Scotland were also investing 
heavily in integrating the disparate steps of production. 
They were designing and implementing systems that co- 
ordinated processes, and they were investing in capital 
equipment that incorporated steps that had formerly been 
located elsewhere in their global networks. The objectives 
of both computer-integrated-manufacture (CIM) and fully 
integrated processing were to speed up turnaround for 
nearby customers and to apply as rapidly as possible every 
bit of market information that might improve both 
equipment performance and sales. Investing in continuous 
processing was considered important in exploiting their 
capital and information inputs to the fullest.
CIM, the automation of predominantly information- 
based tasks in production, had become a major point of 
competition among producers. Managers all emphasised 
their efforts to incorporate computers into production 
both to control individual pieces of equipment and to 
"tie' separate machines and processes together.
All survey firms in the study had installed 
computerised systems for monitoring material inputs and 
work-in-progress. Software systems like MRP (Management 
Resource Planning) monitored production supplies when once 
delivered on-site, ordered new supplies automatically and 
reduced paperwork on the shop floor. Some had purchased 
off-the-shelf systems. However-, Hewlett-Packard and IBM 
developed systems for their own uses, then marketed them 
to industry. These systems replaced the informal or slow 
communications between the administrative offices and the 
shopfloor. They were designed to co-ordinate information 
so that inventory was not held unnecessarily long and that
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additional supplies would be on-site and available when 
needed. Management had been won over by "just-in-time' 
production scheduling: supplies arrive and are delivered 
to a work station only when it is ready. Particularly 
important in computer firms, these systems were often 
accompanied by automated warehousing, including robotic 
transport for supplies. This organisation can 
dramatically reduce the cost of inventories and uses more 
equipment more efficiently because it never stands to 
idle. 15 ' 16 Computerised systems also allow the managing 
director or shopfloor supervisors to monitor the 
production status of any order at any time.
At least four (and probably more) firms had set up 
"islands of automation' coordinating the operation of a 
number of contiguous machines. 17 These were state-of-the- 
art first steps om the complete computer integration of 
the plant, the aim of most managers. Islands of 
automation are clusters of adjacent and different 
production operations where "dense arrangements of 
computer-controlled machinery is coordinated so that 
manual intervention is kept to a minimum" (Marsh, 1984). 
In one of the survey semi-conductor firms, for example, 
one manager had "married' a number of machines in the 
early, repetitious stages of fabrication so that the 
processing steps were automatically scheduled. This means 
one machine "talks' to the others to determine which is 
ready to receive a batch for processing and an automatic 
tracking system takes the batch to that work station. 
Flexibility is a primary aim of extensive computerisation. 
7ne entire cluster can be adjusted to manufacture together 
a changing range of product sizes, shapes and 
specifications. New products can be produced by 
reprogramming, rather than retooling.
Management in all the leading firms emphasised that 
they had committed staff and resources at the facility in 
Scotland to moving closer toward complete automation. 
Because of the extraordinary complexities and unexpected 
problems of such an undertaking, this will take time.
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Management in one firm had a ten-year plan (beginning in 
1979) to establish a completely automated computer 
production facility ("floating' an input to the first 
workstation at the right time, then on to the next, all 
the way through packing, labelling and shipping). Managers 
in three others explained that they first needed a little 
experience with the new equipment: they expected to 
attempt full automation within one year of the interview.
Managers explained that work on these systems was as 
advanced in Scotland as anywhere else in the industry. All 
of the firms employed (and some trained) manufacturing 
software engineers on-site for this work, 18 though in some 
cases experienced specialists were on contract from the 
parent corporation. In this, the Japanese firm's strategic 
emphasis on incremental technological development was 
widely accepted. By learning from the new system, 
technical personnel improve computer capabilities in the 
next installation. As the most recent investment for many 
of these firms, their efforts at computer integration and 
flexible manufacturing in Scotland were their 
corporation's most advanced. 19
Managers in all the semi-conductor firms were more 
consistently committed to CIM investments in Scotland than 
in the computer industry. By contrast, only two of the 
seven survey computer firms were developing extensive CIM 
systems. Both firms produced fairly standardised, low-end 
products, which makes integration easier.
The point of CIM is essentially to capture and 
exploit market information as rapidly and efficiently as 
possible and to shorten throughput time. (See for example, 
Uilkins, 1984.) New information about customer 
specifications when programmed into flexible systems will, 
in principle, produce the needed customised product 
quickly. The economic drive to improve these information 
feedback systems was associated with management interest 
in bringing successive stages of production together.
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Backward Integration
To link manufacturing stages by computer required 
bringing production stages together in Scotland that had 
formerly been dispersed around the world. In a number of 
cases, this consolidation of production was part of global 
corporate restructuring that brought ~backend' activities, 
eg chip assembly, to Scotland. Incorporating these 
separated activities enabled firms to coordinate 
production more effectively with the demands of the market 
and to meet new economic pressures. Four of the seven 
semi-conductor firms in the study (as well as a new 
multinational entrant) built highly automated assembly and 
packaging facilities in Scotland between 1983 and 1984. In 
the computer industry IBM, a firm that had historically 
relied on a widely dispersed global network of 
standardised component production sites, had designed its 
new facility in Scotland to manufacture the entire
or")
personal computer. u However, the other established 
computer firms in the survey had always manufactured the 
entire computer system in Scotland because their products 
- predominantly mini-computers - are not standardised as 
is a micro-computer. However, these firm did not attempt 
to integrate manufacture of peripherals into the Scotland 
operations because there was no compelling reason to 
produce standard keyboards, printers, etc., on site. (In 
fact at least two firms had recently relocated peripheral 
production in Scotland to other parts of the world.)
Forward Integration
A number of the survey firms had added design and 
development activities21 to their manufacturing operations 
in Scotland. These activities were formerly reserved for 
the home-base economy. Three of the region's semi- 
conductor firms and six of the seven computer firms had 
design and development staffs in Scotland. These personnel 
were variously involved in product modification to meet 
European or individual customer specifications and in both 
product and production technology development. None of
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them, however, was involved in fundamental scientific 
research. Centres for basic research (to the limited 
extent that the industry supported them) were still 
concentrated in home base economies. The size and economic 
importance of these staffs differed depending on their 
operational assignments. However, all except one were 
involved in true design and development, not just product 
modification for European standards. The design and 
development commitment of the region's high tech 
multinationals seem to have deepened during the study 
period.
In the semi-conductor industry three of the region's 
oldest firms had long had design staffs. In two cases the 
firms had significantly enlarged their design capability: 
the staff of one grew from 10 to 20 and the other from 24. 
to 64 over the five-year period of the study. In contrast 
one firm rationalised, closing its design and development 
facility in Scotland and centralising all design activity 
in the US. 22
In two firms - a start-up and an established chip 
producer - the design personnel were not only custom- 
designing chips but also designing sub-systems - special 
order board-level high tech electronics products to solve 
specific technology problems. Already experienced in close 
collaboration with their customers in the telecoms and 
military markets, management had decided to seek the extra 
value added they could achieve by producing a finished 
product that incorporated their custom-designed circuits. 
This market orientation demands that design, fabrication 
and assembly be closed tied together, all near the 
customer: designs must be prototyped and communication 
between the stages of production is essential because of 
the inevitably frequent changes in specifications. Ulhile 
industry analysts had predicted that more complex chips 
would propel chip producers into systems work (Ernst, 
1983), these were the only two cases within the survey
 o -t
firms located in Scotland.^0
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Four of the established computer firms with
design/development staffs had majorly enhanced them during 
the study period. Management in some of these cases had 
significantly shifted resources away from manufacturing 
activity to engineering, focusing on developing better 
hardware and software designs for circuits and the central 
processing unit. This in some cases meant much tighter co- 
ordination of design, manufacturing and testing with 
company personnel taking on responsibilities for product 
prototyping, design modifications, developing testing 
protocols, etc. which had previously been done in other 
parts of the corporation.
During the study period, Honeywell Control Systems, 
for example, set up a Solid State Applications Centre. The 
mission of the Centre was to develop new computer control 
products from the chip through the systems levels for 
usage in industrial applications. Because of the 
complexity of the chip, the work included research in and 
design of the semi-conductor technology itself. This high 
technology unit was the only advanced engineering lab in 
Honeywell, located outside the US (SDA, 198O). Another 
corporation had from the beginning assigned its Scotland 
subsidiary the responsibility of developing basic product 
technologies into commercialisable products to be 
manufactured at the plant. Development and design 
responsibility at the facility had grown sharply: in 1976 
only 43% of the plant's output was internally-developed 
product; by 198O that had risen to 70% (Cressey, 1984) and 
by 1984., 1OO%. In a third firm, the size of the 
engineering design staff had remained approximately 
stable, adding a few young graduates yearly. However, the 
product development activity grew to dominate the 
operations of the plant. By 1984 the engineering division 
accounted for almost a third of site employment, compared 
with only 7% in 1979. In these three firms, engineers were 
developing ideas that would provide a stream of products 
for the plant to manufacture.
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Design and development managers indicated that this 
had become essential in competing in high tech markets. 
Increasingly sophisticated customers demanded customised 
products: that required the region's firms to have design 
and development capability. In one firm, when two major 
customers asked for help, a computer repair centre and a 
very small R&D staff developed two new products for their 
specific needs. The firm then manufactured those products 
in-house for those customers and for wider distribution. 
In another computer firm, a team of staff engineers had 
redesigned product to make it manufacturable in a highly 
automated system. Staff engineers had also developed a new 
and highly automated production process for the facility 
in Scotland. This firm had no design or R&D centre in 
Scotland, but these personnel were clearly involved in 
developing what was to date the most automated production 
design in the entire industry. Another firm, a new start- 
up, had, at the time of the survey, only 6 technical 
people to modify their mass-produced product to meet 
European standards. However, within the first year 
managers acknowledged that they would soon expand that 
scope to include more fundamental design and development. 
Only one computer multinational maintained its original 
pattern of manufacturing entirely to designs transferred 
from the US.
All the survey firms claimed to have process 
development on-site. Because this work can arise out of 
the everyday operational tasks of any engineer, actual 
resource commitment for this purpose was unclear, though 
managers emphasised its value. The development work 
primarily focused on perfecting the operations and 
improving the productivity of their production systems 
C'massaging the system'). Because of the complexity of the 
operations, however, managers mentioned a number of cases 
wnere staff developed entirely new procedures and software 
to solve unanticapitaed problems or to fill technical 
needs as yet unmet by the parent.
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The product-life-cycle theory, even in its updated 
form, predicts that overseas branch plants would 
manufacture established, if not mature, products developed 
in the home base economy. The economic rationale for 
overseas manufacturing remains export substitution to 
improve multinational competitive position vis-a-vis 
domestic producers. The product orientation of the firms 
in Silicon Glen indicated a very different role for these 
plants in world markets and within the corporation. An 
increasing proportion of their products were customised, 
rather than standardised. More importantly, the plants 
were equipped to produce new products for gro.wth markets. 
In fact, a number of the corporations had assigned the 
Scotland plant with product responsibility.
Products in Growth Markets
Every firm in the survey, with possibly one 
exception, produced new products. All of the semi- 
conductor firms produced devices currently dominating 
w_qrld markets, and a number had invested in production 
technologies to manufacture the next generation of chips 
on the horizon - 32-bit microprocessors, 256K DRAM memory 
chips, and EePROMs that are essential companion chips to 
new micro-processors. The capital investment in 3 of these 
4 firms will allow precision down to a circuit line width 
of 1 micron (A micron is one millionth of a meter.) or 
less by 1986. At that point a two-micron width was 
considered state-of-the-art (Cane, 1984) and the world 
industry average in 1985 was more than 4 to 5 microns (New 
York T.iiT>?!~:, 1985). Managers in these firms commented that 
these technologies would also be able to produce a future 
generation of VLSI chips - the 1 megabit memory chip. Also 
all of the producers had targeted markets that would 
demand the most up-to-date product technologies - the 
military, aerospace, telecoms and computer markets. One of 
the producers, while manufacturing only to supply 
corporate needs, was an acclaimed world leader both in its
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mini-computer designs and in its design of chips 
specifically for use in sophisticated computers. None of 
the corporations had allocated mature products to the 
Scottish subsidiary. Even the Japanese firm, whose market 
strategy (not just for the subsidiary, but for the entire 
corporation) had previously been to enter a commodity 
market once the product was well-established, had jumped 
into the next generation product (the 256K memory) and was 
preparing to produce it simultaneously in Japan, the US, 
and Scotland.
The modernity of the computer products cannot be so 
easily gauged: software changes and adding a new memory 
board update a product without fundamental design 
changes. Three of the firms manufactured products that 
were designed on-site, so the Vernon delay of product 
introduction overseas did not exist. The remaining four 
firms produced products designed and first manufactured in 
the US. The time lag between product introduction in the 
US and production overseas was minimal for all. Even the 
two volume producers - IBM and Wang - were manufacturing 
products that had only arrived in the US market the year 
before.
Customised Products
Almost all of the survey firms produced customised 
products - either solely or in addition to volume 
standardised commodities. All but one of the semi- 
conductor firms manufactured chips to customer 
specifications in 1984. Most of these firms had gained 
their market power as volume producers of standard 
chips. 2S Managers in all of the semi-conductor firms, 
following on industry forecasts, expected customised 
product to become a much larger portion of plant output 
over the next few years. The computer industry also was 
geared to customised production, but, because of the 
nature of the product, that had long been the case for 
most producers. Only one producer was solely oriented to 
mass production of low-end products, aimed at the office
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automation market. The others had, because of the expense 
and sophistication of their machines, always produce 
small-batch customised product. Industry managers expected 
that demand to continue; even one of the two volume 
producers anticipated that customised products would grow 
as a share of their output.^
Single Sourcing
Further, a significant proportion of the survey firms 
had been assigned world responsibility for some of their 
products - either as a second source for home base markets 
or global single sourcing. Five of the seven semi- 
conductor multinationals and two of the computer firms in 
Scotland had world product responsibilities. One of the 
semi-conductor firms and two of the computer firms were 
assigned single source responsibilities for the global 
corporation. Uhile most of the other firms were assigned 
to supply the European, African, Middle East and to some 
extent the Far East markets, at least five of these firms 
were expected to be a second, if not a primary, source for 
the home base market - the US or Japan markets, the most 
sophisticated in the world. In one case the parent 
corporation was expected to buy as much as 75% of the 
output of the Scotland plant. This shows that output from 
the Scotland plants competed directly with the world's 
most advanced, highest quality products in some market 
segments. In industries where new, high quality product 
technologies can only be produced by new production 
technologies, world product responsibility
requires investment in extremely modern, if not state-of- 
the-art equipment, corroborating the earlier finding.
The survey interviews further revealed that in many 
cases the product market assignments of the Scottish 
subsidiary had been upgraded during the 1979-1984 period. 
The share of customised business in their total output, 
the number of products they supplied for the world market, 
and the level of sophistication of their products had all 
been enhanced as part of recent global investment
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strategies. One computer multinational gave the Scotland 
subsidiary world market responsibility for its specialised 
business computers in order to eliminate duplication of 
extensive capital investment within the corporation. The 
Japanese multinational made a particularly interesting 
investment decision. Planning to build a chip fabrication 
facility in Europe, the firm decided to build it in 
Scotland, then upgraded its investment plan. Rather than 
manufacture the 64K DRAM, a product in a market that was 
peaking, the new plant would produce the upcoming 
generations of chips - 256K DRAMs and 1 megabit memories.
The multinationals, then, had allocated to the 
subsidiaries single source responsibility for the newest 
generation of products and the technological capability to 
produce the whole product - not part. This gave the 
Scotland plant access to the world market over the longest 
period of time possible, new scope for maximising sales. 
By restructuring the division of labour in the 
corporation, the corporation gave the subsidiary 
opportunities for scale economies while avoiding duplicate 
investments in expensive, fast depreciating capital stock.
5.3.5
The survey was not designed to explore the extent to 
which decision-making responsibilities such as financial 
planning had been devolved to the subsidiary management. 
Managers, however, frequently indicated that they had 
extensive independent responsibility (eg financial 
planning, technology assessment and investment) as long as 
they operated within specified corporate constraints. The 
nature and extent of those constraints, thus of the 
autonomy, varied with the individual corporation and its 
market position, and cannot be determined from the survey 
data. However, DEC was an example of a firm that had gone 
on record to claim that greater subsidiary autonomy in 
Europe was an operational objective for its UK facilities 
(Horsley, 1983). Furthermore, those corporations investing 
state-of -the-art technologies in Scotland had allocated
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responsibility for testing, selecting, and installing the 
new technology to subsidiary personnel. Exploring 
corporate limits on subsidiary autonomy and the changes in 
constraints over the business cycle would be an important 
topic for further research.
5.3.6 ._.__._.. -.__._m .
The changes outlined above - the investment in new, 
at times state-of-the-art equipment, based on greater 
computer control and flexibility and the responsibility 
for increasingly sophisticated and highly customised 
products -
all required technically trained personnel. They were 
needed in greater numbers to oversee, modify and repair 
the operations of new production equipment, to design and 
test new and custom-ordered product and to deal with 
potential customers. This shift in the activities at the 
plant and the nature of new capital investment together 
reduced the need for lesser skilled workers per unit of 
output. While, as suggested by the product-life-cycle 
theory, semi-skilled production workers dominated the work 
force of survey firms at the beginning of the study 
period, 41% in 1979, they had declined to approximately 
one-third by 1984. Subsidiary managers predicted that 
employment of technically-trained personnel would continue 
to rise while that of less skilled production labour would 
fall over the next years.
The adoption of new technologies and the integration 
of design, development and testing activities at these 
plants radically altered the kind of work, the definition 
of jobs, and the qualifications for the new occupations, 
as well as the numbers of workers needed. All of these 
changes contributed to the industry's extensive and 
increasing dependence on highly skilled technical labour - 
by 1984, at least one quarter of the work force in survey 
firms. The next chapter will more fully address the impact 
on labour and the labour market.
146
ANAL .YS_ I S 0 F MA NAG E MEN T ST R A T E G Y
All of the survey firms had invested extensively in 
more automated processes during the study period (1979 - 
1984). Only the four firms with highly uncertain 
competitive positions and one with a highly specialised 
product had more conservative investment strategies. 
Management in the survey's market leading firms had 
invested in a wide range of automated equipment. For the 
market leaders it was a race to automate operations in 
Scotland constrained only by production deadlines. For 
weaker firms investment in new technologies in Scotland 
was moderated by corporate rationalisation plans that 
threatened to concentrate capital investment in other 
locations.
The rush to invest in new technologies was not the 
conventional rationale of a capitalist wanting to reduce 
his expenditure on labour or to eliminate his industrial 
relations problems. Here capital-saving was the objective. 
More automated processing was introduced to protect the 
increasingly expensive partly-processed product from 
contamination and breakage  thus to avoid defects, to 
reduce the time that expensive inventory and work-in- 
progress was held, and to use very expensive capital 
equipment intensively before it became obsolete. 
Economising on capital, not labour, was the competitive 
imperative (Elster, 1983; Ernst, 1983). Only those 
computer firms that had long delayed capital investment, 
maintaining manual production methods, were introducing 
automation in part to reduce labour costs.
The economics of automation were more compelling in 
the semi-conductor industry than in computer production 
because of differences in the production processes. In the 
semi-conductor industry, yield is a critical determinant 
of both unit cost and profit. The most effective way to
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improve production yield, or the number of good chips per 
wafer, was to use more precise production equipment. 
Because the yield depends so heavily on successful, 
predictable chemical processing, a major concern was to 
eliminate the impurities that the wafers would be exposed 
to in processing. That meant both purifying the air (to 
meet conditions as stringent as those for an operating 
theatre) and reducing the numbers of times wafers and 
production inputs were exposed to air and handling during 
the more than 2OO processing steps. People's dandruff or 
the particles a smoker exhales can contaminate a whole 
batch of wafers, as can any imprecise or irregular 
movement when putting wafers into a chemical process. 
Table 5.3 shows the range of ordinary activities that can 
contaminate the product. Errors that would seem slight in 
other environments can ruin wafers: with the higher value 
added in recent generations of chips (due to the front-end 
research and design investment), contamination represented 
a major cost threat. Eliminating potential contamination 
and irregularities improved yield.
Even a slight drop in yield radically alters the unit 
cost, can eradicate unit profitability in sharply 
contested markets, and can shift the cost advantage of
O~7
producing in one location over others. / Japanese firms, 
realising this, had invested in advanced automated 
equipment earlier than most US firms. Corporate managers, 
facing unprecedented cost and price competition from 
Japanese firms (New ...York...... Ti.mes., 1985) had insisted that
improved production yield was critical to survival under 
the new conditions of cost- competition. Investing in 
automated procedures was a way to protect their wafers and 
minimise input costs. In the early 1980's, US firms 
automated production systems to replace human intervention
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to increase yield (Firianc.ial...,.Times, 1984C). The aim was 
to preserve capital, not to reduce labor costs.
Survey interviews and trade press articles emphasised 
the importance of removing people in production to 
protecting capital.
"The only problem with humans," as one managing 
director said, "is dandruff."
"In the latest very large scale integrated circuits 
(VLSICs),..the contamination which is introduced when 
an operator, even one clad in surgical type gown and 
gloves, picks up a wafer is enough to disrupt the 
entire operation of the circuits...[H]andling of 
the circuits is undesirable...."
In addition, "[t]he point has been reached where 
human control of the processes is often not good 
enough. Human controllers are simply not as 
consistent as their computer counterparts." 
(Keyhoe, 1981A)
"Uafer fabrication specialists have come to the 
conclusion that the human operator is the greatest 
contribution to potential contamination in 
semi-conductor clean rooms. " (S.ejTLi.cpnd.u.ct.or. 
International, 1984)
"It has been suggested that if all humans were 
removed from cleanrooms, yields would double... 
strictly due to the reduced contamination. 
(Singer, 1983)
"Automation is...generally accepted as the route 
to higher production yields and greater device 
complexity." (Keyhoe, 1981B)
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"In VLSI you have to separate people from the 
process to increase yields, and only automation 
will do that." ( E 1 ect. rpn i_cs. , 1983)
TABLE 5.3
The Increase in Contamination
Times increase over
ambient levels 
(particles, .2 to 50 
per million)
Personnel movement
Gathering 4 to 5 people together
at one location 
Normal walking 
Sitting quietly 
Laminar flow workstation with
hands inside 
Laminar flow workstation - no
activity 
Personnel protective clothing
Brushing sleeve of uniform 
Stamping on floor without shoe
covering 
Stamping on floor with shoe
covering
Removing handkerchief from pocket 
Personnel per se
Normal breath
Breath of smoker up to 20 minutes
after smoking
Removing handkerchief from pocket 
Personnel per se
Normal breath
Breath of smoker up to 20 minutes
after smoking 
Sneezing 
Rubbing skin on hands and face
1.5 to 3 
1.2 to 2
1 to 1.2
1.01
None 
1.5 to 3 
10 to 50
1.5 to 3 
3 to 10
None
3 to 10 
None
2 to 5 
5 to 20 
1 to 2
SOURCE: S e: m_i. c; o> nidI u c; t. or.....In t . e r; n a .t.i o n a 1., 1984, p.19.
Greater speed, as well as improved precision was 
another way investment in new technologies helped reduce 
unit capital costs. The faster batches of wafers could be 
processed, the better management's chances of earning 
payback on the equipment before it became obsolete. Many 
managers stressed the competitive importance of investing 
in state-of-the-art equipment to speed up throughput, even 
though it often meant spending substantial time and money 
to get the new machines to work. They claimed that waiting
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for a well-tested machine or the next breakthrough in 
production technology would be a strategic mistake in the 
comeptition of the 1980's. The firm would lose the 
experience of working with a technology its competitors 
were using, putting the company at a short-term 
competitive disadvantage in terms of quality, unit cost 
and turnaround time. That rapidly translates into lost 
market share in this fast-paced industry. As one manager 
explained,
"At the state-of-the-art end, the vendors are 
inevitably still debugging the machines. So 
producer, while developing its own product, has 
to debug the production system as well. There's no 
alternative. That's the price a company has to pay to 
stay in the front-end of the industry... If the 
company waits around for the two years it takes to 
iron out all of the problems with a machine, the 
company would be two years behind the industry. 
Though this process may be a bit slower, a company 
can't afford to wait. If a competitor working at the 
state-of-the-art end gets a 1 megabit RAM out six 
months ahead (of our company), they immediately 
capture that chunk of the marketplace the company 
needs.....So there's no way a company can avoid the 
changes. It's the marketplace that determines what 
individual companies do.
- Manager of a VLSI facility in 
Scotland (Interview, 1984)
This manager made it clear that the ~can't wait* 
technology competitiveness voiced by managers in Silicon 
Valley was just as central to the success of the 
subsidiary. 28
It is also important to remember that the integrated 
circuit is a unique product with its production economics. 
Because the precision of production equipment determines 
how many microscopic circuits can be placed on a chip, a 
new, more densely packed chip demands a better machine 
than previous ones. Introducing new products usually 
demands new capital investment. There is rarely a choice 
in fabrication and now in assembly between a new machine 
and a manual method because most of these operations 
cannot be done manually. The production processes are
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predominantly chemical and the outcomes (ie the circuits 
and connections on .the chips) are microscopic.
While competition stimulated increased automation in 
the computer industry, there was a wider range of 
technological options, thus investment strategies among 
the survey firms. These reflected the companies' 
competitive standing and product markets. The front-end 
costs of research and development, including software 
development, had skyrocketed and were increasingly 
unpredictable. Some managers called these costs - 
particularly the cost of software - uncontrollable. Given 
continuously falling hardware prices and price/performance 
ratios (Duncan, 1981), management had to attack costs 
somewhere: the target was the calculable costs of 
production (Ernst, 1983; Engstrom, 1984). Because many 
firms had maintained largely labour-intensive production 
methods, automated technologies to eliminate labour could 
significantly reduce a large share of production costs. 
However, the expense of these machines and the rise of 
information-related costs also pressed management to 
invest in new technologies as part of a range of capital- 
saving measures, especially in testing. Individual firms' 
investment over the period were more often than not more 
restricted in scope than those of the semi-conductor 
industry. This is due both to the differences in product 
and to the precarious competitive position of three of the 
firms.
However, the pressures to reduce and minimise 
production costs were felt by all competitors. Interviews 
suggested that this was equally true for producers of both 
volume/price-sensitive products and those at the 
technology/monopoly end of the range..
11 We are trying to move to a much higher degree 
of automation within our instruments because 
keeping production costs down is the way to 
kill the competition",
according to the engineering manager of a high-end 
instruments/computer firm. Management at Honeywell had 
publicly claimed that investment in automation was a high
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priority. Automation was most frequently introduced to 
eliminate wastage, to reduce work-in-progress and stored 
inventory, and to speed up production turnaround.
Testing was a prime target of computer industry 
investment. Increasingly complex computers required more 
and more varied testing. More highly automated (and 
sensitive) test equipment used at more frequent intervals 
during production helped both speed up production and 
reduce defects. As in the semi-conductor industry, the 
defect rate was a major concern to management. Uith the 
greater complexity of the computer, a defect that was not 
found until the product was complete cost £1000 to repair, 
while a problem caught earlier in production, eg at the 
board level, cost only £10. Firms could no longer afford 
the traditional manufacturing practice of an "allowable 
defect rate': they installed test equipment at many stages 
of production and altered the work organisation to strive 
for zero defects. 29 Even the two firms with the most 
unstable market positions30 had been unable to avoid 
investing in new ATE in order to meet the technological 
demands of their government, military, and banking 
industry customers.
The two computer multinationals that had not invested 
significantly in CIM were the two long-established firms 
that had uncertain competitive futures. Their cost- 
minimising strategies depended on reducing production 
labour. They automated individual production tasks and 
they switched to buying in components and subassemblies 
rather than manufacturing them in-house. This 
eliminated costs in activities which had insufficient 
scale economies and reduced dramatically the size of their 
production labour forces. 51 In fact, these efforts 
allowed them to hire almost exclusively engineers and 
technicians, transforming large, long-established 
manufacturing plants into product engineering facilities. 
The plants had originally manufactured all components on- 
site, including cabinets, cables, .printers and printheads, 
keyboards, power supplies, etc. The machine shop in one
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firm had even manufactured screws. They both streamlined 
down to assemble and test only the computer's central 
processing unit. In one case, the changes translated into 
a reduction in machine shop employment from a peak of 
1000 in 1974 to 8 by 1984. However, the firms' emphasis on 
expelling labour and seeming neglect of product turnaround 
were out of step with the competition, reflecting waning 
demand for their products. Managers in both firms 
admitted that their corporations had surplus production 
capacity internationally and that corporate restructuring 
was on the cards, making extensive investment risky or 
impossible.
That the semi-conductor firms were more consistently 
committed to investing in CIM than the computer industry 
resulted from the compelling economies of throughput 
possible in semi-conductor processing. Throughput refers 
to the effectiveness (yield), as well as speed, of 
processing and delivering small batches of finished chips. 
These economies with their focus on the quality of 
produced output rather than simply the quantity must be 
achieved by a smooth and flexible organisation of 
personnel and capital equipment in production and 
distribution. Equipment must not only provide speedier. 
processing, traditionally the aim of automation, but also 
ease and speed of adjustment to a range of production 
inputs and outputs.
"While manufacturing traditionally was geared 
to achieve factor savings by sacrificing 
product-line flexibility to economics of scale, 
the new generation of computer-based automation 
systems will allow firms to reconcile these 
conflicting objectives and thus open new paths 
to regain profitability. As a result of these 
developments, computerized automation systems 
are expected to transform the economics of 
many types of industrial manufacturing 
involving both mass and batch production." 
(Ernst, 1985)
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The move to establish "systemation', as Perez (1985) 
calls it, was spawned by the new economics of micro- 
electronics manufacture. 52 Firms facing severe price 
competition had to reconsider the wasted expense of a 
global organisation that required frequent trans-shipment 
of materials, parts and sub-assemblies over thousands of 
miles (Ernst, 1985). Rising costs of the capital 
equipment and of the production inputs pressured 
management to synchronise production and distribution 
systems better. Systemation, or bringing together and 
coordinating formerly disparate steps in a continuous 
manufacturing process, when paired with flexible 
equipment, enables the complete manufacturing of a range 
of products fairly rapidly and on short notice.
"The firm as a whole becomes a continuous 
flow system of activities, information, 
evaluations and decisions...[Ujhereas the 
assembly line [of the past] was based on 
constant repetition of the same sequence 
of movements, information technology is 
based on a system of feedback loops for 
the optimization of the most diverse - 
and changing - activities...This potential 
...could have a profound impact. It can 
transform production planning from a 
periodic hit-or-miss activity into a 
more reliable day-to-day adaptive 
system, coupled with flexible 
production facilities." (Perez, 1985)
Commissioning such a system, especially with the 
complexities of semi-conductor manufacturing, is extremely 
complicated, time-consuming, and risky. According to 
interviews, managers were willing to make these 
investments because of their capital-saving potential. 
According to one engineer who had designed an "island of 
automation' for one of the survey firms, state-of-the-art 
systems significantly reduced the time that work-in- 
progress sits around waiting for the next available 
machine. The savings are created by reducing the time 
unfinished product sits in the plant and by maximising the 
use of the production equipment. 53 For example, the 
manager of a semi-conductor fabrication plant adding an
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automated assembly facility explained that the firm wanted 
to be able to meet customers orders more quickly. The 1983 
chip boom had created an acute bottleneck for the firm: 
sales were delayed because the firm had had to wait for 
their finished chips to return from the Far East. 
Integrating all the production activities in one plant 
would prevent a repetition of this delay and exploit the 
advantages of being near to customers. At the same time, 
local managers admitted their concern over how long and 
unpredictable the set-up time was for these complex 
systems.
Highly integrated systems both exploit and depend on 
the intangible input of information. Access to market 
information and knowing how to make the equipment produce 
what customers want are essential to keeping capital 
equipment busy and operating well. Maximising throughput 
depends critically on successful organisation of market 
and technological information and experience - called a 
'closed feedback loop' in the industry. The more 
frequently technical staff have to adjust the machinery 
for changing product specifications, the more 
knowledgeable and effective they become: that means less 
downtime and higher yield. There is a powerful dynamic 
between the economic use of information inputs and 
economising on capital.
The fact that so many of the survey firms served 
government and military markets made investment in 
integrated production even more compelling. Military 
customers, state telecoms firms, etc. want the assurance 
of quality, technical support and reliable supply that a 
self-sufficient production facility nearby can offer. As 
one engineer with international experience explained,
"I think more people [firms] will begin 
to demand that the facilities [for 
assembly and test] are out here..a.[I]t's 
a comfort more than anything else that 
you're not doing it in the Far East... 
Quality is very important: it's 
becoming a big market now. I think it's 
a good business decision to have your 
facilities close. People can come into
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your facilities and see what you've got, 
making sure you've got all the right controls. 
You can satisfy them on the quality issues."
The company decisions to incorporate design and 
development with manufacturing were to capture and exploit 
these information economies. 5^ Allocating design and/or 
development capability to a Scotland plant enabled the 
subsidiary to establish a professional technical 
relationship with the market. That gives the subsidiary 
information and contacts that can create new products and 
possibly a new market: that would add to, extend and 
perhaps improve the usage of the production facility. That 
can enhance revenues prospects, productivity performance 
and, as outlined above, lower unit production costs.
Further, adding these capabilities to a manufacturing 
site enables the plant to generate new sales independent 
of decisions at corporate headquarters. This can be very 
important for the longevity of and continued investment in
the subsidiary. In many of the firms, the subsidiaries
* 
competed with other plants in the corporation, as well as
with the new potential locations, for each corporate 
investment project. The competition was based on 
productivity and unit cost performance, speed and success 
of starting UP new operations, as well as relative input 
costs. Management and technical professionals in the 
subsidiaries had, for this reason, lobbied the corporation 
for. increased design and development responsibilites. 
Because the cost of the capital equipment necessary for 
many aspects of high tech design and R&D is so high, 
locating these responsibilities in the Scotland plant 
indicated a corporate commitment and dependence that could 
not easily be abandoned at the first market downturn. That 
kind of commitment was an important step in retaining 
technical professionals Can important objective of high 
tech management, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter).
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4.4.2._Sup_p i.y_.i..Q9_ ...tJl*L .^P.rJr.d......Market
Producer technology and investment decisions derived 
from the need to capture the European market (See 
discussion below). Supplying this market with advanced 
microelectronics products required modern production 
technologies. Given the enormous expense and relatively 
short period of return from advanced production equipment, 
management assignment of world market responsibility to 
the Scotland subsidiary was an effort to exploit that 
investment to the fullest. It minimised duplication of 
investments within the corporation and maximised for the 
subsidiary its potential market. In addition, US 
multinational management found that producing even the 
most sophisticated products in Scotland reduced costs over 
those in the US. They could realise this cost advantage 
even when supplying the US market. The discussion below 
and in Chapter 6 details the specific cost-minimising 
opportunities of producing in Scotland.
The competitive necessity to cope with fast-paced 
technological change, increasing competition, and the 
growing burden of capital costs compelled US management to 
reconsider the role of the plant in Scotland within the 
corporation. Economic priorities for rapid adjustment to 
market changes and more intensive use of new equipment had 
overwhelmed the conventional rationale for delaying the 
transfer of the most advanced (and usually knowledge- 
intensive) technologies to a subsidiary. The economics 
that had geographically divided up the industry, 
dispersing part-product arid duplicate "clone' plants 
across the globe, had become obsolete.
The aim of greater integration of all the stages of 
design and manufacturing was to establish a collaborative, 
non-hierarchical process that would facilitate the flow 
and rapid exploitation of information. Production 
engineering must respond to product design; design must 
accommodate the requirements of testing, and changes in 
test routines must be incorporated into design. This
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interdependence of processes necessitated moving away 
from the hierarchical structure imposed by the 
geographical separation of the stages of production. 
.Restructuring the organisation of work to gain greater 
flexibility and responsiveness required placing formerly 
isolated activities next to one another and, because of 
its historic spatial organisation, a global restructuring 
of industry activity.
5 - 5 THE ROLE OF SCOTLAND IN THg INTERiVIATIONAL DiyiSION^OF
This development of advanced, more autonomous 
manufacturing and design facilities marked a sharp break 
in the history of multinationals in Scotland. Did 
corporate management respond to market pressures by 
enhancing all their plants around the world? How do we 
attempt to understand the development in Scotland in the 
context of international product competition and the 
global competition for multinational investment? Uhile the 
research in this study cannot answer the first question, 
this section will analyse why Scotland was the host 
economy for these developments.
Key management concerns in these two industries were 
how to respond rapidly to perpetually changing market 
conditions and how to manage the resulting financial and 
competitive risks of the large capital investments 
considered essential to stay competitive. The hectic pace 
of change was o critical feature:
"Much of the industry remains subject to
a repeated boom-and-bust sequence similar to the
classic "hog cycle'. But there is another
twist. Production equipment grows obsolete
at a relentless rate - its useful life can be
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as short as five years - each new generation 
of chip-making machinery costs several times 
more than its predecessor." (Keyhoe arid 
DeJonquieres, 1984)
These concerns are central to understanding the growth and 
nature of the industry's development in Scotland.
5.5.1 I.he.._C.ompet i t i ye ^..mporj: ance.......pf . .Eurppe
By the late 1970s the industry had identified Europe 
as a critical market. Severe competition in both semi- 
conductor and computer markets and the heightened expense 
and risk of new investments had reshaped multinational 
corporation priorities in all investment decisions. 
Corporate location priorities were big, growing markets 
around the globe. The two industries were, at that time, 
bursting at the seams to expand their revenue base 
quickly. The European market was an attractive and fertile 
ground for electronics firms (Crisp, 1983A) because in 
population terms it was the largest individual market in 
the world, sales had shown rapid growth and this was 
expected to exceed that of the US (Meredith, 1983; David, 
1984) .
In addition Europe's domestic producers had barely 
scratched the surface of potential demand. "[ I Indigenous 
competition is weaker than in other markets" (Smigh, 
1984): the market was wide open for large firms to gain 
market share quickly. Europe's highly industrialised 
economies had the high incomes and technological 
sophistication that high tech industry thrived on and the 
industrial markets the corporation had targeted. Europe 
had become the competitive battleground for US and 
Japanese high tech multinationals by the early 1980s 
(Borrus, 1983; Crisp, 1983A; Williams, 1983). The 
necess ity for continuing communication with the market to 
win and retain customers and the competitive importance of 
being inside the EEC tariff wall meant the battle for 
market share could not be managed by exports: producers 
would have to manufacture within Europe. At least eight of 
the survey multinationals had established major
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manufacturing plants in both Germany and the UK to gain 
access to large industrial markets.
Britain was the first choice for many US electronics 
producers wanting a share of the European market 
CFin.ancial._J.tDies, 1983A; 1984A). By 1984, the UK had 
become the largest overseas market outside of Canada for 
the US electronics industry (Large, 1984A). As an English 
language country and an economy with a large state and 
military market, a very strong computer market and new 
opportunities due to the deregulation of the telecoms 
industry, the UK offered many advantages as a 
manufacturing base.
To understand why high tech investment was
concentrated in Scotland rather than other parts of the UK 
requires an examination of the political economy of the 
region. The next section examines the factors that 
influenced management decisions to invest in Scotland. 55
5.5.2 Scotland's Uell-Developed Infrastructure
Scotland had a number of features that made it 
attractive relative to the other UK regions vying for 
foreign investors. The region had a long history of US 
multinational investment (Forsyth, 1972; Pirn, 1975; 
McDermott, 1977), though not all of it was harmonious 
(Hood and Young, 1981). Multinationals, mainly firms based 
in the US, dominated the region's electronics industry 
from the early 197O's (US firms employed 47% of the 
industry's 1973 employment; McDermott, 1976). The region 
also had an infrastructure that was conducive to the high 
tech industry. Scotland's "business climate', which was 
the result at least in part of explicit economic 
development policy, deserves closer examination.
Logistically, Scotland was very well connected to the 
rest of England and the Continent: the air, rail and road 
transport networks and telecommunications were well- 
established and reliable. Communications are essential for 
an international industry which depends on the continuous
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shipment of cargo, information and people around the 
world.
For the high tech industry, infrastructure means more 
than air and telephone connections. The infrastructure in 
Scotland offered many opportunities to soften the risks 
and minimise the costs of operating in the European 
market. The attractiveness of the region for foreign 
direct investment derived both from its growing base of 
electronics firms, including important defense contractors 
(eg Ferranti), and public policy initiatives and 
incentives that created a well-developed and growing 
private sector supply and subcontract network and 
mechanisms to ease the entrance of overseas investors.
By the end of the 1970s the region had a growing 
number of small firms that catered to the existing 
semiconductor and computer multinationals. There were 
plumbing and ventilation contractors experienced in 
building the industry's controlled-atmosphere facilities. 
The economy included suppliers of the industry's 
specialised gases and chemicals, well-known manufacturers 
of printed circuit boards, a quartz firm (to make the 
glass lenses for the photolithography steps in chip- 
making) , integrated circuit mask (or pattern) makers and 
custom chip design houses. During the study period many 
more supplier firms announced plans to open plants in the 
region, including a Japanese producer of silicon and a 
major US subsystem supplier to IBM. As the managing 
director of one of the start-up firms in the survey 
explained, a high tech firm could get all the subcontract 
services and production inputs to turn their design into a 
product within twenty miles of the plant. Officials at IBM 
also claimed that almost half of their outside sourcing 
came from suppliers in Scotland (1982). "The 
subcontracting opportunities [for multinationals] in 
Scotland are enormous," a company spokesman said (Eglin et
al. 1983).
In an industry where swift market changes were the 
norm, a range of nearby suppliers was extremely important
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(Oakey, 1983). The proximity of supply eliminated the 
timing problems and uncertainties of depending on overseas 
sources of supplies. A well-developed supply structure 
gives a firm a lot of flexibility: unexpected orders can 
be filled quickly and smoothly while the firm minimises 
its investment in employment and inventory. A reliable 
network of outsourcing and subcontracting firms also 
allows the multinational to focus its fixed capital 
investment: management can invest in only those 
activities that are tied to the technology of their 
product. As a manager in an instruments plant explained, 
the firm had to maintain an extremely high overhead to pay 
for the office environment of its design development- (and 
therefore engineer-) intensive facility. So, the firm 
outsources many inputs not related to its central 
technology: "It doesn't make sense to put our efforts into 
other (input manufacturing) areas which will push UP the 
price of our instrument significantly." (Interview, 1984)
The growing number of large, market-leading high tech 
firms had begun to have a dynamic effect by the early 
1980s. During the period of the study, managers had begun 
purchasing directly from other multinational producers 
operating in the region, particularly the chip 
manufacturers. Historically, most multinationals purchased 
major or technology-intensive inputs through a central 
corporate ordering agency and distribution system. This 
frequently meant receiving supplies of chips through 
intermediaries in the US, Japan and other parts of Europe. 
A number of managers mentioned that they had just recently 
begun dealing directly with the producer firms nearby. 
This simultaneously reduced the delivery time and offered 
them immediate engineering support and design adjustments. 
This relationship also works as a guarantee of supply, a 
serious concern during a market boom. This was the key 
reason one semi-conductor firm began manufacturing in 
Scotland: the firm moved into the region to capture IBM 
business (Interview with California manager, 1983), as did 
other major suppliers (eg SCI Systems).
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The well-developed regional supply network operated 
like a just-in-time supply system outsi.de the plant. It 
served as a buffer against changing market conditions. In 
addition, proximity and economic interdependence enabled 
firms to establish better communications and control over 
critical quality standards CO'Connor, 1985). This reliance 
on nearby supply companies mirrored that of high tech 
firms in Japan and had proven to be an important element 
in their success.
The infrastructure proved to be particularly 
important when starting up or expanding a facility. Once 
management decided on an investment, they wanted to bring 
those new technologies on stream rapidly. The rush was to 
earn return on the investment before the technology become 
obsolete. (Semi-conductor firms in particular had had the 
costly experience of investing in manufacturing facilities 
in the US which were never completed or delayed due to 
sudden market downturns.) The industry had found that the 
Scottish economy supported a rapid start-up phase. A 
manager in one semi-conductor firm claimed that a burned 
down fabrication plant in Scotland was completely rebuilt 
and operative within six months (1982): that experience 
favourably influenced corporate management to locate a new 
product facility at the site in Scotland at a later date. 
Another firm, with experience in the region, planned to 
build and begin operating first a modern assembly and test 
site, then a very modern fabrication facility all within 3 
years. The local periphery of suppliers and subcontractors 
minimised the chance of long; unpredictable and costly 
delays in scheduling new investments. 37
5.5.3 Public Sector F_inancial. Incentives and Policy
The regional authority in Scotland, supported by the 
Government, had years earlier made a commitment to 
attracting the electronics industry to the area to create
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jobs (Scottish Development Department, 1963; 1970). That 
policy, modified and honed over the years, was supported 
both by the pro-active state industrial policy of the 
Labour Government of the 1970s and employment creation 
efforts of the Thatcher Government in the 1980s. 
Throughout this period, the regional authority was able to 
offer a handsome package of financial support and 
incentives to overseas firms: foreign direct investment by 
high tech electronics multinationals remained a major 
target because it brought not only employment but also 
expertise in the new technologies. The Thatcher 
Government was particularly active in attracting foreign 
multinationals during the study period (Committee on 
Scottish Affairs, 198OD; Fraser of Allander Institute, 
198O).^8 This section briefly reviews the public support 
used to attract overseas investors and its importance for 
these multinationals at a time of financial crisis.
The primary financial incentives for overseas firms 
locating in Scotland originated from the Industry Act of 
1972 which provided automatic grants on fixed capital 
available for firms in designated "development areas' of 
high unemployment. Also Section 7 of the same act 
established regional selective assistance (RSA), which 
were discretionary grants to firms. More recently, the 
Industry Development Act of 1982 designated a wide range 
of special projects - eg using new automated technologies 
- that could qualify a firm for public grants.
The Scottish Development Agency (SDA) had from the 
beginning been active in soliciting foreign investment to 
create and maintain regional employment and to further 
technological and economic development (Fraser of 
Allander, 1978). In 1979 the SDA sharpened its regional 
development strategy (Committee on Scottish Affairs, 
1980A): the agency decided to consolidate its efforts more 
effectively to attract and support the local development 
of modern rather than mature technologies and industrial 
rather than consumer industries. In its aim to intensify 
the region's technological base and to increase employment
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(Meredith, 1983), it targeted the growth industries of 
data processing, semi-conductors and office automation. 
The new initiative was supported by continuing central 
Government funds (both automatic and selective aid), 
particularly for new technology projects, and by 
organisational consolidation. At the same time that the 
international high technology stage was set for major 
technological and organizational changes, the policy 
framework and political climate in the UK and Scotland 
offered encouragement to those sectors by offering what 
the multinationals needed - money, incentives for capital- 
saving investment and the technical labour force to 
oversee the new equipment.
High tech multinationals gained a lot of financial 
assistance through the Regional Development Grants (RDGs) 
during this period. According to the annual reports of the 
SDA and reports in B|2l..t^jsh_..Bus_i_nes_s., every multinational 
in the survey had received many grants between 1979 and 
1984. (For example, IBM in Greenock received almost £9 
million in RDGs plus a £650,000 RSA grant during the 1979- 
1984 period; almost £4.5 million was awarded to National 
Semiconductor, mostly RDGS, during the same five years.) 
Grants from Section 8, aid for projects that adopted 
technologies that the state had designated as important, 
were not as common. Only two firms, Hughes 
Microelectronics and General Instruments, were awarded
 * O
grants during this period from this source. ^
The total financial package (grants, incentives, 
loans, etc.) for the industry's foreign investors was 
often substantial.^0 The direct grants alone covered as 
much as 4O% of the cost of a firm's fixed capital 
investment. However, comprehensive cost accounting of all 
public financial assistance to these firms is not 
possible: the actual size and mix of the components of any 
one firm's financial package were not made public. In 
addition, the legislatively mandated forms of incentives 
and aid were supplemented by lump sum payments given by 
the Government to firms it was particularly eager to
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attract. The size of these bribes was understandably 
undisclosed (Interview with Professor Simpsori, Fraser of 
Allander Institute, 1984).
These firms' success in winning grants account at 
least partially for Scotland's disproportionately large 
share of these public sector funds. Scotland was the 
single largest regional recipient of both RDGs and RSA 
grants since the early 1970s C Ecpnom.i_st , 1983; More ton, 
1985). During the 1979-1983 period, 54% of all national 
selective financial assistance (in value terms) offered to 
electronics firms in Great Britain went to predominantly 
multinational investors, and that share was expected to 
rise significantly in 1984 (Young, 1984).
There were other sources of public sector assistance 
for these firms. European Investment Bank loans offered 
funding for up to half of fixed capital costs at lower 
than commercial rates; national sources loaned funds at 
concessionary rates and in certain circumstances without 
interest (East Kilbride Development Corporation, n.d.). 
Also the Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB), for 
example, gave grants for training employees in the use of 
new technologies. Managers frequently took advantage of 
these grants (Haug, 1984). In addition, Scotland had 
maintained an industrial derating policy, while England 
and Uales had abolished this operational cost saving. This 
halved the rate bill for all industrial firms in the 
region (Interview with editor of 1984).
Besides helping to negociate these financial packages 
for potential investors, the SDA structured and financed 
infrastructure development for the microelectronics 
industry. Rent-free or rent-subsidised factories were 
offered for the first five years of an investment, 
eliminating the delay of waiting to build a plant from 
scratch. The agency also assisted firms in recruiting, in 
contacting local sub-contractors and in finding low-
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interest loans. Agency policy was to minimise the problems 
and the costs of setting up a plant in Scotland.
With its mandate to encourage the growth of the 
industry in the region, the SDA actively supported the 
growth of the supply sector for high tech electronics. For 
example, the SDA financed a new firm, Semicomplex, to fill 
an important industry gap. This firm serviced and 
supported production equipment for the semi-conductor 
industry, ending the industry's critical and costly 
dependence on long-distance servicing from overseas 
firms. *" * 
In addition, the SDA won Parliamentary approval in 
the early 1980s to set UP Locate in Scotland (LIS) to 
reduce the bureaucratic problems for overseas investors. 
LIS served as the single agency promoting Scotland and 
negotiated financial assistance for multinationals. LIS 
reduced the confusion and sped up the bureaucratic 
processing: multinationals considering investing would no 
longer have to deal with many separate national and 
regional bodies. The LIS targeted industries and firms, 
particularly the semi-conductor industry, and supplemented 
its offerings to prospective, desirable firms with access 
to venture capital firms. Officials claimed the initiative 
was quite successful, winning £1 billion in foreign direct 
investment in its first three years of operation 
CE..i-n§!n.c iaL.,ii.rnes, 1985). Boasting the efficiency of the 
agency, LIS claimed that LIS claimed that it won the 1984 
investment of a Japanese silicon producer, by completing 
all the necessary arrangements in one week.
Government regional policy provided further support 
for the industry's overseas investors. The New Town 
system, backed by local development corporations and 
funding to develop and improve infrastructure, offered 
potential investors an available and captive working class 
labour force, immediately available housing (Moreton, 
1981; Meredith, 1981) and public officials tripping over
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themselves (due to high unemployment rates in these 
greenfield towns) to attract multinational investment. 
Because of their mission to create a town economy out of a 
village, the development corporations also aggressively 
built or remodeled facilities to have factories available 
for immediate occupation, a convenience "unmatched in most 
cities and ...towns" (Henderson, 1982). Scotland's five 
New Towns (Livingston, Irvine, Glenrothes, Cumbernauld and 
East Kilbride) were quite successful in attracting firms, 
many of them electronics multinationals, particularly 
during the 1983/4 period of industry growth (Van de Vliet, 
1984; Jones, 1984).
The Importance of Equipment Subsidies
Managers were asked in interviews if public financing 
had influenced the nature, scale or rate of investment in 
new capital or new technologies (as was suggested by Hood 
and Young, 1984). While the survey responses did not 
provide a clear answer, many acknowledged that the state 
grants for fixed capital investment, the largest of the 
assistance programs (Haug,1984; Hood and Young, 1981) may 
have accelerated the pace and scale of already planned 
investment. This corroborates the expectations and 
findings of McDowall and Begg (1981), Thwaites, Edwards 
arid Gibbs (1982) and Haug (1982, 1984).
Importantly, these fixed capital investment grants 
were paid out on the day the company opened the plant and, 
in some cases, earlier than that. This was extremely 
important to these cash-constrained firms. The automatic 
RDGs and RSA grants significantly reduced the actual 
front-end investment costs of a firm starting-up 
manufacturing. More commonly, public sector incentives 
were paid once production was under way - for example, tax 
rebates tied to output level or tax-exempt profits. One 
managing director emphasised the importance of this 
assistance to his start-up semi-conductor facility: he 
explained that the size of outright grants available in 
Scotland enabled him, in effect, to buy two expensive
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pieces of equipment for the cost of one. Because the 
biggest direct grants could only be applied to capital 
investments, firms gained the greatest financing by 
establishing highly-capital intensive facilities in 
Scotland.
One multinational's study compared the costs of 
locating semi-conductor manufacturing in six European 
countries and confirmed that state grants made a capital- 
intensive investment in Scotland extremely attractive. 
Only Ireland was cheaper in the calculation of 
identifiable costs (Confidential corporate location study 
for a VLSI chip facility, 1984). The potential savings of 
operating in Scotland were the largest for the most 
capital-intensive investment options. 4" 2 While the 
findings cannot prove that public sector support shaped or 
accelerated technological change in Scotland's high tech 
subsidiaries, they do suggest that the grants helped 
mediate a crisis of cash-constrained firms wanting to 
invest in expensive new technologies.
5.5.4 The^Education System and the Labour Supply
The region's universities and colleges provided 
important support for the high tech electronics industry. 
These public institutions offer education and training in 
electronics engineering and computer science, supplying 
the industry with a technically trained labour force every 
year. (This role will be examined in detail in Chapter 6.) 
In addition the highly-reputed science and technology 
faculties at these schools offered their facilities and 
staff to perform applied research for the industry.
Most of the region's technology institutions had 
organised industry liason departments and independent 
"teaching companies' to seek industry contracts for short- 
term process and product development or problem-solving 
research. Winning these contracts had become very 
important to the education sector. Many of the engineering 
schools were facing state funding cutbacks: the contracts 
provided financing to ensure that faculty could maintain
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their research staff and other resources. In some cases 
institution administrations had required technology 
faculty to attract private sector funding to maintain 
their research efforts. So the public sector's support for 
the high tech industry grew during the period of the 
study. These resources proved important, particularly to 
firms that were expanding rapidly with overworked or 
inexperienced staff. Industry managers could ask academic 
staffs to solve their unexpected problems.
The dynamics of the local labour market were an 
additional feature of the economic infrastructure that 
developed to support these industries. The combination of 
more than 300 electronics firms in the region, some of 
them modern multinational concerns, and a concentration of 
technology education institutions generated an experienced 
and highly educated technical labour pool. Firms had 
access to research faculty and staff arid employees of 
other firms, as well as yearly batches of new graduates. 
The region's growing and increasingly varied demand for 
technical labour had created a local labour market that 
could attract and retain technical professionals. There 
was mobility not only within a firm but also among the 
many firms in the region, giving professionals a range of 
opportunities for developing their careers. This and other 
features of the labour market,^3 very important to the 
development of these multinationals in the region, will be 
examined in more detail in the next chapter.
One other aspect of the local labour market, however, 
is cogent to this discussion. By 1979, high tech 
multinationals had experience in operating in Scotland: 
management was impresssed by the high productivity high 
tech firms had achieved in Scotland. For example, the 
Greenock plant of IBM had "beaten' the Japanese subsidiary 
in productivity performance by 15% and was at least equal 
in quality (Baggott, 1981). IBM in Scotland had achieved a 
doubling of output every five years for- the last 15 while 
employment grew much more slowly. Other testimonials to 
the highly productive labour force include: 'Overall
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productivity has risen 30 - 50% in three years'; "Overall 
productivity has increased substantially. This company 
operates "lean and mean' in everything except the 
injection of capital.' (Executives from a computer and a 
semi-conductor firm, respectively, quoted in SDA, n.d.B) A 
manager in one of the largest semi-conductor firms said 
yield had doubled at the plant over the past two years and 
that the plant performed better in terms of quality and 
low turnover than any of the corporation's other 
subsidiaries. A manager in another semiconductor firm, 
also now investing heavily in Scotland, similarly claimed 
that the plant's productivity quickly surpassed that of a 
corporate subsidiary in Ireland. Uhile the productivity 
success in Scotland must be largely attributable to 
production capital (They were, after all, highly capital- 
intensive facilities even in the early 1980s.), managers 
also considered the region's hardworking, trainable and 
experienced production labour force a major contributor to 
performance success.
Because of the uncertainties in high tech electronics 
product markets, investing in expensive capital anywhere 
was risky (as the two years of market contraction after 
the survey proved). The entire package of state assistance 
for investments in Scotland reduced the risk of state-of- 
the-art investment as well as the outright cost.. The 
managing director of a computer firm emphasised the 
importance of state aid for high tech firms. When asked 
why multinational firms were installing state-of-the-art 
manufacturing technologies in Scotland, he replied:
"These industries are protecting themselves 
with Government money. They are sharing 
the commercial risks with the Government... 
That's why there is so much [investment] 
activity in Scotland. The companies are not 
taking the risk: the SDA is."
Corporate managers in California had stressed that 
financing capital investments was one of the semiconductor 
industry's two greatest problems in the early 1980s. With 
high tech/management: worried about the cost pressures of 
investments they had decided they must make, the state
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grants in Scotland were the right kind of assistance at 
the right time. These grants gave them both upfront money 
and lower operating costs (eg lower interest payments) and 
surely must have influenced management decisions about 
investing, reinvesting and the quality and pace of thai- 
investment in Scotland.
5.5.5 Sco t JLand. ... .as__a . Sour ;ce __ o ±.....Bp:t_h. . Jec_h^
F inance
The regional economy of Scotland offered these 
multinationals an unusual opportunity. In contrast to most 
of the world's regions competing for high tech 
multinationals investment, Scotland offered high tech 
multinationals public financial incentives and an 
established and growing technical labour market, bot_h_ in 
t.he__..sarne._ Many other regions across the globe 
advertised similar or better aid packages - usually to 
attract jobs to an underdeveloped area. But economically 
disadvantaged areas usually had no high tech activity. 
That meant the technical personnel had to be imported from 
an industrialised region, often far away. The higher costs 
of recruiting, relocating and retaining technical 
personnel in this situation made these investments both 
expensive and risky.
The availability of generous state incentives in the 
same region as a pool of appropriately trained labour and 
an industry-specific infrastructure made Scotland a prime 
investment site for these industries.^5 It set Scotland 
apart from most other potential and actual locations of 
high tech industry (outside the US and Japan) . The 
Japanese semi-conductor firm decided to locate its VLSI 
fabrication facility in Scotland rather than elsewhere in 
Britain or Europe because of the combination of nearby 
support for VLSI work (the technology research 
universities in Edinburgh and supply industries), the 
public sector financial package and the availability of 
technology graduates, as well as the chance to economise 
by adding onto an established plant that was already
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highly productive (Interview with personnel manager, 
1984).
The [high tech] companies who have come 
to Scotland and got the most out of the move 
are not those who have come just for a cut-price 
factory and subsidised capital equipment - 
important though those elements may be. They are 
those who have come here and taken advantage of 
quality brains in developing R&D programmes, 
available in number and at an attractive 
cost.... There are of course the financial 
incentives...There are other countries who may be 
able to offer slightly better terms to a would-be 
developer; there are countries who can provide 
lower cost labour. But what Scot land...can offer 
that cannot be matched anywhere in the world is 
an education [sic], trained labour force with 
a great track record as far as adaption to new 
techniques and disciplines is concerned." (Managing 
director of Burr-Brown quoted in Fife_J\jews, n.d).
One firm, for example, chose to greatly expand its 
semi-conductor production facility in Scotland rather than 
another plant in Ireland because the Irish economy had an 
insufficient supply of highly skilled technical people. 
Another multinational, in a corporate study comparing the 
costs of setting up a semi-conductor facility somewhere in 
Europe, recommended siting in Scotland: it offered both a 
high level of grant and highly trained personnel. The 
study explained that in the Republic of Ireland, the 
lowest cost option at first calculation, "the desirable 
support facilities [infrastructure] are lacking and local 
technical training is not so well advanced as in 
Scot land,..so local recruitment of key staff... would 
require commitment to a substantial training investment." 
(confidential corporate study, 1984).
An SDA survey further supported the importance of 
this combination. Their survey of overseas firms investing 
in Scotland found that the supply of technical labour and 
the level of labour productivity were the two most 
important factors in determining the location of a new 
plant. The third was the availability of financial 
assistance. (Interview with project planning manager for 
the SDA, 1984). When combined with the industry support
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available in the region, Scotland was a highly favoured 
location site.
"Scotland now produces almost 50% by value of 
all semi-conductor devices made in Europe. It has 
acquired most of the support facilities enjoyed 
by companies operating in the USA, from university 
departments specialising in training staff at all 
levels (even possessing their own research and 
fabrication facilities) through service 
organizations, including the whole range of electron- 
beam mask-making and CAD houses to industrial gas and 
equipment support organisations." (Confidential 
corporate study of possible European locations, 1984)
This corporate comparative study also indicated why a 
number of the subsidiaries in Scotland had become global 
suppliers for the corporation. Reduced capital costs and 
wages and salaries lower than those in the US combined to 
produce lower production costs in Scotland than in the US, 
even for the most sophisticated chips. Labour costs, while 
not the biggest component in total cost, were still 
considerable. In Scotland they were 25% below those in the 
US. Total cost for an advanced assembly and test facility 
in Scotland reached only 77% that of one in the US. It was 
further assessed that a fabrication facility in Scotland 
would offer the same cost advantage. The corporation soon 
after began building a full fabrication plant.
Corporate management considered more than the short- 
term, calculable operating costs in decisions to upgrade 
the role of the subsidiary in Scotland. Tapping Scotland's 
technical labour supply - both graduates and experienced 
professionals - generated its own dynamic. Corporate 
managers, eager to move activity out of California because 
of the high turnover of technical personnel, faced severe 
international competition for technical personnel. They 
considered it important to create conditions in their 
other facilities that would attract good talent and would 
inhibit turnover. Devolving new products and design and 
development responsibilities to the Scotland subsidiary 
was at least partly to give professionals in the 
subsidiaries work they would continue to find interesting. 
In one semi-conductor firm, the production manager
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explained that the plant's technical professionals were 
pressuring corporate management to build a Planned 
European design centre on-site. These professionals wanted 
opportunities to enhance their career ladders internally.
"We don't like to be seen (by corporate 
management) only as hewers of wood and 
drawers of water."
Similarly, a manager in a start-up computer firm explained 
that the firm planned to expand its development work soon 
because of
"the influence of the people we've hired 
here for manufacturing. [Our technical 
employees] have come from state-of-the-art 
manufacturing environments and have 
brought with them greater technology 
and process experience than our company has 
[formerly] had."
The technical professionals, only too aware of the 
boom-and-bust nature of the industry, were also concerned 
about job security. They wanted corporate management to 
demonstrate corporate commitment to the facility. Adding 
research and development resources was known to improve 
the technical synergism of a facility. (le personnel were 
able to improve production performance faster due to the 
interplay between R&D and manufacturing; Haug, Hood and 
Young, 1983.) Allocating product development resources 
would be seen as a corporate commitment to the growth and 
future of the plant in Scotland. Locally available grants 
and financial aid reduced the cost and risk of 
decentralising these expensive activities to Scotland.
The education and training facilities, state 
incentives to capital-intensive multinational investment 
and the developing infrastructure to serve the high tech 
industry made Scotland an exceptional location in the 
early 1980s. These resources made starting up and 
operating in Scotland smoother, less risky and less costly 
than in most other places in Europe. There were few 
locations anywhere else in the world - except perhaps 
Singapore - that offered the industry an experienced
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labour pool, resources to support flexibility and growth, 
and such a wide range of cost-reducing opportunities.
5. 6 ?iJjM#.j!^^ 
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This survey describes a cluster of predominantly US 
multinational subsidiaries in Scotland that are 
considerably different from what the product life cycle 
(PLC) theory of overseas multinational investment would 
predict. Capital investment in the subsidiaries in 
Scotland was more modern and sophisticated with respect to 
the parent's home base manufacturing plant than the theory 
suggests. The production technologies were in most cases 
as advanced as those in the home base facilities and, in 
many cases, particularly those where the parent had made a 
substantial new investment, the technologies were state- 
of-the-art with respect to both the individual corporation 
and the industry.
These technologies were necessary because the 
increasingly sophisticated international markets - 
particularly for capital goods - demanded up-to-date, high 
quality and customised products that in most cases can 
only be produced with modern equipment. As a result, the 
subsidiaries had responsibility for major new, growth 
products. Some of the survey firms were one of only two or 
three in the corporate network assigned to supply those 
products, and they were produced at a sufficiently high 
level of specification and quality to second source the 
home base economy (US and Japan). Many had global, single 
source responsibility for products.
The products were information-intensive: they either 
embodied or had to process appropriately the information 
needs of the customer. Uith the information requirements 
of past and potential customers changing and growing 
increasingly complex daily, the market was one of 
continual and fast-paced change. Throughout the study 
period, new demands for the performance of a technology
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and new ways to meet those demands - ie new, competing 
products - surfaced in the market. The products and the 
techniques that produced the products of the established 
multinationals had to be able to change in response to 
that competition.
While Vernon suggested that such a volatile period 
would surround the introduction of a new product, the 
uncertainty and change was, in his view, restricted to the 
first phase in the cycle. Change was not a continuing 
variable in the system. However, the findings reported 
here suggest that the volatility and the necessity for 
corporate adaptiveness was part of the nature of these 
information-intensive product markets. End-users buying 
expensive capital equipment would be unlikely to invest 
heavily in equipment that was not tailored to their 
complex and specific information requirements. The 
manufacturing facilities had to have a continuing 
flexibility in capital equipment and personnel to assess 
and respond quickly to meet these changing market needs 
and to make sales. The subsidiaries had to do more than 
manufacture: they also had to service their regional 
market. The facilities had to have the personnel to offer- 
customers help in implementing the use of new equipment 
and guarantees of quick repair.
Market demands and competitive problems compelled 
investment in computerised systems that promised economies 
of throughput, rather than scale. That is, technologies 
and people had to be capable of producing small batches of 
variously-specified products quickly, effectively and at 
minimum unit cost in an industry where all the production 
inputs was rising. With its location in the European 
market and the regional capital grants and high 
techonology infrastructure, the subsidiary in Scotland 
became important in helping the corporation respond to the 
severe pressures to economise on time and on the use of 
capital and information.
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Vernon's (1964) theory oannot explain this pattern of 
multinational overseas investment. Uhile Vernon's work was 
clearly stimulated by his view of the importance of the 
internaional business organisation in the post-World War
II world, he did not envisage the development of a truly 
international market. His reconsideration of the PLC 
theory in 1979 did concede that income disparities that 
had formerly set the US apart from the rest of the 
advanced industrial world had diminished. When paired with 
extensive experience overseas, he realised that 
multinationals might not wait as long as he supposed to 
invest in manufacturing overseas. However, he maintained a 
rigid concept of a geographically hierarchical staging of 
global investment.
A market that is so internationalised, however, 
weakens the economic rationale for this model. 
Information about new technologies is now diffused at 
least throughout the advanced capitalist world almost 
instantaneously - through information technology firms, 
many of which are multinationals, and through the trade 
press which operates globally. The failure of firms to 
supply newly capable capital equipment to industries 
throughout Western Europe and Japan once it is introduced 
in (for example) the US, would enable competitors to 
capture those overseas markets. That would be a costly 
mistake for firms striving to establish and capture the 
widest possible market base to support those new products. 
The competitiveness and speed of change in high tech 
markets had driven firms to establish their presence in 
and communications with potential markets to exchange 
information about the technologies and to respond quickly 
to produce to meet identified customer needs as soon as 
the product is manufacturable. Those pressures seem to 
have induced management to invest rapidly in major markets 
to exploit economies of information, rather than wait. 
Flexible manufacturing makes this feasible.
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Product standardisation was a central assumption of 
the PLC theory. Producing customised technology-intensive 
capital and intermediate goods, however, alters the 
dynamics of overseas investment. The economic rationale 
for delaying direct overseas investment was, according to 
Vernon, to wait until there was a well-defined mass market 
overseas so that economies of scale for standardised 
products could be identified. Investment overseas would 
also be delayed until it was clear that the mass market in 
the home base economy was sufficiently big that losing 
exports as a result of an expansion overseas would not 
jeopardise domestic scale .economies.
However, the part-process and/or clone manufacturing 
facilities that were conventionally the overseas outposts 
of multinationals are too rigid and limited in scope to 
serve markets demanding high technology customised 
product. The separation and geographical dispersion of 
production stages that achieved economies of scale for 
standardised products create diseconomies of time, of 
capital use and of skilled personnel that management found 
unacceptable in a regime of rapid change. Customers were 
no longer satisfied with standard products and were 
demanding customised commodities. They also expected 
their supplier to provide technical services as well as 
the hardware. Buyers wanted computers, for example, 
reconfigured to their needs or the software for a chip or 
computer developed for their specific application. Uith 
the anticipated growth and market dominance of customised 
product, relying on standardisation and associated rigid 
production organisation was no longer a viable competitive
strategy.^6
Computerised manufacturing equipment in principle^7 
enables overseas investment without waiting for a critical 
market size. One installation of capital equipment can 
manufacture many product variations by adjusting the 
software program. Small batch production becomes 
economically feasible if the market is big enough to 
provide many customers. But the adequacy of the equipment,
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its operational reliability, the speed and sureness of 
resetting between orders - the economics of throughput - 
become the critical factors determining viability and 
competitiveness.
Given these competitive demands, the overseas 
subsidiary must have the advanced equipment capable of 
both more reliable performance and flexibility and the 
skilled personnel and autonomy to use the equipment fully 
and to serve a market where continual change is 
anticipated. The standardised manufacturing branch plants 
of Vernon, Hymer, and Froebel et al - the "headless, 
heartless* overseas outposts of the corporation - would in 
most cases be a liability in these fast-paced and highly 
contested markets.
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These developments in the high tech electronics 
industry suggest that industry distinctions are 
sufficiently significant to discredit efforts to construct 
an all-industry ahistorical model of the global structure 
and economics of the multinational corporation. The pace 
of change in the industry had been phenomenal. The 
capabilities of the technologies and the expectations of 
the market have changed yearly, even in the older computer 
industry. Also the market power and position of individual 
competitors have shifted almost yearly, altering the 
economic necessities and strategies of the corporations. 
Vernon' s static, ahistorical model assumes that firms 
invest overseas to protect and continue accruing the 
benefits of their undisputed oligopoly power. This ignores 
the potential of new technology developments to challenge 
that market power in any one regional market and around
the globe.
Overseas investment cannot be explained solely (as 
seems implicit in Vernon) by management desire to increase 
monopoly profits (by increasing revenues) or to improve 
profit margins (by reducing transaction or unit labour 
costs). Corporate management has to generate sufficient
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revenues to support their rising threshold of R&D and 
operating costs to stay in the market. Increased 
specialisation, customisation and competition in each 
market segment has necessitated a presence in global 
markets to generate both the revenue and the information 
to continue to compete. With the Japanese (and other East 
Asian markets) still excluding US competitors and the US 
market under attack by the same foreign producers, US high 
tech multinationals must create and exploit all 
significant markets globally as soon as new products are 
introduced to create sufficient revenues for cash flow and 
continuing investment. The pace and dynamics of high tech 
electronics industries call for a reformulation of why and 
where corporations invest internationally.
There are, however, two ways that the timing of my 
research may have exaggerated the importance of the 
rapidity of change and of market pull in fundamentally 
criticising Vernon and Hymer's theories. First, the field 
survey was during a period of rapid growth: a deep 
recession followed soon after. Second, the potential for 
significant US Government intervention to protect the US 
microelectronics industry would significantly alter the 
economics of investment, growth and globalisation.
The period of my field survey was one of dramatic 
attempts by US firms to catch up in technological 
capability and market share after the recession. Scotland 
was a growth centre for the industry in part because, as 
explained above, it offered support for rapid start-ups 
and room to grow - in terms of space and available labour 
supplies. This period of dramatic expansion was quickly 
followed by two years of the most severe slump in industry 
history. The recession robbed firms of two of the only 
five to eight years of product saleability for amortising 
the expense of the new capital equipment.
The recession may have significantly altered 
corporate strategy as it undoubtedly altered R&D 
expenditure, relative market positions and 
competitiveness. Companies may have responded to their
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dramatically changed world by trying to slow down the 
breakneck pace of change. Firms may have decided that 
participating as market leaders in cutting edge product 
markets was too expensive and risky a strategy to sustain. 
Companies may have switched to market segments with lesser 
technological demands or markets where demand would not 
change very fast. For example, to compete for major 
telecoms and many military orders, firms have to guarantee 
to supply the product for anywhere from ten to thirty 
years. If this kind of change, maintaining production 
capacity over such a long period, were widespread amongst 
US market leaders, the pace of technological change would 
inevitably slow down. As a result, this would reduce the 
economic importance emphasised here of factors 
specifically supportive to the rapid exploitation of 
investments overseas.
Investigating actual corporate responses to the 
economic changes after 1984. is beyond the scope of this 
research. The likelihood of the scenario above is not 
known. However, even this kind of change does not alter 
the importance of the finding that mass production is no 
longer the inevitable and sole aim, much less the mature 
stage of, global production relations. The information 
content of products, thus the necessity of customising 
them to customer uses, demands flexible manufacturing 
techniques to allow variability for batch production (even 
if the batches are very large). Vernon's and Hymer's 
theories rely completely on standardised, mass production. 
Allowing for continuing product variability in all markets 
means relying on a larger proportion of technical 
personnel overseas than Vernon and Hymer anticipated and 
the absence of any economic rationale for a global 
hierarchy of production (except by major differences in 
market needs) and the rigid staging of overseas 
investments. The high tech industry still fundamentally 
challenges the adequacy of the PLC theory.
Second, the US microelectronics industry, led by 
merchant semi-conductor firms, has been actively lobbying
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for greater protection from the US Government. The 
seemingly unstoppable competitive challenge by Japan to US 
firms' survivability (Defense Science Board, 1987) 
combined with the damage of the recession to rally the 
industry to press the Administration and Congress to 
intervene and restrict imports, promote exporting 
opportunities and provide new ways to finance and organise 
R&D. Predicting the form and extent of intervention that 
will result from the strong protectionist mood in 
Washington in 1987 is impossible. As a result, it can 
only be said that most policies if enforced will influence 
the dynamics of the global microelectronics industry and 
in particular will likely alter the persuasive economic 
advantages and the timing of investing overseas. These 
potential structural changes do not, however, alter the 
continuing importance or character of major overseas 
markets and the necessity to serve them with advanced, 
flexible manufacturing and technical support capability. 
Government policies may alter the structure of these 
global markets but not their nature: state intervention in 
the US is unlikely to bring a return to markets for 
standardised high tech products and with a slower 
receptivity to technological advances. Only that would 
help restore the explanatory power of Vernon's and Hymer's 
theory of multinational investment.
Another issue this research raises is the heightened 
tension between centralised control and decentralisation 
within these multinationals. Uhile control by headquarters 
remains central to competitiveness - to minimise 
production costs globally and to exploit market 
information rapidly throughout the corporation, devolving 
technological and administrative responsibilities to the 
subsidiary is essential to the corporate aim of finding, 
creating and exploiting markets quickly. Managers in 
survey interviews gave the impression that the "rules' for 
centralised control and devolved responsibility were 
confused and in flux. How the conflict is resolved (if it 
is resolvable) at the level of the individual corporation
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and the industry is an important area for future research. 
The competitive advantages of flexible and knowledgeable 
responsiveness to market changes embodied in the models of 
flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel, 1984) and 
decentralised continuous processing (Hirschhorn, 1984.) may 
prove to be extremely powerful if the momentum of 
technological and market changes continues. It is 
significant that the people lobbying for the subsidiary's 
greater technological autonomy are the technical and 
managerial professionals with market and technological 
knowledge and skills that corporate management considered 
so critical to continuing competitive viability. Such a 
tendency would, however, significantly alter the mobility, 
the interests and the economic coherence of the 
"multinational corporation' as an operational institution 
of capital accumulation.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the relationship of the 
survey's high tech multinationals to the Scottish labour 
market. Research findings on recruitment, employment and 
training practices of the survey's firms indicated 
corporate strategies that were not consistent with the DLM 
theory. Competitive pressures had driven management to 
reconsider how to organise work. New strategies did not, 
however, develop in a vaccuum. The specific conditions of 
the labour market in Scotland were very important in 
shaping those strategies and offered cost-minimising 
opportunities that proved competitively valuable in 
responding to global crisis.
The theme of the chapter is of a dynamic relationship 
between the region's industry and the local labour market, 
a possibility that the demand-side DLM theory excludes. 
Uhile there is more to Scotland's high tech industry than 
the fourteen multinationals in the the survey, these firms 
clearly dominated the labour market. They employed a large 
and growing share of the electronics labour force. As 
Table 6. shows, that strength increased with the industry 
expansion of the 1979 - 1984 period.
A few large electronics firms - Ferranti Ltd. and 
Racal-Mesl Ltd. - and the printed circuit board 
manufacturers, Exactacircuits Ltd. and BEPI Circuits Ltd., 
were also part of the region's high tech sector. While 
their relationship to the local labour market was 
undoubtedly important, they were excluded from the survey 
because they were essentially British defense contractors 
and thus cushioned from competitive pressures. Most of the 
rest of the industry employment was in supplier firms (eg 
mask-making firms, computer cable and harness companies, 
etc). These were mostly quite small - 3 to 50 workers, 
according to survey data. The small supplier firms added
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TABLE 6.1. SCOTLAND ' S
High Tech Multinationals and the Uider Electronics
Industry
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
a) My sample
b) Electronics 
industry*
(a) as % of (b)
1979 1984
% Increase 
1979-1984
9855
37100
27%
11007
35500FC
31%
+ 12%
4%
ENGINEER AND TECHNICIAN EMPLOYMENT
a) My Sample
b) Electronics 
industry**
(a) as % of (b)
1816
4800
38%
2825
6550 
43%
+ 56%
+ 36%
* Source: Employment data for the region's wider 
electronics industry derive from the MSC for Scotland 
(1983); 1984 employment figure is actually a forecast for 
1985 employment.
** Source: MSC for Scotland (1983) using actual survey 
data for 1979 and predictions for 1984 based on annual 
recruitment rates (1983).
only a small number of new jobs. Consequently, employment 
change in the survey multinationals dominated industry 
activity. Furthermore, the survey multinationals had 
economic clout that exceeded their- share in regional 
employment. These firms held the greatest promise for 
creating future jobs in the region (BAH, 1979). They also 
were global market and technology leaders. These firms, 
while few in number, clearly shaped the development of the 
region's labour market.
The first section of this chapter reports survey 
findings on company employment practices and the structure 
of work. The structure of work refers to how work is 
distributed amongst workers and, thus, is a relational
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concept - how workers relate to one another. The rest of 
the chapter analyses first the demand pressures, then the 
importance of regional supply-side conditions in framing 
multinational technology and employment strategy.
6 . 2 RE SEARCH.._. F ._! N_D I_NG S
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For DLM theorists, employers reap significant 
economic benefits by segmenting jobs and workers into non- 
competing, exclusive groups. The segmentation occurs both 
within firms and between an industry's big and small firms 
(the core/periphery divide) . This hierarchical 
organisation of employment outlined in the DLM theory is 
entirely consistent with that of the PLC theory where the 
hierarchy is a global one: branch plants of a multi-plant 
corporation are often designed to rely on "secondary* 
employment, while primary jobs are concentrated in 
headquarters and home base advanced manufacturing plants. 
This implies that overseas multinational subsidiaries 
would employ predominantly semi-skilled labour, along with 
only the small cadre of managers and skilled workers 
necessary to carry out standardised mass production for 
regional markets. Though there were a few exceptions in 
the computer industry, this had been the case in Scotland 
during the 1970s.
My research in the Scottish high tech electronics 
industry indicates that corporate management had, in 
contrast, been striving to find new sources of employment 
flexibility: the Scottish labour market offered them 
unique ways to cope with the concerns that had come to 
dominate management's agenda - rapid market and 
technological change. Managers had begun to believe that a 
more collaborative and less rigid organisation of work 
would create high productivity within the new dynamics 
(and constraints) of competition. To achieve this new work 
atmosphere, managers had sought to remove many of the 
barriers that had existed in the distribution of work 
across the work force and to alter their reliance on the
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external labour market by redefining recruitment 
procedures, required qualifications and target 
populations. As an example of that organisation, the 
Japanese firm had structured work to enhance and exploit 
the knowledge and experience of every worker. This was a 
structure of work far different from the tradition of the 
industry.
First, in line with the technology and product 
decentralisation reported in Chapter 5, the employment 
profile of-high tech subsidiaries had changed markedly by 
1984. Managers, professionals and technical employees had 
increased as a proportion of subsidiary employment: they 
were needed to carry out the more demand-responsive role 
of a subsidiary located in a highly contested market. 
During the industry's phenomenal expansion in 1983/4, 
primary jobs were the focus of company recruitment drives. 
In fact, in three long-established firms in the region - 
where employment had historically been dominated by semi- 
skilled employment, managers had not hired any production 
workers. They competed in the external labour market to 
hire engineers and technicians, and filled every vacancy 
for a semi-skilled worker with an engineer. 2 Table 6.2 
shows that professional and technical labour had by 1984 
become about one-third of the work force.
Because the figures below refer to total site 
employment, they mask the new and increased importance of 
technical labour in new company investment. Technical jobs 
clearly dominated the employment associated with the more 
technologically advanced expansions. Engineering and 
technician jobs comprised 60% of the employment in the new 
automated assembly of one semi-conductor firm* National 
Semiconductor, for example, announced that 50% of 1OOO 
additional jobs would be for technical personnel (30% 
engineers, 20% technicians; Large, 1984). A planned 
subsidiary of International Microelectronics Products, 
custom chip producer, was expected to employ a large work
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Percent of Total Site Employment in Scotland 
Computer and Semi-conductor Firms
1979 1984 **
Managerial
Engineers*
Technicians
11
10
5
17
11
TOTALING 21 32
Semi-skilled
Production
Uorkers 40 36
* Includes 9 Firms
** Includes 12 firms
There was no consensus amongst firms on the definition 
of management. The problem arises because most of the 
industry's management are engineers who may continue in 
engineering and almost all but the most recently recruited 
engineers have some management responsibilities. To 
simplify, the survey asked for the numbers of top or 
senior managers. As a result, the numbers of people 
employed as managers, thus the numbers in primary jobs may 
have been underestimated if engineers serving as managers 
were not included in the data on engineer employment.
*f Includes software and computer professionals who may 
not, strictly speaking, be software engineers because of 
the confusion in the ocupational terminology. Because of 
that confusion, this likely underestimates this 
occupational employment: companies in some cases included 
these professionals in support staff employment and the 
data could not be disaggregated.
force in exactly the same proportions (Interview with SDA 
officials). The managing director of another semi- 
conductor firm claimed that the employment ratio of their 
new custom microelectronics systems unit was one technical 
person for every semi-skilled operator.
Managers in the survey, when asked to forecast their 
employment three to five years hence, predicted the
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proportion of engineers and technicians would continue 
growing, with increases in the annual recruitment of 
technical personnel and in many cases the continuing 
contraction of semi-skilled jobs. The director of a custom 
chip and microelectronics systems company predicted that 
65% of his 1990 work force would be technical labour (with 
managers adding another 1Q%).^
This proportion of managers and technical labour in 
subsidiary employment in Scotland did not differ 
significantly from that in the home base economy. Table 
6.3 shows that managerial and technical labour shares of
TABLE 6.3. OCCU _PAT I0_NAL__DISTRIBUT10N_I. N _THE__ US_COMPU.TEJR
AND SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES
- Massachusetts -
Percent of Total Employment
Office, Computing Electronics Components
& Accounting Machines & Accesories
SIC 357 SIC 367
12.8.Q * 19.83** .1983
Managers 9.9 12.5 10.1
Engineers 10.5 11.9 6.3
Technicians 8.4 9.2 7.O
* *
TOTAL: 28.8 33.6 23.4
SOURCES: * Kuhn, 1982, PP. 93-4;
** DES, 1985, pp.188-9 and pp.206-8.
employment in the industry in Massachusetts ranged between 
23 and 34%. Data from Massachusetts provides a useful 
comparison because the state has a high concentration of 
US high tech employment and of R&D and advanced 
manufacturing activity (while electronics employment in 
California is more diversified). The higher concentration
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of managerial jobs in the home base economy accounts for 
most of the difference between Scotland and the US.
Employment in these subsidiaries was no longer simply 
"secondary* jobs. Management needed more and more 
technology-trained workers to perform the tasks demanded 
by highly competitive global markets. As a result, 
management at headquarters could no longer expect to 
maintain continuous and tight control over the subsidiary 
or the growing number of college-educated and 
technologically-sophisticated employees. This work force 
could not be treated as peripheral or expendable labour, 
as the DLM theory would predict.
6.2.1 Remqy i ng__B_arr i .e_r^§_ .
Engineers and Technicians
Management in a number of companies had decided to 
establish (or more probably allowed) a more flexible work 
structure to accomplish the upgraded technology and market 
responsibilities of the subsidiary in Scotland. Worried 
about very short timetables for expansion and producing 
new products, managers reached across occupational 
barriers to deploy both engineers and technicians to get 
work done quickly. Interviews indicated that managers 
often considered highly trained technicians and engineers 
interchangeable. For example, managers frequently referred 
to both engineers and technicians as their ^engineering 
talent' when allocating work and considered both bachelors 
degree and advanced technician course graduates in the 
same labour pool when recruiting (See Appendix 4 and 
discussion below for explanation of technology-related 
qualifications. ) The complexity of tasks assigned to and 
the autonomy allowed an engineering employee depended on 
the individual's background arid merits, product 
requirements, pressing schedules and the firm's 
difficulties in hiring engineers arid technicians from the 
external labour market. Many managers reported either 
hiring higher grade technicians as engineers or gradually 
moving technician employees into engineering work. 4 
Technicians with a qualification that included
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programming, for example, experienced a range of 
employment opportunities associated with the increasing 
importance of testing and the industry's heavy investment 
in ATE (Interviews with technical college faculty; 
Marshall and Brisbane regional labour market report, 
1984).
Assessing the extent to which, for example, 
technicians had been given engineering responsibilities 
would require detailed research on the labour process in 
each firm, a task beyond the scope of this study. Attempts 
to estimate a shift of work to technicians by associating 
changing occupational distributions with changing plant 
activities proved impracticable: managers idiosyncra- 
tically and inconsistently interpreted technical 
qualifications and job titles, making occupational 
distributions reliable only for general interpretation. 
However, other labour market studies of the region 
confirmed the fact that many of the people employed as the 
industry's engineers did not have a university degree 
(SEPD, 1980; Hampson and MacLeod, 1983) and that there was 
considerable flexibility in the way that an employee with 
a given technology qualification was deployed within a 
firm.
Table 6.4 compares an employment forecast for 
technical labour for the whole electronics industry and 
the actual employment increase in the survey multinational
corporations alone. The unanticipated growth of technician 
employment may have resulted from management's 
opportunistic use of technicians in the structure of work. 
Technician employment in the survey firms in 1984 was 
almost twice that predicted by the SEPD. While the data do 
not offer proof, the results may be interpreted as 
consistent- with the substitution of technicians for 
engineers. 5 In addition, some managers may have 
substituted technicians for operators to implement new 
production technologies.
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There were also reports that some firms in Scotland 
had hired engineers to fill technician jobs because of 
local surpluses. While this was not a widespread practice, 
it gave the employer a great deal of flexibility and 
expandability in assigning work to those recruits. 
Employment was not linked to a job description (except in 
the case of the few unionised firms). Management could 
shape jobs to match changing product demand conditions, 
the individual's experience and the labour market 
availability of technical workers. 6
TABLE 6.4. ENG I NEER AND TECHNICIAN EMPLOYMENT. GROWTH
High Tech Electronics Electronics
Industry Only* Industry
(1) (2)
Adjusted to
reflect 
1979-1984 1979-1984
[ACTUAL] [FORECAST]
Engineers + 56% + 52%
Technicians + 36% + 20%
SOURCE: CD Survey data;
(2) Scottish Economic Planning 
Department, S c :g 1 t i s _h .... . E c o n o mi. c 
By 1 1_! et i _n_, ,__D ecember, 1983.
* While the SEPD looked at employment prospects in the 
wider electronics industry, the small number of high tech 
electronics firms in my sample ( 12 by 1984) accounted for 
almost half - 43% - of the job growth in engineering jobs 
and 55% of that in electronics technicians in the region.
Also, many employers had created or were considering 
adding a new job title to maximise their flexibility in 
using qualified technicians. "Lower-level technicians* 
were being trained to do the more routine technical and 
clerical tasks - delivering materials to machines, 
recording process flows, cleaning equipment, etc. - to 
free qualified technicians for more complex tasks. The 
training on the job lasted anywhere from 3 to 8 months. 7
194
This development might appear to be an effort to 
deskill technicians. That was generally not the case: 
there was no evidence of management breaking apart the 
technician job to eliminate it or reduce the worker's 
autonomy. Managers were not trying to wrest control from 
these workers because of their technological and economic 
power in the firm, as suggested in Braverman's hypothesis 
(1974). The objective here was to utilise more fully (and 
profitably) the expertise of workers with formal 
technological qualifications. By removing the more mundane 
tasks, the technician's time was freed to repair more 
equipment and to concentrate on technological problem- 
solving, including taking on engineering tasks. 8 The 
reallocation of tasks amongst jobs or workers, then, was 
designed to enhance the opportunity for a qualified 
technician to use and improve more complex skills and 
knowledge, not to deskill the job.
Of course, this new structure helped reduce the 
firm's demand for qualified technicians (or at least the 
increase) and reliance on the external labour market. 
Managers could minimise their recruitment of more 
expensive and relatively scarce formally-trained 
technicians9 , and as a result, moderate the cost and time 
requirements for expanding and/or modernising. The new 
job, however, was not a major new source of employment: 
even the largest employers had only 20 engineering clerks.
6.2.2 A 1 1 e r i n g..__ t. he. .. ..D i y i s i p n .....p f :. _ ...La bo u r ;.... ..fc > e.t .ween
e h .1. 9.
Survey interviews also revealed changes in the work 
organisation between technicians and operatives in a 
number of the firms installing new production 
technologies. Managers had altered the division between 
tasks appropriate for an operator and a technician.
"Basically the only thing [someone] 
has to do is to set UP the machine 
every time you change the product. I 
think you'd find that operator 
[responsibilities] are beginning 
to change. They're somewhere between
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the level of technician and operator" , 
explained the designer of a new wafer fabrication 
facility. "Module technologists', as they were labelled in 
his new production area, were responsible for the 
calibration of the new equipment and for watching to 
insure that production proceeded smoothly and correctly. 
At least two other survey firms reported similarly 
upgrading the operator job and another had been pressured 
to make similar changes by the trade union. 10 
Traditionally an operator's job had been limited to 
loading the machine and watching the process. 1:L
Interestingly, those firms that had created the 
engineering clerk job had not upgraded operators* jobs. 
Adding the relatively unskilled clerical job to operators' 
jobs deskilled by the new technologies was an alternative 
to the bigger training commitment and higher expectation 
of upgrading (See discussion below).
Giving jobs new labels - engineering aid, module 
technologist, setter, etc. - was not a trivial change. New
job titles give employers the opening to reject tradition
1 
and to target a different labour supply. ^ They make it
easier to reorganise work without apparent link to pre- 
existing jobs and workers. 13
All of these changes were accompanied by policies to 
foster individual achievement to divert employees from 
focusing on the expectations and limits of a job. In many 
cases formal barriers such as job grades had been 
eliminated. 1 ^' Even where job grades had been maintained, 
managers no longer used them as automatic steps for 
promotion or pay increases. A worker's promotion and pay 
were determined solely by the supervisor and manager 
assessment of her/his performance. They would rate 
performance on assigned output and productivity targets, 
absenteeism, attitude, etc. The highly individual merit- 
based decision minimised the importance of time-served or 
seniority.
Without job descriptions or traditional barriers 
between jobs, managers could define both the content of
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the job and the pay to reflect individual merit and 
company needs. Managers had assumed control over the 
deployment of labour. The personnel manager at one of the 
computer start-up firms emphasised the importance of this 
change:
"[An employee] walking into this 
office saying, ~I don't have a job 
description and I want one,' would kill 
this place."
6.2.3 New Recruitment Strategies
Management concern to exploit this employment 
flexibility (or at least recognition of the new potential 
for flexibility) had altered recruitment strategies for 
much of the industry. Managers consistently emphasised 
newly important qualities when hiring new employees, and 
research indicates that managers were targeting non- 
traditional populations to fill the industry's jobs.
Personnel managers, college lecturers, and regional 
JobCentre managers underscored the qualities the industry 
valued - intelligence, "fit' and commitment to paid 
employment. The screening mechanisms, however, varied with 
the occupation.
Management had revised selection procedures to 
reflect the concern to hire intelligent workers at all 
occupational levels. 15 At the operator level most of the 
survey firms required the equivalent of three to five O 
levels. In one survey firm requiring a minimum of four 0 
grades, a manager explained:
"With the very high volumes we 
have the job requires a high 
level of awareness of what is 
going on, a very high degree of 
understanding the process. It is 
not just as assembly process. So 
they are responsible young people, 
they read their newspapers." 
(Wattie, 1984). 16
This selectivity contrasts sharply with the 1970s when 
neither level of schooling nor achievement mattered, and 
employers did all they could, such as setting up part-time
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working patterns and mothers' shifts, to create and 
attract unskilled labour to support the industry's growth.
For technician and engineer jobs, college and 
university students were interviewed in the annual milk 
round and only those with top marks were hired into the 
multinationals. 17 Managers claimed to be unwilling to 
make concessions for an excellent academic record; they 
claimed to delay hiring if they could not recruit 
satisfactory "quality.' 1S
An applicant's suitability for work in the industry 
was a very important criterion when selecting new 
employees. Managers valued the qualities of being able to 
communicate and being sociable as much if not more than 
academic qualifications. 1<5 They looked for friendly, neat 
and articulate people when interviewing for operators. 
Ueeding out haphazard, highstrung and uncommunicative 
workers had become more important as the new technologies 
demanded greater precision and watchfulness. 20 For 
technical jobs, managers were looking for people who could 
discuss clearly and easily the technical issues of the 
job, who took directions well and who could cope with the 
industry's high level of stress. In interview after 
interview, managers claimed to have hired as technicians 
young people who had no technology-specific 
qualifications yet who seemed to be "a good fit,' even 
though this required the firm's commitment to train the 
unskilled candidate for months if not years.
"We're more concerned to find "the 
right person', to get someone of 
admirable qualities and to train 
him [sic],"
according to the managing director of one of the survey
firms.
Employment stability, as well as flexibility, was of 
paramount importance in occupations. Because of the 
high information and experience content of the job, the 
critical ingredient for high quality and high productivity 
performance was low turnover amongst both production and
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technical workers. Four firms had lifetime employment or 
no redundancy policies for all permanent employees. Also 
all the survey firms gave preference to applicants who 
were referred by family members who were already 
employees. 21 Having relatives nearby was thought to 
indicate an applicant's commitment to settling in the 
area. The firms also used the related employees and their 
work records to gauge the employability of the applicant. 
Once hired, relatives would help ensure that the new 
employee would be a disciplined and reliable worker. 22
"The more names [of relatives already 
employed here] you put down on the 
application form, the more likely 
you are to get hired,"
confirmed a personnel officer in one of the region's 
largest firms.
In recruiting technicians, geography figured more 
prominently than in earlier years- Managers in many of 
the firms had recently decided to restrict their search 
for technicians to nearby technical colleges. Scotland- 
and UK-wide recruitment had brought in young people who 
recognised their mobility and too frequently wanted to
O"2
move back home after only a year or two of employment. ° 
By restricting the recruitment area, companies aimed to 
hire people wanting to settle in the area. The locus for 
recruiting production workers had never been larger than 
the local community or a distance of five to fifteen 
miles.
There was also evidence that management had become 
much more thorough in investigating workers' backgrounds, 
particularly when recruiting production workers. The 
companies wanted proof that the applicant would be a 
stable, dependable worker. Recruiters tried to determine 
if applicants had a stable family and school history and 
if they were happily married. Women with children had to 
convince managers they had reliable child care to be 
considered, arid women applicants were often asked if they 
were pregnant or had plans for children. 2 ** The routine 
medicals required for production workers before they
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started work usually included a urine test. This allowed 
employers to verify that the women weren't already 
pregnant.
Because low absenteeism was so important to
production quality, management was looking for a long-term 
commitment from production workers. A number of the firms 
had a policy of hiring production workers first as 
temporaries. This practice was used to ensure managers 
that the worker was well-disciplined and productive before 
making the financial commitment of an employment contract. 
After six months or a year, some of the temps with good
<~> c
performance records would be offered permanent jobs. 
This practice also served to discipline the rest of the 
workers by reminding them that there was competition for 
their jobs. This in effect applied harsher secondary 
labour market practices against the firm's secondary 
workers. This practice represented a new duality in labour 
market practice. Uhile long a defining feature of the 
global division of labour between core and .peripheral (eg 
Far Eastern) economies, the use of temporary workers was 
not common amongst employers in the UK.
As a result of all these policies, the regional 
industry reported extremely low turnover and remarkable 
productivity records. An SDA official claimed that total 
turnover in the semi-conductor industry was only 4.% p. a. , 
though the rate was higher for engineers and technicians 
(approximately 10 to 15% p.a., 1984). NEC claimed the firm 
had had no turnover and Motorola's per annum statistic in 
Scotland was the equivalent of staff loss in 
the US (SDA, 1983A). Managers in five survey firms boasted 
that the productivity record of the Scottish plant far 
exceeded other plants in the UK, Europe or even the US, 
attributing the success to low turnover. 26
6.2.4 C h anging. Ta r g e t Popu1 a t i o n s
Employers had begun looking for new populations to 
fill the industry's jobs. Having recognised these newly 
important labour qualities, managers selected new labour
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market segments as appropriate for industry work. 
Scotland's labour market made these shifts possible. There 
were two major strategic changes that were surprisingly 
consistent across the survey firms.
First, employers concentrated their hiring on young 
people without experience for all occupations rather than 
competing for experienced workers. For technical 
personnel, managers had adopted a policy they called 
"growing their own': they hired graduates directly from 
university or college and trained them in-house for the 
job. This training was very expensive. It took 18 to 24 
months of on-the-job supervision supplemented by college 
and corporate short intensive courses to prepare an 
engineering graduate for a high tech job. Similarly, new 
technicians recruited from an academic course were 
usually trained for three to four weeks at the plant of 
the equipment suppliers, and often received further 
training once in the job. As mentioned earlier, managers 
were even willing to train unskilled recruits as 
technicians, requiring usually one month's intensive 
induction training off-site followed by three to four 
years of on-the-job training and day release for a course 
at a local college. Because of the industry's newness to 
the region, the local labour market did not have an 
adequate supply of technicians and engineers with (three 
to five years') experience with new technologies. In 
spite of the expense, managers viewed this "hiring lower 
on the skill chain", as a labour market expert called it, 
as cost-effective. It minimised the firm's wage bill, 
reliance on poaching27 and costs associated with high 
turnover, such as escalating salaries.
Every multinational also had a policy of hiring young 
people for production jobs. 28 This was a major departure 
from the past: high tech production workers and "married 
women* with school-age children had been synonymous in the 
Scottish industry. Managers differed in opinions about how 
young. A few firms had hired school-leavers, but most
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preferred youth with some labour market experience so had 
a minimum age of 18, 19 or even 20 years old.
This was a relatively recent change at the time of 
the survey and was most marked in the start-up firms: one 
1982 semi-conductor start-up had a 150-strong work force 
with an average of only twenty years of age (1984). For 
at least two of the firms, the strategy of hiring young 
people was not a global corporate strategy, but the 
result of a decision taken specifically in response to the 
labour market in Scotland.
Managers preferred young workers because they had no 
bad or out-of-date work practices to unlearn:
"We*re hoping to attract people 
who are new and bright and shiny."
Young people were also more likely than those with child 
care responsibilities to be able to change shifts, to 
travel abroad for conferences, consultations or training 
and to adjust to long working hours with ease. "This is a 
young person's industry", confirmed the head of a 
prominent technical college's electrical engineering 
department. He claimed that his staff counseled people 
over 25 years old against enrolling for training in
electronics because of the strong industry's bias toward
OQ xn young people. ^ » OLJ
Secondly, men were increasingly being hired into 
production jobs which had in the past been exclusively 
female work. All but one of the survey firms (1984.) had at 
least a few men working as semi-skilled operators and 
assemblers, a practice unheard of a few years 
previously. 51 In six of the eleven survey firms providing 
gender-specific data, men were at least one quarter (and 
up to 86%) of the semiskilled workforce, as shown in Table 
6.5.
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TABLE 6.5. M A L E... .W 0 R K E.R S_.. A S..__ A_.__S H A RE..... 0 F_ _TH E__P RODU C T ION WORK""~~~~~""  
Survey Firms
Company A 
Company B 
Company C 
Company D 
Company E 
Company F
Male Workers as Percentage
of 1984 Production
Employment
32
13
2
66
25
50
F i r ; m is
Company G 
Company H 
Company I 
Company J 
Company K 
Company L 
Cqmpany M
O
86
15
5
4
2
53
SOURCE: Field Survey, 1983/4
The shift to male workers was the most marked in the 
start-ups and in newly built portions of existing plants. 
For example, Companies F and M, a computer and a semi- 
conductor start-up firm, respectively, had hired men in 
half of their production jobs. Similarly, fifty percent of 
the production work force in Company I's most advanced 
chip fabrication wing was male: in older fabrication wings 
the work force was 100% female. Also, most of the 
assemblers in Company D's new highly automated 
microcomputer facility, a separate building added onto a
 *o
long-established computer plant, were men. ^ The firms 
hired men to staff the new technologies.
In contrast, technical jobs had always been ~male' : 
men had overwhelmingly dominated engineering and technical 
jobs since the beginning of the industry. That was the 
case in Scotland as it was around the world. There was 
little change during the study period. Of the ten survey
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firms providing gender-disaggregated employment data, five 
had no woman engineers and four had no women technicians 
in 1984. Those firms employing women in technical jobs had 
very few. Ninety-seven percent of the industry's almost 
1000 engineers were men and 91% of the approximately 900 
technicians were male.
6.2.5 Eliminating Care e r Ladders
Grades, promotion paths and rules for progression had 
disappeared, even in the union shops. Managers had 
eliminated automatic grading increases and promotion steps 
by substituting a highly individualised relationship 
between a supervisor and her/his workers. To earn a pay
increase or to advance, an individual had to be selected\
by a supervisor because of performance and attitude. 
Firms had reduced the number of layers in the occupational 
hierarchy: this eliminated many of the relatively few 
jobs, such as leadgirl and supervisory jobs, that were the 
traditional opportunities for production workers to escape 
their occupational ghetto. Supervising had in many cases 
been added onto the other responsibilities of technical 
staff. Technicians were assigned first line supervision of 
the workers on their machines, and the process or area 
engineer was the personnel manager for the group. In those 
few firms keeping the traditional supervisor jobs in 
production, recruitment for them was no longer exclusively 
from amongst production workers. People from other parts 
of the plant and often from the external labour market 
were hired. This eliminated job ladders in production. 
Formal job paths out of semi-skilled work had been reduced 
or eliminated or the jobs themselves were severed from 
their traditional internal labour markets. 33
While management had in many cases trained workers 
for a variety of jobs, there was no association of 
promotion or pay with the addition of new tasks.°4 
Workers were cross-trained to do a number of process tasks 
in chip fabrication, and in the computer industry workers 
learned both a variety of assembly tasks and clerical work
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in inventory or materials handling.Training for each 
semi-skilled job was limited to learning the assigned 
manufacturing task, which usually required two weeks or 
less. 36 This so-called multi-skilling enabled management 
to train enough people to cover for absent workers and to 
adjust to demand shifts. It was not upgrading; it was only 
horizontal movement among parallel jobs.
"[Cross-training] creates more 
interest for the operator and the 
operator sees herself getting a 
promotion with it",
as the managing director of one of the integrated circuit 
firms explained. The semi-skilled worker gains the f.ee.li_ng 
of being promoted without any actual improvement in status 
or earnings.
In dealing with technicians and engineers, automatic 
progression through gradings or job titles was very rare. 
(Only two firms had unionised engineers.) Salary increases 
and job advancement were similarly based on the 
individual's performance and relationship with the 
supervisor. 3 Ulhile most engineers (and some technicians) 
were given management responsibilities, they referred in 
many cases to assignments for specific projects or part- 
projects. That meant, firstly, that it was difficult to 
compare across inidividuals and work areas (except by the 
number of people supervised), and secondly, the 
responsibility terminated with the end of the project or 
project phase. The additional responsibilities did not 
necessarily signify job enhancement or permanent 
progression in the hierarchy.
Engineers and technicians were frequently offered 
training and skill upgrading, but these opportunities were 
not linked to a change in grade, a promotion or a pay 
rise. Most of the training opportunities were short-term 
intensive courses to give employees the knowledge to 
handle a specific new task or new technology.
Management had prioritised and invested heavily in 
quick fixes of training for short-term adjustment to
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market and technological changes. New technical personnel 
and highly skilled and experienced employees were sent on 
technical courses throughout their employment in a firm. 
The courses typically lasted only two to five days. 38 
Managers in all the survey firms encouraged and sponsored 
technical employees on specialised technical upgrading 
courses arranged outside of working hours. Employers also 
sponsored some professional workers to take degree courses 
part-time.
Technical employees expected training opportunities 
as part of their employment contract and viewed them as 
important benefits in highly competitive occupations. 
These new opportunities gave them up-to-date information 
on the newest technologies, making them more saleable in 
the external labour market. Company managers financed 
continuing training opportunities for technical personnel 
who were critical to ongoing and future operations of the 
plant as benefits and rewards to enhance their jobs and to 
retain their loyalty. 39 Providing training and upgrading 
gave these workers career development opportunities inside 
the firm, discouraging their need to move to competitor 
firms to get better jobs. However, there was no automatic 
link between gaining additional expertise and a pay 
increase or promotion.
The leaders in the region's high tech industry had, 
in addition to the efforts inside the firm, actively 
lobbied for more training opportunities and shorter 
courses appropriate to industry needs. Through petitions 
to the British Government, participation on public 
industry-related boards and curriculum development 
committees and countless informal communications with 
regional universities and colleges, industry managers had 
pressured public institutions to enhance and expand 
offerings for technical qualifications and shorter 
technology programs in a variety of formats. In addition 
one corporation had received SDA support to open a school 
to provide training for industry operators and assemblers. 
The course was intended for fee-paying unemployed workers
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who wanted jobs in the industry. They would learn basic 
electronics terminology, assembly technique and safety 
rules, all of which had traditionally been taught in 
company training workshops within the employment 
relationship.
The elimination of clear promotion and career paths 
and the severing of the link between training and job 
grade, title or promotion represented an important new 
development. The vast array of training options, new 
hiring practices and work structures hid the fact that the 
few paths out of secondary jobs had almost entirely 
disappeared and that many of the benefits associated with 
primary jobs had been eliminated.
6.2.6 Strategic Consideration of
.P. .0
In most firms the way employees were actually 
deployed was left to the discretion of function managers, 
so were often ad hoc responses to the capabilities of 
individual workers. In the Japanese semi-conductor firm, 
however, the structure of work was the result of 
corporate-wide strategic planning, and the deployment of 
labour was considered a major factor in the firm's global 
competitive success.
Technology-related tasks were distributed amongst all 
workers, rather than being reserved for those with formal 
technology qualifications. That meant all workers received 
longer, more in-depth training to support the devolved 
responsibilities. By shifting "contextual knowledge" 
(Appelbaum et al., 1986) and responsibilities down the 
occupational line, management aimed to gain plant-wide 
efficiencies and to reduce operational dependence on 
expensive university-trained engineers. Japanese managers' 
commitment to this structure of work no doubt developed 
out of their unique corporate culture and history. The 
modern tradition of Japanese conglomerates included 
continual investment in technological innovation in 
production and lifetime employment guarantees for their 
workers. Inevitably these policies fostered management-
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labour practices distinctly different from those in US 
firms. Large Japanese firms extended many of the benefits 
associated with "primary' workers to their entire work 
force and shifted the primary-secondary barrier outside 
the firm to both the periphery of small supplier firms in 
the Japanese economy and to firms in low-wage economies in 
the Far East. However, Japanese electronics firms, 
particularly high tech companies, had been much less 
reliant on secondary labour markets than US firms. 
Management of labour and work, given this history, was 
quite different in Japanese multina- tionals.
The operators, hired with a minimum of four "0' 
levels in science, maths and technology subjects, were 
chosen because of their potential to learn new tasks; many 
of them had Highers. Each was trained for a number of 
different (though parallel) jobs in chip assembly. 
Managers selected experienced operators for more involved 
production jobs. These workers were then trained to be 
experts in their section of the manufacturing process and 
how to train and supervise new operators. Management also 
selected experienced operators for technician jobs. The 
firm trained them to understand one piece of equipment 
thoroughly and to be able to reset and perform routine 
maintenance and repair on that machine. Management called 
them "setters' to distinguish them from qualified 
technicians. The firm had hired only a few people with the 
formal advanced technician qualification to perform major- 
equipment maintenance and repair. They were then trained 
in-house to assume specialised engineering roles. 41
This firm's practice then was to offer all employees 
from the lowest production worker up opportunities for 
training and more responsible jobs. This in effect granted 
some of the benefits of primary jobs to all employees. 
However there was no promotion ladder or protocol. 
Decisions were taken urti laterally by management without 
formally specifying the criteria to employees.
The result was what Hirschhorn (1984) and Appelbaum 
et al (1986) would call a relatively robust structure of
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work. Appelbaum et al define robust and algorithmic work 
structures, the extreme ends in a structure of work 
continuum, in the following way. Robust forms of work 
organisation are
"designed to promote learning, flexibi- 
lity and adaptive behavior on the part 
of workers...The defining characteristics 
of robust forms...have to do with the 
relationships among employees at different 
levels of the firm. Confidence in workers at 
lower levels allows managers to hand off 
problems ...to lower levels for solution 
while freeing those at higher levels to 
develop new products and markets...[T]he 
more common, algorithmic form of computer 
rationalization accepts only preselected 
information and reduces worker initiative 
and knowledge of the production process... 
[C]omputers [are- used] to limit the 
possibilities for decision-making and 
creativity in the jobs of operators,... 
technicians and service workers and to 
centralize and control these functions 
higher up in the bureaucracy" (pp. 14-15).
Rigid barriers between jobs and stark differences in 
working conditions, associated with dual labour markets, 
are inconsistent with the economic and operational aims of 
a robust organisation of work. Its strength and economic 
benefits derive from'all workers sharing information and 
collaborating in quick decision-making. Continual turnover 
amongst groups of workers or denial of access to training 
resources, characteristics of conventional secondary jobs, 
would make communication and collaboration amongst workers 
across occupations and departments unwieldy or impossible.
This firm's managers had attributed s number of 
benefits to an integrated strategy that combined state-of- 
the-art-technology investments, training, employment 
security and a robust structure of work. First, it 
dramatically reduced the number of degree engineers needed 
on site.^2 A group of only nine degree engineers, only 5% 
of their 1984 manufacturing work force, could handle all 
the firm's complex engineering tasks when supported by a 
core of eight very experienced engineers from Japan. That 
compared to the industry average of 21% (1984).
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Secondly, management viewed internal training and 
promotion as a way to build worker loyalty to the firm. 
Workers who know that the firm is willing to reward their 
good performance and invest in them will, it was assumed, 
stay with the company and strive for promotion. The 
intent of the strategy - not unlike that of most of the 
industry - was to replace oppositional management-labour 
relations with a company-first attitude. This policy of 
continuing training/retraining supported by a guarantee of 
lifetime employment aimed to minimise labour turnover.
Thirdly, the worker learns to see her/himself as a 
part of the process: s/he identifies job-related capabi- 
lities with the firm rather than allying with an 
occupation or group of people. The personnel manager 
explained that people with formal qualifications "feel 
they know it all...and that [would not] fit in here." 
Management wanted to avoid hiring people who would have 
strong views about what work they should do or, because of 
too much attachment to a job, who would resist retraining 
and new work assignments. Furthermore, training focused on 
firm-specific skills. This enabled the firm to 
individualise pay decisions for a work force without 
formal qualifications, as well as minimise reliance on the 
external labour market. It is difficult to argue for pay 
comparability without industry-recognised qualifications.
Company management in this firm was more committed to 
a flexible, robust structure of work than the rest of the 
industry. They accomplished it by hiring an entire work 
force that was academically accomplished - "haCving] been 
taught to learn" - and by training them internally to 
minimise reliance on the external labour market. 
Flexibility within the firm meant the company could 
respond uniquely to changing market demands. ^ Each worker 
could be taught increasingly complex technology-related 
tasks as needed: to achieve this the barriers between jobs 
and workers could not be as rigid as was the tradition in 
the industry. While this may at times be slower than 
relying on the external labour market, the corporation had
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a strategy that minimised technology and market surprise, 
allowing longer-term employment planning.
A critical difference between this firm and most of 
the US firms was that management had the advantages of 
extensive experience with advanced technologies and a 
strategy that intertwined technology, work organisation 
and labour management. While most of the capital 
investments of US firms were significant technology leaps 
and attempts to catch-up with world technology leaders, 
the Japanese firm had invested in technologies and labour 
processes that were only incremental advances over a 
similar plant which opened in California in the preceding 
year. The corporation was an international leader in 
developing and using the most advanced production 
technologies: corporate experience with state-of-the-art 
equipment minimised the chances of technological 
surprises. Skill needs could be anticipated, enabling 
management to design a coherent and adaptable structure of 
work and recruitment strategy. In contrast, US firms' 
allocation of technology-related tasks to lesser-skilled 
or experienced workers was in many cases a hurried 
response to too many changes and too much growth too fast.
The system was not, however, one of significant 
autonomy for or control by workers. While it gave all 
workers a more interesting job, as well as guaranteed 
employment, it came with costs. To ensure flexibility in 
redeploying workers, management effectively eliminated 
skill transferability. The absence of formal qualifica- 
tions eliminated guidelines for fairness in promotion. 
Simultaneously, workers lost some degree of mobility and 
inevitably leverage over pay.
6.2.7 Summary ......pf.....F.i_Qcl..i .ngs
The proportion of technically skilled labour in 
subsidiary employment had increased and surpassed what 
would be expected in offshore branch plants. Firms had 
hired the personnel necessary to ensure the company could 
accomplish the technologically sophisticated tasks
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demanded by the world market. The demands of rapid and 
large scale expansions led managers to recognise the 
necessity of collaboration and good will within the 
workplace: only in such an environment would workers be 
willing to deal creatively with a wide range of technical 
problems and to accept long hours and high levels of 
stress to meet deadlines. To establish this atmosphere and 
to benefit from a well-trained labour force, most 
employers had eliminated job demarcations, particularly 
between engineers and technicians, and were restructuring 
the allocation of work between the two occupations to 
exploit the capabilities of formally-trained technicians. 
Job descriptions and formal rules for promotion within the 
technical work force disappeared. Individual merit- and 
personality-based relationships with supervisors replaced 
rigid rules and class-based internal labour markets of 
most manufacturing industries. Also, managers had 
decided to minimise dependence on experienced technical 
personnel: they hired people they could train and promote 
into jobs as their performance merited. In most firms this 
meant recruitment priorities emphasising suitability and 
potential over formal qualifications, in some cases 
substituting the former for the latter.
These practices were designed to exploit the 
capabilities of trained engineers and technicians without 
regard for conventional demarcations in order to cope with 
short-term start-up and expansion pressures and the 
demands of rapidly changing and growing markets. Bringing 
down the barriers between engineers and technicians and 
separating workers from identification with their 
occupational group allowed managers to squeeze greater 
information and productivity returns from each level of 
trained worker (not unlike increasing the intensity of 
labour time).
The barriers between technicians and operators had 
also in many cases changed, but not to the same extent. 
Some firms had redesigned and enhanced the production 
worker's job to exploit the time freed up by new
212
technologies. However, these workers were still largely 
cut off from higher-level jobs. They were not offered the 
mobility within the work structure available to highly- 
motivated technicians. The new flexibility provided them 
only limited opportunities for more interesting, 
responsible work.
The Japanese firm however had redesigned the entire 
employment structure to take advantage of the pool of 
technology-related skills in the Scottish labour market. 
Management had structured work in the Scotland plant to 
upgrade all jobs with respect to occupational conventions. 
The motive was to reap the long-term benefits of increased 
flexibility in deploying labour. Managerial prerogative 
replaced traditional credentials and class-based 
conventions in allocating work and mobility opportunities 
within the firm. The more robust structure of work 
provided both short-term and long-term cost advantages 
that management considered important in achieving a highly 
competitive market position.
As a result of industry efforts to achieve 
flexibility, there was little evidence in this sample of 
the highly bifurcated work force widely reported as the 
result of incorporating new technologies into traditional 
and high tech industries (Rumberger and Levin, 1984; 
Bluestone and Harrison, 1984). They had found a 
significant gap of middle-level jobs: employment was 
concentrated in highly skilled technical professional jobs 
and in deskilled production work. Research in Scotland's 
high tech industry found this pattern only in small, 
domestic firms.
Another result of management giving priority to 
flexibility and stability was a shift in which workers 
were considered the most appropriate for the industry. 
Opportunities provided by the local labour market were 
instrumental in framing was considered the most 
suitable - not just for a job, but for long-term 
employment in a firm and for the character of the 
industry. During the survey period there was a marked
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shift in who was hired and who was expected to meet the 
new demands of the industry. Recruitment focused on hiring 
young people with little or no work experience and on 
hiring men, even for those jobs formerly considered 
women's work. The unique and powerful role of the local 
labour market in altering the long-standing gender and age 
expectations for industry workers will be thoroughly 
examined later in the chapter. First, the competitive 
value of flexibility is reviewed.
6.3. JQHJLJSSO^ 
SJJRATEGIES
The industry crisis outlined in previous chapters 
clearly forced corporate management to develop new 
strategies to deliver more sophisticated, more variable 
product faster and better to an extremely volatile market. 
The preceding chapter contended that heavy investment in 
more advanced technologies was part of a solution: new 
equipment made possible unprecedented speed and accuracy 
within batch manufacture. However, the technology does not 
in and of itself determine the structure of work: 
decisions about the organisation of work arise out 
of/result from the social and political relations at the 
level of the company, the industry and the economy (Noble, 
1979; Shaiken, 1980; Cooley, 1982). This section begins. 
to examine why the industry adopted the strategies 
described above in Scotland at this time.
Market pressures for variable if not custom-designed 
product and for improved product quality from formerly 
mass production firms imposed new demands on the 
performance of a firm, thus on the nature of capital 
investment and the use of that capital. By investing in 
computerisation in manufacturing, an installation of 
capital could produce small batches to varying 
specifications. Computer monitoring and controls 
simultaneously offered a higher degree of reliability. 
Further, the engineering information embodied in the 
equipment's microprocessor made the changeover between
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batches relatively fast and easy, in contrast to 
complicated and time-consuming retooling in traditional 
manufacturing systems. The ways these capabilities are 
actually adopted within a firm are then shaped by the 
particular competitive conditions driving the industry and 
the firm and by the capital-labour relation, a reality 
ignored by many theorists infatuated with the new 
technologies.
Hirschhorn (1984) provides a discussion of the 
potential of the new microprocessor-controlled 
technologies to transform the organisation of work. His 
analysis proves particularly valuable for assessing 
developments in the high tech industry because the 
chemical and nuclear industries * of his research similarly 
have a reliance on extremely sophisticated technologies, 
high information content in production and economies 
achieved through continuous processing.
New microprocessor-controlled technologies are 
extremely complex manufacturing systems which, in chemical 
and semi-conductor or computer production, link together 
formerly separate processes. Because the response of one 
process to a change or problem in another is 
unpredictable, the integration of processes increases the 
sources of error. Electronic controls cannot possibly be 
designed to anticipate and correct all possible, much less 
unforeseen, complications. Hirschhorn asserted that the 
human content of work associated with the new technologies 
must centre on technological discontinuities - 
understanding and responding to the use of new materials, 
or product modification, potential failures, etc. The 
computerisation can take over the routine monitoring and 
control tasks: the workers' jobs must be to respond to 
unanticipated errors.
He argued that the complexities of integrative 
technologies require workers throughout processing to 
solve problems; this in turn places new demands on the 
organisation of work and the worker. To understand 
completely and respond quickly and correctly to a system
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disfunction, any worker must know a lot about all the 
processing steps, the nature of the product and'the 
responsiveness of the equipment in the work environment. A 
problem appearing at one worker's station may have been 
caused at a much earlier stage in production. The worker's 
capacity to learn and to adapt and to regulate the 
controls is critical to the quality of production and the 
productivity of the equipment. Contextual knowledge of 
work on the shopfloor, not simple rules or procedures (If 
a green light comes on, do this.), determine successful 
production (eg low defect rates, high capacity 
utilisation).
According to Hirschhorn, two conditions produce this 
outcome: flexibility and stability. The flexibility is 
that of individual workers' responses and of the 
organisation of work allowing workers individually or 
collaboratively to intervene quickly in operations beyond 
the confines of their station. Stability refers to the 
continuing employment of workers within the firm. He 
considered employment stability critical to enabling the 
work force to learn and apply the contextual knowledge 
associated with experience.^5
"Flexible systems can adapt quickly 
only if information is widely shared 
arid diffused within them. There is 
no hierarchy to problem-solving: 
solutions may come from anyone, 
anywhere. In flexible-system enterprises 
nearly everyone in the production 
process is responsible for recognising 
problems and finding solutions. (Reich, 
1983; quoted in Stern, 1985; p.14.)
As implied here, Hirschhorn contended that the number of 
job classes must be reduced to allow greater collaboration 
and fast response, arid workers must be given greater 
control over her/his activity to reflect the more 
integrated responsibilities. The technology transforms the 
of work: the relationship of employees becomes 
one where shared information and responsibilities replace 
hierarchical and routine protocol and procedures.
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Technological change demands that a robust structure of 
work replace the conventional reliance on algorithms.
However, Hirschhorn's analysis was one of a 
technology determinist. In fact, a technology can be 
adopted in many ways. The survey in Scotland demonstrated 
that there is no inevitability in the pattern of work 
associated with computerised technologies. Hirschhorn's 
transformation of the workplace must be seen as one end of 
a continuum of strategies for structuring work. The same 
technology can be adopted in a firm relying on a highly 
algorithmic organisation of work Cie based on hierarchies 
and routinised procedures) if the employer cannot reap or 
recognise the benefits of greater flexibility. The extent 
to which a firm adopts a robust work structure or an 
algorithmic one is mediated by the market context of the 
firm and industry and the vision and experience of 
management.^
For the high tech companies in Scotland, the 
competitive conditions that stimulated investment in 
advanced technologies and the economics of operating in 
Scotland shaped the decisions about the organisation of 
work. Managers in the Scottish subsidiaries had to oversee 
the installation and rapid start-up of sophisticated 
capital equipment to take advantage of unexpected market 
growth. At the same time, they had to meet newly pressing 
objectives that would both expand potential markets and 
reduce unit costs - providing more and better field 
service and technical assistance, reducing downtime and 
product turnaround time - all in a market that had 
previously been served by branch plants. This growth and 
change happened quite rapidly. Managers turned to 
qualified technical personnel to meet these demands Cat 
least in the short-term): as a result, company recruitment 
and employment policies in US firms favoured engineers and 
technicians.^ The pressure of time convinced management 
that they could demand more of people with lesser 
qualifications to meet short-term pressures. Companies 
removed or softened established demarcations betweeen jobs
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and hired lower on the skill chain to get production 
moving.
This gave calculable financial returns. Recruiting a 
qualified electronics technician to do an electronics 
engineer's job saved firms approximately £1200 in annual 
salary (1984; calculated from SDA electronics wage 
survey). While the differential is relatively small, the 
savings would significantly influence the cost of a major 
expansion. 4-8 This practice helped mediate the effects of 
the global escalation of electronics engineers' salaries. 
Interviews, however, gave the impression that management 
valued the incalculable flexibility this gave them in 
project and team management as a much more important 
benefit than payroll savings. 4- 9 Technicians could be 
expected to take instructions more readily and were less 
likely to have the professional expectations that would 
inhibit their doing any tasks.
However, a demand-side argument is insufficient. It 
can only establish the parameters for management 
employment strategies. The survey confirmed that 
recruitment and employment strategies in Scotland 
differed from the rest of the multinational (including 
plants in the home base economy). Managers in Scotland 
recruited younger people and "hired lower on the skill 
chain' than was conventional practice within the 
corporation. While the industry had historically 
considered Scotland little more than a relatively 
inexpensive rural labour force inside the EEC, changing 
competitive conditions forced a reassessment of the local 
labour supply. The specific conditions of labour supply, 
not technology alone, shaped how the industry could meet 
pressures to reduce unit capital costs and to respond 
quickly to capricious markets.
6. 4 IH E......p^.Y N..A..M.1C.........I ,N£ LU E N C .E...... OF__ S.Q.Q T.L..A..N.D.'..S..... LA B OUR..... M AR K E T
A number of features of the labour supply in Scotland 
promoted the industry's employment growth and reshaped 
employment between 1979 and 1984. The most important
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factors distinguishing Scotland from other possible global 
locations, listed below, will be discussed in turn in this 
section:
. high and rising unemployment;
. a highly educated labour force and, more
specifically, a significant and growing
technical labour supply;
. a resilient national culture and community; 
. gender as a factor in the workplace and in
the external labour market; and
. state labour market intervention to stimulate
the industry*s growth.
6.4.1 _....H_.ij{£._J^
The region's unemployment rate rose steadily in the 
late 1970s, then escalated sharply in 198O, tripling 
during the 1975-1985 decade. During this period Scotland 
carried a significantly heavier burden of unemployment 
than Great Britain, as indicated in Table 6.6, maintaining 
a lead ranging from 16 to 42% (though the gap narrowed 
during the early years of the Conservative Government).
A rapidly rising male unemployment rate dominated the 
trend. The long-term decline of the region's traditional 
industries (mining, fishing, shipbuilding, metalworking, 
engineering and vehicles) made increasing numbers of men 
redundant throughout the 1970s. The growth of the 
electronics industry had created predominantly women's 
jobs> providing few employment opportunities for the 
swelling ranks of jobless men. The recession of 1980-1
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TABLE 6.6 ..Z!lE.._yNEJ!!fLPYi1ENL.J?ATE IN SCOTLAND
Percentages 
Annual Averages
Scotland Great Britain
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983*
1984
1985
5.0
6.7
7.7
7.7
7.4
9. 1
12.4
14.0
14.9
15. 1
15.3
SOURCE: Annual
3.9
5.4
5.7
5.6
5.2
6.7
10.2
11.9
12.7
12.9
13. 1
Abstract of Statistics, (1987):
Central Statistical Office; Table 6.6, 
p.114.
* The data beginning 1983 reflect changes in the provision 
of the 1983 Budget that changed the way unemployment was 
measured and which groups qualified for benefit (eg 
excluding some groups such as men aged 60 and over from 
having to sign on at Unemployment Benefit offices).
aggravated the disparity between male and female rates: 
Table 6.7 shows that the male rate exceeded the female 
rate by more than 6 percentage points. Rising male 
unemployment was met by a contraction in regional 
employment opportunities for men. Male employment fell by 
more than 15% in less than ten years (1974 - 1983), while 
the region's service and electronics industries boosted 
post-recession female employment.
Deteriorating employment opportunities in so many 
traditional industries focused public concern on youth: 
close to half of the region's unemployed were young 
people. Forty-two percent (on average) of those claiming 
unemployment in the early 1980s were people under 25 
(calculated from Table 2.6, Em pi. o y m ent..... _Gja e 11 e, various 
issues, 1980 through 1985). The steel, mining, 
shipbuilding and metal-turning industries no longer 
provided jobs for the region's male school-leavers.
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Employers in the growth industries (electronics and 
services) had been hiring predominantly married women for 
their new jobs. Youth
TABLE 6.7. S.CnTLA^
yNE.MPLp_YMEN Y_ ...RATES.
Percentages 
Annual Averages
Male Female
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983*
1984**
8.4
9.3
9. 1
8.7
10.7
15.0
17. 1
18.0
18.4
4.3
5.3
5.7
5.7
7. 1
8.9
9.8
10.7
11.0
* See Note to Table 6.6 above
** Five-month average
SOURCE: E.mpipymient. _Gaze; t1. e (1983,1984) Table 2737 "S25 ""126,"""""""'"
unemployment, particularly male youth, had become a 
serious problem.
These developments created a singular opportunity 
for high tech employers. The collapse of traditional 
industry had created new, compliant labour reserves in the 
same location as the burgeoning microelectronics industry. 
This allowed continued industry growth without kindling 
the upward pressure on wages or worker strength associated 
with labour market shortages (for lesser skilled labour). 
Employers could also increase their selectivity in hiring 
without bidding up wages. This relatively costless growth 
broke the historical pattern of relocating to find new 
labour markets when rising wages or political constraints 
hampered growth (Massey and Meegan, 1979). Scotland gave 
the industry the opportunity to expand in a familiar 
business climate by tapping new, high unemployment labour 
segments. This gave employers the leeway to alter 
employment strategies and to hire selectively from a pool 
of qualified applicants. Managers were extremely pleased
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with these surplus labour markets. One firm received 7000 
applications for 45 assembly jobs (1982); in this case 12 
to 20 people were interviewed for each production job. 50
The shortage of alternate employment opportunities in 
the region and elsewhere in England, the historic haven 
for job-seeking Scots, had altered workers' vocational 
plans and expectations. The desire to get a job in the 
high tech industry had transformed the labour force. 
Middle class young people with credentials to enter 
university had instead chosen to gain technical 
qualifications to compete for the industry's jobs. 
Qualified engineering and science majors were willing to 
take conversion courses   and jobs for which they were 
overqualif ied to get into the Scottish industry. Untrained 
young people flocked to courses that were any sort of 
preparation for electronics industry jobs.
6.4. 2_^__Jiig_hJL_x__^^^
Trained Labour Force
The region's educational system had earned a 
reputation amongst corporate managers for producing a 
literate, well-educated labour force. The "above average 
educated local population" (Interview with semi-conductor 
executive in California) was an important advantage 
Scotland offered over many other possible locations. 51 
High tech employers could safely raise the academic 
requirements for entry-level jobs without losing the 
labour surplus they enjoyed when recruiting. Further, the 
willingness of school-leavers amongst others to take 
vocational subjects or complete post-school training 
programs relevant to the industry (eg the publicly-funded 
Training Opportunities Programme - TOPS) gave firms the 
option of recruiting computer- and electronics-literate 
young people even into unskilled jobs.
However, the sizable and rapidly growing supply of 
technically-trained labour was a most important factor 
distinguishing Scotland from most other labour markets. 
During the late 1970s the region's educational 
institutions yearly graduated approximately 250 electrical
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and electronics engineering degree students and on average 
1205 electrical and electronics technicians.^2 Paralleling 
the growing economic importance of the electronics to the 
region, enrollment on most of these electronics 
engineering courses expanded steadily throughout the 
1970's and early 1980's. Many of the region's eight 
universities and further education and technology colleges 
expanded their electrical and electronics engineering 
degree courses in 1975/6, leading to a rapid growth in 
student intake (a 55% increase in the four academic years 
that followed) and corresponding increases in graduates 
(MSC for Scotland, 1980). There was a similar increase in 
physics, maths and computer science degree students over 
the same period: graduates from these fields were 
recruited for process engineering in the semi-conductor 
industry and for software development and programming. The 
pressure to produce qualified people led to a faster than 
expected increase in the electronics and related degree 
engineers during the early 1980s. Intake on electronics 
engineering degree courses increased by 30% in only 2 
years (1981/1982) and the number of graduates grew by more 
than 80% in the five years from 1979/80. 53 Given the 
international competition for technical labour, the growth 
of this labour pool was a very important factor in high 
tech growth in the region. 5^
Electronics technicians were also supplied yearly to 
the local labour market. Even though intake fell slightly 
in the early 1980's, higher pass rates and higher 
proportions of completers remaining in Scotland produced a 
steady annual supply of technicians.
ynere was a change in the nature of the technical 
labour supply that occurred alongside its growth: there 
was a shift of non-degree techology students into more 
academic courses. There was a sharp drop in enrollment in 
and availability of traditional trade and part-time 
programmes for engineering technicians (eg City and Guilds 
and ONC qualifications), the courses that had primarily 
been for working class youth serving apprenticeships.
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Simultaneously, enrollment in full-time courses for 
diplomas and certificates rose. These courses had more 
academically rigorous entry requirements and curricula 
than the C&G and ONC courses and in a growing number of 
cases required full-time participation for two to three 
years. As a result, opportunities for working class youth 
to gain a qualification while earning a wage within an 
industry apprenticeship dwindled. In addition, because of 
the increased competition for access to industry jobs, 
enrolling in these courses had become more difficult, 
bidding up entry requirements.
The region's long record of producing a rich supply 
of technicians with both a broad and deep knowledge of 
electronics technologies is important to this discussion. 
Technicians have historically had a more important role in 
European manufacturing than in the US. The ratio of 
technicians to engineers in UK manufacturing was 4 to 1 
(197O) while US manufacturers employed less than for 
every engineer (0.62: Starnes and Hacker, 1985). 
Technicians in the UK with an advanced qualification had 
historically straddled the line between professional and 
working class status in engineering industries (Whalley, 
1985). For example, many in Scotland had become managers 
of their own firms (Interview data). US corporations 
located in Scotland adapted to profit from this source of 
flex ibi1ity.
The HD graduates, because of the academic nature of 
their course were a particularly important component of 
the local labour- supply. These graduates - technically 
technicians -- were hired into the industry both as 
technicians and engineers. It was a fast-growing market 
segment. Diplomates of this three-year full-time course 
more than quadrupled from 1977/8 through 1982/3, 
encouraged by the industry's interest and increasing 
competition for the industry's jobs. Though admission 
required at least two Highers (a Scottish school 
examination similar to an English A level) in Maths, 
Physics or English, competition for places had bid up the
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qualifications of successful applicants. Enrollees at one 
well-known college had on average 3.2 Highers and many of 
them had more than that. Increasingly, students capable of 
attending university had enrolled in these courses to get 
access to industry jobs (Interviews with heads of 
electronics engineering departments at Bell College of 
Technology, Paisley College of Technology and Glenrothes 
College of Technology). 55
This trend of increasing numbers of middle class 
students to be represented amongst those with non-degree 
technical qualifications may have been important in 
fostering greater willingness amongst managers to hire 
technicians for engineering work. Eliminating the 
traditional class antagonism between working class skilled 
youth and the middle class professionals, these young 
people could be expected to fit into the engineering team, 
to collaborate easily as paraprofessionals and to move 
Into professional responsibilities. Another reason 
managers may have preferred to recruit technicians for 
more complex work is that they were perceived to be less 
mobile than degree engineers.
"I think it's certainly true... 
that people in recruitment 
recognised that graduates seem to 
think of themselves In a more mobile 
way than college diplomates...The 
diploma holder rather than the 
graduate does get the reputation 
for staying near home...Most of them 
stay in Scotland."
-- Interview with Dr. I an Beat on, 
Head of School of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering, Bell 
College,of Technology
They represented a more stable and satisfiable work force 
than university-trained engineers.
Furthermore, regional concerns about shortages of 
engineers likely influenced managers in their employment 
decisions. Regional surveys had reported that firms had 
experienced recruitment difficulties and shortages of 
qualified degree engineers In microelectronics and
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computer science in 1979 [SC(D&D, 1979] and forecast a 
shortfall through at least 1985 (SEPD, 1980). While 
managers in the survey multinationals had not experienced 
significant shortages, that was to be expected: as 
multinational firms, they were the region's best-paying56 
and most attractive employers and powerful contenders even 
in a competitive labour market. However, all managers said 
that engineers' salaries had been escalating much faster 
than inflation, and at least two executives claimed the 
regional competition for engineers, including poaching, 
and the associated cost increases had gotten out of 
hand. 57 Efforts to curb company dependence on degree 
engineers may have been a response to this perceived 
problem.
.__t^^
The range of technology-related skills available to 
the region's industry was growing fast. To add to the 
expanding supply of labour with formal technical 
qualifications, the schools and colleges had begun 
offering new industry-relevant programmes to teach youth 
technology subjects more quickly. In schools for example 
the new "16 to 18 Action Plan' initiated curricula to 
teach technology subjects in short modules. 58 In this 
program students would choose the modules they wanted 
rather than following the traditional prescribed curricula 
of a two- or three-year course for qualification. The 
motive for the program was to produce very quickly a 
supply of young people ~ literate' in electronics and 
computer technologies (Interview with Scottish Technical 
Education Council adminstrator ) . Industry managers had 
pressed educators to set up this system to produce a 
technical labour supply faster than was possible under the 
traditional training/education system. This regional 
programme would give the industry a yearly pool of workers 
that had a rudimentary understanding of the technologies 
and without formal qualifications. The lack of degree,
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certificate or diploma would mediate pay expectations and 
job quality demands.
Because of the region's high and rising unemployment 
and the relative scarcity of job opportunities, the 
industry had succeeded in increasing the regional supply 
of labour with a range of technical knowledge and in 
shifting the responsibility of that training to the 
individual and the public sector. The electronics 
technology courses in all the region's technical colleges 
were fully if not oversubscribed, in spite of the 
substitution of full-time pre-employment participation for 
part-time/day release study within employment. Educators 
expected the new modular courses to be popular though they 
provided neither grades nor qualifications. The industry 
had even socialised training for production jobs. 
Government Skillcentres and technical colleges had in 
recent years established short (eg 13-week) courses in 
electronics assembly for participants in the Youth 
Training Scheme and for the unemployed. Further, one of 
the semi-conductor multinationals had received SDA and 
other public financial backing to set up a high tech 
training centre for basic production training to fee- 
workers seeking assembler and operator jobs in the 
industry. These facilities provided the basic training 
that employers had traditionally offered in in-house 
training workshops. As indicated in the discussion above, 
qualifications even for lesser skilled production jobs had 
been bid UP and unemployed workers facing severe 
competition for these jobs were willing to enroll in 
programmes that gave them any advantage in their job 
search. 59 The recently established training opportunities 
had succeeded in drawing more and more people into pre- 
employment public and private sector training that offered 
no formal, transferable qualifications. 60 As a result, 
managers had a wider choice of applicants when they 
recruited and greater flexibility in job assignment.
A major source of industry "flexibility' was college 
and university provision of technology short courses for
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introducing and upgrading skills. Academic faculty in all 
the region's higher education institutions and in centres 
like the Microelectronics Educational Development Centre 
(MEDC) at Paisley College of Technology (Supported by 
state funds) were custom-designing two to four-day courses 
to meet specific industry needs. With every firm near a 
regional technology college, firms could send employees on 
short courses whenever a new expertise was needed or a new 
technology introduced.
Open Tech was another major training programme to 
support the high tech industry: this was an extensive 
distance learning programme. 61 By all accounts the Open 
Tech workshop in Scotland had been lavishly stocked with a 
wide array of advanced new technologies geared for the 
needs of the region's high tech employers. The array of 
short courses and the option to "retool* employees through 
Open Tech gave industry management a variety of ways to 
graft emerging skills onto their existing work force 
without hiring additional or highly specialised 
professionals.
6.4.3 The... _V a 1 ue g> f'. Cu.It. ur;a 1.......Cph_es.iye_ness
More fundamental than its geographical containedness, 
Scotland has a deep and enduring national culture and 
pride. Natives are part of lasting family and friendship 
networks and a culture that, while conquered by England, 
remains distinct from the rest of Great Britain. Most 
Scots have a strong attachment to their country and many 
would prefer to settle in Scotland. The industry found in 
Scotland a stable (and hard-working) labour force. 62
Multinational management appreciated the advantages 
this offered. By hiring relatives of their employees, 
managers in effect hired an internal system of pressure 
and discipline that ensured low absenteeism and good work 
habits. They also acquired e willingness of employees to 
cover for one another at work and at home, eg providing 
child care in a region where institutionalised child care 
was non-existent. 63 Managers also discovered a supply of
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Scots working overseas - mostly in the US - who were 
willing to move back: these were the experienced techical 
professionals that the industry so seriously needed.
6. 5 LHE.....R.QL.E__0_F.....GENDER
In an industry with such stark occupational gender 
segregation, gender relations must have influenced the 
labour market shifts in recent years. While the survey 
could not directly address such a sensitive issue, the 
discussion explores how gender issues seem to have 
influenced management efforts to achieve flexibility in 
staffing and work organisation and why employment 
opportunities for women had narrowed even further. Two 
distinct, though inseparable, factors focus the discussion
male dominance of the technical labour supply and 
management expectations in making staffing decisions.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, men 
overwhelmingly dominated the region's education and 
training courses for the industry's technical jobs. ^ In 
interviews, managers blamed the absence of any female 
engineer employees on the maleness of the labour supply. 
A review of the ways educators, parents and peer pressure 
have steered young women away from technology and 
scientific professions is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. 65 The discussion here explores only one aspect 
of women's participation in the technical labour force - 
women retraining as electronics technicians.
Technicians are critical to maintaining plant 
manufacturing activity, and their importance grows with 
the increasing complexity of and investment in new 
technologies. In addition, the job of electronics 
technician seems to offer opportunities for growth and 
development. The actual gap between the work done by the 
technician and the operator has been narrowed both by the 
new technologies and the design of work on some 
shopfloors. The experienced operator's knowledge of the 
product and the fundamentals of the process before it was 
automated is important to the technical work associated
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with that equipment - resetting, maintaining and repairing 
the machine. Retraining operators as technicians to tap 
their product and process experience seemed an expedient 
way to get knowledgeable technical personnel quickly. 
Deciding to get training in electronics theory also seemed 
an obvious way for women semi-skilled production workers 
to improve their earning potential, their job satisfaction 
and, given the threat of automation, their employment 
security. Employers, claiming to invest heavily in their 
workers and to encourage upgrading, would have been 
expected to sponsor the training of their women workers.
6.5.1 Bar;ri. er s tp^.....Upgrading
In fact very few women workers volunteered for 
retraining. Interviews with women workers and technology 
educators indicated that it was extremely rare for the 
industry's women to pursue upgrading opportunities on 
their own. The logistical, financial and psychological 
barriers proved too great.
Management's unwillingness to allow institutionalised 
training during work time (Select Committee of Science and 
Technology, 1984) meant that retraining required evening 
classes; a part-time course took from three to six years. 
That is a long time to study outside of a full time job, 
and was impossible for workers on evening, night or 
twelve-hour shifts.
Transportation was a major barrier. Technical 
colleges were usually on the edge of town or a few towns 
away., and in one-car families, women rarely had drivers' 
licenses and/or access to a cor. 6 Public transport in 
Scotland was infrequent, and getting from a housing estate 
to anywhere except the centre of town was cumbersome, 
time-consuming and simply infeasible for evening classes.
A further disincentive was management staffing, 
policies. All of the survey firms had frequent and 
unpredictable overtime usually due to understaffing. 
Managers expected, if not pressured, workers to do 
frequent overtime.^7 Transferring workers to other shifts
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to cover for absences and demand changes was also a 
feature of employment, in a number of firms. In an industry 
where attitude as well as performance determined wages, 
promotions and job security at times of redundancies, 
workers felt pressured to oblige. Uomen expecting to work 
an hour or two more per day or frequently on weekends 
could not commit themselves to regular attendance at 
evening training classes.
The absence of institutional child care was a 
considerable problem: taking evening classes required 
making additional arrangements with the husbands or 
relatives who invariably had taken care of children during 
the workday. None of the companies provided child care 
or transportation or stipends to cover these expenses for 
workers wanting retraining.
Furthermore, women workers in many of the firms were 
very pleased with their employment situation. They were 
delighted to be employed in a region of high unemployment 
and appreciated that they worked for some of the highest 
paying employers in the region. Most of the workers 
interviewed were satisfied with their employers. Many had 
extremely good benefits for the manufacturing industry and 
were well-paid for women workers in the region. In fact 
the average hourly pay for the industry's semi-skilled 
production operators, light assemblers and senior 
assemblers (assembling complex units) far exceeded the 
average hourly pay of women manual workers in footwear, 
clothing, textiles and hotels and catering both in 
Scotland and in Britain, as shown in Table 6.8. Uhile 
approximately 9O% of women production workers in clothing 
had gross weekly earnings of less than £1OO (including 
supplementals; N ew...E.arn.i.ngs.__.Surve  y, 1983), most of the 
Scottish industry's operators and senior assemblers earned 
ori average just over £100 (£101 and £106, respectively) 
before adding overtime, productivity bonuses and shift 
premia (calculated from weighted plant averages; SDA, 
1983). Their pay was better than they could have earned in 
most other industries.
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Gaining a non-advanced technical qualification would 
have enhanced their basic earnings by only 15 to 23% 
(depending on their occupational category; calculated from 
confidential survey of eastern Scotland's high tech 
multinational corporations, 1983). Table 6.9 suggests the 
differential may actually have been much larger - anywhere 
from 38 to almost 50% and widening yearly. However, these 
calculations are based on average pay without any 
overtime. 68 Lucrative overtime (double pay on weekends) 
and shift alllowances as production workers further erode 
that differential. Uhile it is highly likely that women 
workers did not know the true extent of the differential, 
it was very clear from interviews that they did not 
consider the higher earnings of upgraded jobs sufficient 
reward for the years of difficulty that retraining would 
impose. 6<*
In addition women wanting to upgrade their skills had 
to be able to finance themselves. Working class women tend 
to spend their earnings on child- and household-related 
expenses (Whitehead, 1981), not on themselves. Moreover, 
the high and rising unemployment had made many of the 
industry's women workers major if not sole breadwinners 
for their families. Investing in their future was not 
feasible for women in financially constrained 
households. 7Cl
The considerable fears of going back to school were 
also a major barrier. Women workers who had considered 
retraining (or who had been encouraged by union shop 
stewards) expressed doubts they could manage academic 
study. Technician courses required examinations in higher 
maths and technology subjects, a formidable venture for 
school-leavers, particularly older workers.
Furthermore, the industry's unprecedented growth 
during the early 1980s concealed most of the signals that 
might have warned women that their jobs were in jeopardy. 
Most had little knowledge of industry-wide developments 
that would have indicated that the long-run security of 
their jobs was threatened. While a few of the firms had
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TABLE 6.8. WQM.E.N. !_S .... WAGES ... .. I.N......ELECIRON.I C.S AND 
N STRI S EM P 'LO YI N "
- Britain and Scotland
(£ Sterling)
Scotland's Electronics Industry
Semi-skilled production 
operators
Light Assemblers 
Senior Assemblers
2.59
2.53
2.72
Source: SDA (1983)
Weighted by plant employment
Excludes overtime and premia
Women manual workers in 
footwear, clothing
Scotland 2.01 
Britain 1.98
Women manual workers in 
textiles
Scotland 2.11 
Britain 2.00
Women manual workers in 
hotels and catering
Scotland 1.84 
Britain 1.88
Women non-manual in
insurance, business services 
and finance
Scotland 2.68 
Britain 3.10
SOURCE: New.... E a r; n. i n g.s.. Survey (April, 
1983') Tables 120 and 122.
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TABLE 6.9. PAY.......IN.....THE......RE.G.ION.'...S......ELECTRON.ICS_ FIRMS.
Average Wages and Salaries* 
(£ Sterling)
12*3 12.84
Electronics Engineers 8888 9436
Sr. Electronics Engineer 11258 11480
Electronics Technician 7599 8280
Semi-skilled Production
Operator 5252* 5624*
Senior Assembler 5516* 5962*
* Calculated from hourly wage, based on 39-hour week, 
including no overtime.
** While the survey sample is claimed to represent the 
region's entire electronics industry, the majority of 
included firms (70%, 1983; approximately 85%, 1984) are 
the high tech electronics multinationals that are the 
focus of this study.
SOURCE: Calculated from SDA An n u a _1_ S u r y e y
(1983, 1984).
made production workers redundant due to restructuring or 
market slump during the study period, the industry's 
overall expansion in the region was generating new job 
growth. That combined with guaranteed employment in many 
of the firms implied a secure employment future for the 
industry's workers. Amongst the women interviewed, only 
those in companies facing severe market difficulties 
recognised the vulnerability of women's jobs and the 
importance of retraining. This view was riot widespread.
Rather than waiting for volunteers, managers could 
have actively recruited their women workers to retrain as 
technicians. Most managers had, after all, expressed a 
serious commitment to continuing training for their work 
force. In addition they fully anticipated the impact of 
automation on operators' jobs arid the increasing 
importance of technical skills throughout production. In
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the survey managers were asked If they had upgraded their- 
women employees to qualify for emerging jobs. The 
incidence was in fact extremely rare. Only employers 
indicated that they had in recent years 
retrained semi-skilled workers as technicians. That 
represented a of only a handful of employees. 7:L
This was indeed surprising. There seemed to be clear- 
economies to retraining these workers - reduced hiring and 
redundancy costs and economies on workers' experience and 
product knowledge in information-intensive production. 
There were, however, many reasons why this was not a 
popular method to gain technical skills.
Evening classes for technician retraining usually 
were part of a course for a lower-level qualification, 
such as a Certificate. Employers had already decided, 
however, either to hire technicians with a more advanced 
qualification or to recruit unskilled people with no 
qualification and train them on the job. From the 
managers' viewpoint, the lower-level qualification had 
losr most of its usefulness in advanced manufacturing 
facilities. Older women with a non-advanced qualification 
would be seen as overqualifled for the lesser demanding 
technician tasks, and not trained well enough for the more 
complex tasks.
Further, a woman worker studying part-time would need 
two to three years for a lesser qualification and up to
six for an advanced one. ^ Managers were having 
difficulty forecasting staff needs two to three years 
ahead. The long lead time for this kind of retraining 
proved problematic because it Implied a job guarantee -far 
in advance of an Identified need.
More fundamentally, technical jobs were assumed to be 
male. Managers seemed to consider men more suitable for 
that work. Many of these executives and their managerial 
staffs had never worked with women technicians and 
engineers. They consistently and unconsciously referred to 
their technical personnel as guys and semi-skilled 
production workers as girls. Maintaining the maleness of
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technical jobs also ottered a degree of comrort in an 
industry strained by high demand and many dimensions of 
uncertainty. Maleness had nourished the communications and 
sociability so important to company productivity. hen 
could more readily join in the collaborative technical 
problem-solving, professional chitchat, and after work 
softball games and tnip-, to the pub. Men understood the 
challenge and the necessity to stay late when a production 
run had to be finished or a problem solved. Furthermore, 
with almost every engineer a manager, men were perceived 
to be better at managing other men than women. The 
uncertainty and potential problems from introducing women 
as Part of the team in this often highly stressful 
situation made managers wary.
Management disbelief that women production workers 
were appropriate for technical work was another barrier. 
While no one explained precisely why they had not upgraded 
operators, the conversations implied that women operators 
were not intellectually capable of technology-related 
tasks. Perhaps it was because many were hired before 
recruitment standards required academic achievement. Uith 
experience of women workers only as production or clerical 
staff, managers had little experience to contradict this 
class- and gender-biased view. They attribute the 
experience they have nad with women as subordinates, eg 
assemblers, to all women in the labour market. °» 7 '-
These perceptions, whatever the cause, were very 
important in trie recruitment and training alternatives the 
rirrn ^dopteci. While managers suggested that the- lengtn or 
time it took to retrain operators was considered a 
disincentive, they frequently hired young, unskilled 
school-leavers and they were willing to train them as 
technicians. This represented a training commitment of at 
least two to four years. For instance, a 17-yefar-old 
unquslified young man was hired to operate a semi- 
conductor firm's most; sophisticated, most expensive piece 
of new equipment (a SI million laser trim machine). 
Training inducted first a three- to rour-week intensive
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course at the equipment vendor plant in the US, then two 
to three years on-the-job training, supplemented by day 
release study at a local technical college. An industry 
labour market analysis confirmed the impression that this 
was a common practice. Approximately one-quarter of the 
total regional stock of electronics technicians in the 
wider electronics industry were trainees (1979-80), a high 
ratio compared to other industries (MSC for Scotland, 
1980). Prime multinational employers and small firms 
alike did this where there was an insufficient supply of 
very local technicians and the alternative was the 
potentially high price of hiring qualified personnel on 
the "national' (Scotland-wide) labour market.^ The new 
employees were all hired because managers had been 
impressed by their social skills and ability to fit in. 
They also were viewed as good risks as stable employees; 
in these positions management wanted people who would soon 
be supporting mortgages, etc., thus committed to their job 
and employer. They were also all young men. 76
The study's multinational firms had, in fact, a 
higher share of women electronics technicians 
(approximately 9%) than was found in the UK electronics 
industry (4.4%; EITB, 1984). For example, one large 
regional employer, apparently concerned about women's 
position in the industry, had included 8 women in their 
apprenticeship programme of 21(1984). This firm had a 
progressive policy; however, this isolated attempt to 
change the gender balance was clearly overwhelmed by 
industry-wide practices and the barriers of ease, 
convention and preference. More commonly, managers 
consistently allocated their discretionary resources for 
training and upgrading technology-related work to male, 
not female, employees.
According to male managers, the absence of women from 
technical occupations was because there were no trained 
women to be hired from the external labour market. It is a 
supply problem: that relieves management of 
responsibility.
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The reality is, of course, much more complex. Even 
where there are qualified women available, the exclusion 
mechanisms in hiring and in the workplace, eg denial of 
further training and promotion opportunities, are very 
powerful, and as has been shown in the US, eclipse the 
supply-side problems (National Science Foundation, 1986). 
Managers still expected women to leave the labour market 
for marriage and/or child-bearing, jeopardising the 
company's return on any investment in training. This was a 
great concern amongst this industry's employers because 
the value of the training depreciated very quickly with 
the fast pace of technological change. That women 
technical professionals in electronics had demonstrated 
more commitment to the labour market and the firm than 
this had not yet informed management's expjsctations o^ 
women workers.
"Work is still seen...as a stop-gap 
before marriage and child-bearing, and the 
interruption that the latter brings is 
clearly a disadvantage in anybody's 
career. Many employers would prefer 
not to promote a woman for that reason, 
and do not realise that the woman 
engineer often gives her employer 
more years of service before the 
break than the man who will readily 
change his employment for his own 
betterment after two to three years",
according to Dr. Elizabeth Laverick, an electronics 
engineer and a leader in electronics education (National 
Electronics Review, 1983). Management's expectations, 
expressed below by a JobCentre manager responsible for 
channeling candidates to the region's industry, still 
guide employment and training policy.
"When a man [is hired], usually 
family troubles don't bother his 
work. But if a woman [is hired], 
she gets pregnant and she leaves. 
But if you've got a man arid he's 
happy and you're happy, he can 
be there for a long time."
In this case, as in the question of competence, the 
qualities they attributed to women and the resulting
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policies that excluded them from good employment 
opportunities were ones that conveniently maintained the 
status quo and male comfort. 7®
These expectations were widely shared. The industry's 
female work force had internalised and accepted that men 
were more suitable for technical jobs. Trade union shop 
stewards who had tried to persuade production workers to 
take upgrading training consistently met disinterest and 
resistance. A few women workers commented in interviews 
that they thought semi-skilled women who were curious 
about the technologies were stepping out of line. At the 
same time they accepted without resentment that men 
assigned to production would eventually be promoted to 
more technical work. In closeknit communities like those 
in which most of these companies are located, risking 
criticism from friends must have inhibited women from 
wanting to try untraditional jobs.
Further, there was widespread community concern about 
the financial and personal/household problems resulting 
from high and rising male unemployment. Women workers 
wanted to see their sons, husbands, brothers, etc. getting 
jobs in the industry. None of the women interviewed 
expressed concern or resentment that men were given 
training opportunities and access to the technical jobs. 79
6.5.3. S_taJ;.e.._Lj3.b_pu^
The state actively intervened to support the creation 
of a labour force suitable to the industry's needs. The 
SDA considered the industry and particularly foreign 
multinationals as the region's best potential source of 
employment growth, so set out with a new mix of policies 
in 1979 to attract foreign investors. Increasing the 
supply of technical labour was a priority (BAH, 1979). 
The region's high tech training provision was viewed as a 
major attraction in marketing Scotland to international 
investors.
"In particular the scope for long-term 
profitability with all the educational 
and inf rastructural advantages that
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Scotland offers, especially for industries 
in high technology, are overridingly strong 
selling points which must be marketed..."
(Committee on Scottish Affairs, 
1980)
The activities of the SDA, the New Towns and the 
educational authorities, acting to promote a stable, 
flexible labour force, in no way challenged the existing 
gender exclusion of the industry's male jobs. In fact, 
state intervention was explicitly directed to creating 
more jobs for men.
The SDA, the Scottish Technical Educational Council 
(SCOTEC), the MSC for Scotland and the individual colleges 
and universities had all contributed to expand the 
vibrant education and training infrastructure tailored to 
high tech industry needs. The system expanded the numbers 
of people getting technical education and training of all 
sorts - both as primary professional and vocational 
education, as retraining and as upgrading. Grants from the 
Central Government and financial incentives and pressures 
channelled resources into developing curricula and new 
linkages with industry with one aim, "namely the 
effectiveness in meeting the needs of industry and 
commerce" (NEDC, 1982; also ITEMS, 1984).
Uhile the SDA had widely publicised the region's 
efforts to turn educational institutions into "resource 
centres for industry" (House of Lords, 1984), the colleges 
in particular had been allocated little if any additional 
funding for planning or implementing new, speculative 
courses (Williams, 1984) or ventures. 80 In fact, financial 
freezes or cutbacks were in many cases the stimulus for 
new industry-specific ventures. Faculty at many of the 
region's colleges in particular had been forced to acquire 
external, private sector funding to sustain their own 
research activities. University and college faculty 
created revenue-generating projects - short courses and 
teaching companies to bid for research and development 
contracts81 - while the numbers of student grants were 
reduced, publicly-funded courses were cancelled and
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resources for expanded workloads were constrained if not 
cut. Efforts to get industry attention seemed to have been 
relatively successful because the commercial and informal 
links between technical education and industry in Scotland
(via frequent communications and collaboration and 
subcontracting) had fluorished, distinguishing it from 
high tech industry in England and Wales as described in 
Oakey (1981) and Oakey et al., (1984).
The New Town Labour Supply
The region's New Towns, formerly central in UK 
housing policy, had become major instruments of industrial 
policy: the major attraction of these "industrial growth 
points" (SEPD, 1981) was their contained and stable labour 
forces. Acute housing shortages in the major cities 
dissuaded workers lucky enough to be rehoused in New Towns 
from considering moving again. This provided a captive 
labour supply for lesser-skilled jobs. Also, New Towns 
gave newly locating firms access to affordable housing in 
physically pleasant communities which satisfied the 
quality of life standards of their professional employees. 
The housing authorities placed all employees of a town's 
new high tech firms at the top of the placement list, 
easing the way for inward investment. These employees 
usually brought family that added to the town's captive 
labour reserves. This was quite a relief from the 
increasingly crowded, polluted, high cost and high 
turnover situation in Silicon Valley. 8^ New Towns also 
offered important financial and infrastructure support 
discussed in the previous chapter.
With these inducements, the Scottish New Towns had 
been quite successful in attracting high tech 
multinational investment. Nine of the twelve new computer 
and semi-conductor firms that had located in Scotland 
since 1980 set up in New Towns and all of the four 
multinational manufacturers planning facilities in 
Scotland announced that they would locate in New Towns. 83 
One New Town, Livingston, had been particularly
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successful: it attracted one firm per month in 1983 - 
creating 1000 jobs, yet its unemployment rate was 18% (Van 
de Vliet, 1984) .
Regional efforts to generate additional employment in 
the region were not neutral. Concern that the electronics 
industry created predominantly female jobs had surfaced as 
early as 1974 (Firn, 1974, 1975A) . Official worry recurred, 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s as high tech activity 
had expanded yet had provided few jobs for the region's 
unemployed men, either unskilled youth or those made 
redundant from the continuing decline of the region's 
traditional industries. Internal reassessment of 
development strategy led the SDA to prioritise investment 
initiatives creating "real jobs* - that is, jobs for men 
(Interviews with public sector officials and regional 
industry experts) . The SDA could communicate the urgency 
of this priority to firms directly: this was the agency 
that negotiated with potential investors over the actual 
financial assistance they would receive for direct 
investment in the region. This pressure must have 
influenced companies' recruitment of operators and 
engineering aids.
dej^rJ:!.!?^^
At the same time the education system continued to
train an almost all-male technical labour supply. There 
was no attempt to make the industry's more interesting 
technical jobs accessible to women. This was not a 
priority. Meeting industry's fast-changing needs quickly 
was. Training in a hurry, under financial and resource 
constraints, and responding under pressure to meet 
industry's labour expectations left no time or resources 
for affirmative action programmes. College educators 
estimated that women's participation in the region's non- 
degree engineering and technology courses - only 2% in 
1979/80 (EOC, 1982) had not improved in recent years. They 
suggested in fact that it had worsened. Only 4 women 
received a 1981 electrical and electronic engineering
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degree out of 1046 awards in UK colleges; in the 
university system only 1.8% of almost 19,000 electronics 
engineering degrees were awarded to women (1980; CNAA 
statistics department; Department of Education and Science 
statistics department). 84" More than half of the eighteen 
advanced information technology courses (ie high 
technology specialisms such as microprocessor conversion 
courses) at universities throughout the UK had three or
fewer women students in 1983/4. (Gordon and Pearson, 1984).
In addition to degree programmes, the state provided
a wide range of publicly-funded programmes to subsidise if 
not supplant industry investment in training. For example, 
the UK Department of Industry financed the entire first 
year's training budget for firms locating in designated 
Development Areas, many of which were in Scotland, and 
the EEC Social Fund gave firms up to £7000 for each 
employee they trained to use new technologies. Firms had 
complete discretion over training provision. Without 
monitoring or any equal opportunity goal, the courses 
seldom included women.
Also the MSC's TOPS programme, which had historically 
provided retraining opportunities for adults, particularly 
adult women, was drastically reduced and its remit altered 
in the early 1980s (Finn, 1984; Goldstein, 1984). TOPS- 
funded programmes for more advanced skills in electronics 
and competition for the smaller number of placements 
increased. Further, training providers, fearful of losing 
erratic and dwindling MSC funds, focused selection of 
applicants on their success potential (ie the likelihood 
that could easily cope with a demanding, intensive course 
and get a job) rather than need, work history or 
affirmative action goals. This in effect excluded from 
publicly-funded training women wanting to make a job 
change: as unconventional students without an electronics 
background they were more likely to have academic problems 
and less likely to seem suitable candidates to industry. 
The administrator of a special TOPS-funded electronics 
engineering technician course reported that he did not
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remember any women students in four years of running the
QfL
course.°°
Overworked university and college faculty admitted 
that they had no time to plan or implement programmes to 
recruit young women to their courses. No resources or 
faculty time had been allocated to assist women students 
in whatever difficulties they might have faced in 
competitive, predominantly male courses.
The absence of affirmative action policies or 
resources and the shift of state support away from adult 
unemployed and low-wage populations to highly employable 
groups guaranteed the continuance of male domination of 
the region's technical education, training and employment.
6.6 SUMMARY
The findings reported in this chapter have
demonstrated a few simple yet important developments. The 
economic world that produced the economic rationale for 
divided labour markets - a world satisfied by mass 
produced, standardised products - had radically changed. 
Corporations with rigid structures and rules could not 
find ways to deal with the character of crisis in the 
early 1980s. Corporate management had to learn to respond 
swiftly and creatively to fast-changing technologies and 
sharp, sudden competitive market shifts. Information, 
having become a costly and competitively important 
intangible input, had to be captured and fully exploited 
within the company. That potential depended on the 
stability of the entire work force and its collective 
knowledge and expertise. Employment stability and 
flexibility in deploying workers produced for managers the 
cost-minimising opportunities in the competitive world of 
the 1980s. The rigidly segmented employment of the DLM 
model cannot deliver well-coordinated, highly integrated 
production, fast product turnaround and highly customised 
product because these required close communications and 
responsiveness amongst the stages of production and 
distribution and the involved workers. They also demand
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consistent mechanisms of control throughout the - 
corporation. The production technologies and the new 
relationship to the market demanded rapid response 
throughout the organisation. The deep hierarchical 
structure, the differences in control mechanisms amongst 
job segments and the inherently^conflictual relationships 
of workers treated very differently in DLMS could not 
produce the fast adjustments and throughput economies 
needed to compete in these markets.
Secondly, the industry's development in Scotland 
during this period confirms the importance of global 
labour market differences in shaping multinational 
corporate activity overseas. The supply conditions of the 
local labour market shaped the strategies adopted to 
replace the hierarchies and rules of corporation and work 
structure. The conventional business view that 
technologies and employment strategies are determined by 
corporate management prior to and without consideration of 
local factors (Interview with Professor Rosenbloom of 
Harvard Busines School, 1983) did not (if it ever had in 
the past) accurately reflect reality. To ignore the 
influence of individual labour markets around the globe on 
firm and corporate structure and on the structure of work 
and quality of jobs denies the sources of flexibility and 
economic advantage that drive the development of the 
modern multinational corporation.
Thirdly, the rapid growth and change in the regional 
high tech industry clearly displayed the dynamic 
interrelationship of the demand and supply sides of labour 
market operations. Labour market analyses which locate 
problems solely on the supply or demand side are myopic 
and simplistic (Bruegel, 1984; Humphries and Rubery, 
1986). The specific conditions of the surplus labour 
supply shaped management employment strategies which 
themselves influenced how people in the labour market 
viewed their employment options.
Within this dynamic, gender proved to be an important 
factor. Strategies were honed explicitly or unconsciously
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to favor the employment of men over women in order to 
promote at least the short-term interests of capital. 
These efforts were reinforced by conditions that were 
prior to or independent of the sphere of capitalist 
production - market and non-market structural barriers and 
socialised behavior and expectations. Uithout prime 
responsibility for children, women workers might have 
pursued retraining opportunities and, by changing the 
gender balance in the technical labour supply, transformed 
the technician occupation (or at least exposed the sexism 
of recruitment). Fears of mounting social problems from 
the rising male unemployment compelled public officials to 
intervene to create jobs for men. Uithout this capital 
might not have responded at least so quickly to the male 
labour surpluses. Gender-related expectations and gender 
politics shaped the ways corporations found to maximise 
operational flexibility and the speed and ease with which 
corporations adjusted to change.
This chapter has attempted to show that occupational 
segregation by gender (and other factors) cannot be 
considered static or permanent. Further, demand-side 
analysis cannot adequately explain either the competitive 
strategies or the changing international profile of 
multinational corporations. Gender, and more generally, 
global labour supply conditions frame the capabilities and 
the outcomes of capital's response to crisis.
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CHAPTER 7 : STR_y.CjyRAL.._...FLI.XI.BILI.I.Y =
J^Q.^^
GLOBAL LABOUR SUPPLY DISTINCTIONS
7. 1 _ NJ.R.Q DU CI ION.
This chapter reviews the major findings of the 
research on industrial change in high tech multinationals 
in Scotland. To interpret the importance of the findings, 
the research and the industry must be viewed in context. A 
section of the chapter is devoted to providing this 
perspective by outlining the limitations of the research 
and the analysis. The chapter closes with an assessment of 
the challenges this research poses for existing and 
evolving theory on the organisation of the corporation and 
modern industry. The discussion focuses on the "missing 
middle' and post-industrialism arguments as particularly 
important and widely supported views.
7.2. RE VIE W __0_F _ ,.THE_....R.ES.EARCH.
This study has revealed a new, more complex pattern 
of multinatiorialisation in US firms than that usually 
presented in the literature on the product life cycle or 
the global division of labour. The fast-pace and quality 
emphasis of the industry's product markets and the 
unpredictability of the international economy forced a 
reconsideration of corporate strategies in the US 
microelectronics industry and a reshaping of the 
corporation. The conventional model of a multinational 
corporation proves inadequate for producing successfully 
for the markets of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In particular, a structure that disperses rigid mass 
production facilities around the globe while confining all 
R&D and corporate control to the home base could not 
supply technologically-advanced products to a 
sophisticated, diverse and global market. To supply 
markets with customised information-processing products at 
competitive prices, US firms were forced to concentrate 
resources on investing in expensive physical capital and
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information resources and then to use them to develop new 
*>ays of reducing unit costs.
US firms in these markets had to aim simultaneously 
for continuing new product introduction and economies in 
the use of the capital and information necessary for 
continual innovation. To achieve these economies of 
throughput, managers turned to investing in the most 
advanced and capable production equipment and to depending 
on the knowledge, experience and commitment of technical 
employees, the idea-people, the problem-solvers in the 
organisation of production and product design. To confine 
these actiivities to the home economy and far away from 
important markets, as had conventionally been the case, 
would have prevented firms from selling well in those 
overseas markets. Electronics, almost from the beginning, 
has been a truly international market place; overseas 
customers learned of new technologies at the same time as 
everyone else C through trade fairs, journals, etc.). By 
the early 1980s,these customers realised that technical 
support and re-supply options within a few hours' travel 
time were critical in their use of high tech products. And 
the producers realised that standardised products would no 
longer work in sophisticated applications markets. Even 
leading firms which had historically profited from the 
mass production of standardised products were compelled by 
the market to become "service' companies - educating, 
designing for and serving the specific needs of the 
customer. This kind of approach was essential to capturing 
market share in Europe, considered by major US and 
Japanese multinationals as an important untapped market.
Shifting more activity to prime markets also offered 
firms greater cost and price stability in a regime of 
floating and rather unpredictable exchange rates. In 
particular, the fairly predictable currency relativities 
in the European community meant firms which had located 
high value added activities inside the EEC had some 
measure of price protection. This potentially provides an
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advantage over competitors supplying the EEC through 
exports.
This study confirmed that new technologies and 
responsibilities for product and process had been devolved 
to the subsidiary in Scotland to serve the important 
European market. Most firms had invested in very advanced 
if not state-of-the-art technologies, had established more 
highly integrated facilities to replace part-process 
plants and had regional if not world responsibility for 
the corporation's newest and most advanced products. All 
the survey's firms were involved in process development. 
In many cases this involved nothing more than assessing 
incremental changes and reporting the results for 
corporate-wide use. However, a number of firms were 
testing new systems and developing entirely new software 
products for internal needs. A number of subsidiaries had 
product development responsibilities; professionals at 
others were lobbying to acquire that responsibility.
An increasing reliance on technical labour 
accompanied the shift to more advanced, integrated and 
flexible technologies: technological knowledge and 
experience and a stable work force were critical to 
achieving rapid payback from investments in new equipment. 
Gaining new economies in the use of capital equipment and 
information inputs (eg rapid set-ups for new product 
batches, reducing wastage of supply inputs) were made 
possible by technically-qualified people, designing 
products and guiding the processing to achieve lower 
defect rates. Increasing investment in expensive capital 
with a great deal of flexibility compelled managers to 
reassess their strategies of employment and work 
organisation.
Because the severe competition in the industry put 
pressure on individual firms to apply technical 
information as rapidly as possible, there was a close 
association of information and experience with 
responsibility at both the individual and plant levels. 
Technical personnel with an idea for a better product or
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for a cost-saving process improvement frequently were 
encouraged to develop that idea into a viable product or 
operation. Executives at corporate headquarters could not 
assume responsibility for or command long-distance control 
over all projects, particularly in a booming market: to 
get a fast turnaround time, those with the idea were given 
responsibility to pursue it. For example, the technical 
staff in a semi-conductor subsidiary in the survey 
designed and developed testing software that was needed, 
which it later sold to the parent firm: this was an 
unplanned decentralisation of responsibility that resulted 
from the industry's fervour for rapid market response. 
Software professionals in another firm turned the software 
they had developed for an automated warehouse in Scotland 
into a product for the global corporation to sell. New 
product responsibilities were similarly devolved to 
subsidiaries: headquarters awarded new products to the 
facilities demonstrating both the capital and labour 
capabilities (in terms of productivity and cost 
performance). The subsidiaries of the study's 
multinationals were particularly successful in winning 
new, sophisticated product investment.
The market forced this decentralisation to the 
subsidiary in Scotland. Customers expected the subsidiary 
to have both the expertise and authority to take decisions 
and implement them. The field survey revealed many 
examples of technical professionals in one firm consulting 
with the supplier firm both to get technical asssistance 
on product usage and to get products designed/redesigned 
to their particular needs. With some firms locating 
product design etc. in Scotland, there was competitive 
pressure on others to provide it. A long, international 
sign-off procedure to get this technology-related 
information would have sent customers to a competitor. 
Devolving value-added activities to the subsidiary in 
Scotland created better relationships with the market and 
generated new product ideas, faster turnaround times,
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sales and productivity improvements that could be applied 
throughout the firm and faster turnaround times.
The market was not the sole determinant of corporate 
structure. After all, advanced development and 
manufacturing plants could have been located anywhere 
inside the EEC, not just Scotland, to serve the European 
market. Decisions to devolve product and production 
technologies to Scotland resulted from the dynamic between 
the industry and the local labour market. The regional 
labour supply offered clear advantages over many other 
locations for firms to succeed in their simultaneous 
objectives of improving product and minimising unit costs. 
In addition to the supply of technical labour from the 
region's institutions, the interesting jobs associated 
with greater technological responsibilities attracted 
technical personnel from outside - both young and 
experienced. The new structure of the industry in Scotland 
shaped a labour market segment that made industry 
recruitment of highly skilled and experienced people 
easier. This in turn made investment in new technologies 
more economical.
The rigid, hierarchical employment structure 
associated with branch plants was not consistent with the 
objectives of decentralising responsibilities. For the 
firm to reap the benefits of market-responsive production 
capabilities, work had to be structured to make 
information feedback mechanisms effective and to 
encourange rapid applications of information. The emphasis 
on deskilling and the dependence on relatively unskilled 
labour associated with branch plant production was no 
longer appropriate. For example, while the new 
technologies had capabilities to deskill some of the work 
of a computer field service technician, 2 to deskill the 
job or the worker WOuld have jeopardised a key link 
between the market, the product development staff and the 
testing division. To understand the customer's technical 
concerns and to be able to report to professionals in 
other departments with sufficient sophistication, the
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field service technician needs solid technological 
training. Product repair often meant going beyond making 
the product work to making it work for a particular, 
complex application. To do this, a technician had to be 
able to talk to and sometimes do part of the job of 
various engineers. An example, cited earlier, demonstrates 
the potential benefits from effective communication with 
the customer and within the supplier firm. In the course 
of repairing equipment for a major customer, technical 
personnel at one of the survey computer firms identified 
the customer's need for a new product; the R&D department 
then designed it and the firm manufactured it in-house.
A change In which workers were appropriate for the 
industry's jobs was associated with and, more importantly, 
seemed instrumental in, the changing structure of work. 
Recruitment and employment decisions were framed by local 
labour markets conditions. The availability of a highly 
trained technical labour supply and a growing pool of male 
youth in Scotland proved to be particularly important to 
the economic development of and the definition of work in 
the industry.
Uhlle a departure from the industry's past, 
management's willingness to allow a less rigid and 
segmented work structure overseas is not all that 
surprising. US high tech executives, many of whom were 
once entrepreneurs had always believed that easy 
communications and autonomy were essential working 
conditions for their technical employees. This was the 
only way to ensure that ideas would become products rather 
than die within a bureaucracy of memos and decision- 
making. The same fluidity would be necessary inside a 
subsidiary with technology-intensive responsibilities.
Devolving sophisticated technological 
responsibilities also demanded effective inter-firm 
collaboration: the transnational structure of the 
corporation had to change to permit lateral communications 
amongst plants and to maintain the industry's 
"technological dynamism' at the level of the corporation.
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Projects shared across countries were not unusual. 
Communications arid collaboration amongst personnel with 
the relevant expertise in a number of major facilities 
across the globe were frequent. Technical personnel in the 
subsidiary (usually engineers) were given management 
responsibility over particular projects or part-projects: 
these professionals working in Scotland were just as 
likely as someone in a home base plant to control a 
corporation-wide project in their field of specialisation.
This kind of communication and collaboration could 
not be handled in corporate meetings of managing directors 
or closely controlled by headquarters executives. That 
would have slowed down the potential return. Many of the 
firms had in recent years flattened the hierarchy within 
the subsidiary in Scotland and within the home base 
companies to facilitate this lateral flow of information. 
They eliminated many middle management positions to remove 
layers of bureaucracy that block easy and rapid 
communications. 5 Devolving technological responsibilities 
to the subsidiary in Scotland, then, to some extent 
required restructuring work to promote faster learning 
within the subsidiary and between the subsidiary and other 
major corporate facilities and to reap the returns on that 
information.
7. 3 LI Nil A IIP NS.. ...OF.... T HE......STUD Y
The interpretation of these findings is, as outlined 
in the introduction, limited by the methodology of the 
research. Ulhile cross-checking and corroboration was 
attempted, the research rests primarily on interviews with 
managers. An interview does not allow the time or the 
rigour to distinguish clearly managers' hopes from their 
actual policies or differences across companies in 
policies that hide beneath similar jargon. The indicators 
or interpretation of findings from this kind of research 
cannot provide precision, absolute consistency or complete 
reliability. The attempt has been to offer a snapshot that 
profiles the developments in a new and fast-changing
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industry that inspite of a very public "persona' have 
largely remained hidden from view.
That snapshot, though, captures only one point in 
time. A change in a corporate directive or a shift in the 
market would likely have altered the economics of existing 
policies and might have led to a change in the balance of 
centralisation/decentralisation between corporate home 
base and the Scottish subsidiary. The study period was one 
of market growth, resulting in unprecedented capital 
investment and optimism. The massive market downturn that 
followed in 1985/86 surely affected the Scottish plants. 
The data reported here, however, cannot help predict or 
interpret company adjustments to the recession. This, the 
industry's most severe downturn to date, is clearly an 
important one for further study: tracing the Investment 
patterns and allocation of work at the subsidiaries In 
Scotland through the recession would contribute greatly to 
a clearer understanding of just how much economic and 
financial importance corporations assigned to 
opportunities for greater flexibility and employment 
stability in Scotland.
The results of this study reflect the character- of 
the survey firms. They were market-leading corporations 
producing some of the high tech Industry's most advanced 
products. The findings refer to the compelling economic 
and social relations of production arid distribution 
resulting from (for the most part) sophisticated 
inf or mat ion-1 ritenslve products and catering to demanding 
customers. The findings here do not contradict evidence 
that the economics of the electronics Industry's historic 
International division of. labour continues to provide 
Important cost-cutting opportunities based on 
extraordinarily cheap labour. I do not argue (as 
Hirschhorri, 1986, does) that the observed tendencies of a 
decentralised structure of work are generalisable to all 
industry. The recent growth of multinational electronics 
plants just across the USA border in Mexico (part of the 
rnaquiladora programme) arid the further fractionation of
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production amongst myriad subcontractors attest to the 
still irresistable advantages of this relative cost 
difference. That option, however, is a viable one 
primarily for highly standardised (or at least ~component- 
ised') low technology products that can be manufactured by 
relatively low-skilled labour. The results reported here 
emphasise the importance of the nature of the product and 
its end-user markets in establishing an industry's 
economics of production and distribution. So, while 
limited in its implications, this study does suggest that 
the economics and the resulting spatial pressures of 
rapidly-changing information-intensive product sectors are 
different. If the markets succeed in increasing the 
information content and efforts to impose "permanent 
innovation' on other industries, the results reported here 
may have wider application.
Finally, the study is limited by its focus on only 
one region in the world. The data reported here provide no 
insight into developments of these same corporations in 
other parts of the world, particularly the debate about 
corporate decisions to use new, more automated 
technologies to relocate activities from the Far East to 
the home base economy. The only contribution this research 
offers to the subject of export-dominated multinational 
investment is to emphasise the importance of both end-user 
markets and heterogenous local labour markets in framing 
those relocation/reinvestment decisions.
7   4   Q.Q.N.!RIB UTipN Tp.... CURRENT...DEBATES.
7.4.1 ....J.U!?-....^..ls.S:i..G.9......!!!?..i.^!d.Xe:
Prominent contributors to the literature on 
technological arid industry change in high-tech and other 
industries have found an increasingly bifurcated labour 
force. Employment growth and labour demand are 
concentrated in very highly skilled often professional 
jobs, and in low level jobs, frequently deskilled by the 
adoption of new technologies (Bluestone and Harrison, 
1984; Rumberger and Levin, 1984; Morgan and Sayer, 1983).
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Middle level jobs are eliminated. This "missing middle" 
(Bluestone and Harrison, 1984) represents an unbalanced 
distribution in the benefits of economic change and 
growth.
The shape of growth in the industry in Scotland was 
much more evenly distributed. Management responsiveness to 
the specific conditions of the Scottish labour market led 
to a restructuring of work and as a result a different 
pattern of employment and recruitment. The quality of the 
regional education system and the availability of young 
people with a record of academic achievement assured 
management of an intelligent labour force that would be 
receptive to training. Managers were willing to risk 
recruiting unskilled but well-educated youths and giving 
them chances to assume more and more responsibilities, 
including working toward a skilled job without prior 
training. Furthermore, the vocational system, undergoing 
significant change at the time of the survey, was 
expanding its offerings to teach the basics in electronics 
technology in schools: these efforts were to increase 
quickly the supply of technology-literate young people to 
the industry. This labour supply, lacking the established 
formal qualifications, would presumably be recruited at 
lower pay. Inspite of entry level jobs and pay, these 
workers would have at least been introduced to the 
technology's problems, preparing them to learn more 
complex tasks.
The higher education system, including technology 
colleges, provided courses leading to a range of industry- 
specific qualifications. All these supply developments 
meant managers could distribute some of the tasks formerly 
grouped as the job for a highly qualified technician 
amongst lesser qualified workers. Employers "hired lower 
on the skill chain" (Interview with director of Institute 
for Manpower Studies) because it freed up qualified 
technicians to do more demanding, engineering work and, as 
a result, releasing specialised engineers for more complex 
tasks. It also minimised the firm's reliance on the
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external labour market, cushioning it from the regional, 
national and international competition over and salary 
acceleration of degree engineers. In both cases the firm 
minimised its total wage bill while expanding the amount 
and sophistication of the workload per worker. Public 
sector support of the industry, in particular, industry- 
specific training arid education, bolstered this 
relationship with the local labour market. The strategy to 
hire lesser skilled people at all levels and train them 
inside the firm meant that -- at the firm and industry 
levels - there was no gaping hole in the occupational 
distribution and mediated the employment increase at the 
highest, most specialised levels.
7.4.2 T hi e; Cui rr; ent Deb»ate p n P g s t-In dust r i a1i s m
The research findings of this study expose some of 
the shortcomings of a current debate in academic circles 
in the US about the changing shape of industry and 
employment. Led by Hirschhorn (1984) and Piore and Sabel 
(1984), the Post-Industrialists argue that there is now a 
new industrial economic regime in which all manufacturing 
is or will be organised to provide production flexibility 
and continuing innovation. This requires an enhanced 
contribution by all production workers in terms of skill, 
contextual knowledge and responsibility. Hirschhorn argues 
that the technology - the particular nature of complex 
electronics control mechanisms - commands this labour 
process restructuring. Piore and Sabel contend that the 
markets require it: global markets will riot support mass 
production of a standard product.
Competitive success demands variable product (both 
over markets and time periods) which depend on both a 
craft-like labour process organised around small batch 
production and an industrial infrastructure that links and 
supports company specialisation. Hirschhorn, Piore and 
Sabel insist that firms and industries should, even must, 
adopt this profile of a new industrial order to remain 
competitive. However, their mistake was in equating a
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small batch process with a craft-labour process. The new 
technologies allow new, conceptions of work and the labour 
process to produce small lots of variable product.
Furthermore, both arguments fail to address the 
factors that will shape if. and how the restructuring of 
work and employment will take place. Their propositions 
suppose that a demand-side decision, a memo from corporate 
headquarters, will dictate the change. Firms will then 
invest in the appropriate recruitment and/or 
training/retraining. Uith their single minded belief in 
one necessary outcome, they failed to realise that the 
changing competitive environment can create a range of 
outcomes in the organisation of work. In particular, they 
are blind to the dynamic relationship between the labour 
supply and the structure of the firm and work. The social 
relations of production, not the technology alone, frame 
the structure of employment and the firm's response to 
competitive pressures. Ignoring these contingent factors 
left them open for the criticism of Kelley (1987), 
Shaiken, Kuhn and Herzenberg (1986) and others that 
supply-side institutional factors - particularly 
management-union/management-labour relations - mediate the 
process of associating skills with new technologies and of 
organising work.
However, this criticism did not go far enough: there 
are powerful social relationships other than that of 
skilled, unionised workers and management that influence 
the outcome. The findings of this research underline the 
importance of two previously ignored dimensions to the 
post-industrialist debate - the internetionalisation of 
capital and the role of gender.
7.4. 3..... In^..e.r_n..a..t..i.p.n.a...l.......p.if.l.er_ence.s
The variety of organisational cultures and histories 
of multinational corporations makes the inevitability of 
the post-industrial model unlikely. For example, the 
Japanese firm structured employment to rely heavily on 
eight senior engineers who were experienced in starting up
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other plants around the world. The experience these 
engineers brought to the new start-up to a great extent 
substituted for hiring a large contingent of expensive 
degree engineers. The purpose of seconding these engineers 
to Scotland was to prevent the development of plant 
autonomy, particularly to impede potential independent 
action by highly trained engineers. This cadre of 
engineers from corporate headquarters set the bounds of 
the technology responsibilities for the plant and 
simultaneously outlined the allocation of work amongst the 
workforce. The result was a more robust organisation of 
work for lower and middle level employees. However, this 
was dictated from the top down. This was one conception of 
flexibility without the autonomy of and control by craft 
workers that is the model and the objective for Piore and 
Sabel.
A firm operating as a multinational has a much wider 
range of supply conditions and opportunities to exploit 
those conditions than a one-country firm. Given a world 
of opportunities, the specific supply conditions of any 
location of a firm can significantly influence the 
structure of that firm. Management in these industries had 
been eagerly looking for ways to reduce unit costs without 
sacrificing quality or innovative potential to cope with a 
severe industry crisis. The specific conditions in the 
local labour markets promoted an organisation of 
technology and work that in many cases had no precedent in 
the corporation. Firms had shifted the allocation of tasks 
amongst jobs and workers both at the more skilled and the 
lesser skilled ends of the production process to take 
advantage of a labour force that was well-educated at all 
levels and a culture of engineering that attributed 
professional capability to upper level technicians. 
Management adapted their employment and work policies in 
response to the qualities of the labour supply and in 
particular the size, growth and variety of the technical 
labour supply. Both Piore and Sabel and Hirschhorn present 
a demand-side model where firms are compelled,to alter the
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work structure: the supply-side has no place in their work 
except to serve management in a functionalist way. 
However, this study of the high tech multinationals in 
Scotland clearly indicates that labour supply factors do 
shape the organisation of work and management's 
willingness to reconsider employment policies.
There were clear corporate financial benefits to 
restructuring employment and work in the Scottish plants. 
The labour costs for an advanced semi-conductor assembly 
and test facility in Scotland with a full complement of 
highly, though perhaps differently, skilled workers was 
only three-quarters of the cost of -operating the same 
facility in the US. Wages for a high level technician in 
Scotland were only one-third the salary of a young degree 
engineer in the US and one-half that of a US technician. 
Salaries in Scotland for equivalent young electronics 
engineers were only 4.3% of those in the US, as indicated 
in Table 7.1. Furthermore, the regional development 
authority, with a directive to improve the technological 
sophistication of the region's industry, was able to offer 
an array of incentives, subsidies and financial bribes to 
persuade firms to increase their technological commitment 
in the subsidiary and to shift the balance of their 
employment to technically trained labour.
These decisions were also the result of management's 
assessment of the situation and confidence in the 
potential of a policy of hiring ~lower on the skill 
chain'. Most of the subsidiary managers were Scots: they 
knew well the quality of the region's educational system 
and the advantages offered by the increasing 
specialisation of programmes in industry-specific fields. 
They were also familiar with the fact that high level 
technicians were widely considered engineers and 
historically had had jobs and experience that allowed them 
to rise to management positions or start their own firms.
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TABLE 7.1. C^P£J1AJ1I^^ IN_ THE US"" ~~~~"~~~"
Weekly Salaries, 1983 
US Scotland* % Scotland/US
Electonics
Engineer $608* $259 43%
Electronics
Technician $406* $222 55%
Engineering/
Scientific
Programmers $352** 47 - 88%
Entry* $400-525 
Experienced" $500-750
Semiconductor
Processors
(Based on 40-hr, week) $153 48 -85%
Entry" $180-220 
Experienced" $500-750
Electronics
Assemblers $150-161 47 -94%
Entry" $16O-2OO 
Experienced" $240-320
SOURCES: * Weekly earnings: Mont.hly__Labqr Review,
( 1985 ) , P . 55-6 .
+ SDA Annual Survey (1983) and confidential 
survey data Earnings based on salaries or 
hourly pay. US dollars calculated at the 
exchange rate of $1.5159 to the £ sterling 
(1983); S tat.! st i c a.l......A b s t r act ...... .1 9 8 7 (Table
1470) .
"Selected Occupations, Wages and Outlook,"
.__........k§. t?.PJT......!l^.EK!~..t..... ..By 1 1 e t n , San Jose (California)
Job Service; first quarter, 1983.
** Systems analysts employed in the region's 
electronics manufacturing firms.
In addition, managers had expressed confidence that even
261
relatively unskilled workers would prove eager, striving 
employees as much because of the persistent unemployment 
in the region and the UK because of the well-known work 
ethic of the Scottish culture.
Managers' willingness to experiment in assigning and 
training inexperienced and sometimes untrained recruits 
for demanding jobs attests to the strength of local labour 
supply characteristics in decisions about the association 
of skills and responsibilities to jobs and workers, even 
when the benefits of a change cannot be quantified. If the 
region's more robustly structured plants prove more 
successful competitively than other subsidiaries, as 
Appelbaum et al. (1986) claim should be the case, Scotland 
may continue as a locus for high tech growth and the plant 
in Scotland an ever more important part of the global 
operations of these corporations.
7.4.4 _._.
A second major failing of the post-industrialism 
analysis has been to ignore gender. Gender is a 
fundamental, if often unart iculated, aspect of the social 
relations of a plant, firm and industry. It has been 
ignored in this debate. This exclusion results either from 
the writers' belief that gender is inconsequential or from 
the assumption that gender is not operative in the male- 
dominated workplaces that have most often been the focus 
of study. 5
The research findings of this study here affirm, 
however, that gender relations shaped management efforts 
to structure a new flexibility in the workplace. The 
availability of a new male labour force - unemployed male 
youths in particular - enabled management to hire men into 
formerly female areas of work giving them wider 
responsibilities than formerly alloted to a semi-skilled 
production worker. The fact that they were men checked the 
potential for comparison with previous jobs and workers 
and limited complaint by women workers. Further, male 
managers tended to have different if not higher
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expectations of their male workers in terms of worker 
expectations of a job and their commitment to paid 
employment.
As a result, they opened doors for these workers, and 
often enhanced their jobs. Ulhile they in most cases 
changed the job title to make this easier, there were also
cases where male workers in positions directly comparable 
to women workers were favoured. As is so often the case, 
men were assumed to have a long-term commitment to the 
labour force while managers worried about the employment 
stability of women. With a priority to improve the 
stability of their entire work force, management looked to 
the male labour force. The shift in the gender balance 
toward men would also foster the improved communications 
and the collaborative atmosphere so important to keeping 
complex information-intensive production processes 
operating. The availability of a male labour force made 
restructuring work even with an established work force an 
easier and attractive opportunity for management.
~Tacit skills' then had become very important to the 
labour process and those "skills' important to stressful 
and continuous complex production were defined 
fundamentally in gender terms. Male managers attributed to 
men the abilities of communicating and understanding 
technical information, being comfortable in non- 
hierarchical relationships, and joining in and fostering 
shopfloor camarderie and teamwork. These attributions were 
shaped by past experience and long-standing assumptions, 
and they were instrumental in management's willingness to 
open up the structure of work and to commit increased 
resources to training the men considered appropriate for 
the new situation.
The multinatinal corporations had reintegrated stages 
of work and enhanced W0rk opportunities for workers to 
reap the direct and indirect benefits of a diversified 
(and relatively inexpensive) male labour force. These 
findings mirror the work of Beneria (1986) and Beneria and 
Roldan (1987) which showed how gender can be used to
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work and industry structure. They found that 
the availability of cheap women's labour in Mexico 
combined with the deskilling opportunities of new 
technologies to subdivide work and industrial organisation 
in a number of industries. The outcome was many-layered 
hierarchies of sub-contracting built on simple, dead-end 
jobs for women.
The specifics of the male labour force in Scotland 
proved very important. The local labour supply, in 
contrast to many others dominated by shortages, was in 
surplus and included available male workers all along the 
skill spectrum - unemployed unskilled but well-educated 
men, particularly young men, men trained in a range of 
industry-specific areas, and highly trained men with 
experience in high tech work. This labour supply was also 
considered a stable one: there was a high probability 
these workers would stay in the region. This was 
particularly important given the high turnover and 
instability of both technical and production workers in 
the US. Further, the region's shrinking employment base 
due to the decline in traditional manufacturing 
employment, the less costly standard of living (with 
respect to the US, Switzerland, a major world location of 
R&D labs, the London region, etc.), and the yearly 
increase in the supply of trained labour from the 
education sector meant that the cost of employing men was 
lower than in most already established advanced production 
locations. Furthermore, the annual renewal of the 
technical labour supply and local opportunities for 
upgrading would moderate the pressures to increase wages 
and salaries. This made capital investments safer: it was 
less likely that a company would have to relocate 
production, for example, to resolve labour supply or 
labour cost pressures. By taking advantage of this labour 
supply and the traditional fluidity between technical 
workers (Whalley, 1985), and by offering non-salary 
professional opportunities (eg training), employers could 
improve short- and long-term productivity in sophisticated
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technological work and minimise unit costs by hiring men 
into a more flexible work structure. While the direction 
of causation cannot be proven, that capability was 
associated with corporate decisions to devolve to these 
subsidiaries of new, advanced products and 
responsibilities and, supported by regional policy, the 
development of a more technologically sophisticated and 
more autonomous industry.
These developments were not the result of a simple 
association of men with new technologies. After all, there 
were a few firms in the survey where new process equipment 
had been introduced and the work structure assigned to 
those machines was algorithmic; that is, the jobs were 
simpler, severely limited, more monotonous and often more 
stressful than previous production jobs and completely cut 
off from enhancement or promotion opportunities. The 
production work force in these cases remained entirely 
female.
The determining factor in the gender, thus the 
nature, of the work was management's willingness to take 
risks and to invest in employing men. Using an example 
cited earlier, one employer expressed serious concern 
about employing men in a semi-conductor facility in jobs 
traditionally held only by women. The manager had 
carefully redesigned the usual female machine-minding jobs 
to satisfy the expectations of their predominantly male 
work force (which had previously worked on another 
product). The jobs for these workers included resetting, 
maintaining and repairing their machines. To retain these 
workers' loyalty and interest, company management had 
transformed the operator's job into a variable and semi- 
autonomous technical one. Management had a range of 
choices in employment and work structure, not a 
technological or competitively inevitable one. However, 
the value of a loyal, stable labour force - "the kinds of 
people who will be worried about making their mortgage 
payments" - to meet new pressures of production convinced 
managers to re-fashion jobs and titles to meet the
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expectations of those they thought the most suitable for 
the work - men. 6
7. 5 CONCLUD.I NG......POI NTS
The sheer rapidity of technology and market change in 
the computer and semi-conductor industries pointed to a 
need to investigate how accurately two widely used 
theories on multinational corporate organisation and 
labour markets - the product life cycle and dual labour 
market theories - explain recent industry and corporate 
activities and events. This research has attempted to 
demonstrate how important the particular product and 
product markets are and how necessary it is to reassess 
the nature of competition in analysing industrial 
development. The economics of producing information- 
intensive products for a highly internationalised 
marketplace clearly challenge the explanatory powers of 
conventional, ahistorical theories that rely on rigid, 
hierarchical and general structures to promote capital 
accumulation and development. More importantly perhaps, 
this research has attempted to demonstrate that gender is 
a factor that must be brought into the analysis of 
industry structure and adjustment, areas of "serious 
economic analysis" from which it has too long been 
excluded.
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ENDNOTES 
CHAPTER,..!....
1 Some computer firms are exceptions: their post-war 
growth included expansion overseas to get government 
contracts, eg, IBM and Honeywell in England. These 
exceptions will be outlined in the context .of the history 
of the industry in Chapter 4.
^ There were a number of important studies either 
specifically on multinationals or on electronics firms in 
Britain, of which multinational corporations were a part. 
But much of this work was done before 1979/1980 and/or 
assumed that the pattern of employment, the allocation of 
technologies and the role of the subsidiary within the 
corporation was essentially the same as in the past 
(McDermott, 1979; Massey, 1978; Massey and Meegan, 1979; 
Hood and Young, 1979, 1983). There were two exceptions: 
Pearson (1983) importantly recognised that multinationals 
targeted different labour pools in different locations, 
and Morgan and Sayer (1983) called attention to the 
changing make-up of the high tech work force in the UK and 
elsewhere. Neither, however, linked these observations to 
the structure of the multinational, or more specifically, 
to the international role of that subsidiary in the 
corporation.
3 The definition of high tech is a source of disagreement 
amongst analysts. What "high tech* industries have in 
common are a higher than average employment of 
engineering, scientific and technical personnel and a 
higher than average share of research and development 
expenditures relative to sales (DES, 1986). Many 
industries qualify as high tech, using these measures: 
aircraft, space vehicles and guided missiles, plastics and 
pharmaceuticals, for example, are industries that could be 
included. Throughout this document, however, high tech is 
used to refer to the two microelectronics industries under 
examination; while a simplification, the term is used to 
distinguish these sectors from electronics industries that 
are less information- and technology-intensive.
^ See footnote 1 in Chapter 4 for definitions of 
integrated circuits and semiconductors.
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CHAPTER 2.
1 The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-0) theory of factor allocations 
dominated much of the academic work then. Heckscher and 
Ohlin targeted the two questions - what kinds of goods 
will any one economy import and export and what are the 
economic gains from free trade. Heckscher and Ohlin viewed 
the differential allocations of factors of production 
across the world's economies and the resulting comparative 
cost advantages as the stimulus for trade.
Their factor proportions model claimed that a country 
would export those products the production of which made 
most use of its abundant factors and would import products 
requiring relatively more use of its scarce factors. In 
its simplest two-factor form, that model predicted that 
the US would export goods whose production processes were 
more capital-intensive than its imports because the US was 
considered to be better endowed with capital than labour 
relative to other economies.
^ Vernon's model, however, is fully consistent with the 
transactions theory of overseas investment reviewed 
earlier (Caves, 1982). Vernon considered that the 
calculation of costs did not take one far enough toward 
understanding the reasons ways firms became multinational.
5 His work, a departure from the body of the trade debate, 
derived from a sense that the micro concerns drove the 
macro trends.
^ While Vernon admitted that others had previously 
explored some of these factors, that work had been part of 
an explanation of overseas investment that was triggered 
by the persistent structural world dollar shortage of the 
late 1940s and 1950s. The dollar shortage forced US 
exporters to consider foreign direct investment because 
overseas customers were restricted in purchasing dollar- 
denominated goods. This analysis of foreign direct 
investment (eg Williams, 1953) was abandoned when the 
shortage disappeared.
5 One of the values of Vernon's work, according to a 
number of analysts, was its explanation of the reputation 
for successful innovation in the US. He argued that the US 
market had a higher than average income relative to other 
countries, twice that of Western Europe, for example. An 
opportunity for high income products would first appear to 
someone who knew the US market. In addition the US had 
relatively high labour costs and unrationed capital 
compared to all other capitalist markets. Opportunities to 
develop products conserving labour would most likely 
appear to a firm in the US where demand was conditioned by 
these relative factor allocations (Vernon, 1966; PP.192- 
4). The absolute and relative size of the US market 
further supported successful product commercialisation in 
the US.
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This analysis diverged from the factor proportions 
theory in that Vernon emphasised the importance of factor 
scarcities in stimulating innovation. The traditional 
theory, by considering information a free and mobile good, 
argued that factor differentials should in no way bias 
innovation.
^ There would have been plentiful opportunities and time 
for other firms to copy the product and production 
technologies, so increased competition was considered 
likely.
7 He did, however, admit that changing relative interest 
rates might influence the location of an overseas 
investment.
® Vernon argued that locating in a low-wage economy was 
triggered by the development there of a sufficiently large 
market for the product, due in part to the much reduced 
price of a mature product. The added advantages of 
manufacturing in that low-cost economy helped, almost 
incidentally, in management's overriding objective to gain 
further returns on its technology, even at that late date, 
in the home economy.
Scibberas (1977), for example, found no evidence of 
delays in introducing and producing new products in his 
survey of smaller European semi-conductor multinationals 
operating in the UK in the mid!97Os.
"As an industry '[in the past] matures, product design 
becomes standardized and the focus of competition shifts 
toward incremental manufacturing refinement and 
marketing. " However, in a situation of rapid and 
continuing technological change, " [t Dechnological 
innovation, which upsets established design parameters, 
refocuses the search for competitive advantage on new 
products and processes.
[The newest generation of semiconductors] represents 
the continuing technological innovation that cuts directly 
against arguments that the semiconductor industry is 
"maturing' ." (Borrus, 1983).
11 Profit-maximising employers will, according to the 
model, understandably hire men rather than women for jobs 
that are skill-enhancing and for jobs that offer long-term 
career development benefits because they do not expect 
women to be a stable work force.
Also, employees in these jobs were more likely than 
secondary workers to be unionised.
Uhile many, ascribe primary and secondary jobs to core 
and periphery firms, respectively - the former, large, 
powerful corporations, the latter, small firms (eg, 
Harrison and Sum, 1979; Friedman, 1979; Tarling, 1981), it
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is just as possible for workers in the two types of jobs 
to work on the same shop floor (Piore, 1975).
Piore (1975) indicated that the secondary job level 
cushions the firm and its primary workers. The company's 
standardised production and its associated primary sector 
workers depend on stable demand. The employer assigned 
secondary workers to the tasks, part-products or products 
that were subject to flexible or unpredictable demand: 
because these workers were easy and inexpensive to fire 
and rehire, the firm could cope with demand swings by 
trimming secondary workers. This also proved to reassure 
primary workers of their relative employment security, 
reinforcing their commitment to the employer.
In contrast to Doeringer's useful theorisation of the 
relationship between the external labour market and the 
employer's willingness to train, he underestimates here 
the extent to which the external labour market can turn 
these decisions around. A surplus external market can 
place an employee in direct competition with outsiders for 
an available job vacancy, particularly if product demand 
is high. A surplus external labour market which is very 
finely developed enables employers to hire outsiders for a 
variety of very specific tasks cheaper than retraining 
employees.
Harrison and Sum (1979) reported Paul Osterman' s 
discovery of a type of secondary job that might lead to 
primary sector employment. In older industries, young 
unskilled workers in small job-shop, eg in metalworking 
and machine repair, might receive sufficient on-the-job 
training to qualify them for skilled production jobs in 
other firms.
Also Rosenberg (1980) found some evidence of workers 
moving from the secondary into the primary sector during 
cyclical booms, but indicated that most of the movement 
was reversed when the economy turned down.
" Functionalism involves interpreting what exists as the 
outcome of what is needed by the ruling class" (Amsden, 
1980; p. 27).
18 This discussion relies on the very thorough and expert 
analyses of women's participation in the labour market of 
Bruegel, 1982, and Humphries and Rubery, 1984.
19 This mobility between the domestic sphere and the 
sphere of production, reinforced by the jobs and work 
places in which women are concentrated, have in the past 
made women workers less vulnerable to union organisation. 
Capitalists considered this a further boon. To allege that 
this is women's antipathy to unions or organising as dual 
labour market economists tend to do is to misread the past 
and the present. This history has more to do with the 
rigid framework of male-dominated trade unionism and the 
occupations that have traditionally been unionised
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(Bruegel, 1982). In recent years women in white collar 
work has proven themselves more likely than men to be 
unionised and there are also numerous example of women 
production workers organising in spite of male opposition 
inside and outside the trade union movement (eg the Lee 
Jeans occupation and the Plessey Bathgate strike, Elder, 
1979; Findlay, 1986).
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CHAPTE.R_._3._
1 Three important electronics multinationals of US-origin 
were excluded from the survey, though they may have 
provided relevant information. One, Beckman Instruments, 
was excluded because it was primarily a medical and 
measuring instruments manufacturer. While computerisation 
of the product has made it exceedingly difficult to draw a 
line between an instrument and a computer, it was 
determined that Beckman's product market, and thus its 
market strategy, was sufficiently different to warrant its 
exclusion. NCR (formerly National Cash Register) and Timex 
were not included because of their products and production 
processes which - while electronics- were not advanced or 
high tech microelectronics, using an above-average share 
of engineering, scientific and technical workers in the 
work force as the defining characteristic (Massachusetts 
Division of Employment Security, 1985). These firms were 
assembling watches, calculators, low level home computers, 
accounting equipment and other electronic products, often 
on subcontract. They were all low end of the market 
products with low information content, primarily directed 
to consumer markets. While data from these firms might 
have provided a valuable contrast to developments in the 
high technology sector, resources were inadequate to 
expand the survey to include them.
While there were a number of Scottish- and English- 
based firms that were important to the development of the 
region's microelectronics industry, they were not 
included. The plants located in Scotland did not actually 
produce chips or computers as finished products. ALso, in 
spite of establishing a global presence, firms such as 
Ferranti Ltd. were still predominantly UK firms, not 
multinational corporations. More important, Ferranti and 
Racal-MESL, two large high tech firms in the region, were 
almost exclusively British defense suppliers: this 
significantly cushioned them from the pressures of global 
competition so important in driving the development of the 
survey firms.
2 Cutbacks by the Thatcher Government on data collection 
contributed to this problem. Lower funding for Government 
surveys reduced the frequency of and, in some cases, 
eliminated data collection in these industries (eg, the 
Census of Production).
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C.HAPT.E..R_.4._...
^ A semi-conductor is an electronic device made of a 
number of possible substances that have the property of 
partly conducting electricity. Integrated circuits, a 
specific subset of semi-conductors, encapsulate many 
thousands of electrical circuits usually embedded in 
silicon crystal. One square chip can now contain hundreds 
of thousands of electrical components - transistors and 
diodes, capacitors and resistors. Chips are an advance on 
earlier electronic technology in that they are solid state 
or monolithic. That is, all the components are formed 
together by the same production processes, all embedded in 
a sculpted device. There are no moving parts, parts put 
together mechanically, or loose connections that can be 
sources of failures. They replace devices that wired 
together separate discrete components. The wholeness of 
the device makes communication - the movement of electrons 
very much faster.
While integrated circuit is the term that refers 
precisely to the product technology which is the subject 
of the study, the more general term, semiconductor, will 
be used frequently and interchangeably.
Chips have differing capabilities and different 
markets. There are three basic types of chips - logic, 
memory and microprocessors. Logic chips process 
information signals, memories store information, and 
microprocessors are complete computers on one piece of 
silicon. The three types can be designed and in some cases 
programmed to fill a wide range of (if, programmable, 
variable) functions.
2 Other microelectronics terms used throughout the text 
include the following:
. dynamic RAM (D RAM): a memory chip which must be 
"refreshed" within a short period of time or it will lost 
the bits stored. It permits a very high density memory ( a 
large number of bits in a single integrated circuit) and 
thus a very low cost per bit stored.
. EePROM: electronically-erasable programmable read- 
only memory. The code stored in this memory array can be 
programmed by the user, erased, and then programmed to a 
different code. These are important support chips for the 
microprocessor.
. RAM - random access memory: stores digital 
information temporarily and can be changed by use. It is 
the basic storage element in a computer.
. ROM - read only memory: permanently stores 
information used repeatedly. It cannot be altered.
3 Computers too fall into three basic product areas -
mainframes - large, powerful information
processors, 
minicomputers - smaller processors that
can be distributed throughout a work- 
place, and
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microcomputers, including personal 
computers, a small, stand-alone 
machine (that can be linked to a 
bigger computer) for use at home or 
work.
In addition, the computer industry includes all the 
firms that produce or implement only one part of a 
complete information system, eg firms manufacturing 
peripherals like printers and disk drives, firms producing 
software, the programmes that make the equipment work or 
develop it for particular uses. Computer bureaus and 
consulting firms can also be included in the industry. 
These are firms that provide a range of services to assist 
the market in choosing and using computers.
The distinctions between the segments have blurred 
over the past years due to the phenomenal advance in the 
computing power of even the smallest computer and the 
downward pressure of prices for all hardware systems. 
However, a mainframe was considered a systme with a multi- 
level general purpose architecture costing £100,000 and 
up. They are still predominantly based on architectures 
that were developed in the late 1940s (Duncan, 1981). 
Minis are smaller. Now, however, there are "superminis, 
or an equivalent of a mainframe built as a mini, and 
"supercomputers," extremely fast and powerful mainframes. 
The micro, developed as a much simpler, mass production 
product for a desktop, has become much more powerful, 
making it much more difficult to distinguish it from some 
lower-end minis (Snoddy, 1983).
* Hardware and software have, in fact, a dynamic 
technological and economic relationship. For example, the 
increasing complexity of the systems has for various 
reasons driven up the costs of developing the software. 
Uith integrated circuits able to handle so much more 
information, many producers have embedded some of the 
operating instructions in the chips to reduce total 
production costs. This is called firmware.
5 Together these markets achieved 1973 sales of $4.1,165 
billion (Scibberas, 1977; p. 5O).
6 Growth averages mask significant downturns. The world 
market slumped in 1972, 1975, 1981 and 1985/6.
7 It is important to note that Japanese computer firms' 
involvement in the industry, particularly in the US 
market, has been to a great extent hidden by its OEM 
(Original Equipment Manufacturer). Leading Japanese 
producers supplied US firms with equipment that were 
marketed under the brand name of the US dealer.
8 Many independent producers were bought UP by large, end- 
user companies. Of the thrity-six independent firms 
established between 1966 and 1979, only seven were still 
independent by 1979 (Markusen, 1985).
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Intense industry competition propelled technological 
change. In only a few years there was exponential growth 
in the number of transistors and circuits that could be 
embedded in a small chip of silicon. The table below 
distinguishes the successive generations of chip 
technologies and complexity.
No. of 
Transistors
Small-scale Integration (SSI) 10 
Medium-scale Integration (MSI) 1OO 
Large-scale Integration (LSI) 10,OOO
to 20,000 
Very Large-scale
Integration (VLSI) 2Q,OOO+ 
(eg, 64K DRAM - 64,000+)
I960- 
1970-
 1974
 1982
198O-
NOTE : Transistors are the fundamental component of a 
circuit, the switch that directs or amplifies the 
electrical signal.
10 The competitive importance of the mini as a major 
product improvement in the computer industry will be 
explored in detail below.
 ^ The market also required every producer to establish a 
second source for its product to innsure that one firm did 
not have a monopoly on its supply. This meant giving the 
product technology to a competitor. The second source firm 
frequently improved on the product, patented the 
improvement and offered it to the market. In some cases, 
the secondary supplier gained market share at the expense 
of the original producer.
Uhile some firms specialised in custom rather than mass 
markets, these firms usually limited their involvement in 
special order markets. The high costs of developing one 
specialised design for an individual customer could not be 
covered by the revenues from the low volumes usually 
purchased (Borrus, 1983).
US computer producers bought 35% of the chips shipped 
by US producers in 1978 (USITC, 1979).
14> As Tom Watson Jr., president of IBM, explained:
"Too much proprietary information was invovled 
in the circuitry production. ... Unless we did it 
ourselves, we could be turning over some of the 
essentials of our business to another group." 
(Billings and Hogan, 1979, p. 83).
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IBM had set up captive chip production years earlier - 
1964. (Billings and Hogan, 1979).
The attempt by 1C firms to sell computer systems was a 
further discouragement to established computer producers 
from initiating any major technological collaboration with 
1C firms.
Just such a crisis developed when IBM released a major 
new product in the mid!970's. In retaliation for a 
technological advance introduced by one of the BUNCH, IBM 
introduced a new system at greatly reduced 
price/performance ratio from its existing products. Not 
only did replacement revenues plummet, but also many 
customers decided to lease rather than buy thenew machine 
in case IBM offered further improvemens in the near 
future. Theretreat into leasing cut IBM's yearly revenues 
dramatically. In the following years, IBM strategy was to 
introduce new equipment with a price/performance ratio 
generally in line with existing models (Billings and 
Hogan, 1979).
Most of the new entrants were spinoffs from the 
established industry firms. They were frequently started 
by engineering staff with a good idea that had not been 
well received in the parent firm or with a taste for the 
entrepreneurial role.
The benefits of minis to management included their 
ability to break up the information monopoly of the data 
processing department and the resulting higher wages 
commanded by programming professionals in these 
departments. This incentive to buy the new machines should 
not be underestimated.
^ " The 32-bit microprocessor introduced in 1984/85 was 
four times more powerful than its predecessor. Just such 
a crisis developed when IBM released a major new product 
in the midl970s. In retaliation for a technological 
advance introduced by one of the BUNCH, IBM introduced a 
new system at greatly reduced price/performance ratio from 
its existing products. Not only did replacement revenues 
plummet, but also many customers decided to lease rather 
than buy the new machine in case IBM decided to release 
additional improvements in the near future. The retreat 
into leasing cut IBM's yearly revenues dramatically. In 
the following years, IBM strategy was to introduce new 
equipment with a price/performance ratio generally in line 
with existing models (Billings and Hogan, 1979).
More powerful machines could be produced in smaller 
cabinets, with smaller, less expensivepower supplies and 
cooling fans, smaller, fewer support structures and fewer 
boards. This led to significant savings in the cost of 
computer hardware while miniaturisation of the chip meant 
that the cost of the ics on a copmputer took up a larger 
proportion of total hardware costs. The price of chips
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continually spiraled downwards. All these changes meant 
that better, more powerful and flexible machines could be 
marketed more cheaply, creating new applications and 
widening potential markets.
21 Computer manufacturers, even in the 1960's, allocated 
9% of their total expenditures to R&D. This compared with 
an average allocation of 7.2% by firms in other industries 
that also had high R&D commitments (Billings and Hogan, 
1970) .
22 Oakey (1981) defines semi-skilled work as a job 
requiring two to six weeks' initial training 
withoutrequiring or leading to a formal qualification. 
There is a growing and important body of literature that 
recognises "skill' as a social and political construct, 
where the gender of the holder plays a significant role in 
determining the skill level assigned to the job. This 
important debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The text here will adhere to the conventional ascriptions 
and usage of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
forreading ease. This is not intended in any way to 
undermine the contention that the labelling is highly 
gender-biased. The issue will be addressed indirectly in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
The value of offshore assembly in all developing 
countries was $61 million in 1966; that grew to $393 
million by 1969 (Chang, 1971; p2) .
Even niche producers sent their chips to be packaged in 
the Far East. Their specialty strategy did not protect 
them completely from price competition. They could also 
significantly reduce the cost of their products which, 
like standard chips, depended to a great extent on labour 
costs.
EEC imports of many finished and part-time products 
faced a 17% tariff.
The dispersal of labour-intensive low-technnology 
operations to low wage economies in the semi-conductor 
industry encouraged the global spread of computer firms. 
By the late 1960s, a computer firm locating in the Far 
East could be near major chip suppliers. Also many of the 
large computer producers which had "captive' chip 
production (eg, Hewlett-Packard) had set up chip assembly 
and packaging in the Far East. Expanding those into other 
assembly work was easy and relatively inexpensive once a 
corporation had gained experience there.
27 Honeywell centralised these activities in Minneapolis 
and Burroughs, in Detroit.
28 This discussion relies heavily on the excellent work of 
Saxenian, 1980; 1981; and conversations with Lenny Siegel 
of the Pacific Studies Center.
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By 1971, twenty-one of the 23 large semiconductor firms 
were direct offshoots of Fairchild (Markusen, 1986). This 
section leans heavily on the excellent work of Annalee 
Saxenian, (1981).
One million dollars financed a start-up in the early 
period of the industry.
Bellew (1984) reported on company competition in 
Christmas parties: in the late 1970* s firms hired 50-piece 
orchestras rock and roll stars and spent $700,000 and 
more. The explanation was "If you can't entertain your 
employees, ... you* 11 lose them to someone who will" (1984).
No data was available that would give a picture of the 
county-wide employment of the two SIC industries. The data 
quoted refer to the San Jose SMSA, which isthe core of the 
Valley's microelectronics activity, so likely represents 
trends and percentages of the region fairly accurately. 
Also Census of Employment data is quoted: this obviously 
will less successfully capture the changing employment 
structure in the Valley.
In the semiconductor industry lesser skilled production 
workers dropped to 54% of the workforce by 1977, 20% below 
the norm for manufacturing industry, from 72% in 1966. The 
computer industry had 52% of its work force in production 
jobs in 1968, dropping to 44% in 1972 or approximately 66% 
of the manufacturing norm (Markusen, 1986).
This may overstate the share of lesser skilled 
production workers, as it includes maintenance workers, 
many of wqhom would have electrical or electronics 
technician training and qualifications.
For a more detailed analysis of the industry's labour 
demand, see Saxenian (1980; 1981), Snow (1980), Green 
(1983), and Markusen (1986).
56 Silicon Valley housing became the costliest in the US. 
Saxenian (1981) attributes the housing inflation to the 
code restrictions on land use that were meant to preserve 
the quality of life that attracted high tech professionals 
to the area.
It was not simply a matter of finding a labour market 
with wages lower that in the US: such opportunities 
abounded. The offshore wages had to be so low that, when 
the duty of the value added was figured into reimported 
part-products, producers still had significantly reduced 
unit cost.
The figure that Grossman quotes refers not only to high 
tech employment but also employment in consumer 
electronics. Also it includes the employment of domestic 
firms that developed to support the foreign electronics
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sector; she indicates that the majority of the employment 
was in offshore multinationals.
In Penang, Malaysia, for example, four-fifths of the 
electronics workers were women new to the paid labour 
force (Siegel, 1981).
The older women were those who had been working in the 
factories only two years to five years. They were 
frequently called grannies because the strain of the work 
had forced them to wear glasses.
Clearly this is the employers* view: women with eye 
problems and experience in the big city usually had 
difficulties finding other jobs or returning home to a 
rural village. By structuring employment for high 
turnover, these multinationals created significant gender 
specific unemployment problems. Grossman (1979) explains 
these economic and social consequences.
/ o Women workers had to pay to stay in these dormitories,
often surrendering 50 to 100% of their wage packet for a 
bed (Siegel, 198O) . The nearby accommodation however 
practically guaranteed that workers would be on-time for 
work and that they would be shielded from the higher 
living costs in the nearby community, costs that might 
have influenced them to call for higher wages.
The offshore phenomenon was, however, not without 
problems. With the exceedingly rapid growth of an 
installation or Zone, firms at times did experience labour 
shortages. "Even in those regions in which a 
concentration of world market factories had developed to 
such an extent that the availability of young unemployed 
women has been drastically reduced, no change in the 
structure of employment occurs. Instead the firms react 
almost without exception by relocating production to new 
sites where this particular type of worker can still be 
easily hired." (Froebel et al. 1980; p349) . And their 
rapid development in underdeveloped economies led at times 
to soaring living costs and wage inflation. Even worker 
absenteeism and turnover grew to be a problem for some 
workers. Management response was frequently to move to 
another country. They opened UP similar plants in other 
Asian countries, tapping more peripheral or as yet 
unexploited labour supplies. Signetics, a US semiconductor 
firm, closed its factory in the Philippines due to 
mounting costs and expanded facilities in Thailand and 
South Korea (Iscoff, 1985). This experience, repeated in a 
number of countries, led. to concern about "footloose" 
multinationals.
It is important to recognise that all of the plants 
in all of the Far East locations were not structurally the 
same. The development of these offshore colonies (and 
political concerns such as that above) had stimulated 
growth and policy responses. Some of the Southeast Asian
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economies grew into significant markets for the end- 
product. Some of the Governments introduced incentives and 
restrictions on foreign direct investment to spur 
multinational investment in and transfer of production 
te..c.h no lo.gi.es. Also after many years of operation the 
multinationals employed a core of experienced technical 
workers. Management in some cases began to reconsider the 
allocation of technology and responsibilities to that part 
of the world. In the late 1970s some firms upgraded, 
expanded or newly invested in facilities that performed 
more highly technical functions.
Singapore, for example, set up state-sponsored 
training centres and university programmes to train people 
for the industry's more skilled occupations. Singapore 
soon developed into an Asian locus for more highly 
technical multinational operations. Synertek located its 
most capital-intensive and rigorous final testing plant in 
Singapore, while the Thai plant was restricted to manual 
assembly and testing. The Singapore plant also served as 
the customer engineering services centre for customers in 
the Far East (Iscoff, 1983). The Apple Computer company in 
California decided to buy its entire supply of circuit 
boards, the brain of their computers, from a factory in 
Singapore that "makeCs] nothing; they add expert value to 
the labour of others. The facility tests the boards that 
are stuffed by subcontractors: one third of the work force 
had electronics degrees and the rest had at least several 
0 levels (Large, 1983). The economies of the Far East 
developed into a geographical hierarchy of high tech 
offshore operations (Personal communication with Rachel 
Grossman, 1983) : the division of labour within the Far 
East economies reflected differences in access to major 
product markets, labour market resources and state 
policies. Exploring the history and economics of these 
differences is, however, beyond the scope of this 
research.
"...The labour cost share seems remarkably small in 
light of the eagerness of US firms to move their 
operations to other countries. An explanation might be 
found in the fact that other costs are less amenable to 
control than is labour cost. The price of materials is 
not subject to much negotiability. A standard complement 
of capital equipment is necessary to produce a given 
output, and depreciation charges would thus would not be 
greatly variable. This leaves overhead as a controllable 
cost category. Its magnitude in the typical cost pattern 
is quite large, and doubtlessly could be squeezed in most 
firms. It remains the mental habit, however, to regard 
labour charges as the most controllable; hence the 
tendency to emphasise even relatively small reductions of 
labour is bolstered when one's competitors do so. .. [With] 
foreign labour rates rising... at some point significant 
economies must be searched out by actively restricting 
overhead. A 10% reduction in foreign labour cost in the 
above example reduces total product cost by 1%, but a
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slice in overhead would achieve a 3.7% cost reduction 
(Mildred, Nadler and Bengston, 1978)
The state had both the funds and the data processing 
demands for the large, complex and very expensive machines 
of the 1960s and early 1970s. In the UK state contracts 
accounted for one-third of computer sales in the 1970s.
Government agencies and nationalised industries (eg, 
telecoms) were required to buy capital equipment from 
domestic producers. Though the firms were clearly 
multinational, having a production facility in the UK 
qualified IBM, Honeywell Information Systems (as well as 
Motorola and National Semiconductor much later) and others 
to tender bids for state contracts.
While a few US firms established chip design centres in 
Europe, usually in Geneva or southern France, their 
primary aim was to keep up with the technological 
developments of European chip producers.
Many of the firms also served Africa, the Near East and 
some Asian markets from their EEC locations: inside the 
EEC they qualified to participate in the preferential 
trade relations within EFTA and in Commonwealth trade 
agreements.
50 Intel's earnings, for example, dropped from a $22 
profit on its operations for every $100 of sales (before 
taxes, tax credits and interest) in the late 1970s to $1O 
for the first half of the 1980s. Similarly, National 
Semiconductor's profit fell from an annual average of $1O 
on $100 of sales to $6 over the same period (Sylvester, 
1985) .
51 In testimony to the USITC, the Semiconductor Industry 
Association (SIA) claimed that Japanese firms sold 16K 
RAMs in the US for $6 at the end of 1978, while the price 
in Japan was twice that or more. US producers' s prices at 
that time ranged from $7 to $8. (USITC, 1979; p70)
Semi-custom refers to a number of different design and 
production technologies for chips. What they have in 
common is that the chips can be designed and produced 
predominantly with standardised inputs. The 
"customisation' can be achieved with a minimal share of 
resources devoted to the unique specifications. For 
example, the ULA (Unlimited Logic Array) pioneered by 
Ferranti procedure designs and produces a standardised 
logic device. With customer specifications, a final layer 
can be designed and superimposed in wafer fabrication that 
will direct the underlying channels to perform the needed 
functions. All special order requirements are met in the 
last stages of production.
By 1982 minis accounted for 35% of Honeywell 's UK 
revenues (Connor, 1982).
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The stories about Apple and other companies starting in 
a garage were true, yet maintained a powerful mystique 
long after this was no longer a normal or easy way to get 
into the industry.
55 The microcomputer could be designed to specific uses 
and its power and information exchange could be augmented 
by linking it with a business' s mini or mainframe system. 
This method of distributing computing power throughout a 
business could be much cheaper than investing in a number 
of minicomputer systems.
56 Clive Sinclair reduced the price of his home computer 
by 40% within one year at least partly by replacing 18 
standardised chips with one custom-designed chip 
(Economist, 1984). Industry experts claimed that he had 
decided to base all his new product designs on ASICs.
57 For example, designers could develop unique designs by 
putting together standardised parts of circuits to give a 
customer the desired capability.
58 For example, Ferranti Ltd., a relatively small UK firm, 
gained a world class reputation by developing and 
exploiting the ULA technology. It held the lion's share of 
the ASIC market during its first years. "No less than 15 
new chipmakers have attained sales of over $1O million in 
the past three years. " (Keyhoe, 1984B)
59 This is called "foundry' service.
Borrus suggested a third strategy: a producer could 
rent its production facility as a foundry service to 
produce a customer's or a design subcontractor's designs. 
Many of the volume producers, including survey firms, did 
this as a short-term measure. However, management rarely 
found it satisfactory as a longer-term strategy. It 
eliminated the potential economies of being involved in 
developing market-defined designs and was a reactive 
rather than aggressive approach to developing future 
markets. While managers were happy to commit surplus 
capacity on older fabrication equipment to these 
customers, a total dependence on foundry work would impede 
investment in the production technologies for the next 
product, excluding the firm from future markets 
(Interviews with several managers, 1983 and 1984).
61 Computers accounted for at least 50% of their sales by 
1984.
62 Software enhanced the possibilities of product 
convergence. Software can be designed to make a 
manufacturer's machine "behave as if it were an IBM 327O 
terminal" (Cane, 1983A) or other product. Machine's made 
for one use can be adapted by software to compete in other 
markets.
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63 There were cases of captive producers marketing their 
chips in the external market. That potential could 
certainly grow in a market with surplus capacity.
64 A major IBM selling pitch for its PC was teh reputation 
of IBM. "Price will not be a factor in the success of this 
machine. The name on the front is IBM and the companies 
that will buy this machine could not care less what they 
pay," according to an IBM dealer quoted in Meredith and 
Cane (1983).
65 The need to be able to customise chips further pressed 
this necessity for mass production chip firms. With the 
.growth of semi-custom markets, that support had to expand 
to include specifying and designing chips: "[T]he 
development of custom markets may turn a growing segment 
of the semiconductor industry into an engineering 
service." (Borrus et al., 1983).
The technical explanation why this is the case follows 
in the next chapter where each stage of production and its 
requirements are carefully scrutinised.
This was supported by an interview with the one 
Japanese producer in the survey group.
The absence of strategic alternatives derives from the 
specific economies of chip production. For example, more 
sophisticated wafer fabrication equipment can perform two 
important functions: different chip designs can be made on 
the same wafer, economizing on wafer space and input unit 
costs and the more tightlyy controlled the processing the 
more good die will be produced on each wafer. Without 
increasing wafer output, better production technologies 
can reduce unit input costs and improve the yield, both 
reducing unit product cost.
For example, American researchers claimed that a 
producer could have reduced the total manufacturing cost 
of a 16K RAM memory chip (1983) by 62% (from $2.81 to 
$1.06) by using more precise, more expensive production 
equipment (Parsons arid Stowsky, 1985; p54) .
69 The growing commercial importance of the software in a 
computer system is reflected by corporations devoting a 
growing share of their R&D budgets to software 
development. The figures that follow are derived from the 
budgets of four the largest mainframe and 3 of the leading 
mini producers.
Percentage of R&D Budget Devoted 
to Software Development
1981 1985
Software 35% 55% 
Hardware 65% 4.5%
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Source: Paine Webber Inc., reproduced in Bujsiness..._We_ek, 
January 14, 1985, p97.
° IBM, for example, took advantage of a large and growing 
pool of creative entrepreneurial talent in the software 
industry by inviting independent software designers to 
design software for the introduction of the comapnay's new 
PC. The company's aim was to create as wide a variety of 
applications thus new markets for the PC. It treated the 
PC's technology as an open design to nourish this process. 
The diversity and quality of the software products were 
major factors in catapulting the late entry of the PC to 
the top of the market.
There were two competitive responses. Apple Computer, 
the displaced market leader, was forced to respond in 
kind. The firm commissioned both internally and externally 
a wide range of applications software for their computer 
to compete with IBM, particularly in business markets. 
Continual software development to upgrade and retain 
control over a market niche and to exploit new niches is a 
critical competitive strategy for a computer hardware 
firm, lest the product's market disappear (0'Connor, 1985; 
DeJonquieres, 1981D). Secondly, because the IBM product 
technology was open and it had become the market leader, a 
proliferation of IBM-compatible products entered the 
market. They gained sales on the crest of the rich body of 
IBM-specific applications software they could run. Being 
IBM-compatible became a necessary market strategy. Clearly 
these "clones," as they are known, challenged IBM. They 
offered cheaper and technically more inventive equipment 
and ate into IBM's PC sales, which as a volume product, 
operated on a low margin. Uhile IBM eventually developed a 
new product market strategy,7O it maintained its product's 
connection to the software market it had essentially 
created.
In recent years, IBM progressively lost share in the 
mini and mainframe market. The problem stems from the 
advent of distributed processing and the necessity to make 
different models of a firm's computers as well as others' 
computers communicate with one another when they are added 
on. This is essentially a software problem: the software 
structure of the machines must be parallel and compatible 
and there must be an effective software system, called a 
local area network, to coordinate the entire system. IBM's 
customers, according to claims and quotes in the trade 
press, became increasingly discouraged by 1986/7 by the 
non-compatibility of IBM's many machines and by the 
recurrent failure of the firm to produce a software 
network that would make them work effectively together. 
While the extraordinary expense of switching from one 
software system to another will discourage a customer from 
buying a different computer system, this also works to 
place much greater importance on a producer's record with 
its customer base. The experience of the quality, 
flexibility and expandability of the software and the 
servicing record of the manufacturer both count heavily in
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a purchasing decision by existing and potential customers. 
The market's concerns about IBM gave DEC a major market 
advantage (and an increasing share at IBM's expense) 
throughout the 1980s. The company's most acclaimed selling 
point - its design of hardware models around an effective 
software network - won it both new buyers and old IBM 
customers.
These costs include the expenditure on research and 
development of software to operate and sell the system and 
on maintenance costs.
Software maintenance grew from about 20% of small 
systems in 1970 to approximately 30% in 1985. Over the 
same period hardware costs dropped from 57% to 30% of 
total outlay (0* Connor, 1985).
Software development in essence is the structuring and 
manipulation of information and logic: it did not lend 
itself easily to systematic 'Taylorist' work organisation 
as a strategy for increasing productivity and reducing 
unit cost (Ernst, 1983).
The focus here is the competitive life of a product. 
The chip is a near indestructible product and can maintain 
flawless performance for perhaps hundreds of years. 
However, the saleability of a product and its potential to 
earn high revenues are drastically reduced once new 
products with better performance and cheaper functions are 
introduced.
By the mid!980s customers were demanding equipment 
upgrades in even less than two years' time [Interview with 
managing director of an engineering microcomputer firm].
However, this can also have contrary implications for 
the length of the product cycle. With the fast pace of 
innovation and the relative inexperience in both the 
private and public sectors in organising effective use of 
computer systems, potential buyers may moderate or 
postpone computer purchases. When they are ready, they are 
unlikely to consider what would then be "old" systems. In 
addition, producers in this market depend heavily on 
customer testimonials for generating additional sales. 
Without sales to big buyers, manufacturers would stand to 
lose their investment in an entire generation of product.
This is essentially the argument forwarded to explain 
the crash of the computer market in 1985. Computer 
manufacturers found their expected sales growth vanished 
when business froze or postponed new equipment: they 
wanted to make past investments more productive and to 
wait to see the usefulness of the market's new 
technological innovations. The life of much of the 
equipment then on the market came to an abrupt end, as did 
some of the producers.
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77 The continual pressure to increase sales volume derived 
directly from the progressively more powerful ic and its 
cheaper price per bit of information. Duncan offered this 
hypothetical case. "For example, a system builder launcnes 
a processor which performs one million instructions a 
second. It sells 1000 systems over its economic life of 36 
to 40 months giving it a total installed power of one 
billion instructions. The price of the processor was 
£500,000, giving a total turnover of £500 million. During 
the life of the system the price/performance ratio comes 
down exponentially: when it was launched the processor was 
on the ratio of providing an instruction a second for 50p 
whereas at the end of its economic life the industry 
standard had dropped to 20p an instruction a second.
"The new system that the vendor is developing would 
have to be built to provide about half as much again 
processing power as the old one, about 1.5 million 
instruction [sic] a second. To fit on the industry 
price/performance curve so that customers of the old 
systems will almost automatically order the new system it 
will have to be priced at £300,000 -1.5 million times 
2Op. At £300,000 just over 1OOO such systems would have to 
be sold to retain the previous turnover level of £500 
million from the system. The existing user base of 1000 
will therefore have to be expanded by 600 new customers." 
(Duncan, 1981; p9Q~l)
78 The firms were willing to trade narrow profit margins 
for market recognition and share.
For example, the cost of the 64-K RAM was quite high 
when it was introduced in early 1979, while the cost per 
bit of information of the then dominant product, 16k RAM 
memory, was falling. By the end of 1980, less than two 
years later, the cost per bit of the newer product was 
significantly below the lowest cost achievable on the 
older product (0' Connor, 1983).
The F_i.nj|.n_ci.a_l.._T.i.!Ile.JS. claimed that the cost of semi- 
conductors was falling at a faster rate each year. The 
cost of components needed to supply one megabyte of memory 
in a computer cost $32,000 in 1974., $7,000 in 1977 and 
less than $230O by 198O. The forecast cost for 1984. was 
only $500 (1980).
81 IBM, for example, did not suffer unduly from the 
failure of a new lower end PC product, the PC Jr., a 
victim of the times.
82 In England and Scotland Honeywell and Burroughs both 
are exceptions: as long-established corporations in the 
economy, their work forces were organised from early on by 
the unions important in the electrical industries during 
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s - AUEU, AUEW-TASS, EPT. 
While the unions have won important victories for their 
memberships over the years, the non~ and anti-union status 
of the rest of the industry has, among other factors,
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limited their effective power. At both firms the unions 
sustained dramatic reductions in their memberships .due to 
heavy layoffs since 1979 and have found their parameters 
of operation and bargaining increasingly narrowed during 
recent years.
See, for example, Duncan's analysis of the crisis at 
ICL (1981).
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CHAPTER 5.
Official SDA figures are not current, and the figures 
for firms included in 'the industry' vary widely. In 
1983, the SDA reported 215 firms, an increase over the 105 
in 1978. In March, 1984, it was reported that the region 
had 270 electronics-related companies (Rosie); one year 
later, the Financial Times claimed there were over 380 
industry firms. This 40% growth, while not impossible, 
seems implausible. What is interesting, though, is that 
all the employment estimates are similar in spite of the 
vairance on number of establishments, suggesting that much 
of the ~infrastructure' discussed below is composed of 
very small firms.
2 This was in spite of the fact that the industry claimed
only 2% of the region's employment in contrast to the 12%
in traditional manufacturing (Employment Gazette, 1985).
3 Motorola, for example, set up manufacturing in Britain 
because without it, it could not sell to 60% of the UK 
market.jf
^ Chapter 3 reviews the survey methodology amd Appendix 1 
and 2 list the primary survey firms and supplemental 
interveiws that provide the data for this and the 
following chapters.
5 These are the machines that align the many layers of 
microscopic circuit patterns on the silicon wafer and, 
using a photograph-like process, transfer them onto the 
silicon surface. Previously an operator had to align them 
manually by looking through a microscope.
6 "[Our setup] used to require loading the wafers into an 
oven, removing them, putting them onto a tract which first 
layed the photoresist then baked it on, removing them from 
the track, putting them under the aligner, removing them, 
putting them into a machine that washed them, then putting 
them into another over. Now many of these process tasks 
are amalgamated into fewer machines, needing only three 
transfers." (Manager interview, 1984)
7 He implied that he was personally involved in its 
development and would install the system as soon as it is 
available.
8 The data here again does not allow precision. 
"Automated" insertion can be done by machines that require 
someone to place the circuit board into the machine and 
turn it around to position the chips or by a machine that 
performs all movements automatically. Also older machines 
were usually only able to insert one chip on one board at 
a time; newer ones have at least two heads, doubling the 
speed of insertion. In addition managers speaking of 
automatic insertion may now be referring to the use of a 
robotic arm that is able to insert odd-shaped components 
in non-standard patterns, thus automating more tasks than 
possible with semi-automatic equipment. Managers would
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not specify the capabilities of their ^automatic' 
inserters; however, many of these plants had just recently 
installed new automatic insertion equipment, suggesting 
at least multi-headed inserters for standardized 
components.
9 The automation was achieved both by vendors improving 
their production technology and by producer firms 
rethinking their production strategies. One market-leading 
producer, intent on a strategy to automate production as 
completely as possible, switched from using chips designed 
and producing in-house to buying chips on the commercial 
market. The chips produced in-house were unual shapes and 
had many more pins (legs) than standardised chips; 
commercially available insertion equipment could not 
handle the non-standard components. Managment had achieved 
100% automatic insertion of components by the time of the 
survey by using commercially-available automatic insertion 
equipment for standard chips and purchasing robots that 
could be programmed to insert the few remaining irregular 
sized components.
10 The pressures to automate are likely to build as new 
technological possibilities are incorporated into 
production. Surface-mounting was the newest technology on 
the horizon at the time of the study. This process places 
chips on epoxy pads on a printed circuit board rather than 
inserting all their little legs through holes into the 
board. That change eliminated the steps of checking and 
straightening all the pins and drilling holes into the 
board (a very expensive part of the process) and the 
expense of enabling equipment to insert all of those pins 
precisely in the right places. Surface-mounting had pride 
of place in trade journals and equipment trade shows and 
managers expected that they would have to adjust their 
assembly operations within the following six months to two 
years. Surface-mounting had additional capital-saving 
advantages. The chips prepared for this procedure are 
smaller, so the board size can be reduced, having the cost 
of the printed circuit boards alone (Levine, n.d.). Levine 
indicated that producers had no choice but to automate 
assembly when using these chips: the parts are too small 
to be handled manually.
11 Solder is liquidised metal that is used to glue 
components onto printed circuit boards.
Examples are varied and must include the actual design 
of the plant as an effort to automate. The production 
space was kept very small; production workstations were 
arranged in a circle and were close together. The last one 
placed only feet from the shipping department and bay. The 
design was to reduce the handling and transportation 
necessary between production steps.
13 Like the rest of this analysis of industry change, the 
decision to invest state-of-the-art technologies in
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Scotland is not based on one reason alone, but a number of 
factors simultaneously. This description has centred on 
the pull of competition in maintaining technological 
sophisticiation. But always in this market the gap 
between cost and price is a driving force instructural 
decisions. The fast mounting expense of test equipment 
worried managers: in 1984 test accounted for 30% of the 
total cost of producing a chip and that was expected to 
rise to 70 or 80% quickly (It may already be 90% of a 
military market device. ) Only two to three years earlier 
test was only 10% of total production cost (GEIN, 1984). 
Managers had decided they were willing to incur this 
expense because the cost of overlooking a fault and the 
cost of tying up partially-processed product - because of 
the slowness of existing test equipment - were considered 
prohibitive. Test equipment adheres to the "rule of 
fives': "If it costs a semiconductor manufacturer $5 to 
catch a faulty chip during burn-in, it will cost him $5O 
to replace it once it has been installed in a system, and 
$500 to replace it in the field, where it has to be 
serviced by a technician" , according to an executive from 
a test equipment vendor (Quote in GEIN, 1985). Management 
had decided that the firm could not risk those costs and, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, end-user firms had 
begun to refuse to accept insufficiently tested product.
The level of purity of the production room in the 
National Semiconductor offers further evidence of the 
"cutting edge' nature of their technology investment. The 
cleanroom for wafer production was to meet Class 10 
specifications, or no more than 10 particles per cubic 
foot of air (Large, 1984). The industry's cleanrooms on 
average had lower standards for impurities, Class 100 or 
higher.
Fast rising value of inventory (eg, sophisitcated 
chips) and the resulting high cost of storing it (ie the 
prevailing high interest rates of 10 to 15% p. a.) 
compelled managers to tighten up production scheduling and 
reduce stocks. This strategy promised substantial 
savings. Hewlett-Packard publicised the results of a 
system it had designed, reduced its work-in-progress 
inventory by 82%, improved its plant productivity by 50%, 
reduced floor space used (by 70%) and lowered its defect 
rate by 30% (Comput ing, 1985). Significantly, this was 
achieved in a small batch, low volume operation that 
depends on thousands of parts.
16 Even some of the smaller, domestic computer producers 
were feeling the pressure of industry competition to 
automate both inventory and assembly to speed up 
turnaround. These firms had maintained labour-intensive 
assembly operations because they did not have the volume 
to support expensive capital investment or the long-term 
market security to take on debt. Their strategies had been 
to design and market extremely clever or specialised 
computers: they relied heavily on the creativity of their
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engineering staffs and the price premium their ideas 
created. However, managers in the two domestic producers 
in the survey confessed that market pressure for greater 
production precision and lower unit cost (as well as high 
turnover of engineering staff) threatened this strategy. 
In both cases managers admitted that they would soon have 
to automate much more of inventory control and assembly.
17 The function of the interface computer is to upload and 
download device programs, track lot histories, machine 
process parameters, machine utilisation and performance, 
and line loading and balancing. This computer usage 
optimizes material flow and loading and to improve 
utilisation by analysing the causes of downtime. 
Computerisation reduces unit costs accounted by capital 
usage by providing flexibility rather than rigidities from 
automation (Rose, 1984).
18 IBM for example had a team of Scottish engineers that 
worked jointly with a US team to develop its state-of-the- 
art automated manufacturing system. At the end of the 
development phase, those engineers returned to employment 
at the Greenock site to install and oversee the system.
1 9 Management strategy to automate to reduce production 
costs cannot be entirely divorced from an interest to 
establish greater production control. Setting up twin 
facilities will protect IBM from any threat to halt 
production at either of these plants. This is the Ford 
^world car' strategy. Due to the flexible nature of these 
computerised systems, however, the strategy will work not 
only for standardied product but also small batch, 
customized output.
IBM had established a wide global network to produce 
the components of its products. In the 1970s,
""[A] particular computer installation
in one country today might consist of
some peripheral units made in Greenock
and Sweden linked UP with a central
processing unit made in Havarit , Germany
or France linked up with some other-
equipment made in Italy perhaps. It is
quite a complicated rationale but we
obtain economies of scale from that mode
of operation. ' " (Select Committee on Regional
Development Incentives, 1983)
21 Uhile design and development activities can be 
distinguished conceptually, that is much more difficult in 
practice. Design modifies an existing standard product 
technology to fit particular uses. Development is the 
"translation of technical and scientific knowledge into 
concrete new processes, products amd services through 
detail-oriented technical act ivities ... This is the step, 
usually very costly, of solving the technical problems
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required to apply an invention or to improve a technology" 
(Amsden, 1985B) . While the interviews attempted to clarify 
the multinationals' investment in each of these 
activities, the responses were in many cases not clear. 
This is at least partly due to the fact that customer 
design requests for these complex products easily tend to 
require a significant time investment by staff which 
effectively leads to a new product.
22 In interviews in the US and Scotland, a number of 
industry experts indicated that they considered this firm 
a strange firm. This unique global strategy was likely the 
result of the firm's faltering competitive and financial 
position. The aim of management strategy seemed to be to 
minimise the number of global corporate investments and 
the spread of their risks.
23 There is one other exception: National Semi-conductor, 
also a chip producer, had in the past produced digital 
watches in Scotland. However, management found that the 
economics of rejigging production yearly to suit the 
highly changeable desires of the consumer market 
incompatible with volume capital goods production. While 
the corporation has developed other sustained efforts at 
vertical integration, eg NAS, a subsidiary which produces 
point-of -sale datacheck machines, these efforts have not 
involved the plant in Scotland. NAS simply distributes in 
England machines made in the US.
This discussion is further hampered by the imprecise 
and inconsistent answers from the survey interviews when 
managers' were asked about their products and the time 
delay between production in the US and production in 
Scotland.
25 Determining the specific extent of customisation, that 
is, distinguishing product modification from prototyping 
to a customer's specification, was beyond the scope of the 
survey. The distinction is not, however, trivial. 
Particularly in the semi-conductor industry, the various 
methods of customising a product are associated with 
different design and production technologies.
26 Here again the implications of a custom-oriented output 
have implications for the organisation of the technology 
and work, but different ones from those in the chip 
industry. Customisation of computers depends primarily on 
trained computer engineers and programmers to develop the 
software to make fairly standardised hardware work for a 
particular application. The customisation is in designing 
and testing the operating system and application software, 
rather than in the production of the hardware.
27 Improving the chances that each channel on each chip 
will perform perfectly as designed after the wafer has 
undergone so many processing steps requires more careful 
design and., tighter controls in all the processing stages.
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Steps taken in engineering and supervising production can 
improve production yield. Seeking better yield currently 
drives management strategies; they target different points 
in the entire process to improve yield depending on the 
product, the plant, and the time period. For example, 
tightening the precision of processing in the fabrication 
stage will have greater importance during the early part 
of life of the product because these costs are then the 
largest proportion of total product costs. The cost 
priority shifts as the yield of the wafer improves and 
backend costs grow as a proportion of total costs 
(Mildred, Nadler, and Bengston, 1978). However, minimising 
the defect rate at the wafer stage of production remains 
critical as an important way to lower unit cost. A small 
drop in the yield of producing a current generation chip 
(1984) from, say 70% to 60%, causes a significantly 
larger increase in cost - +17% (Unpublished corporate 
location study by one of the firms in the survey). Yield 
can be improved by reducing the size of the circuit: 
making it smaller both improves its performance (the 
current can move around faster) and reduces the chance of 
defects (Noyce, 1977) . However, miniaturisation makes the 
tasks of forming and building the circuit much more 
difficult, working to much smaller dimensions, needing 
more precise, automated production equipment to reduce the 
number of defects.
The trend of rapid replacement of testing equipment 
might have been a relatively recent one for firms in 
Scotland. It was suggested that these same firms had not 
always maintained up-to-date equipment. The current 
priority to improve testing turnaround might have been 
necessary just to try ot catch up with the rest of the 
world industry. Managers comments suggested, however, that 
the market would no longer let a fall behind in test 
capability. Significantly, testing is being modernised in 
Scotland, rather than relying on existing capability 
elsewhere in the corporation.
29 Some of the subsidiaries designed their own equipment. 
Furthermore, these two firms had actually reformulated the 
testing process. They built self-testing capability into 
their products- At a fairly advanced stage of completion, 
the computer product itself would run testing software to 
check for any faults. Using the state-of-the-art computing 
capability in the product reduced the need for investing 
in fixed production capital.
Both the managing director and the personnel officer of 
one of these firms bluntly stated that the plant's 
products were "slightly obsolete.' One firm was in fact 
subcontracting a product design to get back into the 
banking market.
Events in the two years following the study confirmed 
the instability of the corporations' competitive position. 
In one case the parent corporation took over another 
computer multinational in 1986: major reorganisation of
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their international operations followed. The other parent 
corporation diversified out of mini-computer production in 
1986: that decision would have to have been followed by 
disinvestment and/or restructuring of the production 
facility in Scotland. An interview with the economics 
editor of El_ec..tr_on!cs_^^ (1985) provided further 
confirmation that the other firm was having problems in 
world competition with its computer products.
31 The policy of subcontracting out work that was labour- 
intensive was not limited to sluggish companies. IBM had a 
policy of maintaining a 100% buffer of direct employment; 
that is, .supporting as much employment outside the company 
as existed inside the company by encouraging local firms 
to produce components for the IBM plant. These firms, 
which included sheltered workshops, assembled cable 
harness, cabinets, etc. using predominantly manual 
methods. While management explains this is to demonstrate 
the company commitment to supporting the local economy, 
the company's dependence on external suppliers is more 
likely due to the fact that most of this work would be 
awkward and expensive to automate. At the same time, the 
company could weather market UPS and downs by shifting the 
impact to the buffer economy while maintaining its no- 
layoff policy for company employees.
32 According to Perez (1985), a new Kondratiev wave was 
also a major stimulus.
33 It was surprising to find how tenacious the ideology of 
workers as the source of management problems still is 
among managers. For example, the same engineer completed 
his explanation by saying that the new system markedly 
improved worker productivity. In this case, the worker 
does much less than before, merely watching the 
processing, not doing the same or more faster. However, 
management still conceptualises and chronicles the value 
of technological change by - in this case - noting the 
improved number of wafers per day per operator. The 
entire improvement, however, is within and due to the 
capability of the new capital.
34 Haug, Hood and Young (1983) offered a similar analysis 
for their findings when looking at the wider electronics 
sector in Scotland.
35 The research was not designed to rank the importance of 
these features or assign causation between any one factor 
and the shape of corporate investment.
36 The vast majority of the supply firms were small 
companies. While these firms were important to the shape 
and speed of the industry's development in Scotland, more 
than four-fifths of the industry labour force were 
employed in the region's multinationals in 1984 ( Lambert, 
1984).
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37 "The success of [high tech industry] is often 
more dependent on the availability and quality of 
components, subcontract assembly, and supporting services 
than on the central high-tech product. So, the competitive 
production of personal computers is as much determined by 
the ease of obtaining low-tech plastic components, metal 
frames, printed circuit boards, cables, keyboards and 
leadframes as by the central microprocessor chip. " (Firn 
and Roberts, 1984).
 a O
0 In the hope of creating employment, the Government 
encouraged private sector investment not only with funding 
but by omitting any controls or quid pro quos. " We must 
be careful not to impose on high technology industries the 
same kind of detailed controls which are imposed upon 
traditional industries, " said Mr. Patrick Jenkin 
Environment Secretary last September. "Understanding and 
flexibility are crucial." (Lawson, 1983).
39 The grants were £48,000 in 1979 and £64.6,000 in 1983 
respectively.
Five Government programmes in addition to regional 
development grants and regional selective aid offered 
financial support for technological changes appropriate to 
the high tech industry. The Microelectronics Industry 
Support Programme (MISP) gave grants up to 25% of capital 
costs for research, development, and launch of new product 
and process technologies. The Microprocessor Applications 
Project (MAP) helped firms assess, specify and invest in 
new microelectronics technologies. Grants covered up to 
50% of the costs of developing and equipping outside 
courses to train engineers in the use of micro- 
electronics, and UP to 25% for in-house training. Also 
feasibility studies could qualify for grants. Moreover, 
the Government would pay UP to one-third of the capital 
costs of modernising through another programme, the 
Government subsidised up to one-third of the development 
and capital costs for computer-integrated and robotics 
systems. To encourage the diffusion of computers into all 
parts of production, grants were available for feasibility 
studies, development efforts and actual investment in 
CADCAM and CADMAT (computer-aided design, manufacture and 
testing) systems. These subsidies were complemented by 
economy-wide tax incentives for business. Capital 
allowances enabled firms to write-off immediately 10O% of 
capital expenditure on plant and equipment and 79% of the 
costs of new industrial buildings against corporation tax 
(NEDC, 1980). However, the dramatically reduced allowance 
announced in the 1984 Budget may have moderated post-1985 
capital investments in the high tech industry (Karlin, 
1985) .
* * The local industry had in the past had to deal with 
equipment vendors long-distance (Most vendors are in the 
US and Japan.) both in purchasing and servicing equipment. 
That meant ordering equipment to specifications for the
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facility in Scotland had had to be done long distance. 
Also machine breakdown presented a firm operating around 
the clock with troublesome and costly downtime. The new 
company both leases office and demonstration space and 
warehouses spare parts so that vendors can service the 
semi-conductor industry around the clock.
A National Economic Development Office expert on the 
semiconductor industry claimed that the 100% tax allowance 
on capital equipment had also been an incentive to capital 
spending for the industry in Britain. However, the 1984 
Budget introduced the reduction and eventual repeal of 
this incentive.
A point that most development corporation officials and 
many managers mentioned was the quality of life - the 
reasonable cost of living, the lovely countryside, etc.
A newspaper advertisement listed the coincident 
critical factors:
"Now Nippon Chip in Their $100 Million ....Several 
billion dollars has already been invested in the 
electronics industry in LLothian. .. Nippon Electric are the 
latest, with almost $100 million to be spent on their new 
plant at Livingston. Not surprisingly, Nippon are not just 
here for the scenery. For their sort of money, you'd 
expect something pretty special .... Like a workforce that 
has literally grown up with electronics. ... Like easy 
access to the whole of the European market, and beyond by 
air, sea, road and rail... Like two universities and five 
technical colleges providing a constant source of top 
class employee material. And the world famous Wolf son 
Micorelectronics Institute, with a 60-strong research and 
design staff and a highly advanced silicon chip production 
facility - all available to industry .... Like the full 
cooperation of Lothian Regional Council - so much so that 
it sponsored, back in 1979, the UK's first Chair of 
Miroelectronics at Edinburgh University .... Plus the sort 
of working environment that key personnel are happy to 
settle in. ... Mitsubishi , too, are here with their first 
manufacturing operation in Europe and so are Ferranti, 
Hewlett-Packard, Racal, ICL, Burroughs and MFE. If you 
come to Lothian, you'll be in very good company!"
By contrast industry management claimed to be concenred 
about further investment in Ireland. The exceptional 
financial incentives were not paired with these crucial 
factors: the supply of appropriately trained technical 
labour was considered inadequate and the region lacked 
appropriate design, services and sub-supply support 
(Keenan, 1983).
jne survey findings did show, however, that firms had 
found and pursued some opportunities for standardisation 
and scale economies.
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The caveat is included because there is increasing 
concern within industry that flexible equipment is not as 
flexible as anticipated (Salzmari and Mirvis, 1985). The 
set-up can be long and unpredictable because of software 
problems; the range of product changes the equipment can 
handle reliably has too often been very limited. The 
technologies, particularly in the extremely precise 
manufacture of integrated circuits, have not yet been 
perfected to support the manufacturing flexibility that is 
touted.
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CHAPTER....6.._..
 i
The primary/secondary or core/periphery division depends 
to some extent on the particular industry in question. 
While it was quite clear historically in electronics 
firms, assembly workers in some auto plants have been 
considered primary workers and machinists in garment 
factories secondary.
2 The share of technical labour - engineers and 
technicians - who were the main primary workers in the 
industry, had similarly increased in the region's wider 
electronics industry, a trend analysts expected to 
continue. Technicians and engineers* were 12% of 
electronics employment in 1979 (does not include software 
engineers and technically trained management); that share 
was forecast to increase to 17% by 1985 (Calculated from 
MSC for Scotland data presented in Hampson and MacLeod, 
1983). Fife Regional Council similarly predicted that new 
electronics employment would shift to technicians and away 
from semi-skilled labour (mimeo from office of WG Taylor, 
Director of Planning; 1984.), though more labour-intensive, 
less technologically sophisticated firms dominated that 
region's electronics industry.
The changing occupational profile was not simply the 
result of industry growth, but resulted in part from 
significant contraction in jobs for semi-skilled labour 
during the period. Primary jobs accounted for an 
increasing proportion of the employment growth in survey 
firms (almost 3000 new jobs). Employment in primary jobs 
increased 91% on average between 1979 and 1984 amongst the 
survey firms. As available data does not reliably reflect 
company employment in financial, marketing arid other 
professional jobs, this undoubtedly estimates this 
growth., at least were primary jobs. These same firms 
eliminated nearly 1300 jobs, and almost three-quarters of 
this contraction was accounted for by operator and 
assembly jobs. Firms also eliminated clerical jobs 
whenever possible, but available company data does not 
allow measurement of this job loss. Engineering and 
technician job loss accounted for only 10% of the 
contraction.
* The distinction between engineer and technician refers 
both to educational background and employer expectations. 
An engineer would usually have a bachelors of science 
degree and a wide theoretical background. In addition s/he 
could be expected to perform assigned projects with a 
degree of independence, outlining his/her own tasks and 
perhaps those of technicians and other asssistants. A 
technicians would be expected to understand and follow the 
correct procedures for assigned tasks, narrower in scope 
than an engineer, and usually within a close functional 
relationship with engineers and supervisors.
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0 The greater dependency and investment activity of the 
high tech industry on sophisticated capital equipment in 
comparison to the wider electronics industry may explain 
the SEPD's underestimation of technician employment. 
However, this difference might just as readily have led to 
greater than anticipated growth in engineers' jobs, but 
this did not prove to be the case.
6 One semi-conductor firm, expanding very fast, evidently 
had (at least in the short-term) compensated for a 
shortage of experienced engineers with the work 
assignments for engineer recruits and students working 
during university holidays. Students, for example, had 
negotiated order for new equipment for the plant. While 
this was not necessarily good practice, discussions with 
industry experts indicated that, especially during upturns 
and expansions, such opportunities for job enhancement 
were common.
7 The Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB) had found 
this job category most frequently in high tech electronics 
firms. The Board estimated that approximately 16% of all 
technicians throughout the UK electronics industry were 
these technical support personnel without qualifications 
(1983; EITB, 1984).
Q This practice also served as an incentive to qualified 
technicians to be prepared to assume additional 
responsibilities as the company developed. Expecting and 
striving for job enhancement opportunities was thought to 
be important to job satisfaction, thus further benefitting 
management by reducing turnover.
9 While few survey managers considered it a problem, some 
regions had to some extent experienced a shortage of 
electronics technicians. Interviews at colleges of 
technology and employment centres, however, indicated that 
these were predominantly problems of timing and labour 
quality (including the specifics of work experience) 
rather than a quantifiable labour shortage. That is, 
employers may have perceived a shortage because they had 
had difficulty recruiting top graduates of top programmes 
as soon as a technician vacancy was identified. There also 
were some geographical barriers limiting the success of 
firms in particular areas in recruiting qualified 
technicians, even in the context of region-wide surplus.
The survey data is inadequate to report precisely how 
many firms had altered their work structures in this way. 
This innovation was an unanticipated discovery during the 
field survey. As a result, all managers were not 
consistently questionned on this issue.
11 Managers explained that in some processes the 
technician's close oversight of equipment allowed him/her 
to watch production too, eliminating the need for an 
operator.
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Employers sometimes transferred workers from other 
areas to work on new technologies. According to the women 
workers interviewed, the pattern was to bring in someone 
new rather than upgrade production workers, if the 
organisation of work around the new technologies diverged 
from the specific process the operative had previously 
handled. The only cases of upgrading reported were those 
where there was union representation with women shop 
stewards who promoted their workers for retraining as 
testers and technicians.
13 Training for the new job lasted six to 12 months on- 
the-job, but the company could hire unskilled people for 
it because they could perform satisfactorily on the new 
machines within two weeks. Older equipment had required 
only two to 12 weeks' training.
14 This was not possible in the industry's few union shops 
where job rules and demarcations had been to some extent 
maintained.
15 Hiring more intelligent workers and "quality* skills 
had become a priority for the entire industry (National 
Electronics Council, 1984; MSC for Scotland, 1980; Grubb, 
1984) .
Here as elsewhere there was diversity amongst the 
firms. One large semi-conductor firm, while setting no 
academic requirements, preferred wives of skilled or white 
collar professional husbands, using their upper working 
class status as a proxy for intelligence, carefulness and 
motivation (Communication from J. Foord, 1983).
17 The recruitment policy was explicit: a personnel 
officer for one firm said that the company only hired 
engineers with first class honours degrees.
18 The contention of a computer firm personnel manager was 
repeated by many others: "Quality [in this regard] is 
more important than numbers. If we can't find someone 
[with a sufficient high level of academic achievement] who 
is a good long-term bet, we won't appoint". The extent to 
which this truly reflected recruitment practice is 
difficult to determine. However, public officials claimed 
that the shortage of technical personnel alleged by the 
industry was a shortfall of sufficiently high quality 
graduates, not of people with the necessary qualification. 
This is supported by the fact that managers had found it 
necessary to extend their milk round visits to 
universities and colleges in northern England and to 
advertise throughout England for engineers.
19 The personnel manager of a fast-growing computer start- 
up firm emphasised that "The range of skills [needed] has 
developed away from technical skills to social 
skills... You have to have the social skills to convince
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people that you're doing the right things. A OA [quality 
assurance] person who can talk directly with a customer 
[for example]. In our industry the social skills outweigh 
the technical ones." Morgan and Sayer (1984) and Maclnnes 
(1984) also found that behavioral qualities had gained 
overriding importance in industry recruitment.
2O There were a few reports of operators in survey firms
having mixed the wrong chemicals together, creating 
explosives. A few of the gases used in semi-conductor 
production were naturally volatile, potentially explosive 
with careless handling. Employers' answer to preventing 
these potential disasters was to try to screen out workers 
with sloppy habits and with difficulties handling stress.
Many had money reward schemes for employees who brought 
in new workers.
The personnel director at one of the region's largest 
employers commented that they had many mothers and 
daughters and aunts and nieces etc. on their staff. The 
family connection had become so important in recruiting 
that one long-term worker at another firm remarked that, 
"It used to be that the work you had done and what you 
could do was what got you the job. Now it's who you know. 
There's not a [new employee] that walks in that door who's 
not related to someone in here." Maguire (1984) also 
found reliance on family networks important in the Irish 
electronics industry.
Minimising turnover was clearly a management priority: 
in interviews this discussion was invariably concluded by 
a comment that the consequence of this strategy was 
foregoing the best quality candidates.
For jobs that required no formal technical 
qualification, personal and work background were obviously 
very important.
"[The company recruiters] try to be as
thorough as possible to get the person
who will have little sickness or none at
all, who will accept the terms and
conditions of employment, who c&n work
under pressure and will virtually do
anything that is asked of them, "
explained the manager of a JobCentre that screened 
applicants for a large multinational employer. There was 
evidence that interviewers probe for trade union 
sympathies or experience. As a managing director 
explained, personal questions of this kind are legal in 
the UK, while outlawed in the US. Further, firms usually 
required medical exams for new employees; these exams in a 
number of cases included urine tests to insure the woman 
was not pregnant.
25 This practice was not only a trial for applicants; by 
reminding employees how many people wanted a full-time
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permanent job, the temps effectively kept absenteeism low 
and productivity high among the regular work force.
26 One firm said their new facility had achieved the 
productivity of a nine year old sister plant in Eire after 
only two years. Another had achieved twice the 
productivity of other facilities in the UK, and two others 
performed .significantly better than comparable facilities 
in the US.
27 In spite of efforts to minimise it, poaching from 
competitors and regional research institutions was the way 
employers hired experienced technical labour. Raiding 
other firms as a strategy, however, depends on a vibrant 
industry. That the high tech industry and research centres 
had developed sufficiently in the region to create a high 
quality market of experienced personnel was in itself 
considered a sign of success and a stimulus for further 
development of the industry. Managers were worried about 
escalating salaries for experienced professionals 
(especially as a result of the sharp expansion of capacity 
in 1983/4) and "paying more than they are worth," as a 
personnel manager complained. However, raiding was a 
superior tactic to importing professionals from other 
parts of the corporation on extremely expensive temporary 
contracts, a frequent practice in the industry.
28 Some firms did not exclusively hire youth: personnel 
managers at least two firms claimed they hired youth to 
fill approximately half of the vacanices in production 
work, and ^married women' filled the rest of the jobs. In 
one case the practice was explicitly to maintain better 
work behavior and discipline: the older women would keep 
the silly behavior of school-leavers under control and 
were themselves easier for supervisors to manage.
29 A study of labour requirements for the industry in 
England, Scotland and Wales similarly found that the 
opportunities for mature graduates with technological 
qualifications were limited, reported in at the end of 
1984 (Gordon and Pearson, 1984). The report also claimed 
that the industry's employers tended to avoid hiring 
graduates whose first degrees were not in electronics and 
related technologies.
^° This policy was certainly not without controversy. In 
the unionised plants, long-term women workers complained 
that young workers had been willing to bargain away hard- 
won privileges, such as tea breaks, for a few extra 
pounds. They also had accepted redundancy quickly without 
struggle because they (understandably) thought they would 
have no trouble finding new jobs.
At the level of collective consciousness, these were 
still considered women's jobs. In the words of a JobCentre 
manager who recruited for the high tech industry,
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the "ideal person would be a married 
woman betweeen the ages of 30 and 37 
with a couple of children. . . [T]here 
is a very strong argument that this 
type of employment is more suited to 
women.
Women workers said that when young men were recruited into 
these Jobs with them they were not expected to stay long, 
because they just were not appropriate jobs for men.
32 It would be particularly useful to examine the gender
breakdown of production jobs in all the newly automated 
facilities. Firms, other than those mentioned in the text, 
did not provide appropriate data.
In those cases where management had maintained the job 
of supervisor, it was no longer necessarily linked to the 
work area or the workers being supervised. In many of the 
firms, these vacancies were advertised throughout the 
plant; open competition usually brought someone from 
another section of the company. There were reports of 
managers assigning selected workers from other areas to 
these jobs without posting or allowing the affected 
workers to compete. Further, one firm had made the 
supervisor job a paraprof essional one by recruiting from 
the external labour market to fill vacancies. Once hired, 
supervisors were then sent to a US plant to learn the 
manufacturing process s/he would oversee.
In fact, in one case reassignment to a lower-paid job 
resulted in reduced pay. A worker had to accept the pay 
for the job to which one was temporarily transferred, 
though management promised that these transfers-down would 
not exceed 2O% of a worker's work time.
In one firm production workers were taught to do every 
step of microcomputer assembly and were transferred to a 
different station daily if not hourly.
Employers claimed that operator training lasted 8 to 12 
weeks, especially in some of the complex steps of chip 
processing. In fact this period was management's 
estimation of how long it took for an operator to achieve 
speed and minimum productivity and quality targets (and 
thus a period of probation). Actually learning the tasks 
usually took less than two weeks.
It must be noted that this was an import of the 
^culture' of high tech from Silicon Valley; the tradition 
in capital-intensive manufacturing in Britain had been fo 
engineers and technicians to be unionised and pay; job 
descriptions and advancement were matters for collective 
bargaining.
Shortness was the key factor in whether management 
would send staff on available courses. The director of a
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highly-esteemed microelectronics technology centre claimed 
that they no longer planned courses to last more than four 
days because corporate managers had told him, "~If I can 
do without an employee for two weeks, I can get along 
without him forever. * "
These job enhancements may have gained value for 
technical staff in relation to the more traditional job 
benefits and perks. The Government made employer-paid 
health car, life assurance policies and other paid 
benefits taxable in the early 1980s.
It 'is not possible to determine from interview data 
(with the personnel manager as the source) exactly how 
different these jobs were from those for operators in 
other firms. Many firms trained their operators in a 
variety of tasks but these most often remained relatively 
unskilled. Management in this firm seemed to truly value 
good experienced operators, implying their jobs were more 
complex than the industry average. The personnel manager 
explained that they had brought experienced operators from 
a home base plant to Scotland and had sent senior Scottish 
operators overseas for training because experienced 
operators - not engineers - were the only ones with 
sufficient expertise necessary to train.
*  *  Management allowed lesser skilled workers to work 
toward a formal technician qualification, but acknowledged 
that the pace would be slow - up to six years. Management 
did not encourage it.
The personnel manager emphasised that the company's 
state-of-the-art technology was a critical part of the 
strategy. The firm can build a lot of collective 
expertise, that is, past experience, into the equipment 
through computerisation. That reduces the number of 
engineers needed.
The corporation's investment strategy was a. critical 
factor in their organisation of work. The corporation had 
a long-term policy of pursuing the most advanced 
possibilities for production automation: the plant in 
Scotland was the most advanced in a line of progressively 
advanced assembly and test facilities.
The automation and computerisation itself frees up 
personnel. The automation replaces the manual activity of 
the operator so that s/he can perform tasks other than 
simply minding the machines. In addition, the installed 
microprocessor incorporates years of engineering 
information and experience, allowing a lesser skilled but 
appropriately trained person to be the first line of 
technical response.
Further, the corporation had set up a sequence of 
semi-conductor plants around the world, each with a lag of 
one to three years. This allowed each facility to be more 
modern than the last and to avoid the problems encountered 
earlier. Four plants were making integrated circuits at
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the time the corporation began investing in a fabrication 
plant in Scotland.
Because of the company's long experience and gradual 
progression through new technologies, the necessary 
technical responses were more predictable and controllable 
than for those firms leaping uninitiated into new 
production methods. In addition a group of eight extremely 
experienced engineers were assigned to the new plant in 
Scotland for five years: their collective knowledge and 
experience further reduced the expensive technological 
trailblazing that can be associated with introducing new 
technologies.
Where many other firms had used the new technologies 
to assign operators to mind many more machines or to 
perform fewer tasks faster, management in this firm 
preferred to use the technological advantages of the 
equipment and a resident cadre of experienced engineers by 
upgrading the role of operators and minimising the 
staffing needs for more highly skilled workers. The new 
technology installation of Fujitsu provides quantitative 
evidence of the staffing benefits of this strategy: 
computerisation of an advanced manufacturing plant in 
Japan enabled the company to transfer 33% of the previous 
plant's jobs from engineers to less qualified workers 
(Duncan, 1981) .
Also most firms had "single status' benefit policies to 
remove the traditional divisions both between management 
and the rest of the work force and between white collar 
and blue collar workers. To promote a company spirit and a 
friendly atmosphere most employers also sponsored company- 
wide social events, baseball teams, competitions, etc.
While not widely discussed, others beside Hirschhorn 
such as Hood and Young (1980) recognised the value of 
employment stability locally and internationally when 
adopting new highly integrated technologies.
Again, the management-labour relation will crucially 
shape the labour process, but the almost virtual absence 
of organised labour in any effective form in this industry 
means this reduces to the competitive conditions of the 
external labour market. This is the focus of the next 
section.
The focus on zero defects, for example, accounted for a 
reduction in inspector's jobs and the hiring of quality 
assurance engineers who inspected and redesigned 
procedures from design throughout production. These people 
were intended to prevent the quality problems from 
happening, as well as actually overseeing workers.
48 The three largest employers in the survey together 
employed 653 engineers and 533 technicians (1984 survey 
data) .
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The annual reports on wage negotiations of the Scottish 
Honeywell group, documented in Income Data Services (IDS) 
because the firm is unionised, supported the impression 
that flexibility was more important to management than 
pay. A succession of reports in the early 1980s recorded 
agreements that awarded significant flat wage rises plus 
supplemental to production workers to eliminate grades 
and restrictive work rules (IDS, various issues, 1980 
through 1984). This has certainly proven to be the case in 
recent years in many other industries, as well.
50 A JobCentre manager confirmed that "[the employers] 
don't mind spending their time, energy and effort to get 
the right person." The guarantee of no redundancies would 
demand that managers have this range of selection to 
minimise hiring mistakes.
51 A corporate study comparing the economics of locating 
semi-conductor production in a number of European 
locations ruled out locations with lower operating costs 
because of the training and discipline problems 
anticipated from a poorly educated population 
(confidential corporate document, 1983).
52 The calculation here and in the following text of the 
supply and demand for electronics technicians is 
particularly problematic. Specifically, this figure 
overstates the supply of technicians to the electronics 
industry because it includes those specialising in radio 
and television repair and maintenance. The problems in 
interpreting available data are more general, however: 
there are both the range and sources of qualifications to 
be considered and difficulties in comparing across years 
because of the fundamental changes in the structure of 
technician education. The Scottish Education Council 
(SCOTEC) revamped the curricula and the administration of 
technician education and changed the name and meanings of 
the various qualifications. These alterations took effect 
gradually during the early 1980s, making statistics- 
keeping difficult and comparing yearly data highly 
approximate.
53 This was approximately 2O% higher than an earlier- 
forecast (1980), indicating the labour market's 
responsiveness to the growth of and expectations for the 
electronics industry.
54 jne engineers were also increasingly suited for 
entering work in the industry. The region's technology 
universities had expanded their teaching in technology- 
relevant specialisms. This meant that in recent years the 
universities had produced graduates with more specialised 
degrees tailored to the needs of the high tech employers. 
the early 1980s firms could hire graduates with a 
specialism in microprocessors or analog or digital devices 
rather than simply electronics: this sharply reduced the 
in-company training necessary for new recruits. A Silicon
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Valley semi-conductor executive explained that his firm 
hiring mechanical or chemical engineering graduates from 
universities had to then train them for at least two years 
in-house for the engineering work in the industry. 
Similarly one of the employers in Scotland had in the past 
trained for two years or so electronics graduates from 
regional universities in analog engineering and design, a 
part of electronics that higher education had ignored. By 
1984 the technology and science universities, supplemented 
by special state funded programmes for skills conversion, 
were producing engineering graduates with industry 
specialisms - analog electronics and semi-conductor 
processing engineering.
Central Government had also directly supported the 
industry through lavish funding of the leading technology 
universities - Heriot-Ulatt and the University of 
Edinburgh in particular - to set up state-of-the-art 
micro-electronics and computer research labs. For example, 
the Electrical Engineering Department at the University of 
Edinburgh had a working semi-conductor fabrication 
facility.
Similarly science, particularly chemistry, graduates 
had practically filled another course designed 
specifically to convert engineering technicians for the 
electronics industry. This was a certificate course, 
traditionally for working class youth. However, its full- 
time format made it a shortcut for graduates to get an 
industry qualification.
All the survey firms aimed their engineering salaries 
to fall in the top quartile or decile of regional industry 
employers. At least one had a well-known if not advertised 
policy of paying top salaries for electronics and 
production engineers.
Perceived engineer shortages at the Scotland, national 
and international level did not preclude engineer 
surpluses in a few very local labour markets. Engineers 
were willing to accept these jobs because of the 
attraction in landing a job in these firms, especially 
given the region's high unemployment.
The modules were designed as forty hours of classroom 
instruction, much shorter than a class lasting the full 
academic year.
The manager of a regional JobCentre that aided a major 
high tech employer in its recruitment corroborated the 
finding that qualifications and expectations for 
production level jobs in the industry had been bid up. 
"Probably because of unemployment, employers obviously can 
afford to pick and choose. .. They are putting the standard 
a bit higher. People who traditionally were always 
employed in manufacturing. .. are now finding themselves 
unsuitable for manufacturing. "
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60 In fact management in one company, not in the study, 
had prohibited the local technical college from giving 
even a certiciate of completion to the workers who took an 
introductory basic electronics course. Managers were 
concerned to block any illusion that these workers had 
gained a transferable skill that even an unaccredtied, 
unrecognised piece of paper might offer.
61 Open Tech, modelled on Britain's Open University, was 
to provide individualised study programmes outside of 
working hours. Courses would include visits to workplaces 
by lecturers, videos for groups of employees, etc. to 
support independent study.
As a culture, Scots people have a reputation of being 
hardworking; many of the managers in the survey claimed 
they had found this to be true. A promotional document 
produced by the SDA around 1983 to counteract the region's 
other reputation of union militancy and associated labour 
problems is full of management testimonials to the 
hardworking and stable Scottish work force. For example, 
"The professional man [here] is more 
committed to his work than his 
American equivalent. Here they work 
longer hours. " From National Semiconductor 
(UK) Limited.
"Productivity increases have resulted 
mainly from a very stable set of work 
crews. " From an engineering firm. 
(SDA, no date)
Workers, thus the industry, depended on workers* 
relatives, particularly grandmothers, as child care 
providers. Frequently working couples arranged to work on 
different shifts to cover domestic responsibilities, with 
the women taking night shift. This may have become more 
difficult as much of the industry had eliminated twilight 
and back shifts (6 to 10 pm) and moved to three eight-hour 
or two twelve-hour shifts to cover continuous production 
schedules.
Statistics on the gender of enrollments and graduates 
of university courses in the region were not available. 
However, at Dundee University only one woman per year 
entered the electrical engineering faculty during the late 
1970s and early 1980s (National Electronics Review, 1982).
There is a rich and thoughtful literature on the 
subject; sources include Whyte and Smail (1982), 
Blackstone and Weinrich-Hast (1980), EOC (1982 and 1983) 
and Bennett and Carter (1983).
66 While the lack of a driver's license may seem a minor 
stumbling block, training for and passing the driver's 
test was a long time-consuming and expensive process. Just 
getting a license was not an easy solution for how to get
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to classes next term. Women commonly depended on their 
husbands to drive them to work and appointments.
67 Applicants for production jobs were in some cases asked 
during the first interview if they would be available and 
willing to work overtime.
68 The differences in calculations of pay differentials is 
likely to be due to the location of the former survey. It 
is a well-developed but geographically isolated section of 
Scotland's high tech industry and a much poorer region 
than the areas surrounding Glasgow and Edinburgh.
The industry s employers promoted extreme secrecy in 
all pay-related matters. Supervisors persuaded workers not 
to divulge their actual pay to others, ostensibly to avoid 
unnecessary jealousy and problems, yet more important in 
maintaining the entirely individual and isolated framework 
for all pay decisions. In non-union workplaces, workers 
told me they had no idea how much their friends earned. It 
seems very likely that women workers did not know what 
technicians earned or that pay opportunities for 
technicians were improving.
Investing in retraining a woman worker for a more 
technical job also might not have been considered the most 
effective short-term way to raise household income. 
Because of management control over job levels, titles and 
pay, the pay increase for a retrained production worker as 
a tester or a lower level technician may not have been 
significant. If there had to be a choice as to who within 
a household should be subsidised for further education or 
training, the returns to training others would likely have 
been higher and reaped sooner. The potential income of a 
young person with a formal and more academic qualification 
was higher. An adult with a technical background and 
experience would have been able to add more than a 
retrained production worker to household income by taking 
a shorter updating or upgrading course through Open Tech.
71 Actual quantification proved impossible: of those firms 
reporting, one firm gave retraining data at the 
occupational level which could in principle account for a 
number of years while the others provided data for 1983- 
1984.
72 Because these courses had higher entry qualifications, 
the retraining period would probably have been longer. 
Women would undoubtedly have had to pass bridging courses 
in maths and technology to be able to handle the 
academics.
"Women just don't have the killer spirit that you see 
in guys... I was worried about weepy females [when I 
considered promoting a woman employee]," according to the 
head of an electronics equipment firm (Rapoport, 1983).
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It is also important to realise that most of the 
industry's managers were trained as technical 
professionals, not as managers. Their lack of management 
skills and sophistication was clearly a- problem at the 
regional and industry level. Part of their lack of 
sophistication was in dealing with women. Dealing with 
women as subordinate production workers was much easier 
than learning to manage them in more responsible jobs.
75 The greatly increased number of people completing 
technician qualification before entering the labour market 
during the early 1980s may have mediated the frequency of 
this practice. Small, domestic firms, however, pursued 
this strategy because they often could not compete with 
market-leading multinational employers over salaries, 
benefits or perks for people with high level 
qualifications.
The only cases (with one exception!) where unskilled 
women were trained in-house were as technology aids, ie 
for the routine jobs requiring only cursory on-the-job 
training. Similarly the EITB found that in the UK 
electronics industry, the vast majority (80%) of women 
called technicians had received no formal training and 
only a short period of job-specific preparation. Further, 
the women electronics technicians in the EITB survey had 
on average a higher level of school-leaving qualifications 
and had stayed on at school longer than men of similar 
ages (EITB, 1984).
77 The managing director of another firm was pleased to 
report that two of the three engineers his company was 
sponsoring through a unversity engineering degree course 
were women.
78 For example, the managing director of a highly 
automated printed circuit board plant in the region 
argued, "that as plants like his Irvine operation become 
more automated the number of men employed will rise 
because of the range of physical maintenance work 
required. " That seems to be true inspite of the fact that 
automation has eliminated most of the physical lifting and 
manipulating. Before automation he, and many other 
managers, explained that the exclusion of women from 
better-paying technical jobs was because of the weight and 
size of products - panels "awkward to handle." (Young, no
date) .
In addition, managers in my survey frequently 
referred to manual dexterity and patience as the reason 
women were best suited to operator and assembler jobs, 
even though automation had eliminated the physical 
manipulation of products (see also Wong, 1983; Tenne, 
1982). However, Kaplinsky (1982) found evidence that women 
had been excluded from computer-aided design jobs because 
women lack, just these qualities:
"host management reported that
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typing skills were an advantage, given 
that all CAD systems have an alpha- 
numeric keyboard. . . But as far as 
management is concerned, attitude 
and flexibility are more important 
attributes. .. One system manager 
claimed that "females were less 
flexible and dexterous' despite the 
existence of many female CAD 
operators in the US. "
The response would likely have been very different from 
women production workers who had been made redundant from 
some of these and other firms and found it difficult to 
find new jobs and saw men more likely to be hired in their 
places. In the case of the survey interviews, the 
displacement of women by men was concealed by the firm's 
continuous employment growth or contraction focused on 
old, distinctly different product lines.
on
ou In fact some of the cutbacks had reduced the bread and 
butter revenues that would have subsidised the additional 
work and expenses of designing speculative courses and 
establishing contacts in the industry. Further, the 
staffing at the technical colleges had been in effect 
reduced by hiring freezes and increasing faculty course 
and work loads.
81 Industrial Liaison Units had been set up at all the 
technical colleges and universities to open avenues for 
university staff to communicate with and gain contracts 
from the industry. The technology-rich universities had 
all spawned semi-autonomous teaching companies of faculty 
and research staff to serve the industry on a commercial 
basis.
It must be noted that the Development Corporations of 
the New Towns competed with one another and the region's 
industrial and science parks for inward multinational 
investment by also offering attractive financial and 
industry support packages.
Interviews in the New Towns suggested that local 
authorities gad attempted to shape and control the local 
labour supply to suit these industries. Many had a 
preference for "quality' residents when accepting 
applicants wanting to move out of the cities. Screening 
procedures tried to select highly motivated, serious 
workers, "people wanting to make a better life for 
themselves, " as a New Town JobCentre manager explained. 
Also the authorities seemed to target potential inward 
investment and to plan housebuilding and resident inflow 
to maintain a surplus labour supply for the town's lesser 
skilled jobs. They wanted to limit job-hopping 
possibilities and to inhibit wage escalation resulting 
from too many employers competing for the same finite (in 
the short-term) labour supply.
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No comparable statistics were available at the regional 
level.
85 Public money financed many other industry-specific 
training programmes. The MSC, SDA, Scottish Education 
Department (SED), the Scottish Economic Planning 
Department (SEPD) and the EITB had all funded electronics 
industry training courses as incentives for industry 
investment in more technical employment. For example, the 
SDA and SEPD administered funds to pay for the private 
sector training necessary to the success of the capital 
investment project. The grants covered 80% of the cost of 
workers' and instructors' wages and materials for up to 25 
weeks (SDA publication, no date).
86 This particular course was a full-time programme for 
adults to change fields/occupations to a technican within 
one year. It was designed to mediate a predicted shortage 
of technicians (MSC for Scotland, 1980). Entry required at 
least a non-advanced qualification in a science or 
technology field, which many women who might have been 
interested would not have had. Further, research had shown 
that the industry avoided hiring people whose first degree 
was not appropriate to the industry, even though 
applicants had successfully completed technology 
conversion courses (Gordon and Pearson, 1984) . Women who 
would more likely have humanities or biology first degrees 
would have been greater risks and more than likely would 
have been discouraged from enrolling.
The regional vocational and further education 
authorities did not keep gender-specific statistics on 
enrollment or completion, so finding out exactly the 
extent of gender segregation of these routes to industry 
jobs is very difficult. Hence, the discussion must rely on 
anecdotal evidence from educators.
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This does not mean the labour supply developed in 
perfect response with perfect tinning and geographical 
distribution to match the demand for labour. There was 
evidence that the insufficient numbers of experienced 
designers for advanced products - particularly integrated 
circuits - was a factor hindering further investment in 
design facilities in the region.
2 It was widely held that the actual repair work of a 
computer service technician had been deskilled. The 
technology enable rapid identification of faults over the
Tne technician had only to bring out the right 
circuit board to replace the faulty one on the customer's 
premises. However, a large .proportion of computer problems 
are software problems, particularly those specific to a 
.customer's application, which demand much more of a 
technician.
The interviews revealed evidence of management's concern 
about the inherent contradictions between greater 
flexibility and the need for greater control, as 
Hirschhorn (1984) warned. It did not seem that the 
difficulties had yet been resolved. Managers experimented 
with training their engineers in project scheduling and 
setting structured deadlines to impose discipline on the 
R&D process. Also the computerisation allowed any 
executive in the plant or in the corporation to check the 
performance of any individual and the progress of work at 
any time; even when not used strictly as a control, this 
capability helped in locating problems in turnaround time. 
However, the antithesis of corporate cost control and the 
autonomy to develop an idea was clearly a major unsolved 
dilemma for executives at both the subsidiary and 
corporate levels. The study of this problem was, however, 
beyond the scope of this research.
**  Interestingly, smaller domestic high tech firms had 
followed the pattern outline by Bluestone and Harrison and 
others. Their work forces were concentrated both in highly 
qualified, specialised engineers and semi-skilled 
production workers. That was at least in some cases due to 
their continuing dependence on older production 
technologies. Highly knowledgeable and experienced 
personnel were essential to oversee the operation of less 
versatile and sophisticated equipment. The equipment's 
lesser capabilities in information stonaoo and orocessing 
made the machines less independent. Because total regional 
employment in these firms was small relative to that of 
the survey multinational corporations, they probably did 
not alter the industry occupational distribution
significantly.
Importantly, the growth in the micro-electronics 
industry in the region had created divisions within the 
Scottish production labour force itself. Interviews 
implied that the pay, benefits, job security, as well as
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the definition of production work, in the region'55 
multinationals surpassed that of the smaller firms with 
their more tenuous financial and competitive positions. So 
the industry's production workers were not all equal.
5 Of course, Cockburn's work (1983) powerfully contradicts 
this contention.
It is perfectly possible that in some cases there was 
little actual change in job content associated with the 
change in title for production jobs. Examining this 
possibility was beyond the scope of this research. 
However, to some extent it does not affect the power of 
the argument here how much of the altered structure of 
work was form rather than content. The new job title, 
module technologist, setter or whatever, because it was no 
longer associated with female work, was sufficient to 
attract young men and raise their labour market 
expectations of themselves. This alone made these better 
workers for management. An interview with a male computer 
assembler confirmed that he believed he would be supported 
by his supervisor in any expression of interest in further 
training or job advancement. Similarly, interviews with 
personnel officers and women workers in traditional 
women's jobs corroborated the association of and 
importance of expectations with the assignment of a male 
worker: men hired even into standard female jobs expected 
and were expected to move up, while the same was not true 
of young women. In addition, the obvious reality of easier 
communications and sociality with male technicians and 
engineers would in all likelihood enhance their work 
experience, relative to that of a woman in the same 
position.
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